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 This dissertation is a study of the construction of the ‘illegality’ of migration in the Central 
Mediterranean region from the mid-twentieth century to the present across genres, disciplines and 
media. 
    Reading a heterogenous set of sources ranging from film to poetry and from parliamentary 
debates to legal opinions, this dissertation posits the ‘illegality’ of human mobility as a process 
and not an ontological trait, demonstrating its fluidity and tracking some of its most salient changes 
over time. Moreover, it argues that these notions of ‘illegality,’ which developed and are 
interrogated in legal discourse and aesthetic practices, are significantly altered as they circulate 
across linguistic boundaries even though they continue to be understood as stable and neutral 
labels. They form a grammar of illegalization the contested semantics of which are simultaneously 
national and transnational. 
    This dissertation finally suggests that we understand the illegalization of migration as a 
multilingual object that is written and constructed across multiple discourses and disciplines, and 
asks that we tend to its grammar as a way to denaturalize and, eventually, attempt to rewrite the 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER 1 – HOW ‘HIDDEN’ BECAME ‘ILLEGAL’ AND HOW AN ADJECTIVE 
BECAME A NOUN 22 
CHAPTER 2 – REMAINS OF A TRANSIENT لباب  : BABYLON, CHOUCHA, AND THE 
MAKING OF A COUNTER-ARCHIVE OF MIGRATION 99 
CHAPTER 3 – THE RSD: A LITERARY ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE REFUGEE STATUS 
DETERMINATION INTERVIEW IN CONTEMPORARY ITALY 149 
CHAPTER 4 – THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT: TRANSLATIONS AND 
REPRESENTATIONS OF ILLEGALIZATION ON THE HIGH SEAS 204 
CONCLUSION 256 










What does it mean for someone to be ‘illegal’? How is a person moving across borders 
made ‘illegal,’ and what are the rules, grammar and lexicon of this process? My work explores the 
construction of the concept of the ‘illegality’ of migration in the Central Mediterranean region 
from the mid-twentieth century to the present in legal and political documents, literature, and film. 
Taking a cross-disciplinary approach, I analyze various types of representation in order to show 
how illegalization takes place across languages and discourses.1 Generally regarded as 
interchangeable or site-specific labels, ‘illegal’ and its synonyms – ‘irregular’ and ‘economic’ 
migrants, ‘bogus’ asylum-seekers, clandestins and sans-papiers – are in fact part of a lexicon in 
continuous mutation both at the national and transnational level. My work engages with a growing 
corpus of critical work that approaches the ‘illegality’ of people on the move as discursively and 
historically constructed and that aims to denaturalize ‘illegality’ as an ontological trait of the 
subject crossing and traversed by borders.2 Through the analysis of different practices and genres 
of writing and representation, my work considers the ways in which political and aesthetic 
imaginations participate in making migrant ‘illegality’ at once fictional and real. If being ‘illegal’ 
 
1 Contemporary spaces of migration across the Mediterranean Sea have generally been apprehended following 
migratory routes: The Central Mediterranean route has been one of the flashpoints of the EU ‘refugee crisis’ since the 
fall of the Qaddafi and Ben Ali regimes in Libya and Tunisia, respectively. It extends, however, from as far West as 
West Africa and as far north as Denmark, making the outer borders of Europe – in this case, Italy’s territorial waters 
& coastline – and the borders between Italy and the rest of the EU important nodes of conflictual politics of mobility. 
However, identifying spaces of migration with routes risks, at times, becoming a somewhat ‘mechanical’ operation. 
Thinking migration across the Mediterranean as a movement towards and across a corner of the ‘Global North’ that 
resists autonomous mobility from anywhere in Global South may facilitate (or rightfully complicate) geographical 
and ‘sociological’ mapping. 
  
2 ‘We didn’t cross the border, the border crossed us’ was one of the slogans, since then taken up in a myriad 
different contexts, of the immigrant rights protests that took place in the U.S. in 2006 following an immigration 
reform proposed by then-President Bush. This slogan points simultaneously to the role of borders in disrupting the 
continuity of communities as well as to autonomous trajectories of mobility. For a scholarly analysis of the historical 
and political circumstances surrounding the emergence of the slogan, see Josue David Cisneros, The Border Crossed 




is a constantly re-semanticized legal fiction, it is also a criminal offense entailing concrete 
deprivations of purportedly inalienable rights.  
Along with the devices, technologies, and information systems that constitute the tangible 
infrastructure of illegalization there is also a parallel, sometimes preceding system of words, 
rhetorical figures, and grammatical changes that frames and establishes the parameters of that 
infrastructure. Illegalization is at once the network of camps, hotspots, and torture jails that dot the 
borders of the Global North as it is a multilingual literary object going through continuous 
processes of translation, borrowing, loss and accretion of meaning that subtend our thinking about 
migration. It is a contested discursive space that should be invested and engaged as such. The focus 
of this dissertation is the nature of the relationships between ‘legality’ and the constellation of its 
grammatical and political opposites, and some of the ways in which this relationship changed over 
time and across languages and various forms of representation. Together, these conceptual 
fluctuations and their circulation form a multilingual grammar of the illegalization of migration, 
which the Central Mediterranean as a space of migration shaped and was shaped by in significant 
ways.  
 
Illegality or illegalization?  
 
Movements of people across borders have always created, in the modern nation-state, the 
necessity of being controlled. Indeed, the refinement of techniques of border policing have gone 
hand in hand with documenting and determining the legality of passage. Since the latter half of the 
20th century, however, the emphasis on ‘illegality’ has become increasingly pronounced in the 
context of mass movements of labor aligned with decolonization and the expansion of global 
capitalism. In the European context, early organized articulations of the need to challenge and 




the sans-papiers in France (which will be discussed in chapter 1) and the campaign and activist 
network Kein Mensch ist illegal founded at the tenth edition of the exhibition Documenta in Kassel 
in 1997, and subsequently translated internationally as No One is Illegal.3 In the early 2000s, legal 
scholar Catherine Dauvergne wrote in her seminal work Making People Illegal that “[...] Political 
discourse has reached a point where ‘No One Is Illegal’ makes sense as a rallying cry. This reflects 
a distressing evolution of the English language. In the mid-twentieth century the noun “illegal” 
was used in reference to Jewish migrants in various places. By the late 1960s, it was used in 
quotation marks, or as a repeat reference, once illegal immigrants had already been discussed. Now 
it is used without drawing any special attention at all. In English, “Illegal” has become a noun. [...] 
It used to be impossible to call people themselves “illegal.” But the fight against this elision has 
been lost. The emergence of “No One Is Illegal” as a resistance campaign is at once a capitulation 
and a call to examine the construction of such illegality.”4  
 
Since the 1990s, the call has been taken up by critical migration scholars on a global scale. Parallel 
to and in conjunction with the study of the legal and political construction of illegality, a critical 
resistance has grown on the terrains of vocabulary and lexicon.  
 
3 On the exhibition, curated by Catherine David, see Catherine David and Jean-François Chevrier, Politics, Poetics: 
Documenta X, the Book [editor, Documenta and Museum Fridericianum Veranstaltungs-GmbH ; idea and 
conception, Catherine David and Jean François Chevrier] (Ostfildern-Ruit, Germany: Cantz, 1997).  
 
4 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 10. For the 
original English-language manifesto, see https://noii2017.wordpress.com/portfolio/manifesto-english/ : “ Migrants 
and refugees are not wanted in Europe. Here it is nearly impossible for them to find a legal form of refuge or 
immigration, so crossing state borders will always be an ‘illegal’ offence and often entail risking one’s life. An 
‘illegal’ person is someone who stays even though it isn’t permitted or accepted. The possibilities of immigration or 
residence are systematically reduced. Thus an ever increasing number of people is forced into illegality. [...] For 
these reasons we are calling for the support of migrants on entry and the continuation of their journey. We are 
calling for the provision of work and identity papers for migrants. We are calling for the supply of medical care, 





In a brief text written in 2013 to propose the use of the adjective ‘illegalized’ to replace the 
still widely-used ‘illegal’, sociologist Harald Bauder retraces the rich theoretical and political gap 
in what may otherwise look like a simple tense variation between the two adjectives. Bauder points 
out how it is only the actions of the person – and not the person herself – that can contravene the 
law.5 This argument – the need to separate persons and their actions before the law – prompted 
even mainstream media outlets to tell their contributors that “‘illegal’ should describe only an 
action, such as living in or immigrating to a country illegally.”6 In his brief discussion of the 
lexicon of mainstream discourse on migration Bauder shows, nonetheless, the political importance 
of a grammatical intervention vis-à-vis the status of persons across borders. But Bauder points to 
a more profound issue with the adjective ‘illegal’, that is, that “the charge of illegality is meant to 
undermine the moral character of certain types of migrants.”7  
The moral problematization (and problematic nature of) ‘illegal’ had been captured, a few 
years earlier, by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in the second edition of its 
Glossary on Migration, which rejects the adjective on the grounds that “ [it] carries a criminal 
connotation and is seen as denying migrants’ humanity.”8 Despite arguing for the “general 
 
5 Harald Bauder, RCIS Research Brief No. 2013/1 “Why We Should Use the Term Illegalized Immigrant,” Ryerson 
Center for Immigration and Resettlement, availablee at 
https://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/rcis/documents/RCIS_RB_Bauder_No_2013_1.pdf 
 
6 Paul Colford, “‘Illegal Immigrant’ No More,” The Definite Source (Associated Press blog), April 2, 2013, 
https://blog.ap.org/announcements/illegal-immigrant-no-more. Yet the article’s subtitle still reads: “The AP 
Stylebook today is making some changes in how we describe people living in a country illegally.” This speaks to the 
difficulty to always use ‘illegal’ critically and deconstructively, that is, the difficulty to extricate the concept from its 
normative weight, and its normative weight from its perceived neutrality.  
 
7 Harald Bauder quoting Peter Nyers, “Why we should use ‘Illegalized’” 3.  
 
8 International Organization of Migration, Glossary on Migration, 2nd ed. (Geneva: IOM, 2011), available at 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml25_1.pdf. The 2019 edition revised the phrasing is somewhat more 
explicit terms “The term ‘irregular’ is preferable to ‘illegal’ because the latter carries a criminal connotation, is 
against migrants’ dignity and undermines the respect of the human rights of migrants. Migrants, as any human 
being, can never be illegal; they can be in an irregular situation, but it is inaccurate to refer to a person as ‘illegal’.” 





interchangeability” of the adjectives defining migration that contravenes existing laws, the 
Glossary offered definitions for the main adjectives of migration that underscored their semantic 
specificity. Thus, “clandestine migration” is defined as “secret or concealed migration in breach 
of immigration requirements,” while an “undocumented migrant” is “a non-national who enters or 
stays in a country without the appropriate documentation.”9 This somewhat narrow definition of 
‘undocumented’ clearly displaces the focus from abstract illegality to the ‘proper papers’ that need 
to be valid and in the possession of the person. ‘Irregular’, on the other hand, is stated to be 
preferable for its more ‘generic’ nature and capacity to cover what looks, in fact, like a broader 
variety of offenses. An “irregular migrant” is thus defined as “a person who, owing to unauthorized 
entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit 
or host country.” Meanwhile, “irregular migration” is defined as “movement that takes place 
outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries.”10 The introduction of 
a second adjective – ‘unauthorized’ – to reinforce the rather fluid semantic boundaries of 
‘irregular’ shows two important aspects of the ‘illegality’ of migration. First, this ‘buttressing’ of 
alternative qualifications points to the seeming impossibility of finding a suitable substitute for 
what states keep calling ‘illegal’ and treating as such – that is, the breaking of the law. Moreover, 
their inexact interchangeability signals that each of these adjectives points to a specific facet, or 
character, of being ‘illegal’ at a given time inside or across a given space.   
For instance, ‘irregular’ posits from its very morphological construction the transgression 
of a ‘rule’ or norm, which has the potential to sacralize any rule restricting movement across 
 
 
9 “Clandestine migration” and “undocumented migrant” in IOM, Glossary, 2nd ed., 20 and 102.  
 






borders, even those of which the very legality is being challenged or is yet to be affirmed, such as 
ministerial directives or executive orders. Turning to the valence of the word ‘undocumented’, a 
related set of issues emerges. Though it is seldom discussed, the opposite term ‘documented’ 
connotes proof of existence and aligns with the adjective ‘known.’ The word ‘undocumented’ thus 
comes dangerously close to defining, in contrast, ‘that which is not known’ – such as in the 
sentence ‘undocumented deaths.’ Dangerously close because not only does the use of 
‘undocumented’ raise questions about ‘who documents,’ ‘who needs to know’ and who produces 
knowledge, but also because, as the phrase ‘undocumented deaths’ – often applied to drownings, 
shipwrecks and capsizings at sea – reminds us, that which was not documented is often presumed 
not to have happened.11 These institutional critiques of the use of the terms ‘illegal’ and ‘illegality’ 
are crucial, yet they often fall short by assuming the normative neutrality and inherent justice of 
existing legislation, ignoring that contemporary migrations often expose the inadequacy, 
outdatedness and deliberate inhumanity of regulations imposed on the entry and circulation of 
foreign nationals. 
Another group of scholars has proposed the term ‘illegalization’ as the proper substantive 
counterpart to the adjective offered by Bauder. Developed most systematically by anthropologist 
Nicholas De Genova, ‘illegalization’ is a conceptual tool of critical intervention in the process of 
institutional production of ‘migrant illegality.’12 The concept can be deployed on different scales. 
It signals, on the one hand, “an individual or group’s removal from rights but also from structures 
 
11 Which is only thinly veiled in the institutional discourse rhetoric whereby ‘illegalizing rescue’ – emptying the 
Central Med of private rescue ships – has in fact fulfilled its ultimate goal of decreasing arrivals on European shores, 
whereas it only effectively ‘desertified the sea’ and decreased the chances of successful rescue.  
 
12 Nicholas De Genova, “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday Life,” Annual Review of Anthropology 





of life and expression.”13 Moreover, it allows to trace the oscillations of the entire system of 
migration control that go from the wording of so-called ‘emergency’ or temporary measures to the 
evolution of technologies and practices of bordering. The most fruitful contribution of 
‘illegalization’ – both in theoretical and activist terms – is that it enables the re-historicization 
along new lines of the relationship between migrants and states. Morphologically, ‘illegalization’ 
pins temporality and constructedness against the a-historicity and ‘immanence’ of illegality. It also 
paves the way for investigating and exposing mechanisms of criminalization of movement and 
status across and no longer simply within the borders of the nation-state. 
The development of illegalization as an analytical tool has taken place in the context of a 
wider interrogation of citizenship and borders that started, in the context of Europe, with the 
restructuring of national and global economies in the 1970s and the associated restriction of what 
had been, until then, ‘legal’ flows of immigrant labor mostly from former colonies. The latter part 
of the 20th Century marked, in Europe, a sharp turn in the relationship between borders and 
‘illegality’, in particular as the borders of ‘Europe’ changed with the implementation of the 
Schengen Agreement. In this new era, ‘(im)migration,’ was subject to a regime of movement 
control in constant expansion and refinement that operated both at the national and supranational 
level. In response to this dynamic, Étienne Balibar, along with others, underscored the necessity 
to understand borders as devices beyond their territorial configuration. He observed, in this vein, 
that borders are “at the edge of the territory, marking the point where it ends” but that they “have 
been transported into the middle of political space.”14 They are also “intrinsically ambivalent” and 
 
13 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, Border as Method (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 142–144. 
 
14 These observations can be found in the seminal essay “World Borders, Political Borders,” published as Chapter 6 
of Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 109. The work of Étienne Balibar is globally recognized for having largely enabled our 
understanding of the multiplicity and the ‘multiplication’ of borders (to use one of Mezzadra’s formulations) in 




must be understood equally in terms of the movements they enable and those they seek to filter or 
prevent.15 Through the concept of ‘differential inclusion’, political theorist Sandro Mezzadra built 
on Balibar’s foundational work in order to study the border as an articulation of movement leading 
to the multiplication of overlapping and conflicting statuses: “By rethinking the logics of borders 
beyond their apparent role as tools of exclusion and violence, we intend to signal the more open 
and complex ways in which borders react to diverse kinds of migrant subjectivities and thereby 
operate to produce differentiated forms of access and “rights.” Borders function to allow passage 
as much as they do to deny it, they work to increase or decelerate the speed of movement as much 
as they do to prevent or reverse it, and it is in the ways that borders multiply these kinds of subject 
positions and their corresponding tensions between access and denial, mobility and 
immobilization, discipline and punishment, freedom and control.”16 
 Informed by existing political and economic work on regimes of migration control, this 
project draws on previous efforts to denaturalize ‘illegality’ and to think borders as complex sites 
that articulated human movement and the circulation of law, policy, politics and ideology. Yet, it 
focuses more decidedly on language, narrative forms and conceptual grammars taking shape across 
linguistic boundaries.  
This project also intervenes critically at the intersection of two current methodologies. It 
asks the loosely defined yet burgeoning field of Critical Migration Studies to pay more attention 
to the language of regimes of illegalization, and particularly, to apprehend migration as a 
multilingual process shaped by practices of translation that develop illegalization simultaneously 
 
 
15 Étienne Balibar, “At the Borders of Citizenship: A Democracy in Translation?,” European Journal of Social 
Theory 13, no. 3 (2010): 316. 
 
16 Mezzadra in Maribel Casa-Cortes et al., “New Keywords: Migration and Borders,” Cultural Studies 29, no. 1 





at the national and transnational levels. It also asks the subfield of literary and aesthetic criticism 
of migration to explore, historically and transnationally, the political implications of labels and 
nomenclature in order to no longer treat them as fixed ‘identities’ but as larger discursive 




Published initially in English in 2004,17 the IOM Glossary on Migration, introducing the 
‘problem of definitions,’ highlighted a tension inherent in attempts to frame the language of 
migration. This tension resulted from the irreducible singularity of national ‘lexicons,’ the contact 
and ‘communication’ between these lexicons in various domains and the necessity to at least signal 
their possible mutations in translation. Written initially in English, the Glossary enshrines – 
perhaps involuntarily – English as a supra-national and definitive language, that is, as the 
‘institutional’ language of migration, the translations of which do not alter the content and 
knowledge produced according to its grammar and cultural histories. As migration control – and 
the categories it deploys – is still the affair of states both within their borders and in supranational 
formations and international agreements, it is clear that positing one language as sufficiently 
‘representative’ of these categories can obscure the alterations and changes brought about when 
they travel across national jurisdictions through various forms or ‘techniques’ of translation. As a 
result, as an inherently monolingual document meant to define transnational acts, concepts, and 
categories, the Glossary brings to the fore the question of ‘original’ and translation as well as the 
 
17 By the time the second edition was published in 2011, the first 2004 edition had been translated into “into 
Russian, Tajik, Arabic, Spanish, Slovenian, French, Albanian, Bosnian, Chinese, Turkish, Greek, Portuguese, Italian 
and Macedonian” (IOM, Glossary, 2nd ed., 3. Every subsequent edition, however, has been written in English and 





logic guiding the translation of categories that have deep and specific national histories. The 
French translation of the IOM Glossary’s first edition is revealing in this regard. In his foreword, 
the general editor addressed the issue that could be rendered as ‘transnational equivalence’: 
“Another challenge faced in this compilation was the variety of terms used to describe the same or 
similar phenomenon. For example, there may be nuances between the terms ‘illegal migration’, 
‘clandestine migration’, ‘undocumented migration’ and ‘irregular migration’; however, to a large 
extent they are used loosely and often interchangeably. To this end, some cross-referencing of 
terms has been inevitable in order to guide the reader to alternative or interchangeable terms.”18 
The editor’s words address the existence of ‘nuances’ that make each of these adjectives – and 
therefore the ‘types’ of migration they denote – distinct and pointing to some unique aspects. Yet, 
he acknowledges their ‘often loose’ and ‘interchangeable’ uses. His position appears to be unclear, 
as if on one hand he is dismissing the nuances as unimportant while he simultaneously hesitates 
over the ‘interchangeability’ of the terms. Indeed, despite the ‘cross-referencing,’ the Glossary’s 
major contribution at the time of publication was the decision to enshrine ‘irregular’ as the 
preferred adjective for someone without status either across or within national borders. As shown 
above, this term was seen at the time as ‘de-criminalizing’ in contrast to the essentializing 
proliferation of ‘illegal.’  
One of the goals of this study is to show that those ‘nuances’ correspond to crucial 
discrepancies both in the ‘equivalence’ of expressions across languages – immigrazione 
 
18 Richard Perruchoud, “Foreword,” in IOM, Glossary on Migration, 1st ed. (Geneva: IOM, 2004), 4. The French 
version reads: “Un autre écueil auquel cette compilation s’est heurtée a été la variété des termes utilisés pour décrire 
une même réalité ou une réalité similaire. Ainsi, si les expressions « migration illégale », « migration clandestine » 
et « migration irrégulière » peuvent éventuellement comporter des nuances, elles sont dans une large mesure 
utilisées de façon assez libre et sont fréquemment interchangeables. Il a donc fallu utiliser le système de renvoi pour 
orienter le lecteur vers les expressions interchangeables ou de remplacement.” Richard Perruchoud, “Avant-propos,” 






clandestina versus ‘clandestine immigration’, for instance – and to the specific morphological and 
semantic histories of seemingly equivalent adjectives such as clandestino and clandestine within 
their respective languages. Throughout the dissertation I try to show that these nuances – both 
within and across languages – are constitutive of the overarching multilingual paradigm of 
‘illegality,’ itself kept in continuous transformation by the dynamism of these almost-synonymical 
expressions. I argue for the importance of reconstructing the specificities of each type of nuance. 
‘Illegal,’ ‘clandestine,’ and ‘irregular’ share semantic fields in each of the languages in which they 
can be translated with morphological equivalence – that is, by keeping the Latin root – but the 
concept of ‘illegality’ they refer to may be substantially different in the languages in which they 
are translated while coalescing around a shared notion at the transnational institutional level.  
Operating under the coordination of the EU’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home 
Affairs, the European Migration Network’s (EMN) Glossary on Migration and Asylum is an 
attempt at taking into consideration the constitutive multilingualism of the European Union in an 
effort to define, translate, and update over time the most relevant “words” of migration. EMN is a 
network of asylum and migration experts whose task is to compile and provide “policy-relevant 
information” regarding asylum and migration in the EU. The specificity of its Glossary is that, 
contrary to the similar document from the IOM, it is ostensibly structured to embrace 
plurilingualism. For instance, the 2018 edition was published simultaneously in English and 
Italian, which means that the definitions – the main body of the text – are given in those two 
languages. Each of the words being defined, however, is systematically translated in twenty-two 
European languages. If simultaneous publication in multiple languages is characteristic of the 







Maintaining a focus “on legal developments in the framework of the EU acquis on asylum and 
migration,” the Glossary provides and translates definitions of relevant legal terms – of the EU 
legal understanding of certain terms – in most of the Union’s languages. In 2013, a bilingual 
Italian-Arabic edition was also published, which would deserve a study of its own.20  
The example below, which I have compiled from three different editions of the EMN 
Glossary (English, French, and Italian),21 is the definition, in each of the three languages, of the 
act of “not remaining available to the relevant authorities” in charge of executing legal measures 
on the person involved. This act or circumstance is defined under ‘absconding’ in English and 
under ‘fuite’ and ‘fuga’ in French and Italian, respectively. 
 
 
Absconding (GL 6.0, 8) 
 
Action by which a person 
seeks to avoid administrative 
measures and/or legal 
proceedings by not remaining 
available to the relevant 
authorities or to the court. 
 
Fuite (gl 3.0 79) 
 
Action par laquelle un 
individu tente d’éviter des 
procédures légales en se 




Fuga (Gl 6.0 154) 
 
Azione con cui una persona 
cerca di sfuggire a un 
procedimento giudiziario non 
restando a disposizione delle 
autorità competenti o 
dell’autorità giudiziaria.  
 
Scholar of postcolonial Europe Dominic Thomas observed, in an essay on ‘migration and 
grammar’ in the European context, that “according to its founding principles, the EU was to be a 
family of democratic European countries, committed to working together for peace and prosperity; 
 
20 The Italian-Arabic edition was published by Edizioni IDOS - Sinnos, Rome, in 2013, with the financing of the 
European Commission and the Italian Interior Ministry. It is accessible at https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/docs/emn-glossary-ar-version.pdf 
 
21 Glossary 6.0, published in English and Italian in 2018, and Glossary 3.0, to-date the most recent French edition, 
published in January 2012. The English version is available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_en , the Italian at http://www.emnitalyncp.it/wp-






inclusivity and tolerance were thus non-negotiable defining characteristics. Yet, when one 
investigates the vocabulary employed by officials, the language of conventions, treaties and pacts, 
a new grammar of migration comes into evidence whose referentiality, signifying power and 
linguistic coding highlight forms of intolerance – of what has been described as a ‘phobic 
democracy.’”22 In its definitions of ‘absconding-fuite-fuga’, the EMN Glossary provides a clear 
example of the semantic operations on which illegalization of migration moves and expands. First, 
one should note that rather than – or more than – ‘translations’ from one language to another, these 
definitions are better understood as multilingual compositions, whose aim is to construct and 
present a homogenous semantic formation spanning several languages but which inevitably 
presents some slippages. 
The explanatory page on the ‘Scope and Methodology’ of the EMN Glossary highlights 
that each definition “has been formulated according to the IATE standard, meaning that they can 
directly replace the term in any given text.23 For example, the term ‘applicant for international 
protection’ can be directly replaced in any text with its definition: ‘third-country national or a 
stateless person who has made an application for international protection in respect of which a 
final decision has not yet been taken.’”24 This explanation presupposes consistency and 
interchangeability between any term and its definition. ‘Absconding,’ for instance, is covering the 
same semantic area as its definition, which is the act of withdrawing from the reach of the law. 
 
22 Dominic Thomas, “Migration and Grammar in the New Europe,” European Studies 29 (2012): 271. 
 
23 “IATE (Interactive Terminology for Europe) is the EU's terminology database. It has been used in the EU 
institutions and agencies since summer 2004 for the collection, dissemination and management of EU-specific 
terminology. The project was launched in 1999 with the aim of providing a web-based infrastructure for all EU 
terminology resources, enhancing the availability and standardisation of the information.” See 
https://iate.europa.eu/home 
 






Problems arise, however, when we apply the same rigorous principle to the French and Italian 
counterparts. While ‘absconding’ in English is only an act of withdrawal with criminal 
connotation, ‘fuite’ and ‘fuga’ have much wider and ‘tumultuous’ range: if France’s criminal code 
contains a ‘délit de fuite’ that much like the Italian ‘delitto di fuga’ penalizes the act of fleeing 
responsibility (often after an accident), the French and Italian terms encompass a much broader 
range of acts and contexts.25 Besides their uses in music, geometry, and art, ‘fuite’ and ‘fuga’ – 
even when describing a dynamic action – do not always bear a negative, much less a criminal, 
connotation. ‘Se sauver, s’échapper,’ like ‘scappare’ and ‘fuggire’ cover an ampler spectrum of 
cases and reasons than a simple evasion of one’s own responsibility as subject of a legal proceeding 
or as perpetrator of a crime. Moreover, when reading the three entries horizontally following one 
of the possible grids of this ‘simultaneously multilingual’ Glossary, one is asked to reconcile the 
perfect equivalence of the definitions with the discrepancies among the keywords being defined. 
That ‘absconding’ is the perfect word for the a-moral, punishable action conjured by its definition 
shows, in turn, the power of the semantic narrowing being deployed both on ‘fuite’ and on ‘fuga’ 
to crop a semantics of criminality from the otherwise much larger field they occupy. Even taking 
into consideration the argument whereby any discipline-specific language – in this case the 
language of the law – invariably narrows and selects from all the possible meanings being found 
in ‘language’ at large, the object of our reading is a Glossary on migration and asylum, two 
domains to which a vocabulary of criminality is often applied. The point here is not to criticize a 
definition of ‘fuite’ and ‘fuga’ as simply a punishable action, but instead to expose the issues 
arising from such a narrow semantic choice in the context of migration and asylum, where fuga, 
 




fuite, and their perhaps more just English equivalent – escape and flight – are central lexical 
elements and part of a restricted vocabulary of the daily words having direct impact on human life. 
This aspect is further underscored by the fact that the English edition of the EMN Glossary 
does not have an entry for, nor does it mention either ‘escape’ or ‘flight’ in the context of leaving 
one’s own country. Similarly, neither the French or Italian versions acknowledge this crucial use 
of ‘fuite’ or ‘fuga.’ Indeed, there is no reference throughout the Glossary (on asylum) to anything 
remotely close to the act of ‘fleeing and seeking’ protection outside of one’s own country. Thus, 
after noting that the EMN Glossary includes ‘absconding’ but not escape, we should try to apply 
the EMN principle of interchangeability between a keyword and its definition horizontally, that is, 
across languages. According to that principle, ‘fuite’ and ‘fuga’ would constitute the pragmatic 
correspondences of ‘absconding’. More problematic, however, would be playing this game of 
equivalences from the right to the left, where ‘fuga’ and ‘fuite’ find their equivalence in 
absconding, thus losing, in the process, their inherent possibilities for meaning ‘flight’ and 
‘escape.’  
In an early work that studied the history of migrant agricultural laborers in 19th-Century 
Germany – and Max Weber’s take on it – Sandro Mezzadra outlined the semantic and political 
ambivalence of the concept of fuga, which he declares to be generally considered ‘suspicious.’ 
“Bound by opportunism, fear, and cowardice,” fuga was “despised by the patriotic and socialist 
epos alike.”26 Desertion, a ‘fuga’ from one’s own duty and debt to the nation, has forever been a 
martial crime in the history of the Western nation-state. It is, however, through the political re-
semanticization of ‘defection’ as civil disobedience and resistance in the latter half of the 20th 
Century by both workers’ and student movements on both sides of the Atlantic that Mezzadra, and 
 





Yann Moulier Boutang before him, have been able to theorize migrant ‘fuga’ in a long line of 
“behaviors to escape subjection, from the plantation to the factory system, which constitute the 
subjective side of labor mobility throughout the history of capitalist production.”27 ‘Fuga’ and 
‘fuite,’ beyond the moral bounds of the nation-state, become categories of resistance grounded in 
and stemming from migrant agency and subjectivity. Theorizing a ‘diritto di fuga’, or a ‘right to 
escape’, performs the crucial task of approaching migration as happening despite and against the 
devices and categories that articulate global mobility, from ‘border’ to ‘citizenship.’ 
  Something akin to a ‘right to escape’ was also formalized – although not with the same 
exact wording – in international human rights law, more precisely in Article 14 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and, subsequently, in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, which is grounded – legally and morally – on that Article,28 that is, “Everyone has the 
right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”29 
“Movement is a fundamental human right,” recently declared Reece Jones in the 
“Conclusion” to the collective volume Open Borders: In Defense of Free Movement. It is not, 
unfortunately, or perhaps it is, but only incompletely. As Jones explains, “[this fundamental human 
right] is for now limited by the right of states to restrict the movement of noncitizens into their 
territory.”30 Reece is pointing to what is generally known as the ‘lack of a corresponding right’ to 
 
27 Mezzadra, Diritto di fuga, 9. Yann Moulier Boutang, De l’esclavage au salariat: Économie historique du salariat 
bridé (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), in particular Chapter 1, “Le continent du droit de fuite,” 9–27. 
 
28 On the moral foundation of the Geneva Convention see the ‘Introductory Note’ in United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 60-year anniversary ed. 
(Geneva: UNHCR, 2011). 
 
29 Article 14, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
 
30 Reece Jones, “Conclusion,” in Open Borders: In Defense of Free Movement, edited by Reece Jones, 264 (Athens: 





the right to seek asylum. States are under no obligation to grant asylum to those who seek it.31 This 
gap in international human rights law, which constitutes one of the earliest and most pervasive 
mechanisms of illegalization, is visible and literally locatable in the white space that separates 
Article 14 from the one preceding it: 
 
Article 13  
1.) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders 
of each State.  
2.) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to 
his country.  
 
Article 14  




“Right to freedom of movement within one state;” “Right to leave any country, including 
one’s own;” “Right to seek and enjoy asylum in other countries.” This fairly wide semantic field, 
describing the freedom to leave and move and to seek protection and safety, in fact signals the 
limits of a discursive geography of a particular form of movement – escape. Without causing much 
turmoil, this ‘geography of escape’ can be translated as ‘géographie de la fuite’ and ‘geografia 
della fuga’ in French and Italian. Yet there is a potent discrepancy between the geography of escape 
of the 1948 Declaration and the narrow limits of ‘fuga-as-absconding’ in the EMN Glossary. The 
distance between a 1948 effectively non-binding and aspirationally universal document and 2019 
EU law, which is inextricably semantic and political, represents at the same time the 
exemplification and the trace of the process of the illegalization of migration: Fuite-as-absconding 
 
31 Among the many critiques of the ‘lack of corresponding right’, see Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire, 
“Introduction: The Migration without Borders Scenario,” in Migration without Borders: Essays on the Free 
Movement of People, ed. Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); Charles 
Heller, Lorenzo Pezzani, and Maurice Stierl, “Towards a Politics of Freedom of Movement,” in Jones, ed., Open 




in the law of a supranational political formation historically predicated on the untenable dichotomy 
between no unwanted movement from outside and free circulation within forecloses the 
possibilities of ‘fuite-fuga-escape’ imagined by the foundational writings of international human 
rights and refugee law. This foreclosure shows, in turn, how illegalization is first and foremost an 
affair of definitions that often cross linguistic boundaries, and that on that very ground it must also 
be fought. This dissertation, correspondingly, is an experiment in reading illegalization across 
languages and ‘realms’ of discourse by approaching instances of illegalization through the 
possibilities and impossibilities of their circulation across linguistic and disciplinary boundaries, 




Chapter 1 tells the story of one of the early words of migrant ‘illegality’ as it traveled and 
changed between Italy and France over the course of the 20th century. Originating from the Latin 
adverb clam, clandestin / clandestino lived a life on the edge separating ‘hidden’ from ‘illegal’ 
until, sometime during the 1920s, it became increasingly associated with the ‘natives’ trying to 
stow away on the first ferries between North Africa and Southern France and, subsequently, to a 
number of pre- and post-WWII migratory movements. In the latter part of the 20th century, with 
the progressive integration of France and Italy in the Schengen regime of migration control and 
with their distinct positions on the external border of Europe, the French and Italian version of the 
word came to define the ‘ontologically illegal’ immigrant in strikingly different ways. The chapter 
retraces the uses of clandestin / clandestino until the dawn of the 21st century to highlight how the 
morphological and semantic changes of the word(s) – and their irregular contacts across the 




constant connection between national and transnational histories and vocabularies of migration 
control.  
Chapter 2 explores the mechanism of illegalization in an experimental film, Babylon, set 
in Choucha refugee camp, built in 2011 at the border between Tunisia and Libya. The camp works 
as a mechanism of control following the two distinct logics of movement restriction on the one 
hand, and emergency humanitarian assistance to persons ‘en fuite,’ on the other. These two logics 
are only superficially opposed, as they perform in distinct ways an essential function of state 
control of migration. At the same time, the camp develops temporally as a form of life in waiting, 
or in a protracted state of immobile transiency, while keeping the people it hosts in a juridical 
limbo and in an immobile exclusion from social life. My argument for including the camp in a 
study of illegalization is twofold. On the one hand, the camp as a mechanism to restrict free 
movement simultaneously illegalizes all practices of resistance to the restrictions it imposes, as 
well as all the forms of living that attempt to escape that containment. Moreover, as will be 
developed at length in the chapter, the emergency humanitarian camp is also often a place of 
sorting. As such, the procedures attributing international protection to some rather than others 
illegalize the very presence of those who find themselves excluded from international refugee law. 
As a result, the camp produces an effectively illegalized status that only deportation, voluntary 
return, or disappearing into clandestinité can follow.  
In a unique way of filming, Babylon develops a poetics of non-translation to account for 
the irreducibility of the language of migration to a system of equivalences and a visual poetics of 
the “traces” left by a transient form of life – the emergency humanitarian camp – the original goal 
of which is to transfer its occupants elsewhere, and to no longer exist (and consequently be 




In Chapter 3, I focus on the Italian asylum system, and in particular on the Refugee Status 
Determination Interview as a moment in which the monolingualism of the state and the 
multilingualism of humans escaping collide in one of the most potentially destructive instances of 
illegalization, particularly after successive laws have restricted the access to legal remedy 
following a denied asylum claim. I analyze in particular the construction and the transcripts of 
‘asylum narratives’ – the personal histories over which a claim to asylum is adjudicated – in order 
to show the depth of largely unacknowledged practices of domestication and the impact they have 
in directly and indirectly reshaping the way in which asylum-seekers frame their personal 
narratives of loss, violence and escape.  
Finally, Chapter 4 is a study of the principle of non-refoulement at sea between law and 
poetry. Enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, non-refoulement was a central issue of 
the United States’ “Interdiction Program” of Haitian asylum-seekers in the early 1990s and of the 
“push-back” agreements between the EU – through Italy – and Libya in the early 2000s. Through 
a study of the travaux préparatoires of the 1951 Convention and two landmark judicial cases I 
show how the ab initio multilingualism of the principle led to different interpretations and 
translations that were instrumental in opposite judicial outcomes regarding the limits of state 
jurisdiction in the Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas. I put this in conversation with how the poets 
Kamau Brathwaite and Erri De Luca invested – both physically and metaphorically – the sea as a 
space of migrant illegalization through refoulement in ways that expand the possibilities of 
political resistance and of linguistic re-creation. 
The analytical method developed in this project is cross-disciplinary in response to the 
heterogeneity of discourses that form the grammar of illegalization, and it was made necessary by 















The focus and the conceptual frame of this dissertation, the grammar of illegalization, refer 
to the rules and conditions that subtend the creation of various forms of migrant ‘illegality’ in 
spaces that – sometimes simultaneously – are physical, political and discursive. While the 
following chapters will move through more conventional and recognizable spaces and discourses 
such as film, the law, the High Seas, and the asylum interview, the ‘space’ in which this chapter is 
rooted is language itself, or more specifically, a node of interrelated terms that played a major role 
in the construction of a multilingual, European vocabulary of migration. I use the notion of 
‘vocabulary’ to include both terms already existing in everyday language that migration coopted 
and repurposed as well as terms that were specifically created by and in response to migrations 
across the Mediterranean writ large, from Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia to Northern Europe. 
Such a vocabulary developed distinctly along national and linguistic lines for most of the 20th 
century, but those national and regional vocabularies went on to form, whether in translation or in 
their unaltered ‘national’ forms, an increasingly recognizable transnational and multilingual 
lexicon that reflected the refinement and harmonization of European external borders around the 
Schengen space.  
This cross-border linguistic formation is the French/Italian clandestin / clandestino. 
Originated from a Latin root, the word developed in French and then in Italian by way of 
translation. It started to be used in the semantic field of migration in the 1920s and then, 
 
32 My mother and father contributed, respectively, with tracking down relevant Italian parliamentary records for 




increasingly, in the second half of the 20th century until it became, in the Schengen era, the catalyst 
of bitter battles around the language of migration. Indeed, along clandestin’s multilingual 
transformation from adjective to noun it is possible to glimpse how migrating individuals are 
conceived and treated collectively by the state on the basis of their non-conforming status and how, 
as a result, their status is essentialized and naturalized. They become, or come to embody in official 
discourse, the process of their own illegalization. Indeed, clandestin/clandestino is in many ways 
the first lexical cluster that has both driven and encapsulated the linguistic illegalization of the 
migrant subject. As a result, it offers both an anticipation of and a set of tools to read the instances 
of illegalization that will follow. 
Migration studies has generally divided the study of cross-Mediterranean migration along 
preexisting – although often historically unstable – regional lines. Thus, seafaring routes from 
West Africa to the Canary Islands, and from Morocco and Western Algeria to Spain – both its 
mainland and its African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla – have been studied as the western 
Mediterranean route. Similarly the Central Mediterranean as a region comprising Libya, Tunisia, 
eastern Algeria and even Western Egypt to the South, Italy and France to the North – although of 
much earlier formation – gained critical importance after the North African uprisings and the sea 
tragedies that punctuate its history since. But it is not simply for geographical and scientific 
coherence that I confine myself to French and Italian in this chapter. As a matter of fact, future 
iterations of this very study should include adjectives and nouns like harraga, khlsi, etc., to account 
linguistically for that spatiality. However my aim, as with the historical approach of this chapter, 
has less to do with exhaustiveness than with sketching a method of reading illegalization 
systematically across languages. France and Italy are a particularly conducive transnational 




contested borders and, more recently, often diverging agendas as to their individual interpretation 
of their common role of Southern border of the EU. Through this example, I am attempting to offer 
a method for a multilingual poetic excavation of illegalization and invite its application to other 
borderlands and other transnational spaces. My objective is not a full history of the word but the 
sketch of a method, and to engage with the poetics, semantics, and the politics of translation that 
are at the heart of illegalizing mechanisms. My engagement with the term clandestin highlights 
relevant moments in its evolution that, on the one hand, reveal its central role in 20th-century 
colonial and post-colonial semanticization of the ‘illegal migrant’ and, more largely, shed new 
light on the mechanisms of formation of a translingual European lexicon of illegalization. These 
explorations expose, not for the first time, the centrality of colonial ideology in the formation, 
reproduction, and perpetuation of the figure of the ‘illegal migrant.’ 
Tracking down semantic changes and derivative words necessarily means having to resort 
to heterogenous and sometimes disparate sets of sources. As a result, this chapter moves through 
Roman jurisprudence, 1920s ministerial circulaires, literature, and political memoirs to understand 
how an adjective became noun and, over the last century, crystalized as ‘illegal’ the person on the 
move. 
The chapter is divided into three parts: from an introductory discussion of clam in the 
classical age I will move to the interwar period and, to conclude, to relevant instances of the 










Clam, adv. and prep. 1 (adv.) Secretly, under cover. B clam esse, to be or be kept in secret; 
clam habere, to keep secret. 2 (prep.) without the knowledge of, unknown to. 
 
Clandestīnus ∽a ∽um, a. [*clam-de (CLAM) + -TINVS] Done, made arranged, obtained, 
etc., secret, secretly, clandestine. b acting secretly or silently.33  
 
 
Born as an adverb in classical Latin (the adverb clam meant ‘in secrecy or hiding’), from 
which derived the adjectives clandestinus-a, the adjective “clandestin” is recorded first in medieval 
French and then, in italian, sometime during the 19th century.34 During its 20th-century life in both 
French and Italian, clandestin underwent an important morphological modification: it became a 
noun, i clandestini / les clandestins. In and of itself, this evolution of the word is unremarkable, as 
substantivization is a common path for adjectives to follow. The case of clandestin is, however, 
specifically compelling because, as it evolved from an adjective to a noun it also came to identify 
not only a person, but a group. The collective noun resulting from the pluralization of ‘le’ / ‘il’ (les 
clandestins, i clandestini) came to identify a group of persons who, by virtue of their status vis-à-
vis the nation-state and its laws, were considered to be in the country illegally and thus merited 
exclusion in various domains: social, legal, and political (no health and voting rights, 
imprisonment, expulsion). By following clandestin’s morphological and semantic evolution, this 
chapter considers how an adjective meaning ‘hidden’ became a noun meaning ‘illegal immigrant 
worker, trespasser of borders, committer of fraud, threat to the stability of the nation and invader.’ 
Clandestin is a singular case because of how its original semantic field, relating to something 
 
33 P.G.W. Glare (ed.), Oxford Latin Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2002). 
 
34 Precisely in Silvio Pellico’s memoir Le mie prigioni, published in 1832. Quoted in Raffaella Setti, “L’asilante non 







hidden or ‘done in hiding’ sits, with legs hanging, on the edge of social acceptability and of existing 
notions of legality. Its protracted use by the state, refined over decades, caused clandestin and les 
clandestins to embody a specific type of illegality, as the word came to designate primarily illegal 
migration while, on the other hand, changing the meaning of ‘being illegal’ to a personal trait. To 
be clandestin came to mean being ‘illegal’ not as much by action or event – crossing borders, 
losing status – as by ‘essence.’   
The starting point of this study is an interpretation of Justinian jurisprudence that later 
crystallized into the maxim: “clandestina iniusta praesumuntur,” whereby “that which is carried 
out in secret (‘clam-dies’, literally ‘hidden (from) light’) is to be considered against the law.” The 
word then evolved through Medieval canon law, where clandestinitas was predominantly used to 
record the aggravating circumstance of extra-marital affairs. While Medieval canon law still 
mostly associates the adjective and the noun with acts, centuries later, and precisely in late-19th 
century French, the adjective clandestin becomes increasingly associated with movement and the 
act of crossing borders. By this time, clandestine was attached to humans themselves and no longer 
only to their acts. Central to this etymological journey is understanding this shift in meaning that 
enabled the word “clandestine” to come to define the passengers of a ship who did not pay their 
fare and were thus traveling in hiding. 
Through its main meaning of something done ‘in hiding’ or ‘secretly’, clam was often 
semantically opposed to another adverb, palam, which was instead used to mean ‘clearly’, 
‘publicly’, and ‘out in the light’.  
From its most abstract to its most concrete connotations ‘clam’ qualified and described a 
wide range of acts, events, and human behaviors. Its first recorded use in a normative Roman text 




‘secretly’ or ‘clandestinely,’ ‘violently’ or ‘precariously’ against someone.35 From this early 
example on, ‘clam’ and its derivatives maintain a semantic quality of being on the cusp or in the 
margins of legality. These terms bear the potential – not always realized – of making the act or 
behaviour to which they are attached illegal. It is this blurred discursive line separating what is 
legal from what is not that makes ‘clam’ and its derivatives fascinating to analyze, and an apt 
metonym of the historical fluctuations of the lexical devices of the illegalization of migration. 
Indeed, in early juridical interpretations, actions committed in ‘secrecy’ were considered 
inexcusable and impossible to tolerate, especially in opposition to the same actions committed 
manifestly (‘palam’), which were seen as potentially excusable. This is the case, for instance, for 
incestuous marriages, where those palam delinquentes – committing the crime openly – did not 
deserve the same severity of judgment as those clam committentes, or breaking the law in hiding 
or secrecy.36 
Along with the stabilization of the derivative adjectival and nominal forms clandestinus 
and clandestinitas, a process of legal elaboration starts that aims at classifying ‘clandestine’ 
behavior as unjust or un-social, and the ‘clandestine’ character of crime as an aggravating factor. 
 
35 Dig. D. 43.24 (Quod vi aut clam..),1 pr. (Ulp. 71 ad ed.): Praetor ait. ‘Quod vi aut clam factu est, qua de re 
agitur,id cum experiendi potestas est, restituas’. Translated as: “The Praetor says: 'I order you to restore to its former 
condition everything which you have done to the property in question by the employment of violence or 
clandestinely, as soon as proceedings are instituted against you for that purpose.'” S.P. Scott, trans. and ed., The 
Civil Law, IX–X (Cincinnati, OH: The Central Trust Company, 1932). 
 
36 Dig. 23.2.68 (Paulus liber singularis ad senatus consultum Turpillianum ): Iure gentium incestum committit, qui 
ex gradu ascendentium vel descendentium uxorem duxerit. qui vero ex latere eam duxerit quam vetatur, vel adfinem 
quam impeditur, si quidem palam fecerit, levius, si vero clam hoc commiserit, gravius punitur. cuius diversitatis illa 
ratio est: circa matrimonium quod ex latere non bene contrahitur palam delinquentes ut errantes maiore poena 
excusantur, clam committentes ut contumaces plectuntur. “Where any man marries a female relative, either in the 
ascending or descending line, he commits incest according to the Law of Nations. He who marries a female relative 
in the collateral line, (where this is expressly forbidden), or some woman is connected with him by affinity, and he 
does this publicly, he will incur a lighter penalty, but if he commits such an act clandestinely, he will incur a more 
severe one. The reason for this difference with reference to marriage improperly contracted with a relative in the 
collateral line is, that those who publicly commit the offence are not subjected to a more grievous penalty because 
they are considered to be ignorant, but those who commit it secretly are punished severely as being contumacious.” 





This process, spanning the juridical and linguistic culture of late antiquity and the Middle Ages, 
took place within a larger juridical production associated with the rediscovery of ancient Roman 
legal principles. This production, largely concentrated in Northern Italy and specifically the 
University of Bologna, saw jurists drawing their general guiding principles from every field of 
Roman civil law and reformulating them as maxims to be included in widely-circulating works, or 
proto-codes, called regulae iuris or brochardica.37 These texts are presented as a series of legal 
analyses organized around a central word or maxim. The following maxims containing clam or a 
derivative seem to be the most recurrent:38 
Maxim 1: Clandestina iniusta presumuntur 
Maxim 2: Dona clandestina sunt semper suspiciosa 
Maxim 2: Qui clam delinquunt magis delinquunt quam qui palam39 
 
These three maxims shed light on the semantic area surrounding clam in the classical and 
Medieval ages. In particular, they enounce the association of secrecy and suspicion (Maxim 2); 
the crystallization of secrecy as an aggravating factor of crime, though not exactly a crime in and 
 
37 For collections of regulae iuris in modern and relatively recent times see, among others, Peter Stein, Regulae 
Iuris: From Juristic Rules to Legal Maxims (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1966); F. Frommelt, 
Regulae Iuris (Leipzig, Germany: Weiss & Neumeister, [1878] 2003); and L. De Mauri, Regulae juris: Raccolta di 
2000 regole del diritto eseguita sui migliori testi, con l'indicazione delle fonti, schiarimenti, capitoli riassuntivi e la 
versione italiana riprodotta dai più celebri commentatori (Milano, Italy: Hoepli, [1976] 2004). 
 
38 Following the collection of regulae by Detlef Liebs, Hannes Lehmann and Gallus Strobel, eds., Lateinische 
Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichworter (Munich, Germany: C. H. Beck, 1982), 39, 59, and 170. All of these early 
sources on clam are my dad’s findings.  
 
39 In the same order: 1) That which is clandestine (acts, behaviors, anything) must be presumed unjust. 2) 
Clandestine gifts (or offers) are always suspicious, and 3) Those who break the law (or commit a crime) in hiding / 
secretly are at greater fault than those who do so openly. Two things are important to note regarding the translation 
of these maxims: the neutral plural form of maxim n. 1, ‘clandestina’, is tricky because it a case used for anything 
that is not human, thus in this case meaning something close to ‘all things clandestine.’ Secondly, the third maxim’s 
syntax is difficult to render effectively in English because it rests on an intransitive verb, delinquere, that does not 
have an equivalent form, as well as on the adverb magis, which literally means ‘more.’ A literal translation would 





of itself (Maxim 3); and, in what may seem a potentially contradictory direction, the definition of 
‘all things clandestine’ as ‘unjust’ (Maxim 1). There is an important consideration to be made 
about the first of these maxims. The adjective ‘iniusta’, translated in a literal sense as ‘unjust’, is 
composed from the word ius. Ius is at once a right, the law, and what is right. Indeed, the proximity 
of the seme ‘clam’ to the adjective iniustus-a raises the question of what is, then, “legal?” One 
initial answer would be to accept the murky multiplicity of ius as the impossibility to definitively 
separate justice and law, what is morally just from what the law prescribes or allows. Yet, this 
early formulation on “that which is clandestine” as presumptively illegal, unacceptable, or unjust 
encapsulates many of the valences and much of the indeterminacy that clam’s derivative comes to 
carry in contemporary French and Italian. Along with Roman law, canon law is considered to have 
constituted the legal foundations of European law throughout the modern age. Canon law was 
elaborated by clergy and scholars of the Catholic church in codes of similar scope to the Roman 
regulae iuris. Along with these codes, canon law is today mostly known through the Decretales, 
a collection of letters on legal matters contributed by various popes and collected in seven 
‘books.’40 
There are few uses of ‘clam’ and ‘clandestinitas’ throughout the collection. One of the most 
significant is located in Book V, where the Regula V specifically reads: Quod latenter41 aut per 
vim, vel alias illicite introductum est, nulla debet stabilitate subsistere (“That which occurs 
“clandestinely,” with violence or by other illicit means shall not benefit from legal recognition.”) 
This means that any act done under the cover of ‘clandestinitas’ or violence does not enjoy legal 
 
40 Decretales Gregorii IX, assembled on the order of Pope Gregory IX starting in 1230 to replace all former 
collections of canon law. 
 





protection and could be considered void ab initio, as if, juridically, such act never occurred. This 
principle underpins theories of duress and a number of theories related to the publicity of juridical 
acts, and derives its legitimacy from the idea that juridical acts are not one-sided events, in that 
they require both a consensual offer and acceptance within a system apt to recognize both as such. 
Canon law engaged above all with ‘clam’ acts in the context of clandestine marriages. Specifically, 
in accordance to the 12th-century consensualist doctrine for a long time it was possible – and 
sometimes even preferred – to get married without publications or solemnities, without notice, in 
the absence of a notary or a priest, and even in the absence of witnesses. The canonical authority 
fustigated and punished these unions while maintaining their validity on the basis of their 
consensual nature: thus what were called clandestina coniuga were paradoxically prohibited but 
nonetheless valid until the Council of Trent.42  
What I have tried to show in this short review is the manner in which the seme clam and 
its derivatives have historically hugged the boundaries of legality, in ways that made any act taking 
place in conditions of secrecy potentially illegal and perhaps more vaguely “iniustus”, unjust.43 In 
the next section I will retrace the transfer of the adjective ‘clandestine’ in its French and Italian 
 
42 See canon (rule) 51 of the Concilium Lateranensis IV, 1251, titled “De Poena contrahentium clandestina 
matrimonia.” 
 
43 It is important to note now that the word clandestinité in French, beyond denoting the ‘state’ of a particular action, 
individual, or group, was, at least for a moment, a potential object of study and analysis, particularly for French 
historians of Middle-Age and Modern France. For significant attempts at framing and postulating ‘clandestinité’ at 
its broadest, see in particular the volumes (not surprisingly resulting from large colloquia): Sylvie Aprile and 
Emmanuelle Retaillaud-Bajac, eds., Clandestinités urbaines: Les citadins et les territoires du secret (XVIe-XXe) 
(Rennes, France: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008) and Michèle Tilloy, Gabriel Audisio, and Jacques 
Chiffoleau, eds., Histoire et clandestinité du Moyen-Âge à la Première Guerre Mondiale (Albi, France: Ateliers de 
L’O.S.J., 1977). The latter volume shows in the minutes of the discussion sessions an early effort to think the 
historical contours of clandestinité from various vantage points, grounded in moments and practices as varied as 
anarchist clandestine propaganda in the South of France at the beginning of the Great War (Bianco), the notion of 
‘clandestinité’ in Middle-Age clerical sources (Barthélémy and Chiffoleau), and ‘clandestinité’ in 18th-Century 
criminal inquiries (Castan). The more recent Clandestinités urbaines, while narrowing the focus to the city and its 
immediate surroundings, takes the opposition between clandestinité and ‘visibility’ further, with interventions 






forms from acts to persons, as well as its mutation into a noun, showing the continued association 




Part II. From attribute of things to attribute of people: clandestin in modern times 
 
 
In the late 19th century, France is confronted with demographics that sharply contrast with 
that of its neighbours, resulting in the search for labor in the French colonies and elsewhere. This, 
in part, led to the emigration of a large contingent of Italians to seek work in France’s Northern 
mines but, especially, in its Midi, the region adjacent to the border with Italy. Italian workers were 
generally unprotected until the early 20th Century, when France and Italy signed bilateral 
agreements in 1904 and 1906. In the build up to WWI, this emigration led to an intensification of 
border and entry controls in the mountainous borderlands between the two countries. While relying 
mostly on colonial workers during WWI, when the state-run Service des travailleurs coloniaux 
brought to the metropole an estimated 200,000 ‘colonial subjects’ to replace factory workers sent 
to the battlefield, in the early aftermath of the war France turned decidedly to cheap European 
markets for workforce.44 In 1924, at the initiative of several groups of industrialist and land-
owners, the Société Générale d’Immigration (SGI) was founded and presided to the entry of at 
least 400,000 immigrant laborers from Southern and Eastern Europe in the period 1924-1930.45 It 
is in connection with these migratory flows that a vocabulary of illegalization emerges, driven by 
 
44 Linda Amiri and Benjamin Stora , “Les politiques de l’immigration en France du début du XXe siècle à nos 
jours,” in Immigrances: L’immigration en France au XXe siècle, ed. Benjamin Stora and Émile Temime (Paris, 
France: Hachette, 2007), 160–161. 
 





catch-all substantivized adjectives such as ‘les indésirables’ to define all unwanted, supposedly 
‘polluting’, cross-border movement and foreign labor. This changes are reflected, too, in the uses 
of clandestin / clandestino. 
 
With the consolidation, in Southern Europe, of national languages of Latin derivation, 
clandestinus-a and its related noun, clandestinitas, were replaced by almost identical forms in 
French (clandestin / clandestinité) and, later, in Italian (clandestino-a / clandestinità).46 The uses 
of these modern equivalents of the Latin forms remained true to their Latin meanings well into the 
19th Century.47 In the second half of the 19th century, the term clandestin started to be used in 
relation to movement and borders. Indeed, in both Italian and French, clandestin and its derivatives 
 
46 This analysis could and should, eventually, be expanded to include Spanish uses and sources. An early example of 
this is clandestinité / clandestinità is the result of escape or flight: Coming from French, its first recorded use in 
Italian is in Silvio Pellico’s Le mie prigioni (1832) (see note 3 above). 
 
47 A quick search of the BnF online catalog reveals that, from the 16th to the 19th Century, uses of ‘clandestin’ and 
‘clandestinité’ refer solely to acts of behaviours and, in the great majority of the cases, to acts of marriage. For 
instance, The Dictionnaire de L’Académie Française of 1695, for instance, reports three related forms (adverbial, 
adjectival, and nominal): “Clandestin” as adjective remains ‘ce qui se fait en cachette & contre la loi’. The two uses 
listed are ‘mariages clandestins’ et ‘assemblées clandestines,’ with the interesting following comment, by the 
dictionary authors: ‘n’a guère d’usage qu’en ces deux phrases’. This seems to point to a reduction or shrinking of the 
semantic field of the derivatives of the root clam in Modern French. Similarly, the noun clandestinité is defined as a 
‘terme de Palais’ (seemingly to mean ‘Palais de Justice’, thus, if we understand correctly, a chiefly legal term) that 
denotes a ‘vice du mariage fait clandestinement’. Now, a vice is not necessarily a crime but marks instead an 
inconsistency or a procedural mistake, as in the expression ‘vice de procedure’. Once again, thus, clandestinité is 
found squarely in that grey and area between suspicious legality and outright illegality, which is central to the 
subsequent evolution of the adjective as qualifier of people and, later, as full-fledged noun. See 
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k8727998v/f135.image.r=clandestinit%C3%A9?rk=214593;2 
It is also important to note now, despite them being mostly absent from this chapter, the importance to clandestin of 
notions of ‘foreignness’ articulated by the words “lo straniero / l’étranger.” It can justly be argued that a much better 
history of the relationship between Western European (proto)States and migration – or of migration in the Central 
Mediterranean – could be done by following the words étranger-straniero-ajnabi (ghurayeb) (Arabic): this history 
would perhaps be more pervasive and would probably tell us more about the relationship between migration and the 
state and it has, to some extent, been done: See among others Sophie Wahnich, L’impossible citoyen: L’étranger dans 
le discours de la Révolution Française (Paris, France: Albin Michel, 1997); Simona Cerutti, Étrangers: Étude d’une 
condition d’incertitude dans une société d’Ancien Régime (Paris, France: Bayard, 2012). But the interest of clandestin 
is that it is not initially born as a subject necessarily outside of the nation-State. And they only overlap and are conflated 
in very recent times: even in the 1832 Code de l’étranger, the only occurrence of the term ‘clandestin’ is used to refer 






are initially employed in connection with the movement of goods and, later, the movement of 
people. Following the growth of European industrial economies and the correlated expansion of 
colonial empires, the movements of goods – in the wake of new international trade routes, 
agreements, and the establishment of mercantile navies and private companies – and the movement 
of people, specifically in the form of labor, slowly begin to be tracked and controlled. As a result, 
in the early 20th Century the developing borders of France and Italy became the site of the 
development of clandestin as a central word in the growing lexicon of migration control. As an 
example, early forms of smuggling happening at the border between newly-formed Italy and 
France are called trafics clandestins, or contrabbando in Italian.  
Another border and productive site in the history of the term clandestin is the ports and 
coastal waters of Marseille and Nice. These became, despite general institutional agreements, a 
place for the enforcement of temporary yet significant measures targeting “indigenous” passengers 
boarding commercial vessels on North African shores, which represent a foundational moment in 



























[i.e. 19]/1/26 [i.e. 27], Nice, interrogatoire de 20 arabes arrivés clandestinement à bord du Moulouya : [photographie 
de presse]  
 
“L’étude de la clandestinité qui est, par définition, le caractère de ce qui se fait en cachette, 
pose un difficile problème de source puisque, par principe, elle laisse peu de traces, son principal 
souci étant même d’en laisser aucune.”49 As rare visual traces of clandestine sea passages from 
North African colonies to the metropole, often via Algeria, the two photographs reproduced above 
constitute the exception that confirms this general rule. The photographs confirm that traces of 
clandestinité can be found when things did not go according to plan and the hidden travelers were 
forced into an encounter with the officials in charge of policing the port and, by extension, illegal 
movement. In this respect, clandestine passage and its actors, in particular the passagers 
 
49 Daniel Martin, “Approche de la mentalité paysanne dans ses rapports avec la justice seigneuriale: Les assises 




clandestins, are no different, as the traces they leave are almost never direct and personal but 
always pieced together a posteriori, or indirectly reported.50 The photographs seen above are 
nearly identical and yet very different. Although clearly portraying the same event at a short 
interval, their captions differ most saliently in the fact that the first one is a portrait of an arrest, 
while the second seems to be showing an interrogation.51  
The first one appears to be a posed group picture in which the clandestine travelers wait in 
line for something they are expecting. The police officials stand on either side of the frame, while 
what appears to be the ship’s crew hang from the ship’s second deck, and “arabes embarqués 
clandestinement” are at the center of the image. The combination of noun, participle, and adverb 
conjure the idea of men of a certain type doing a certain thing known to readers and by then perhaps 
recurrent. As if, in 1927 in the port of Nice, an ‘arabe embarqué clandestinement’ was 
commonplace to the point of constituting a status, or at least, a recognizable, transferable, and 
repeatedly occurring encounter. 
In the second picture, a looser composition corresponds to a less rigid and seemingly less 
generalizing caption. The specification of the number ‘20’ already brings the caption closer to the 
object of the photograph, the arrested arabes. They are still on deck albeit in smaller numbers, and 
the emotion, excitement, and surprise that appear in the first photograph seem to have dissipated. 
On the one hand, the photographs look like two stills of the same event, taken perhaps in brief 
succession. Yet, simply by the addition of the number ‘20’, the caption suggests that this is a 
 
50 Initially considered an isolated phenomenon, clandestine sea passage – stowing away – grew in numbers and thus 
was increasingly formalized as a problem in metropolitan and colonial legislation alike. Its numbers and perception, 
thus, seem to have changed drastically in the period of time going from the end of WWI until the law of 1936 on 
stowaways (see below). With WWII the practice of clandestine passage seem to have decreases and, consequently, it 
waned progressively from public attention. The adjective ‘clandestine’, as we will see, later moved on to other kinds 
of passage and activities.  
 
51 As the caption reads, the photographs were taken on January 19th, 1927. The second photograph’s date, originally 




specific interrogatoire of 20 specific arabes. The number 20 paradoxically works, in the second 
caption, as the closest thing to an attribute of individual existence.  
But these photographs are two stills of the same event. As already noted, the excitement 
of the discovery is clear in the first one. Two lower-rank policemen gravely look into the camera, 
while their superior, recognizable by the rigid hat, looks at the arrested men. The crew hangs from 
the second deck, eager to witness the scene below. In the second picture, someone who is 
presumably an investigator, or commissaire, is on deck proceeding with interrogations. Most of 
the arrested are no longer present, and those who are look away or at their feet, except for one, 
who has not moved and whose gaze most directly meets the camera in both images of this arrest.  
These sources tell us that the men are arabes and left from Algeria, presumably making 
them, in 1927, ‘subjects’ of France. The Compagnie de Navigation Mixte, which bought the 
Moulouya pictured above in 1904 was, in 1927, one of the three maritime companies licensed by 
the French State to ensure maritime communication – postal and mercantile – between Algeria and 
the metropole.52 Thus, the arabes likely boarded the vessel in Algeria. Another, more important 
piece of information that these photographs contain, however, appears both in their image and in 
 
52 “1895 vit la fin du monopole de la Compagnie Générale Transatlantique sur les lignes d’Afrique du Nord. L’État 
accorda à toutes le compagnies marseillaises une rémunération pour le transport des dépêches et des primes à la 
vitesse. L’accord fut revu l’année suivante. […] EN 1904, pour compléter sa flotte de navires de charge, la 
Compagnie [de Navigation Mixte, CNM] acheta plusieurs cargos d’occasion, [dont] le Calabro, rebaptisé Moulouya 
(3320 Tpl).” ‘Tpl’ stands for ‘tonnes de port en lourd’, or the maximum charge (in ‘tonnes’, or hundreds of kilos) 
that a ship can carry. Of the little we know of the Moulouya, something stands out: “Le 24 août 1917, le Moulouya, 
allant de Marseille à Tunis, eut un engagement qui dura plus d’une heure avec le sous-marin U34 qui tira 120 coups 
de canon mais dut rompre le combat. Devant la riposte de leur proies, les sous-marins ennemis employèrent la 
torpille qu’ils avaient jusque-là précieusement économisée.” Bernard Bernadac, “Petite histoire de la Compagnie de 
Navigation Mixte. Deuxième Partie: 1985–1915,” L’algérianiste 106 (2004): 21. L’algérianiste is a cultural 
enterprise steeped in pieds-noirs nostalgia — its motto is ‘sauver une culture en péril’ — but this study of the CNM 
by Bernadac, published in five installments, it is one of the most exhaustive sources of information on the 
Compagnie and its vessels. Unfortunately, his work skips the years 1916–1937, and thus the period during which 
these photographs were taken. A related doubt, which I have not been able to dissipate, regards when (or even 
whether) the CNM started to use Nice as a port. All records consulted seem to show Marseille as the company’s port 






their text. The passengers “boarded” and then “arrived” clandestinement, and they are subject to 
arrest and interrogation. From the captivated interest of the onlooking crew in Picture 1, where 
they look at the discovered passengers instead of looking at the camera, to the commissaire 
gathering information, we see a familiar trait of the word clandestin, and some additional meaning 
attached to it: for the first time it seems that ‘hidden’ movement, in this case embarquement 
clandestin, is associated with a crime, or at least it is an act demanding the intervention and 
investigation of the authorities. Nonetheless, a thick sense of discovery, of literal and metaphorical 
emergence from invisibility and anonymity pervades these photographs: there are no weapons, no 
handcuffs, and bodies are static. It seems that the police, epitomized by the detective who seems 
to be listening to one of the passengers, is at least at this stage more concerned about the discovery 
of hidden passengers – explaining, giving it a name, a story and a reason – than with prosecuting 
the discovery as a crime.53 And what would be the object of the police interrogation? The 
anonymity of the passengers, and the fact that they were unaccounted for upon departure and as 
such owed the passage fare to the shipping company, or was it in fact the anonymity (clandestinité) 
of their passage from Algeria to the metropole, the invisibility of their presence? We will explore, 
in the following pages, the depths at which these two issues – invisibility and human movement – 
are entangled. 
 
53 Legal scholar Martine Remond-Gouilloud recognized this double acception in her now old but still important 
study on maritime law: “Le passager clandestin est celui qui s’embarque frauduleusement à bord d’un navire. Ses 
buts peuvent être divers; tantôt il cherche à fuir le pays de départ ou à pénétrer en fraude dans le pays de destination 
du navire, tantôt il cherche seulement à voyager sans bourse délier.” Martine Remond-Gouilloud, Droit Maritime 
(Paris, France: Pedone, 1988), 426. See also Kristenn Le Bourhis, Les transporteurs et le contrôle des flux 
migratoires (Paris, France: l’Harmattan, 2001). It is important to note how, in 1988, undocumented border-crossing 
is listed as the main motive of the stowaway. This was not the case, yet, in the 1920s. Or rather, it was the very 
beginning: it is precisely through the repeated codification of the passager clandestin in the mid-1920s as both a 
‘fraudeur’ and a human crossing boundaries that we see the passager clandestin become, little by little, an 




Understanding this question requires a reminder as to the system of law decrees, orders, 
and specific measures known, together, as indigénat that governed the colonies.54 Writing in 1903, 
Émile Larcher, one of the most prominent experts of colonial law at the time, described the 
underlying logic of indigénat – as well as the conditions to which it ‘responded’ and the ‘needs’ it 
addressed – in the following way:  
“Only a policy of moderate subjection will work in the colonies. We must, first of all, 
strengthen our domination through an authoritarian system. The ‘decree regime’ (le régime 
des décrets), and even the Governor’s orders represent the only regime sufficiently flexible 
and mobile to respond to the rapid changes of a society in the process of development 
(d’une société qui se forme). There can be no representative assemblies in a settlement 
where there are little to no Europeans. Similarly, a well-inculcated policy of subjection is 
the only one possible in colonies of exploitation (colonies d’exploitation), which are home 
to millions of indigènes reticent to our civilization, while the European element is 
represented by only a few thousands exploiters, traders, and public officials.”55  
 
Attempting to frame indigénat as a colonial legal necessity due to demographic inferiority and 
native resistance, Larcher is effectively admitting to the existence of a repressive and often 
arbitrary system of legal exception. 
This “decree régime” is the legal mechanism that authorizes the ‘executive powers’ of the 
metropole, and the colony’s governor, to govern directly and “supply”, as Larcher and Rectenwald 
put it, by decree instead of going through the much more tortuous legislative processes of the 
Republic. Embedded in the very first steps taken by colonial France, the “decree regime” was 
 
54 The expression Code de l’indigénat, widely employed, is slightly misleading in that, although they do form a 
sometimes contradictory legal body coherently aimed at governing indigenous life, these various pieces of 
legislation were not collected in a single Code as it had been the case, for instance, with the Code Noir (1685) or the 
Code de Napoleon (Civil Code, 1804). Needless to say, the norms generally aimed at heightened restrictions and 
repression, including on indigenous movement. Apart from Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison’s De l’indigénat (Paris: 
Éditions de la Découverte, 2010), on which I rely throughout this section, also see Emmanuelle Saada, “The Empire 
of Law: Dignity, Prestige, and Domination in the Colonial Situation,” French Politics, Culture & Society 20, no. 2 
(2002): 98–120; Alexandre Deroche, Éric Gasparini and Martial Mathieu, eds., Droits de l’homme et colonies: De la 
mission de civilisation au droit à l’autodétermination (Aix-en-Provence, France: Presses Universitaires d’Aix-
Marseille, 2017). 
 





sanctioned the day after the “capitulation” of Algiers in July 1830 by a principle that lasted until 
1945, whereby “French possessions in the northern part of Africa will be ruled by decree 
(ordonnances)” until otherwise ordered.56 The almost schizophrenic and confusing nature of 
indigénat – where decrees, ordonnances, and laws often conflicting or repealing each other were 
signed continuously,57– becomes clear in the case of the passagers clandestins who, as 
‘passengers’, as ‘hidden’, and as ‘indigènes’ respectively, were the object of overlapping 
legislative efforts which, in the space of three years from 1923 to 1926, regulated passage from 
the colonies to the metropole. These partially overlapping laws are found in the “Code de la Marine 
marchande”, the “Code pénal” and in a circulaire from the Interior Ministry restricting the 
boarding of vessels to the Metropole for the indigènes of North Africa.  
 
In July 1923, following a report from the Minister of Colonies Albert Sarraut, a decree 
from French President Alexandre Millerand signed the “loi du 30 mai 1923 relative à la répression 
du délit d’embarquement clandestin à bord des navires de commerce” into applicability throughout 
the French empire.58 By decree, thus, was declared applicable “in the French colonies and countries 
of protectorate under the Ministry of colonies” the law, promulgated in the metropole only a month 
before, whose declared objective was to criminalize “clandestine passage” and the persons or 
networks that made it possible:  
 
Article 1er. — Toute personne qui s'introduit frauduleusement sur un navire avec 
l'intention d'y faire une traversée de long cours ou de cabotage international est 
punie d'une amende de seize à cinq cents francs (16 à 500 fr.) et d'un 
 
56 Larcher and Rectenwald in a later edition (1923) of the Traité, quoted in Le Cour Grandmaison, De l’indigénat, 
19. 
 
57 Le Cour Grandmaison, De l’indigénat, 24–25. 
 




emprisonnement de six jours à six mois, ou de l'une de ces deux peines seulement. 
En cas de récidive, l'amende sera de cinq cents à mille francs (500 à 1000 fr.) et 
l'emprisonnement de six mois à deux ans. 
 Art. 2. — Toute personne qui, soit à bord, soit à terre, a favorisé l'embarquement 
ou le débarquement d'un passager clandestin, l'a dissimulé ou lui a fourni des vivres 
à l'insu du capitaine est punie d'une amende de cent à trois mille francs (100 à 3.000 
fr.) et d'un emprisonnement de six jours à six mois. Le maximum de ces deux peines 
doit être prononcé à l'égard des personnes qui se sont groupées pour faciliter les 
embarquements clandestins.  
 
 
This law is important for several reasons, some of which are immediately apparent. First 
of all, it presents something that will remain constant – at least in the uses of the word 
clandestin(ement) – until the end of the 20th century: the first association between long-distance 
human movement and the hidden or fraudulent character of the clandestin resulting in the 
association of clandestine movement with a penalty that is both administrative and criminal.59 
Specifically, this seems to be the first time that, in French, movement across borders is 
simultaneously referred to as ‘clandestin’ and (as such, but not entirely) criminalized. The second, 
seemingly superficial yet striking aspect is the concomitant criminalization of assistance to 
migration, which is a pressing issue of today’s Central Mediterranean route.60 The underlying logic 
of Article 2 is that enabling or helping clandestine passage is just as bad – and equally subject to 
penalty – as passage itself, perhaps because it participates in ‘hiding’ a proscribed act.  
Yet, it would be risky to affirm that the 1923 law’s goal was the reduction of migration 
flows. First, it is difficult to assess with certainty which one of the two semantic qualities of 
 
59 Although probably not for the absolute first time, since the legislation on both ‘étrangers’ and ‘passports’ had 
been developing concomitantly albeit not at the same pace. But, according to my findings, this is the first time in 
which the adjective clandestin is officially associated to both movement and its criminalization. 
 
60 Currently, Cédric Herrou and Carola Rackete are just the most internationally known individuals falling under the 
label of criminal enablers (in Italian favoreggiamento, in French ‘aide’). But the arming of a so-called LYCG, the 
criminalization of SAR NGOs ships and of rescue and refuge practices around the internal borders of Europe 






clandestine is at the root of the law, and in what proportion. In the logic of the legislator, was it 
more important to criminalize the financially fraudulent character of ‘clandestine’ boarding as 
‘unpaid debt’, or does this law respond to a growing political attention to movement, thus 
criminalizing ‘clandestine’ as hidden passage, concealed from the State’s growing knowledge 
apparatus and view? The presence of both the adverb ‘frauduleusement’ (art. 1) and of the adjective 
‘clandestin’ (art. 2) seems to suggest that the law and its spirit may have hosted a dual meaning, 
regulating both the consequences of stealing a service and of moving without the State’s 
knowledge, resulting in what legal scholar Martine Remond-Gouilloud described as a ‘conjugation 
of clandestinities.’61 
It is also impossible, from the text of the law, to determine whether it was motivated by a 
preoccupation with inter-imperial movement. On the one hand, the phrasing of the first line of 
Article 1, specifically “long-distance crossing or international cabotage,” seems to be concerned 
chiefly with departures and inter-empire circulation rather than foreign entrance. Algeria was not 
an international destination, “it was France,” and whether the journey from Marseille to Algiers 
constitutes a long-distance crossing is uncertain. However, as was previously noted, this law was 
instituted by decree in the colonies almost immediately after its enactment in the Metropole.62 
Finally, clarifying the legislator’s original preoccupations, in 1924 the Minister of Interior, Camille 
Chautemps, issued an elusive yet vividly criticized circulaire that restricted the movement of 





61 “[le passager clandestin] conjugue alors les clandestinités à l’égard des autorités de police, de douane, et à l’égard 
de l’armateur.” Remond-Gouilloud, Droit Maritime, 427.  





The circulaire(s) of 1924 
 
“It is the constant preoccupation for the native (indigène) worker’s best interest that 
inspired [this law.] It is the pitfalls, dangers, and deplorable consequence of the current lack of 
regulation that determined […] these measures,” wrote Interior Minister Camille Chautemps in a 
letter presenting his circulaire of August 1924 – regimenting the sea passage of ‘native’ workers 
from Algeria to the metropole – to the Governor of Algeria.63 
The circulaire presented itself, ostensibly, as a document aimed at creating security and 
safety around the travailleur indigène’s desire to travel to France. It first differentiated, by way of 
strict pre-embarkation controls in Algerian ports, between travailleurs and non-travailleurs. Then, 
in order to ensure that the indigène was not “leaving behind the stability and gain of an occupation 
that he will not find in the metropole,” it required that the indigène wishing to cross the sea to work 
possess, prior to boarding, a certificate of employment, a medical certificate, and a “carte d’identité 
avec photographie.”64 The story of the carte d’identité in France and, later, in the colonies is long 
and rich and collides with movement within a space that, for some, corresponds to two regions of 
France while for others — for indigenous passengers — was divided by the circulaire into two 
separate jurisdictions.65 In fascinating fashion, the circulaire Chautemps formalizes this difference 
through a slight grammatical change between the verb pouvoir and the verb être, between 
conditionality and certainty: 
 
“Comme il importe essentiellement, dans l’intérêt même des passagers, de prévenir, de la 
part des autorités […], toute difficulté et toute erreur d’interprétation, j’ai décidé qu’à 
 
63 Letter of Camille Chautemps to the Governor of Algeria dated 8 August 1924, in Bulletin Officiel du Ministère de 
l’Intérieur (Paris: 1924), 263–264. 
  
64 Bulletin Officiel (1924), 265. 
 





l’avenir tout passager, quelle que soit son origine, européenne ou indigène, et quelle que 
soit la classe de son passage, pourra être tenu, à l’embarquement en Algérie et au 
débarquement en France, de justifier de son identité.”66  
 
 
We could almost believe the opening sentence, that is, that the circulaire is in fact a non-
discriminatory act67 — at least not solely restrictive of indigenous movement — that aimed at 
enhanced passenger and worker security if the above passage weren’t immediately followed by 
this one: 
 
“Cette justification [de son identité] sera obligatoire pour les passagers indigènes de 3e et 




The lines along which a hierarchy of free movement would operate start to be more visible. 
The circulaire differentiates, first, between workers and visitors. However, the most subtle and yet 
pernicious distinction takes place at the intersection of race and class, in both its social and 
nautical-transportational meanings, by switching from the semantic field of ‘possibility’ to that of 
certainty and obligation. (Poor) indigènes will be mandatorily identified, while all others may be 
asked to identify themselves. On this subtle distinction an important semantic accretion has taken 
place on the passenger, the indigène and, by extension, the adjective clandestin. From now on the 
passager indigène will be identified as such and classified as either worker or non-worker. The 
biggest accretion in meaning, however, happens when the worker, in relation to the nature of labor 
and in opposition with the ‘simple visitor,’ effectively becomes an immigrant, although this is not 
 
66 Bulletin Officiel (1924), 265. 
 
67 Of course, I say “almost” because it is unnecessary to discuss the discriminatory nature of colonial policies, on the 
one hand, and because, on the other hand, the availability of the required documentation to indigenes, along with the 
presumptions on which the circulaire is based, makes the law discriminatory in effect. 
 




yet the terminology because both the worker and the authorities are under the belief that the 
travailleur indigene’s presence in the Metropole will be temporary. By tying the ‘right of passage’ 
to a carte d’identité and, for those seeking work, to a demanding set of additional documents, 
indigenous free movement is made ‘clandestin’ in both its ‘fraudulent’ and ‘hidden’ acceptations, 
while at the same time clandestine passage is racialized and made indigène. Simultaneously and, 
we may argue, as a partial result of this semantic operation, the highly restricted status of the 
‘travailleur (indigène) immigré’ of French postwar and postcolonial imaginary is beginning to take 
shape.  
 
Shortly after the coming into force of the circulaire(s) Chautemps69all the indigenous 
members of Algeria’s General Council70 presented a motion in which they called out the Circulaire 
as ‘restricting the freedom of Algerian Muslims.’71 Their argumentation revolved around 
nationality, law, and procedure: “This rule (réglementation)” the councilmembers write in 
reference to the circulaire “is against existing law, because it is inadmissible that a French person’s 
freedom of circulation (liberté de se déplacer) — the indigène algérien is French following the 
conquest and the Sénatus-Consulte of 1865 — could be restricted by a simple ministerial 
circulaire. […] The travel authorization (permis de voyage) to reach France from Algeria was 
suppressed by the law of 15 July 1914, and only a law can modify an existing law.”72 Their most 
important point, however, relates labor demands on both sides of the Mediterranean to 
 
69 Three circulaires were in fact published in short succession, in the months of August and September 1924, 
although only one listed the travel requirements that, in the wake of the signature, led commentators to speak of the 
‘circulaire Chautemps’ in the singular. They are all collected in the Bulletin Officiel of 1924. 
 
70 Conseil Général d’Algérie.  
 
71 L’Écho d’Alger, 26 Octobre 1924. 
  





contributions (to the fisc, to the Empire) made by Algerians as French citizens: “The measure 
enacted by the circulaire results in the thinning (raréfaction) of Algerian labor force in France to 
the benefit of foreign workers (Polish, Russian, Czechoslovakian, etc.), and the salaries earned by 
Algerian workers are used almost entirely in Algeria, with great benefits for the Algerian fisc, the 
overall prosperity of the colony, and for public order. This restrictive measure also creates a 
legitimate discontent in Muslim masses (les masses musulmanes) and is at risk of pushing them 
towards disorder. The same populations indigènes who fought the War of Law (la guerre du Droit) 
alongside Frenchmen of European origin are legitimately surprised to see that the same Law that 
they helped defend no longer applies to them. Finally, this latest measure distorts the law of supply 
and demand both on the Algerian and metropolitan labor markets.”73  
The ensuing debate – reported by l’Écho d’Alger and involving the signatory councilmen 
and those opposed to the motion and in favor of the circulaires – represents a furtive yet strikingly 
clear look at, on the one hand, the discursive formation of the ‘indigène as immigrant’ as a new 
category to be legislated and, on the other, the development and extension of the trope of the 
indigène as needing to be protected, and ultimately saved, this time from the desire to migrate. If, 
at the beginning of the debate, Councilman Chekiken “appeal[ed] to justice and to the generosity 
of France towards its Muslim sons,” another councilman, Froget, felt “the obligation to point out 
that [the measures] must be in no way considered humiliating or viewed as a form of coercion 
towards some indigènes who go to work in France. They are, on the contrary, preventive measures 
aiming at creating security (safety) around them.”74  
 
73 L’Écho d’Alger, 26 Octobre 1924. 
 
74 This is an extremely tricky sentence and idea to translate, if only because the original French could be interpreted 
in a couple of slightly different ways. Here is Froget’s full reported response: (‘M. Froget croit devoir indiquer qu’il 
ne s’agit en l’espèce d’aucune brimade, d’aucune mesure de coercition à l’égard des indigènes qui vont travailler en 





Furthermore, during the debate, the preoccupation of those councilmen who were highly 
concerned with the ‘security and safety’ of indigènes shifted to the apparatus that had reportedly 
developed around the indigènes’ desire to migrate. Councilman Weinmann, for instance, asks the 
préfet75 ‘whether M. Calvelli, former administrator of a commune mixte who founded a 
boarding/travel agency (une agence d’embarquement) for indigènes wanting to reach the 
métropole does in fact possess the necessary authorizations.’ ‘These remarks by Mr. Weinmann’ 
— the report continues — ‘lead the indigènes councilmembers to forcefully draw attention to the 
exploitation faced, in Algiers, by those indigènes who are trying to reach France and need the 
documents that the new measures demand. There is, on the docks of Algiers, a gang of sharks (une 
bande de requins) that extract up to 200 francs from those indigènes who resort to their services, 
says M. Ameur. This ‘boarding office’ (office d’embarquement, referencing the sharks, and 
playing on the word office-offices as office-services) is where exploitation starts.”76  
It would not be unwarranted to read this reported discussion as the genesis of a debate on 
mechanisms and causal relationships in the illegalization of migrant labor – or those currently 
referred to as ‘economic migrants’ in certain regions of the political landscape. If we attempt to 
read this brief report along with Chautemps’ explanatory notes discussed above we can see, in the 
distant mind of the legislator, the emergence of a particular logic of movement and, most 
importantly, of control. The most problematic aspect of this logic – and thus the ultimate objective 
of the logic of control – seems to be a specific type of migrant and workers’ agency that must be 
penalized and eradicated. The “danger” constituted by lack of restrictions and the “deplorable 
 
75 The préfét, or highest police authority of the commune or province, is also the highest authority on the Conseil 
Général.  
 
76 The final reference is to how exploitation of the indigène seeking work in France will only continue once they 




consequences” of a regime of free mobility within “France” for the indigène that was in place from 
1914 until the circulaire was the main rhetorical focus of Chautemps and the councilmen alike.77 
“To create safety” around the indigène presupposed several assumptions regarding them. First, 
that the indigènes did not have legitimate reasons to leave, thus their desire to do so was 
illegitimate. Second, the unjustified nature of departure testified to their unpreparedness, therefore 
justifying legal action as protection from the pitfalls of uncalculated risk. Third, the indigènes were 
put forth as victims of themselves and of the ‘gangs of sharks’ that both intensified and fulfilled 
their desire to leave. The circulaire rests on the premise of a toxic picture of migrant and worker 
agency that is in line with the founding principles of French colonization and its mission 
civilisatrice and, beyond that, with the illegalization mechanisms of contemporary Europe. 
Specifically, restrictive legal mechanisms created increasingly treacherous and possibly lethal 
conditions of crossing: the illegalized ‘mobile indigenous worker’ was thus exposed, instead of 
being protected, to the dangers of ‘clandestine passage.’ Consequently, even though the 
Chautemps circulaires never mention the adjective or noun clandestin – passager or other – they 
strengthened its role as the vector over which the indigène moved from the status of worker-subject 
to the status of ‘passenger’ to, finally, the status of immigrant whose presence and life in the 
metropole were made illegal. 
Ferhat Abbas, an important figure of the Algerian Revolution and Algeria’s short-lived 
first ‘acting President’ is one of the few commentators who concerned themselves, even briefly, 
with the circulaires.78 In La nuit coloniale he wrote about it (in the singular) within a larger 
 
77 Bulletin Officiel (1924), 263. 
 
78 Most recently, Emmanuel Blanchard mentions the ‘Sidi-Ferruch’ and similar (although not nearly as deadly) cases 
of passagers clandestins occurring in the sole year of 1926, noting that their were part of a larger trend. Emmanuel 
Blanchard, Histoire de l’immigration Algérienne en France (Paris, France: La Découverte, 2018), 35–36. The other 
work that mentions the disaster (also quoted by Blanchard) is the monumental L’opinion française et les étrangers, 




discussion of indigène labor mobility in the interwar period.79 “Malgré la ‘circulaire Chautemps’ 
l’exode des ouvriers algériens en France se poursuit, favorisé par une partie du patronat français. 
[...] En 1924, les colons, soucieux de conserver pour l’Algérie une main-d’oeuvre à bon marché, 
obtinrent du ministre de l’Intérieur, Camille Chautemps, une circulaire qui limitait illégalement le 
départ des ouvriers en France (10 septembre 1924). Mais, un jour, des Algériens s’embarquèrent 
clandestinement dans les soutes à charbon du bateau Sidi-Ferruch. À Marseille, on découvrit douze 
cadavres. Affolé, le Conseil d’État annula la circulaire et dénonça son caractère illégal.”80  
Nevertheless, despite the Conseil d’État striking down the measures for manifest illegality, 
the circulaires represent a foundational act of illegalization that provided the blueprint for the 
articulation of exclusionary practices in the years, and decades to come. 
 
The ‘Sidi-Ferruch’ and the adjective as noun 
“Une tragédie à bord du ‘Sidi-Ferruch,’81” titles the daily newspaper L’Echo d’Alger on 
April 29 avril 1926: 
 
Marseille, 18 avril –– Hier après-midi vers 18 heures, M. Taddei, le si actif 
commissaire spécial de la Grande Bigue, était avisé par téléphone qu'une 
 
 
79 Rather than a mechanism of its illegalization. 
 
80 Ferhat Abbas, Guerre et révolution d’Algérie: La nuit coloniale (Paris: Julliard, 1962), 118. Abbas mentions only 
the last one of the three circulaires. He is also slightly undercounting the number of victims. It is important to 
underscore that, by the time the Conseil d’État struck down the circulaires three months after the ‘Sidi-Ferruch’ 
tragedy, it had been regulating indigenous movement between Algeria and France for almost two years.  
81 It has been difficult to piece together a few details on the ‘Sidi-Ferruch’ prior to the tragedy inscribed its name in 
history. This is due to the fact that SGTM (Société Générale des Transports Maritimes à vapeur), owned, over the 
course of the 20th Century, at least 3 ships named Sidi-Ferruch. One was launched in 1949 [interesting detail: it was 
a ‘bateau moutonnier,’ one that could carry 128 passengers and 6000 sheep between France and Algeria.[ Here are its 
last days: ‘[...]Rejoint Papeete le 24 février 1968. Basé successivement à Fangataufa et à Mururoa, il fait toutes les 
campagnes de tirs atomiques avant d'être désarmé en 1972. Devenu Q 509, il est coulé comme cible le 7 septembre 
1972’]. Another ‘Sidi-Ferruch’ was sunk, on its way from Cette (Sète) to Algiers, by an German submarine in 1915. 
However on our ‘Sidi-Ferruch’, which docked in Marseille with at least 30 arabes embarqués clandestinement, half 





quinzaine de clandestins venaient d'être découverts dans la cale avant du vapeur 
“ Sidi-Ferruch”. Le navire était arrivé le matin même d’Alger et s’était amarré au 
Sud du môle. M. Taddei, accompagné de ses inspecteurs, se rendit à bord du 
paquebot et, avec l’aide d’un inspecteur, procéda à l’interrogatoire des clandestins, 
des Arabes misérablement vêtus. Les indigènes ne voulurent pas parler. C'est 
leur habitude. 
[…] 
On peut reconstruire le drame qui s’est déroulé à bord. Pour cacher les clandestins, 
les marins les placèrent dans la soute à charbon. Une sorte de chambre fut creusée 
dans les blocs de houille et les Arabes s’y cachèrent. Pendant la traversée le mauvais 
temps se leva en mer et le charbon s’écroula, ensevelissant les Arabes sous les blocs 
énormes. D’autres clandestins s’étaient cachés dans les ballastes sous la chaufferie. 
Les marins n’hésitèrent pas à les enfermer; les ballastes furent même boulonnés. 
Une chaleur de 60° y règne constamment.82 
[…] 
 
Le récit d’un clandestin83 
 
Ce matin nous avons retrouvé les clandestins marocains84 dans le même 
commissariat. Ils étaient assis tranquillement sur des bancs et paraissaient accablés. 
Nous leur avons posé quelques questions: Ils n’ont guère pu répondre n’ayant que 
des connaissances très rudimentaires en notre langue. L’un d’eux, pourtant, nous a 
fait le récit de sa folle équipée en ‘sabir’. En voici la substance: ‘Avec les 
camarades, nous avions été racolés sur le quai d’Alger par un inconnu — un 
européen — qui nous a offert de nous faire partir sur le ‘Sidi-Ferruch’ moyennant 
cinq cents francs par tête. Comme nous n’étions pas ‘riches’ (sic), il a transigé pour 
certains à 200 francs et nous a mis en rapport avec des amis à lui et des marins du 
bord. On nous a fait monter; on nous a caché dans le charbon et dans les soutes (les 
ballasts). Nous avons beaucoup souffert pendant la traversée n’ayant guère de 
provisions. Nous ne pensions pas que c’était défendu puisque nous avions payé. 
Après l’arrivée du bateau nous nous sommes préparés et avons attendu qu’on nous 
ouvre. On attendait sans doute la nuit: nous avons été découverts quand nous avons 
fait du bruit’. 
 
82“Une tragédie à bord du ‘Sidi-Ferruch,’” L’Écho d’Alger, 29 April 1926. Accessed at 
https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k7582723v.item.r=sidi-ferruch+L%27%C3%89cho . All issues of 1926 related 
to the ‘Sidi-Ferruch,’ including those of 7 and 8 July 1926 that relay the development of the trial, are accessible 
through the Gallica website. Emphasis mine. 
 
83 From the continuation of the investigation on the April 30th issue of L’Écho, titled “A-t-on découvert tous les 
cadavres?” L’Écho d’Alger, 30 April 1926. 
 
84 “On appelle passager : ‘tout homme qui paie fret pour sa personne et ses effets qui ne sont point marchandises 
(Consulat de la Mer, Ch. CXIII).’ Et le passager clandestin est donc celui qui, ayant pénétré à bord à l’insu du 
capitaine, n’a pas payé le ‘fret dû pour sa personne’. En droit comparé différents noms sont donnés à ces clandestins. 
En France: ‘Marocains” lorsqu’il s’agit des relations avec l’Afrique du Nord. Cette appellation tend d’ailleurs à 
désigner tous les clandestins originaires de nos colonies africaines. En Espagne: ‘Polizonaje’. En Angleterre et aux 
États-Unis: ‘Stowaways.’” Horace Gambini, De l’embarquement clandestin de passagers à bord des navires de 





“Une quinzaine de clandestins, […] des Arabes misérablement vêtus. Les indigènes ne voulurent 
pas parler. C’est leur habitude.” The very first paragraph of the article breaking the news of the 
tragedy in L’Écho d’Alger constitutes, in some ways, a break with the uses of the word clandestin 
that we have encountered until now. In other ways, however, it constitutes a partial crystallization 
of these various uses. The term clandestin became progressively part of a small cluster of terms 
that respond to the need of defining a ‘foreign body,’ intended here in both its physical and its 
collective acceptions. 
The first noticeable novelty is the use of clandestin as noun, unsupported by its longtime 
substantive companion, passager. This morphological progression leads to two different 
considerations. The first concerns the type of information that the word clandestin conveys. One 
hypothesis is that perhaps because of the frequency and exposure of these types of crossings, it 
was no longer necessary to specify – for the coastal press on both sides of the Mediterranean – that 
the clandestins found on board were passengers. There is, thus, an argument to be made about the 
role of a particular practice – in this case, the practice of stowing away – and its repetition in the 
shape of the language used to describe it, whereby clandestin may have morphed into a noun and 
consequently pushed passager off the page – and out of language – because of the frequency of 
clandestine passage in the mid-1920 from Algeria to France, and the concomitant absence of 
anything else ‘clandestin’ as an adjective of people in the same environment. Yet, as we have seen 
above in the circulaires Chautemps, there is in the mid-1920s an increased effort to construct the 
indigène as a moving subject in order to codify and effectively restrict the ways in which this 
movement could happen. Every indigène who did not meet the requirement of the circulaire fell, 
by chance or by choice, into the only category of illegalization existing at the time for that 




documents required by the circulaire could not be illegalized through the grammar of foreignness 
– they were French by law – nor consequently, through that of ‘immigrant’ or ‘refugee’ or worker, 
as it was not illegal to work. The only remaining illegality into which the unwanted movement of 
indigènes could be pushed, and thereby re-semanticized, was hidden at the intersection of criminal 
and mercantile law, and it was ‘clandestine passage.’ It is perhaps ‘by decree’ or rather ‘by 
circulaire’ that clandestin becomes a noun85 and begins to float freely in the register and semantic 
pool of the other labels alongside which it is evoked almost interchangeably in the article about 
the ‘Sidi-Ferruch’ : indigène, clandestin, Arabe, marocain, misérablement vêtu, et qui comme 
d’habitude ne parle pas. All of a sudden – if we can consider these sources as being representative 
of the period of time in which they were produced – clandestin seems to have become a colonial 
marker, a racial stereotype, and increasingly a vector not only of foreignness but of ‘illegal’ 
foreignness.86 
This sense of illegality, however, does not seem to have entirely taken over the semantic 
range of clandestin just yet: this is clear in the portion of the article that “translates”87 the 
clandestin’s own version of the crossing. The circumstances of the crossing as told by the 
passenger would suggest as much – particularly the fact of having been ‘racolés’ and the sentence 
‘nous ne pensions pas que c’était défendu puisque nous avions payé’. It is a short phrase coming 
from the journalist that tells us more about the fact that clandestin still retains something of its 
original connotation of ‘marginal,’ out of the ordinary and sometimes unacceptable, but not always 
 
85 Although, as stated above, the circulaires do not name ‘clandestine passage’ as a crime. In fact, they do not need 
to, as the legal category and its related mechanism of punishment are already in place. They simply push into this 
category every type of crossing not conforming to the circulaire’s impossible demands. 
 
86 Only later will ‘foreignness’ itself be inherently tainted with illegality. 
 
87 For an in-depth study on “Sabir” see Jocelyne Dakhlia, Lingua Franca: L’histoire d’une langue métissée en 




squarely illegal or punishable. The phrase in question, used to describe the crossing, is ‘folle 
equipée.’ 
According to dictionaries,88 ‘une équipée’ is ‘[une] entreprise irréfléchie, téméraire ou 
prêtant à la critique,” “dont les suites sont le plus souvent fâcheuses.”89 The Tlfi also lists among 
its ‘[quasi]-synonyms’ ‘aventure, frasque, fredaine.’90 The fairly wide, open, and potentially 
contradictory semantic possibilities of equipée, reinforced in the expression folle equipée, range, 
as the dictionary testifies, from adventure to risk. They can thus encompass successful – if pointless 
– acts of courage as much as endeavors conceived and carried out in mindlessness and even 
stupidity. Taken and read together, however, ‘équipée’ and its range of quasi-synonyms do point 
to something out of the ordinary, ‘off the tracks’ whatever the ‘tracks’ may be – moral, contractual, 
or socially accepted at a given time. Breaking the law is only a potential consequence of an équipée 
and not an inherent trait of the word. For the journalist inquiring about the tragedy of the ‘Sidi-
Ferruch’, the act of stowing away seems to be as much about the danger and risk of the act itself 
as it is about something that ‘Arabs (or indigènes, or marocains)’ do. As a result, as much as we 
have seen clandestin drift towards criminalization of illegality, in 1926 it retains as much of an 
association with the rarity and risk of the act of stowing away as with its breaking of the law.  
 
88 “Équipée,” in Trésor de la langue française informatisé, accessed on 25 2019 at http://stella.atilf.fr/  
 
89 “Équipée,” in Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 8th ed., accessed at 
https://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/academie8/%C3%A9quip%C3%A9e 
 
90 In the same dictionary, ‘fredaine’ is most elegantly defined as ‘[un] écart de conduite,’ specifically in the domains 
of the sexual and the sentimental. This constitutes, beyond its specific domain, perhaps the closest synonym to the 






In the same article, the author collects the opinion of Antoine Borelli, who was at the time 
‘special commissioner of railways, ports, and emigration.’91 He offers the readers of L’Écho 
d’Alger a quick, problematically linear, yet for these very reasons important historicization of 
‘native’ movement across the Mediterranean, and of the mechanisms supposedly in place to restrict 
it. 
 
  “Nous avons pris l’opinion très autorisée de M. Borelli, commissaire spécial 
des chemins de fer, des ports et de l’émigration. M. Borelli nous déclare que ces 
décès sont regrettables, mais que le fait n’est point isolé, bien au contraire. “Jadis, 
les marocains et les arabes s’embarquaient pour la France sans contrats de travail 
et très ostensiblement, tout naturellement. Dès leur arrivée, on les refoulait sur leur 
port d’embarquement. Ce fut ensuite l’embarquement clandestin, dangereux, mais 
notre service de surveillance veille toujours et chaque arrivée est minutieusement 
épluchée. À noter que les commandants de navire ont tout intérêt, au départ, à 
empêcher l’embarquement des passagers clandestins, car ce sont les compagnies 
prises en défaut qui doivent refouler, par le plus prochain navire, les ‘resquilleurs’. 
En ce qui concerne le cas du ‘Sidi-Ferruch’ il est regrettable, puisque c’est hélas un 
fait accompli aujourd’hui, que les coreligionnaires des victimes ne connaissent pas 
la nouvelle: cela les aurait refroidis et leur aurait montré, quand ils s’adressent à ces 
agences clandestines, à quel bandits ils ont affaire.” 
 
The practice of indigenous workers crossing, the special police commissioner tells us, is 
longstanding. In unspecified ‘old days,’ ‘Arabs and Moroccans’ would board ships without 
employment contracts and would be infallibly discovered and sent back. Such a statement, in light 
of the legislative chronology available and what we know by now about indigenous movement 
between Algeria and France, seems to be hardly accurate, particularly in the period between 1914 
and the circulaires. But I believe we should be less interested in a laborious fact-checking of the 
 
91 In her influential study The Boundaries of the Republic, Mary D. Lewis mentions Antoine Borelli – albeit under 
the slightly vaguer title of ‘special police commissioner’ – for his role in the first ‘screenings’ of what she terms the 
“early refugees” of the 1920s and 1930s, specifically Russians and Armenians who arrived by sea in Marseille. As it 
is easily imaginable, these ‘screenings’ bore little if any juridical guarantees and oversight, and Borelli is reported to 
have been keen in refusing entry to those who were suspected to be ‘dangerous from the point of view of Bolshevik 
propaganda.’” See Mary D. Lewis, The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism 
in France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 160 for the quote above, although all of Chapter 5 is 




commissioner’s narrative than in the words that he chose to offer it. It is striking that he evokes a 
time when the indigènes ‘s’embarquaient ostensiblement.’ This adverbial characterization of the 
verb ‘s’embarquer’ directly echoes, albeit in antonymic form, the caption below the photographs 
take onboard the Moulouya in the port of Nice and discussed earlier, which depicted ‘Arabs’ 
embarqués clandestinement. It is precisely this antonymy that is important, in the fact that not only 
does it bring clandestin forcefully back into the semantic realm of ‘hidden’, but it also reframes 
the idea of illegal movement. “Long ago,” the indigènes were pushed back if they had no proof of 
employment upon landing in France. It seems, then, that the circulaires’ sole effect was to 
‘clandestinize’ – hiding from sight by making it illegal – their boarding of ships headed to the 
metropole. The two meanings of clandestin thus finally met in one use. 
In this light, what sense should we make of the commissioner’s paraphrasing of the 
passager clandestin as a ‘resquilleur’? The resquilleur ‘goes beyond his right’ and ‘sneaks in,’ 
without paying or without waiting his turn.92 He cheats, possibly but not necessarily criminally. 
The intent to criminalize – and the logic of criminalization – of all of these behaviors floating in 
the grey area between amorality, unacceptability, and illegality shows up, instead, more forcefully 
in the commissioner’s use of the adjective ‘dangerous’ to qualify stowing away. It would be 
perfectly acceptable to call it ‘dangerous’ in light of what just happened in the hold of the ‘Sidi-
Ferruch’, but the subordinate clause clearly shows that these embarquements are dangerous first 
and foremost for the State, whether or not they imperil the stowaways. The commissioner’s words 
show how, first on the decks and then in the holds of commercial ships, the indigène was illegalized 
and how clandestin, in its semantic instability, was the perfect vector for the expansion and 
refinement of this logic.  
 





To further prove that embarquement clandestin had become a problem not of ‘unpaid or 
undetected passage’ but of passage itself, here are the words of Senator Boivin-Champeaux, 
rapporteur de la commission de législation civile et criminelle, who in 1933 spoke to his fellow 
senators regarding “important modifications to the law of 17 December 1926 ‘on the disciplinary 
and penal code of the mercantile navy.’”93 The new dispositions, the legislator affirms, “visent la 
répression de l’embarquement clandestin.” He then continues, in strikingly recognizable language, 
to paint a bleak picture of France’s ability to ‘arm’ and defend itself against the “intensive exodus 
of indigènes from North Africa to France.” Significantly, he immediately sets up the connection 
between the ‘exodus’ and the myriad ‘factories’ which, by taking care of smuggling / hiding the 
indigènes or providing them with fake papers, effectively produce it. His commission’s 
conclusions are that only a harsher penal regime for both the crossers and the ‘factories’ would 
succeed in curbing the flows.94 The use of the word ‘exodus’ points to a recrudescence of the same 
colonial interests underlined by Abbas a few pages above. The invoked severity of the punishment, 
and the wish to expand its scope and thus responsibility for the crime, may point to a refining 
mechanism to control and regulate the physical location of indigenous labor within the Empire. It 
is interesting that this is done by penalizing the clandestine crossing from Algeria as an 
international offense, this time formalizing – for the sake of the indigène – the selective ‘border’ 
between Algeria and France towards which the circulaires Chautemps only gestured. 
 
“Or, l’article 74 de la loi de 1926 distingue deux sortes de délit d’embarquement clandestin: 
l’embarquement clandestin à bord d’un navire armé au bornage ou au cabotage national, 
 
93 ‘Loi du 17 décembre 1926 portant code disciplinaire et pénal de la marine marchande.’ For the discussion, see 
Journal officiel du Sénat, 13 June 1933, 1336ff. 
 
94 “Vous savez [speaking to senators] que, depuis fort longtemps, les ministres de l’intérieur et de la marine 
demandent à être mieux armés pour prévenir l’exode intensif des indigènes de l’Afrique du Nord. Vous savez aussi 
qu’il existe de véritables officines qui se chargent de ces transferts d’indigènes d’Algérie en France. Pour empêcher 
cet exode il faut, d’une part, renforcer les peines notoirement insuffisantes prévue par la loi de 1926 et, d’autre part, 




pour lequel l’infraction consiste dans le simple fait de monter à bord d’un navire, et 
l’embarquement clandestin à bord d’un navire au long cours ou de cabotage international, 
pour lequel l’infraction réprimée est l’introduction frauduleuse à bord d’un navire, avec 
l’intention de faire une traversée.” 
“Il y a intérêt à unifier le caractère de ces deux délits, mais, alors, se pose la question de 
savoir quel caractère il faudra donner à ce délit unique. Faudra-t-il opter pour le délit 
contraventionnel ou, au contraire, pour le délit intentionnel? La commission de législation 
civile et criminelle a cru que, étant donné le but à atteindre, il était indispensable de donner 
à ce délit le caractère intentionnel; en cas de délit contraventionnel, en effet, on ne peut 
atteindre ni la complicité, ni la tentative de complicité. Dans le texte que nous vous 
soumettons nous avons donc unifié les deux délits: il n’y aura plus qu’un seul délit 
d’embarquement clandestin, qu’il s’agisse du cabotage national ou international. D’autre 
part, ce délit aura un caractère intentionnel; on pourra ainsi atteindre la complicité et la 
tentative de complicité.”95 
 
The 1933 law, which its rapporteur Boivin-Champeaux justified with rhetorical gestures 
towards ‘biblical’ movements of people and third-party enablers that would characterize much 
subsequent political discourse supporting migratory restrictions, signifies simultaneously the end 
and the beginning of the passager clandestin. On the one hand, this is the most refined form – in 
terms of criminalization – of the passager clandestin produced by French legal language, one that 
marks the indissoluble association between the passager and the border, thus ushering the 
passager into the realm of international migration. On the other hand, this is where the passager 
clandestin ceases to exist in the French context, since the indigènes around whom the crime of 
‘clandestine passage’ was so closely modeled underwent a lexical transformation, first with World 
 
95 “But Article 74 or the 1926 law [on embarquement clandestin] distinguishes between two sorts of offenses 
regarding embarquement clandestin. On the one hand, clandestine boarding of a ship equipped for coastal and 
national navigation, in which case the offense consists of the simple fact of having boarded the ship. On the other 
hand, stowing away on a ship equipped for ocean-to-ocean or international navigation, in which case the offense 
consists of ‘fraudulent boarding with the intention of crossing’. It would be advisable to unify the character of these 
two offenses, but what should be the character of the new, single offense? Should it be a simple violation or, instead, 
retain its intentional character? In light of the goal of this reform, the Commission has deemed indispensable to 
make it an intentional offense, since it would otherwise be impossible to attain both attempted complicity and 
complicity. Thus, in the text that we submitted to you we unified the two offenses: There will only be one délit 
d’embarquement clandestin, whether it be on national or international routes. Moreover, this offense will bear 
intentional character, in order to attain both complicity and attempted complicity.” Journal officiel du Sénat, 13 June 




War II and then with the trente glorieuses,96 during which they were first legalized and later 
restricted as ‘immigrant workers’ or travailleurs immigrés.  
Nevertheless, the passager clandestin-stowaway continued to have a life of its own 
throughout the 20th Century and well into global contemporary migration, although it is used 
chiefly in cases of individuals or small groups hidden in commercial vessels or planes.97  
The remainder of this chapter will turn to the use of clandestin as an adjective-noun that 
becomes the name for other forms of migration and other types of migrants. I will show first how 
the hardening of pre-WWII Italian and French nationalisms contributed to the precipitous drifting 
of clandestin towards the burgeoning lexicons of ‘straniero-étranger’ and ‘refugié.’ I will then turn 
to the early 1990s when les clandestins - i clandestini became the name for the foreign and the 
alien, the immigrant and the illegal, as well as the hidden and undetected. 
 
 Pre-war(s) Italy: Emigration and Growth of the ‘Alien’ 
 
Between its unification in 1861 the aftermath of WWI, Italy was a poor country that 
encouraged its people to leave and seek better fortunes or even mere survival abroad. At different 
times, emigration concerned both the South and the North, and was primarily directed to the 
Americas for the former and to Northern Europe for the latter.98 The steady flow of emigrants 
 
96 Les trente [années] glorieuses defines the period of time from the immediate aftermath of WWII to roughly the 
mid of the 1970s, during which France’s (and most of Western Europe’s) economies grew exponentially. In the case 
of France, travailleurs indigènes from current and former colonies were instrumental in rebuilding its industrial 
production after the war. Legalized ‘officines’, or filières as they used to be called, where put in place under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Labor to ‘import’ workforce in large numbers from both North and West Africa. The 
end of the trente glorieuses in usually made to fall in the middle of the two oil crises of the 1970s, 1973 and 1979, 
respectively.  
 
97 Olivier Clochard, “Enfermés à bord des navires de la marine marchande,” Annales de Géographie 702–703 
(2015): 185–207. Also in other languages, and on various means of transportation (buses, cars, planes). Paloma 
Maquet et Julia Burtin Zortea, “Quand la marine marchande seconde la police aux frontières.” 
 
98 The relation between area of origin and destination is slightly more complex. See on this Andreina De Clementi, 
“La ‘grande emigrazione’: dalle origini alla chiusura degli sbocchi americani’ in Storia dell’Emigrazione Italiana, 




alleviated the “economic pressure” of masses of unemployed people.99 Italian emigration in the 
period stretching from the end of WWI to 1927, when Mussolini officially shut down the Consiglio 
Superiore dell’Emigrazione — the official organ taking care of emigrants in Italy and abroad — 
was in a state of perpetual change, demographically, geographically, and legislatively. The main 
problem confronting authorities in Italy was the sudden postwar ‘stagnation’ of emigration.100 
Italy, a country that saw (and oversaw) the departure of roughly 15 million emigrants per year in 
the period 1876-1920 (almost 7 million of which to extra-European countries) was, in the interwar 
period and into the early 1920s, confronted with dramatic contraction of migratory patterns with 
respect to the trend in place since the beginning of the century.101 At the time, the decline in 
departures were attributed to the ‘saturation of those labor markets’ that had been a preferred 
destination for Italians for over half a century. In this respect, one of the most dramatic changes 
was represented by an Emergency Quota Act passed by the United States Government in 1921, 
which restricted the yearly number of admissions from the same country to 3% of the number of 
residents from that country living in the United States as of the 1910 Census. 
After 1922, the stance on emigration of the newly-installed fascist regime presented an 
ideological break from the policies of the liberal right-wing governments of the previous 20 years. 
From very early on, indeed, the fascist regime proposed and enforced an ideology of emigration 
that was, in fact, much closer to colonization than to what was deemed a dispersal of workforce 
 
 
99 Francesco Sulpizi, Il problema dell’emigrazione dopo la rivoluzione fascista (Rome, Italy: Società Dante 
Alighieri, 1923).  
 
100 Sulpizi, Il problema, 29. 
101 For a full account of the numbers for the period 1876–1988 see Antonio Golini and Flavia Amato, “Uno sguardo 
a mezzo secolo di emigrazione italiana” in Storia dell’Emigrazione Italiana, ed. Piero Bevilacqua, Andreina De 




and the ‘dilution of the nation and the race’ that had preceded.102 “Emigration is evil when it is 
directed to places of foreign sovereignty. […] Emigration is necessary, but only to lands and 
countries that belong to Italy. Italy wants to keep close its most humble sons, the peasants of the 
South and the land-breakers and miners of the North.[...] Men and groups destined to live in the 
orbit of other races because of their humbler and weaker status are fatally and violently assimilated 
by and diluted in those races. […] Fascism, thus, does not intend to encourage an emigration that 
would weaken the strength of the race and the State alike.” 103 
The idea of a stronger nation, developing within its national borders as well as abroad on 
the basis of an undiluted ‘Italian race’ constitutes, at the same time, a reason to curb mass 
emigration and to strengthen the contours of that race along with the physical limits – the borders 
– of the state. If the folly of a purer Italian ethnos culminates with the so called “Racial laws,” 
approved in close succession between 1938 and 1940,104 the protection of the demos and its land 
happened – among many other mechanisms – through an increasingly refined semanticization of 
the idea of straniero, ‘foreigner’ or alien. As instrumental as it was for the solidification of the 
‘Italian race,’ the definition of ‘foreign Jew’ contributed to refining what ‘foreign’ meant and led, 
in the latter part of the 1930s, to a reinforced surveillance of the Northern borders of Italy to prevent 
both the transit of Jewish refugees from Central Europe and the escape of dissidents. As the only 
gateway through safety was the border with France, theirs and other fugitives’ passage created a 
 
102 This is explained in great detail in Emanuela Primiceri, Il Consiglio Superiore dell’Emigrazione nel periodo 
fascista, particularly at 208–215. 
 
103 Primiceri, Il Consiglio Superiore dell’Emigrazione, 214. 
 
104 The Leggi per la difesa della razza were a juridical system of laws, decrees, and orders that included, most 
saliently, the prohibition of ‘mixed marriages’ and a new, updated, and more encompassing ‘definizione di ‘Ebreo’ 




migration problem between France and Italy that is often referred to as ‘clandestine’ by 
historians.105 
All the examples relating to ‘clandestinity’ that I have found in the early legal actions of 
the Fascist regime pertain to a ‘watermark’ aspect of clandestinità: the condition of anonymity, of 
being without or withholding information on oneself from public authorities, which was engraved 
in official writing in 1931 when a sweeping ‘Public Safety Law’106 included an entire section on 
‘foreigners.’ Among its provisions was the injunction that ‘within three days of their entry into 
national territory foreigners must present themselves to the Authority for Public Safety of the place 
 
105 See among others Riadh Ben Khalifa, Délinquance en temps de crise : l'ordinaire exceptionnel devant la justice 
correctionnelle des Alpes-Maritimes, 1938-1944. Paris, France: Champion, 2015. Sandro Rinauro, Il cammino della 
speranza : l'emigrazione clandestina degli Italiani nel secondo dopoguerra, Torino, Italy: Einaudi, 2009. Paolo 
Veziano, Ombre al confine : l'espatrio clandestino degli ebrei stranieri dalla Riviera dei Fiori alla Costa Azzurra, 
1938-1940 ( Cuneo, Italy: Fusta, 2014). The period roughly from 1930 to the beginning of WWII for France and 
Italy. June 1940 for Italy’s declaration of war against France, immediately followed by an armistice signed by Pétain 
with the Fascist regime. From then until its own armistice with the Allied forces in 1943, Italy occupied a stretch of 
land mostly consisting of the French side of the Alps. Italo Calvino powerfully described the border zone from the 
point of view of an Italian soldier in 1942, who crosses into lands that Italians historically considered ‘stolen’ by 
France and only ephemerally reannexed during the war: in his Into the War, the border that used to separate France 
and Italy is seen from a coach that is taking soldiers just a few curves further along the coast, to the occupied city of 
Menton. “We climbed on to the coach and set off. We were going along the Riviera and the officers urged us into a 
song, which soon died out. The sky was still grey, the sea a glassy green. Near Ventimiglia we looked with curious 
eyes at the cement ponds which had crumbled under the explosions: They were the first bombed-out homes we had 
seen in our lives. From the entrance to a railway tunnel the famous armored train, Hitler’s gift to Mussolini, was 
sticking out; they kept it under there to prevent it from being bombed. We approached the old border at Ponte San 
Luigi, and Capt. Bizantini, who was leading us, started to stir up national pride over this business of Italy’s borders 
moving. But the conversation quickly dwindled into an embarrassed silence, because, in that initial period of the 
war, the topic of our Wetern borders was delicate and embarrassing even for the most avid Fascists. For our entry 
into the war at the moment when France collapsed had not taken us to Nice, but only to that modest little border 
town of Menton. The rest would come our way, they said, at the peace settlement, but by now the idea of a 
triumphal entry with full pomp had faded.” Italo Calvino, Into the War (Boston, MA: Mariner Books, 2011), 34. 
 The few years preceding the start of WWII and, specifically, the 1940 German invasion of France and Italy’s 
declaration of war constitute a very important historical and lexical moment as all these unwanted peoples and social 
groups crossing into France from land and sea are progressively gathered, in French, under the collective name ‘les 
indésirables’. Again a substantivized adjective, les indésirables allowed the political debate and public opinion to 
crystallize a racialized idea of the French people against and in response to these reportedly ‘undesirable’ guests or 
people in transit: Jewish refugees, Italian dissidents, Southern European ‘economic migrants’ – then called 
‘travailleurs’ – , vagabonds and nomads, etc.  
106 Art. 142 Regio Decreto Testo Unico Leggi di pubblica Sicurezza (1931) 18 giugno 1931, n. 773 (G.U. n. 146 del 
26/06/1931) (pubblicato nel supplemento ordinario alla Gazzetta Ufficiale n.146 del 26 Giugno 1931) TITOLO V. 
DEGLI STRANIERI. CAPO I. DEL SOGGIORNO DEGLI STRANIERI NEL REGNO. ART. 142. (ART. 143 T. 





where they are, to give an account of themselves107 and complete their ‘declaration of stay.’” 
Authorities would also be able to ‘expel from’ or ‘send to the border any foreigner who would not 
be able to give an account of themselves.’108 Finally, the law set punishment in the form of fines 
and detention for anyone attempting to leave the country without a passport ‘entirely or partly 
motivated by political reasons,’ and authorized the use of weapons ‘whenever necessary to prevent 
illegal passage at unauthorized border checkpoints.’109 
‘Dare contezza di sé,’ much like the English ‘to account (for oneself)’, covers a wide 
semantic ground. It stands out, in this text, precisely because of its poetic and abstract quality that 
do not seem to conform to the required rigidity, precision, and flatness of the language of 
prescription and punishment. If this phrase signals a subjecthood in formation – a specific type of 
 
107 My emphasis. The sentence is “dare contezza di sé” in the original text: For an Italian definition of ‘contezza’, 
see “contézza s. f. [der. di conto «noto»]. – 1. letter. Notizia, cognizione particolareggiata di una cosa: avere, dare, 
prendere c. di un fatto; mi trassi oltre per aver contezza Di quello spirto (Dante). 2. ant. Conoscenza, familiarità: la 
giovane ... la c. della sua vecchia con lui aveva veduta (Boccaccio).” Accessed 13 Septrmber 2019 at 
http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/contezza   
 
108 Art 152 Regio Decreto Testo Unico Leggi di pubblica Sicurezza (1931) 18 giugno 1931, n. 773 (G.U. n. 146 del 
26/06/1931): “Police chiefs of border provinces (prefetti) can expel, by way of a foglio di via, from the border those 
foreigners who are not able to give an account of themselves or are found without means. For the same reasons, 
police chiefs of all other provinces can send to the border foreigners found in their provinces.” 
 Original: “I prefetti delle provincie di confine possono, per motivi di ordine pubblico, allontanare, mediante foglio 
di via obbligatorio, dai comuni di frontiera,[...] gli stranieri di cui all art. 150 e respingere dalla frontiera gli 
stranieri che non sappiano dare contezza di sé o siano sprovvisti di mezzi. Per gli stessi motivi, i prefetti hanno 
facoltà di avviare alla frontiera [...] gli stranieri che si trovano nelle rispettive provincie.” 
 
109 Art. 158 Regio Decreto Testo Unico Leggi di pubblica Sicurezza (1931) 18 giugno 1931, n. 773 (G.U. n. 146 del 
26/06/1931). “Anyone attempting to expatriate without passport or any document valid in international agreements 
fully or partly for political reasons is punished with detention from 2 to 4 years and a fine of no less than 20.000 
Liras. In any other case, anyone attempting to or expatriating without a passport is punished with a 3month to 1-
year arrest and a fine of 2000 to 6000 Liras. The use of force (weapons) is authorized whenever necessary to 
prevent illegal passage at unauthorized border checkpoints.” 
“Chiunque, senza essere munito di passaporto o di altro documento equipollente a termini di accordi internazionali, 
espatri o tenti di espatriare, quando il fatto sia stato determinato, in tutto o in parte, da motivi politici, è punito con la 
reclusione da due a quattro anni e con la multa non inferiore a L. 20000. In ogni altro caso, chiunque espatri o tenti 
di espatriare senza essere munito di passaporto è punito con l’arresto da tre mesi a un anno e con l’ammenda da L. 
2000 a 6000. È autorizzato l’uso delle armi, quando sia necessario, per impedire i passaggi abusivi attraverso i 







straniero under semantic construction – it also lays bare a central quality at the heart of the 
distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ that, perhaps, clandestin has not yet shown us but with 
which it is intimately linked: the act of speaking oneself into (legal) existence before the State.  
As we saw earlier in this chapter, the ‘clandestine passengers’ of the Sidi-Ferruch who 
survived the heat of the coal chambers did not initially speak to the investigators. They were 
eventually summoned to do so mainly to provide details about the logistics of the trip, the outside 
help they received, and an estimate of the number of those still under the coal. As much as their 
collective identity as indigènes mattered, their individual identity did not: they would have been 
brought back to the last North African port of the ship, regardless of whether that was the place, 
or even the colony that they came from.  
Today, the concomitant rise of international and human rights law would prevent, at least 
in theory, such a hurried procedure of expulsion without identification. Which is why it is in the 
interest of every migrant not wanting to be returned to their home country to withhold or give 
erroneous information when caught. The provisions in the law quoted above were decisive in 
introducing the need for foreigners to justify their presence, and to make themselves known to the 
State within the bounds of existing laws. Any non-citizen unknown to the State was punishable for 
this anonymity. This does not feel too removed from the late-20th Century assumption that the 
immigrant who hides, and who is made to hide because of both the State’s withdrawal or lack of 











Part III: Clandestino-clandestin becomes ‘illegal’ across the moving postcolonial Border 
 
Je leur ai amené tous mes papiers pour leur montrer que j’existais110 
 
 
The Multiplications of the Postcolonial clandestin  
 
If, since the creation of the European Union, the histories of migration of France and Italy 
tend to align due to the consolidation of their position within the EU border control and asylum 
systems, their trajectories and relationships to migration diverged for much of the second half of 
the 20th Century. In France, the engineered labor migration started in the 1920s through the Société 
Générale d’Immigration resumes in full swing after the end of World War II, mostly targeting male 
workers from Sub-Saharan and North-African colonies. Much like the interwar labor migration, 
the post-war recruitment was intended to be seasonal or periodical and did not entail, particularly 
in the workers’ imagination, any idea of settlement in the Metropole. What has been since referred 
to and studied as le mythe du retour lasted well into the trente glorieuses. For lone male workers, 
however, returns became increasingly difficult administratively, economic, and emotionally. In his 
foundational study on Algerian emigration to France in the 20th Century, sociologist Abdelmalek 
Sayad noted the lengthening of “emigrant stay” during the 30-year period following WWII by 
stressing the “quasi-permanence” of the North African (in his ethnography, Algerian) emigrant, so 
much so that the only return is the one allowed by yearly vacation breaks. “Tu es venu en France 
pour quelque temps, tu fais comme si tu es là pour quelque temps, c’est du provisoire, mais une 
année après une année, voilà cinq ans, voilà dix ans, voilà vingt ans, voilà la retraite.” A similar 
sentiment is echoed in the discussions of one its ramifications, the regroupement familial (family 
 
110 “Zineb, an old Moroccan man,” whose testimony is gathered by Bénédicte Goussault in Paroles de sans-papiers, 





reunion) policy that allowed families of immigrant workers to be enjoy the fathers’ administrative 
status and join them in France. “Je revois ma mère, allant et venant dans la pièce principale, où 
s’entassaient des cartons qui contenaient nos vêtements, de la vaisselle, des draps, des serviettes... 
Je l’entends encore se dire, à elle-même : “L’année prochaine, on s’en va ! On repart au pays.” 111 
Moreover in 1973, following a growing number of racist attacks culminated with a number 
of undiscriminated attacks against “North Africans” throughout southern France that left five 
people dead, the Algerian Government decided to suspend emigration towards France. Shortly 
after in France, the Government appointed by newly-elected President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
introduced a series of measures to limit immigrant labor that were aimed at addressing France’s 
growing unemployment following the oil crisis of 1973. With a law passed in July 1974, labor 
“immigration” was officially stopped. 
In 1985 in Schengen, a small town nestled between Luxembourg, France, and Germany, 
the representatives of five European countries signed an agreement to “strengthen the solidarity 
between their peoples by removing the obstacles to free movement” and, in view of this goal, 
“endeavour to abolish checks at common borders and transfer them to their external borders.” 
(Schengen Agr., Preamble, art 17., 1985). The five original signatories were France, Germany, 
Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The 1985 Agreement became a Convention in 1990, 
to which became parties, in the space of two years, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece. Thus, in 
1992, Schengen became to signify an area of free circulation of people and goods between 
European countries: the Schengen Area was officially born. The institution of free internal 
movement signified a consequent displacement of the mechanisms of immigration control on the 
external border of that Area. In the long history of European immigration control whose ideology 
 





and implementation had always been a primary function of the nation state, Schengen represented 
a major historical, technological and ‘epistemological’ break that ushered what has been known 
since, in migration studies, as the Schengen Era. By the time this phase of migration control was 
in full swing the uses of clandestin had multiplied in both Italian and French.  
 During the 1990s, in their respective adjectival and nominal forms, clandestin-clandestino 
were part of an imaginary of almost exclusively of immigration.112 The ‘incoming’ prefix reflected, 
from the point of view of Europe, the more linear, ‘post-imperial’ trajectories of migration of the 
second half of the 20th Century, as well as a more general concern with entry into a sovereign 
State or space rather than with movement, circulation, and later redistribution across multiple (EU 
and non-EU) states. 
In the Schengen era, it was no longer or very rarely a question of ‘clandestine’ affairs under 
the stars, or of incestuous unions reluctantly accepted by the Church. It was not even necessarily 
a question of passage. In the first decades since the signing of the agreement and the creation of 
an (internally) “borderless Europe,” the uses of clandestin fell almost solely in the context of 
immigrant entry, stay, and labor. The vocabulary associated with them was also concentrated in 
the fields of repression and control: combattere, arrêter, maîtriser, lottare contro. The goal had 
become to fight against, thwart and stop l’immigrazione clandestina and les clandestins on both 
sides of the Italy-France border.113 In the 1990s the frequency of the adjective and noun grew 
exponentially in public discourse on migration and the legal apparatus to regulate it. Both le 
clandestin and il clandestino were frequently employed in a variety of contexts. Federico Faloppa, 
 
112 And ‘émigration’ in Francophone North Africa, both in official texts and everyday speech. 
 





one of the few critics to engage directly with the word “clandestino” in his study on the vocabulary 
of racism and migration in the Italian context, has observed that 
Twenty-five years ago what was generally retained of “clandestino” was its semantic trait 
of invisibility. We had immigrants, but they weren’t seen much. And especially they were 
not known: we did not know what they did or how many of them there really were, exactly 
because many of them were “clandestini.” 
Now “i migranti clandestini” are highly visible, so much so that they are talked about in 
sleep-troubling, hyperbolic terms: They land in waves, they invade. [...] “Il clandestino,” 
as Annamaria Rivera wrote, is nowadays guilty of being overly visible. Or rather: the more 
he is visible and (media-)exposed, the better. Because that is how he becomes omnipresent 
and recognizable in his stereotypization, thus excludable, deportable. Most importantly, 
however, he becomes collective: A mass, a horde, an army to fear and against which to 
take arms. Before being a man or a woman, he is a danger.114 
 
In this passage as well as in subsequent moments of his work, Faloppa identifies important 
qualities of the word in its end-of-century uses. First, he raises the point of the clandestino’s 
‘visibility,’ which reflected and increased mediatization of migration and the resulting overall 
intolerance. On this point, however, one is struck by the thickness and complexity of assessing 
even the meanings of ‘visibility.’ In the case of clandestino there are at least three kinds of possible 
‘visibility’. On the one hand, we can speak of ‘visibility’ as a foreign, threatening, dangerous 
element to society that is maintained and amplified by political discourse and media. This is what 
Faloppa, and Annamaria Rivera whom he quotes, refer to when the speak of ‘(excessive) 
visibility.’ It seems to me that rather than a ‘visibility’ (i clandestini sono troppo visibili in the 
Italian text) what is aptly underscored here is in fact a process of focus on and overexposure of a 
single strand of an otherwise complex legal status. Secondly, we can speak of the ‘visibility’ that 
law and society give to a category of people by endowing them with rights and seeing to the 
 
114 Federico Faloppa, Razzisti a parole (per tacer dei fatti) (Rome, Italy: Laterza, 2011), 67, my translation. See also 
Federico Faloppa, “Media and Migration: Some Linguistic Reflections,” in Destination Italy: Representing 
Migration in Contemporary Media and Narrative, ed. Emma Bond, Guido Bonsaver, and Federico Faloppa (Bern, 
Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2015), 105–123. For a more media-based, less historical approach, see among others 




enforcement of those rights. Third is the ‘visibility’ claimed by a marginalized group with direct 
political action. Although ‘visible’ as a new meaning of clandestin will not be the axis of this last 
few pages, we will explore the contemporary illegalization of clandestin – or rather, the last phase 
of the transformation of hidden into illegal – in three contexts: the political debate around legal 
measures, the measures themselves, and the lexical choices of political action. They all raise, at 
least tangentially, questions of visibility. 
The first important consideration about the word in the contemporary age of cross-
Mediterranean migration is that even though clandestino is the paradigmatic figure of the 
illegalization of migration from the 1980s well into the 2000s in both France and Italy, the term in 
its nominal form is not used in most of the laws of that time on either side of the border. Il 
clandestino, le clandestin, les clandestins seem in fact to exist everywhere but in the letter of the 
law, where clandestin-o-a remains at best an adjective, when it is not in fact replaced by apparent 
synonyms such as ‘illégal’ ou ‘irrégulier.’ 
What is also worth considering is that the juridical effort to ‘combat,’ ‘thwart’, or ‘eradicate 
clandestine immigration’ focuses, especially in France, only partly on ‘clandestine entry.’ As an 
example, the main foci of the important group of laws known as Pasqua-Debré (1986, 1993, 1997) 
after the names of their rapporteurs, both French Interior Ministers, are ‘illegal’ entry as well as: 
restricting the legal conditions of stay by subjecting it to a valid employment contract; tightening 
the quotas and conditions for ‘régularisation,’ that is, the possibility to rectify a loss of status; and 
facilitating deportation.115 Specifically concerning entry, for instance, Article 19 of the first 
 
115 Lois Pasqua-Debré: the “loi n° 86-1025 of september 9 1986 and the “loi n° 93-1027 of 24 august 1993” 
“relatives aux conditions d’entrée et de séjour des étrangers en France” are known as ‘lois Pasqua.” The “loi Debré” 
is “loi n° 97-396 du 24 avril 1997 portant diverses mesures sur l’immigration.” Particularly important for the kind of 
work that I am trying to do was Charlotte Lessana, “Loi Debré: La Fabrique de l’immigré Parties 1 et 2,” Cultures et 





“Pasqua law” presents, after a revision undergone in 1991, an overlapping and layering of 
adjectives and nouns that express the interchangeability of ‘clandestin’ with any other adjective of 
the semantic field of illegality: “L'étranger qui a pénétré ou séjourné [*irrégulièrement, 
clandestin*] en France sans se conformer aux dispositions des articles 5 et 6 sera puni d'un 
emprisonnement d'un mois à un an [*durée*] et d'une amende de 2000 F à 20000 F [*montant, 
pénalité*].”116 ‘Irrégulièrement, clandestin,’ an adverb and an adjective in parentheses, disrupt 
each in their own way the syntax of the original text of 1986. The notion of ‘illegal (entrance)’, 
instead of simply being derived by the non-conformity of the person’s status with the articles of 
the law detailing the conditions of entry, is made plain: ‘irrégulièrement, clandestin’. Whichever 
way one tries, however, ‘clandestin’ is difficult to read, as it does not fit anywhere in the syntax of 
the pre-existing text. It is almost as if ‘clandestin’ – adjective dropped in the middle of an otherwise 
meaningful sentence – was a vector to something else, a renvoi to another way of calling the 
specific status and subject whose existence – and punishment – the text is writing into law.  
It appears, indeed, that the function of clandestino as a ‘vector’– the same one through 
which the indigène started to bear the signs of an unwanted immigrant –` was still present in the 
second half of the 20th Century. However, it was no longer through ‘passage’ that clandestin – 
and therefore le clandestin – had become illegal, but through labor: “Il lavoro clandestino” or “le 
travail clandestin.” For instance, it is generally agreed that Italy’s efforts to regulate migration start 
with a law known as ‘Legge Martelli,” approved in 1990. There is, however, an earlier law from 
1986 that explicitly addressed both the ‘treatment and placement of extra-CEE immigrant workers’ 
 
116 Text reproduced as above and followed by the following note: “[*Nota : Texte dans sa rédaction résultant du 







and ‘immigrazione clandestina.’117 Similarly, in 1975, well before the Pasqua Laws in France, the 
GISTI118, then a newly-formed organization, wrote in one of its earliest juridical guides: “After 
World War II and until recent years, the capitalist system underwent massive growth. This growth 
came with a large immigration that was mostly uncontrolled or even often clandestine. Because it 
did not conform to the ordonnance of 1945119 regulating the presence of foreigners, this 
immigration was often called sauvage. Shortly after, immigration sauvage became a real politics 
of immigration.”120 The guide provides further contextualization for this politics of immigration 
sauvage, ascribing it to the ‘insufficient numbers of French workforce,’ the possibility to ‘direct 
immigrant workers towards the most exacting and dangerous jobs’ (les emplois les plus pénibles 
et les plus dangereux), and finally to its responding to the interests of both the ‘electoral and social 
 
117 Legge 30 dicembre 1986, n. 943. Created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 the CEE, ‘Comunità Economica 
Europea’ or European Economic Community, was an economic union that preceded the monetary union that is 
today the EU, by which it was incorporated in 1993 (then European Community). 
118 Formed in 1972 as the Groupe d’information et de soutien des travailleurs immigrés, the GISTI is now the 
Groupe d’information et de soutien aux immigré.e.s. Beyond the formal abandonment of grammatical gender 
restrictions, it is worth noting the absence of the word ‘travailleur’ from its current denomination as a diversification 
of migration and the problems facing migrants. “The Gisti started in 1972, when jurists, militants, and social 
workers got together to form a ‘Groupe d’information et de soutien des travailleurs immigrés’, whose name echoed 
the ‘Groupe d’information sur les prisons’ created in 1971 and animated by Michel Foucault and signaled the 
founders’ desire to ally juridical expertise with political action.” Accessed 13 September 2019 at 
https://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article170 (my translation). 
 
119 On the Ordonnance of 1945, which formalized ‘the foreigner’ and stood, in whole or part, until the Pasqua Laws, 
see Michel Reydellet, ed., L’étranger entre la loi et les juges (Paris, France: L’Harmattan, 2008). 
 
120 Collectif d’alphabétisation du Groupe d’information et de soutien des travailleurs immigrés (G.I.S.T.I.), Le petit 
livre juridique des travailleurs immigrés (Paris, France: Maspero, 1975), 17 (my translation). Writing – or rather 
speaking – around the same time, Carmel Sammut had a similar assessment of the situation, with some additional 
important nuances: “L'immigration clandestine (appelée également « sauvage » ou « spontanée ») avant l'entrée en 
vigueur des circulaires Fontanet-Marcellin-Gorse était un phénomène reconnu, toléré ou même favorisé par les 
pouvoirs publics qui y voyaient certains aspects positifs pour la France : « Une immigration, même clandestine, 
coûte moins cher à la France qu'une politique nataliste».” The final quote is attributed to Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, 
politician and loyal servant of de Gaulle. Carmel Sammut, “L’immigration clandestine en France depuis les 
circulaires Fontanet, Marcellin, et Gorse,” in Les travailleurs étrangers en Europe occidentale: Actes du Colloque 
organisé par la Commission nationale pour les études et les recherches interethniques, Paris-Sorbonne, du 5 au 7 
juin 1974 (Nice, France: Institut d'études et de recherches interethniques et interculturelles, 1976), 380. For a brief 
general overview of the immigration policies of those years see, among many others, Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, 





bases’ of the government (la base électorale et sociale du pouvoir). “Big companies” - they wrote 
- “could thus find the large numbers of foreign workers that they needed, while small and medium-
sized businesses could resist competition by hiring foreign workers “au noir,” that is, they could 
remain competitive by saving on taxes and social contributions (40% of the paycheck) that they 
would not have to pay.”121 Leaving aside the jarring imperial undertones of the phrase 
‘immigration sauvage’ (and even au noir) and focusing exclusively on clandestin, we see how, in 
the space of a few lines, the adjective is used or at least evoked in two distinct domains: At the 
beginning, immigration clandestine is used in opposition to ‘controlled immigration,’ thus 
implying the use of clandestin as hidden. The original French speaks of ‘une immigration 
considérable, sans contrôle particulier ou même, souvent, clandestine,’ leaving the door ajar for 
two possible interpretations, one in the sense of ‘undetected’ and hidden, the other going in the 
direction of ‘eluding control.’ Furthermore, the text seems to equate ‘sauvage’ with ‘clandestine,’ 
or at least, it seems to suggest that a specific pattern of immigration – clandestine at least in part – 
became or was the result of a political agenda of ‘immigration sauvage’ that served the interest of 
the ruling class and of their electorate. Moreover, we see traces of clandestine in the identification 
of “travail ‘au noir’’ as one of the benefits that employers would ‘receive’ from a politics of 
immigration sauvage. Poetically and semantically, several words and strands meet on this narrow 
field: Further research on this topic will have to include a study, already hinted at by scholars, of 
how clandestine life participated in the invention of the night.122 And now here work institutionally 
known as ‘clandestin’ is called ‘au noir,’ just as in more recent French it’s called ‘au black’ and 
 
121 Collectif d’alphabétisation, Le petit livre juridique, 18 (my translation).  
 
122 For late classical, medieval age, see Mario Sbriccoli, “Nox quia nocet: I giuristi, l’ordine, e la normalizzazione 
dell’immaginario”. Storia del diritto penale e della giustizia, Scritti editi e inediti (1972-2007), Vol. 1 Milano, Italy: 
Giuffré, 2009, 261-278. For modern Europe, see Roger Ekirch, At Day’s Close: Night in Time’s Past (New York, 




in Italian ‘in nero.’ Needless to say, ‘black/nero/noir’ as ways of doing something, as it is signaled 
by the prepositions that precede them, all convey a sense of hiding from view, of invisibility, and 
ultimately of ‘official non-existence.’ In the company’s books, the employee ‘au noir’ does not 
exist or only exist partially, depending on the hours she is declared to be working. It is thus easier 
to see how several distinct notions of undetectability and invisibility bring clandestin-o closer to 
illegality on the vector of labor and, as a result, how those clandestine workers are made to drift 
towards absolute or ‘immanent’ illegality through the substantivization of the adjective and the 
resulting loss of their qualification of workers. Clandestino, from defining a specific type of 
employment, comes to signify the entire status of the person employed that way, and beyond.  
We can also see the overlapping and seeming interchangeability of these new forms, layers, 
and semantic associations of clandestin in the parliamentary debates that surrounded the most 
important ‘illegalizing’ laws of those years in both France and Italy. 
Jean-Louis Debré, France’s Ministry of Interior and rapporteur of the 1997 law that closed 
the first era of legislative crackdown on immigration, was for instance able to bring closer two 
ways of using clandestin in the same sentence – and be understood. To promote and defend 
increased border controls of manufactured goods and their transportation as a potential vector for 
human smuggling, he made an explicit link between smuggling and labor by using the same 
adjective: “l’atelier clandestin est très souvent le point d’aboutissement d’une filière 
clandestine.”123 Although clandestin in both these uses means ‘hidden from view,’ the term 
‘filière’ is meant to include steps of ‘clandestinity’ and dissimulation that happen across time and 
space. Thus clandestine entry and clandestine labor, once needed to be ‘known,’ become illegal.124 
 
123 Jean-Louis Debré quoted in Lessana, “Loi Debré 1,” 7.  
 
124Philippe Henriot, “chef de la mission interministérielle de lutte contre le travail clandestin,” is quoted by Lessana 




The flexible meaning of ‘clandestin,’ as we have seen, was the ultimate enabler of the 
nominalization of the adjective. The resulting transformation of the ‘immigrant’ into ‘the illegal’ 
was observed by Charlotte Lessana – whose work on the Loi Debré is as unique as it was important 
for this research – when she wrote: 
 
Clandestin, “si volatile”, devient la cible d’un discours, d’une logique politique visant, de 
par le clandestin et donc de manière moins ouvertement raciste, l’immigration en général. 
“Le discours sur l’immigration clandestine, c’est le cache-sexe du discours sur 
l’immigration.” […] La légalité cherche donc à établir une discrimination en rupture avec 
le critère de l’origine. C’est pourquoi la désignation du “clandestin”, comme adversaire, 
est un moment clé de la construction du problème de l’immigration.125 
 
 
The insights of the paragraph above are especially important, starting with the reaffirmation 
of the ‘volatility’ of clandestin. The ‘volatility’ evoked by Lessana points to the flexibility we just 
mentioned and that is a contemporary consequence of the original semantic indeterminacy that we 
have encountered since the early days of clam. In an even more important contribution to 
understanding the word, however, Lessana attributes to the word’s volatility enormous political 
power in the form of a disguised mechanism of discrimination. Fighting immigration clandestine 
on the pretense of ‘needing to know,’ of dragging hidden activity out of the dark and into the light 
of State and public knowledge is, in fact, a way to exclude otherness not on the increasingly less 
acceptable basis of ‘origine’ – France’s official political and demographic criteria that come the 
 
de travail illégal n’a pas de définition juridique propre. Elle recouvre de fait un ensemble d’infractions [...]: le travail 
clandestin, le marchandage, le prêt illicite de main-d’oeuvre, l’emploi d’étrangers sans titre de travail, l’infraction à 
la réglementation sur le travail temporaire, le placement payant, l’emploi non déclaré, le cumul d’emploi. [...] 
Juridiquement le travail clandestin est [soit] la dissimulation d’activités, [soit] la dissimulation de salariés. Il y a 
néanmoins une zone de jonctions entre le champ de l’application du code du travail et celui de l’entrée et du séjour: 
c’est l’infraction d’emploi d’étrangers sans titre. En 1993 l’emploi d’étranger sans titre pèse pour 8% du travail 
illégal.” Lessana, “Loi Debré 1,” (fn 115), 13. Just like clandestin in the 1920 brought together passage and labor (Le 
code de la Marine and the circulaires), clandestin in the 1990s brings together labor and immigration control (Code 
du Travail and Code de l’entrée et du séjour). These works (Partie 1 and 2) represent an early and sustained attempt 
at reading the ideological and discursive workings of the Debré law and, in general, of restrictive immigration 
legislation of the 1990s. For that reason they are of great value. 
  




closest, in uses and misuses, to the concept of ‘race’ – but on the seemingly unquestionable, God-
mandated, stone-set basis of legality.126 The substantivized ‘clandestin,’ Lessana seems to say, is 
an important other because of its malleability and adaptability to several domains of illegalization, 
from passage to crossing to labor. ‘Clandestin’ makes it possible to assign to the ‘immigrant’, to 
the non-status foreigner, responsibility or at least semantic ‘proximity’ to several offenses or 
violations of law in which he or she is not necessarily involved. This quality of clandestin remains 
seemingly intact in Italian uses, while bearing signs of its own specific processes of racialization. 
Such signs are visible in the words of Senator D’Onofrio during the debates to approve the 
law known as ‘Legge Bossi-Fini’ (2002), which presented the most extensive and repressive set 
of measures against immigration up to that point and for at least a decade. D’Onofrio, from the 
seats of a center-right small political formation known as UDC, part of the right-wing coalition 
Government that passed the law, was quoted saying: 
 
[...]È per questo che abbiamo rimesso alla emersione del lavoro nero, materia su cui è 
competente il ministro Tremonti, la valutazione sulle modalità di tale estensione anche agli 
immigrati clandestini che hanno svolto del lavoro nero di tipo industriale e commerciale. 
Sappiamo che è una materia aperta e che la emersione del lavoro nero ordinario è previsto 
che scada proprio oggi; faremo quindi in modo di valutare se l'emersione del lavoro nero 
italiano possa essere estesa, in quanto tale, anche al lavoro nero clandestino.127 
 
Leaving aside the political questions attached to ‘regularization’ as a potential mechanism 
of illegalization, and the reluctance to treat regularization of foreign workers on the same plane as 
 
126 This and the following chapters are, in part, a study of what are in fact the very organic, circumstance-specific, 
and sometimes arbitrary traits of notions of legality – and the corresponding ones of ‘illegality’ – in the context of 
migration. 
  
127 [...] This is why we have chosen to treat the regularization of clandestine immigrants (immigrati clandestini) that 
performed illegal work (lavoro nero) in factories or retail within the framework of the larger issue of the 
regularization of illegal work – of which Minister Tremonti is responsible. We know that this is an open question 
and that the final date to regularize illegal work [without incurring in fines] is exactly today. We are thus 
considering the possibility of extending the regularization of ‘lavoro nero italiano’ to ‘lavoro nero clandestino.’ 




that of Italian nationals. It is worth considering the way in which the Senator’s grammar mixes 
otherwise distinct vocabularies of status, race, and employment. First, the expression ‘lavoro 
nero,’ or undeclared work, is a sizable employment issue in Italy now and it was so then. What is 
striking, however, is less its hierarchization over racial and citizenship lines than the fact that on 
opposite sides of these lines stand ‘the Italian’ and ‘the clandestino’ (and not, for instance, ‘Italian’ 
and ‘foreign’). In this use, clandestino is effectively shedding the meaning of ‘unregistered work’– 
carried, in the same sentence, by the expression lavoro nero – and made instead to carry a 
racialized meaning whereby lavoro nero clandestino comes to mean something close to ‘ illegal 
work performed by aliens illegally here.’ The clandestino ilegal – now made noun and followed 
by other adjectives, as Manu Chao once sang – is finally here. 
 
Clandestin in French and Italian, and across Schengen: Literary representations 
This section introduces two literary representations of clandestinité across the borders of 
Europe, and specifically, of the clandestino-clandestin as a border-crosser. The first is an excerpt 
from Franceso Biamonti’s Vento Largo (1991), set in the dry borderland between France and Italy 
in the Southern Alps. The second, starkly different in aesthetic and focus, is from Hamid Skif’s La 
géographie du danger (2006), which narrates a similarly mountainous border-crossing from the 
point of view of a North African “clandestin.” 
A believer in an intemporal Mediterranean landscape and a decaying “Mediterranean 
civilization” deeply influenced by the Mediterraneanism of Paul Valéry and Albert Camus, Italian 
novelist and essayist Francesco Biamonti was a man of the sea and of the rocks.128 He was born in 
 
128 For an articulation of the historical and ideological differences and continuities between Paul Valéry’s and Albert 
Camus’ “Mediterraneanisms” see Madeleine Dobie, “For and Against the Mediterranean: Francophone 
Perspectives,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 34, no. 2 (2014): 389–404. For 




1928 and spent all his life in the village of San Biagio della Cima, nested in the hills above 
Ventimiglia, where he died in 2001.129 Before and after his late literary début he made his living 
as a cultivator of “mimosa” or Acacia dealbata, a shrub found throughout Northern and Southern 
Mediterranean shores from Portugal to Palestine and known for its small, bright yellow flowers. 
He was, most importantly, a man of the border between and the borderland of France and Italy, 
and his aesthetic was deeply rooted in the dividedness and the unity of that stretch of land.130 In an 
article published in the same year as his most famous novel, Vento Largo, Biamonti describes the 
Mediterranean as “ancient and tragic,” epithets that recall vividly Albert Camus, and further 
appropriates this intellectual heritage by identifying three main “focal points” of observation and 
articulation of a 20th century Mediterranean:131 “The Mediterranean [...] carries the dark joy of 
tragedy, a joy coming from light, and a tragedy coming from lucidity. [...] Three voices represented 
it exceptionally: The voice of Montale in the Gulf of Genoa, the voice of Valéry from the Gulf of 
the Lion, and the voice of Camus from the Algerian shores.”132  
Biamonti’s Mediterreanen geographic and cultural continuity, however, bears witness to a 
degraded, disaggregating civilization: “This sea taught pietas, the respect for the dead, for women, 
 
territorio dell’esistenza: Francesco Biamonti (1928–2001) (Milan, Italy: FrancoAngeli, 2019); and Franco Croce, 
“Il romanzo-paesaggio in Francesco Biamonti,” in Francesco Biamonti: le parole, il silenzio, ed. Andrea Aveto 
(Genova, Italy: Il Melangolo, 2005). 
 
129 Ventimiglia is the last Italian coastal town before the border.  
  
130 “Io andavo quotidianamente a Mentone, dove c’era una libraia, appassionata di letteratura, che teneva tutto. 
Leggevo “Combat”, che era un giornale al quale collaborava Camus e Camus era un grande ammiratore di Char 
[…]. Char per me è stato fondamentale.” Biamonti quoted in Giorgio Bertone, “Confine o frontiera? La Liguria di 
Francesco Briamonti”, Quaderns d’Italià 7 (2002): 93.  
 
131 “In a speech delivered in 1937, on the occasion of the opening of the Algiers Maison de la culture, the then 
twenty three-year-old Camus inveighed against the idea of a Latin Mediterranean, defending instead a perception of 
the Mediterranean as essentially Greek, i.e., tragic and ironic rather than bombastic and imperialistic.” Dobie, “For 
and Against,” 396. 





children, and the elderly, and forgiveness of the defeated. But today these moral laws have been 
broken, in North Africa, in Yugoslavia, in Sicily and even in Naples. This sea taught beauty, now 
reduced to a shipwreck on its shores. It was a civilization oscillating between soul and matter. [...] 
But now that the suprahistorical principles have fallen, the exasperation of historicism (in which I 
include religions) revived old hatreds, divisions, and separations. Each of its peoples withdrew, 
separated even within themselves by imaginary heresies. And yet, where the waves break the same 
old lullaby accompanies the work of fishermen; the same light rises in the morning and the same 
shadow falls at night.”133 
The contrast between the almost a-historical intemporality and simultaneous decline of the 
Mediterranean landscape through which seep both nature and humanity dominates the 
representation of the borderlands and border crossings in Vento Largo. Written in 1991, Vento 
Largo is the fragmented story of Varì, like Biamonti a cultivator of Acacia dealbata and olive 
trees, Sabèl, and their unrealized love. It takes place, like all of Biamonti’s writings, in the bilingual 
borderzone nested between the Maritime Alps to the North and the Mediterreanean Sea, cut in an 
imaginary middle by the French-Italian border.  
In introducing Biamonti’s first novel to the public, Calvino caught clearly and succinctly 
the saliency of the Ligurian borderlands in Biamonti’s prose that would later extend to the 1991 
novel Vento largo: “There are ‘landscape novels’ just like there are ‘portrait novels.’ Page after 
page and hour after hour, this one lives off the light of the harsh and precipitous landscape of the 
 
133 Biamonti, “Mediterraneo antico e tragico,” 122. His is a highly (and archaically) secular vision of the region and 
its ‘essence’: “ [The Mediterranean], a blue plain on which Europe trespasses and marginalizes itself, but which 
remains its ancient heart. I believe that on this sea the continent will test its mastery (mettere alla prova la sua 
valentia). Politicians and men of culture, will they be able to navigate on a light vessel and with agile spirit, made 
agile by contemplating the quick disappearance of every faith (il rapido svanimento di ogni fede)?” (123). Also: “Le 
prose nord-africane di Camus (Noces, L’été) sono bellissime. Questa lucidità mediterranea, di un pensiero che trova 
in sé la nascita e il compimento, che non rimanda a nessun aldilà, che fa meditare solo sull’aldiquà, viene dalla 




Ligurian backcountry in its Westernmost slip, right at the border with France.”134 However, the 
‘harshness and precipitousness’ of the borderland of Vento largo is a result of natural phenomena 
– drought, ceaseless winds, difficult soil – and land morphology and has little to do with the 
violence of the border. Consequently, the contemporary reader is confronted with a somehow 
estranging representation of the border between Italy and France. Not the contested lieu and device 
of differential inclusion that we have come to recognize so easily in previous sources, that border 
is instead portrayed more as passive marker or, rather, a silent witness of clandestine passage. In 
Vento Largo there seem to be none of the “hatred, anger, and exploitation” so vividly portrayed by 
Gloria Anzaldúa in her groundbreaking work Borderlands/La Frontera and, since then, in 
countless visual and literary representations of visible and invisible borders, whether Mediterrean, 
Atlantic, or Inter-American.135And that’s the metaphor of it: the border can only be a within and 
without, en-deça and au-delà. There is no looking for the line, there is no line, there is just a 
‘before’ and an ‘after’, an admission after a petition, a fiction of temporality.  
Vento Largo starts with the bells of a mountain village marking the death of a man who 
was also its most experimented – yet unofficial – passeur. Varì, the protagonist, reminisces of their 
time together after having spent a brief moment at the passeur’s wake: “We walked a lot together 
– he thought on his way up – we met them all, nomads and travelers. We were two honest passeurs, 
although he did it for work and I on my lost time. We never left anyone on this side of the border.” 
136  
 
134 “Ci sono romanzi-paesaggio così come ci sono romanzi-ritratto. Questo vive, pagina per pagina, ora per ora, della 
luce del paesaggio aspro e scosceso dell’entroterra ligure, nell’estremo suo lembo di Ponente, al confine con la 
Francia.” Italo Calvino quoted in Claudio Panella, “Francesco Biamonti: del «donner à voir» sul confine tra 
l’immagine pittorica e la parola,” Between 1, no. 1 (May 2011): 6. 
 
135 Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands / La Frontera. (San Francisco, CA: Aunt Lute Books, 1987), 17. 
  
136 “Li abbiamo incontrati tutti, nomadi e viaggiatori…” Francesco Biamonti, Vento largo (Turino, Italy: Einaudi, 




This passage, although presented as a fleeting memory of a man walking uphill to his lonely 
farm, highlights a few aspects of the mountainous borderland in which it is set and the social roles 
and categories that its produced and allowed in the early 1990s. First, the word ‘passeur’ is never 
translated or italicized in the original, marking one of the few signs that the novel bears of the 
rooted and widespread bilingualism of the region. Moreover, the use of the term ‘passeur’ as an 
import from French points, beyond the bilingualism of the borderland, to the centrality of that 
figure in the history and society of that space, supported by moral codes of honesty and conduct 
associated with a long-standing practice.137 The organicity and embeddedness of the passeur in 
the borderland also emerges from the verbs that, in this brief passage, are used to describe his 
activities: “to walk” and “to meet” suggest that bringing people on the other side of the border is 
in fact natural to the man of the borderland hills and highlands and makes the act of bringing people 
across one of encounter, marginalizing as a result the transactional and financial aspects that are 
usually associated with border crossing, and that are indeed central to Skif’s account.138  
However, it is the phrase “we met them all, nomads and travelers” that carries important 
complexities. The use of the two vaguely romanticized categories of ‘nomads’ and ‘travelers’ 
seems to suggest that there are just two names for those crossing a border illegally and thus all 
illegal crossers fall in either one of those categories of human movement. If Varì seems blind or 
unreceptive to other forms of movement dictated, for instance, by persecution, danger and fear, 
and therefore to the complexity and contested nature of the legal categories into which are framed 
those who cross, on the other hand the romanticized border casts a shadow on the system of 
 
 
137 Les indésirables: Riadh Ben Khalifa, and  
138 This is reminiscent of the way in which Mediterranean sailors interact with “accrued” and harshened borders that 
manifest themselves in cases of shipwreck and distress at sea, appealing to higher moral and professional principles 




sacredness, legality, and retribution that sustains the idea of national borders from the point of 
view of the state. He is, in a certain way, dissacrating it. There can be no “illegals” in Varì’s 
vocabulary as the very legality of the border seems something that a borderland farmer / passeur 
can walk over, something almost posterior and inferior to his relationship with the land itself. 
There are, nonetheless, clandestini. The woman that Varì is tacitly in love with, Sabèl, 
comes to visit him shortly after the passeur’s death to tell him that at the time of his death the 
passeur 
 
[...] was hiding two clandestini and now she didn’t know what to do with them. She 
didn’t have the guts to abandon them. He was Bulgarian and she was Rumenian, a most 
beautiful woman that reminded her of someone she met years before, when she used to 
work on the Corniche d’Or during the Acacia dealbata season.  
 – On the first clear night, make them go. Not now, no, nights are dark, and if they use a 
light they will be spotted from afar.  
 – What if they tried during daytime? 
 – They would get caught for sure. 
 – Don’t you know a passeur? Can’t we find anyone? 
 – There’s plenty of passeurs but they’re down by the coast, and really untrustworthy. I 
wouldn’t put them in their hands. They risk less if they try by themselves: the worst that 
can happen if they get caught is that they will spend a couple of months in the Latina 
camp. Where are they now? 
 – In a barn above the village.139 
 
Eventually, Varì decides to take them across himself. The morality binding him as passeur 
to border crossing emerges even more poignantly in the distinction he makes between the passeurs 
of the coast and those of the highlands and mountains. Their “untrustworthiness” points, obliquely, 
to the uniqueness of the passeurs of the highlands in their practice of border crossing which seems 
to result, as I have suggested earlier, from their specific relationship with and interpretation of the 
(border)landscape. It is, however, the entire dialogue between Varì and Sabèl that is animated by 
sentiments and a general morality that we have not encountered throughout this study. The 
 




clandestini, here, are nothing less than persons seeking help or even simply directions. They are 
human as they have never been and the question of their illegality seems far away, almost 
incongruous. This humanization of the two Eastern European clandestini takes on additional 
nuances as they climb, led by Varì, up the terraces and ravines all the way up until the border is in 
sight along with, on the other face of the mountain, its French side. The humanization of the 
crossers seems to be taking place over the border, somehow unhindered by it and thus boundless, 
like the narrator’s gaze describing the view from the top of the last hill: 
 
They entered an olive grove, the last one, in precarious state under the assaults of wild 
shrubs. 
The two walked lovingly side by side, wrapped by the night, him heavy and her light, 
nimble as if sleepwalking. After the stones of a dale only rocks and stars. Then, up, the 
glassy face-wall with their path etched on. 
 – Do not speak, – Varí whispered, – here the voice has no obstacles and runs all the way 
to the border. Come, slowly. 
They could see the sea all the way down, a disturbing sea. It looked like a shinier 
precipice, glueing the bluffs together. They kept climbing up a couloir of dust and ground 
shells, in which their feet sank, and once on the crest another sea appeared, vast this time, 
and almost breathing. Dotting the Côte d’Azur, clearer in its profile, were blinking 
lighthouses of Cap Ferrat and Cap d’Antibes. Farther away was the Corniche d’Or, 
emerging from the embrace of the waves whose mist seemed to be climbing up all the 
way to the Esterel summits. They watched the lights of Castellar and Sospel poking holes 
in the darkness while they waited for the moon to shine on the other side of the crest.  
 – Where would you go? 
 – To Castellar. And from there down to Menton.140 
 
 
From the crest “another sea appeared, vast this time, and almost breathing.” It is significant 
to point out that the only break in this climb to the border comes not from any visible sign of 
geophysical or political interruption – barbed wire, a tower, or a checkpoint – but from the sea, 
which one would instead expect to be the only constant element of the landscape on either side of 
the border. Indeed, as we will see in the following chapters, borders at sea tend to disappear and 
 




resurface much less predictably. A new, different sea, as the first signifier of changing jurisdictions 
displaces the focus of the narration away from any visible signs of demarcation and, 
simultaneously, further away from any possible juridical valence of Varì’s and the clandestini’s 
actions. This is further reinforced by the impressionistic toponomastic description of the lights 
lining the French coast, and, above all, by the clandestini’s last question to Varì: “Where would 
you go?” The contemporary reality of the exploitative, profit-driven and potentially violent 
passeur is subverted by the figure of Varì in Vento largo, a character which strives to detach the 
role of passeur from the border and its legalities by giving it a nobility that is at the same time 
intemporal and with deep historical roots. These roots tie the passeur not only to a tradition of 
clandestine crossings but also, in Vento largo, to the elements of the landscape, which exist across 
and beyond the infrastructural signs of a border between countries. The border as a device of 
repression and criminalization of passage is utterly absent, much to the surprise of the clandestini 
themselves: 
 
 – I don’t know how to thank you – Danila said, before asking how much they owed him.  
 – You already paid Andrea. 
 – I hope we’ll see each other again. 
 – Send news and stay in touch … Oh, my address: Evaristo Seitre in Aurno, Luvaira. 
As Danila was scribbling it down in the light of the moon, she suddenly started 
trembling: – A ... dog ...  
Varí quickly opened his pouch and wetted a ball of cotton with ether from a glass vial, 
and he left it on the ground. 
 – Quickly! let’s go down, into the dark. 
They hid behind a rock. The dog kept going back and forth on the crest. It had caught the 
smell and was disoriented. Yet, behind it there was no patrol, there seemed to be 
absolutely no one. Now it was immobile, its snout to the sky, breathing quickly. 
 – Oh! It’s Malò! – Varí exclaimed. He whistled loudly and the dog drifted very slowly 
towards them, almost crawling. – It’s the passeur’s dog. 
He took them all the way to Castellar. From there he watched them go down, their 
silhouettes against the sea below and its loud undertow muffled by the rocks. As he came 
back the dog had started sniffing bushes again.141 
 
 




The odd familiarity and proximity between passeur and clandestini that was so seamlessly 
established in the previous excerpt is reinforced in the passage above, not only when he refuses to 
be paid but, especially when Varì gives his full name and address. Moreover, through what seems 
to be a rather old-fashioned courtesy in the age of border securitization – asking for news of their 
safe arrival to be mailed to him – Varì establishes a form of return that effectively stretches the 
encounter between clandestini and passeur beyond the temporal frame of one-way border crossing, 
effectively furthering the seeming erasure of the border and, with it, any need for the very notion 
of legality. However, a dog – a foretelling sign of the repressive apparatus of the border – plunges 
the crossers and the reader into the more familiar register of fears and hiding in relation to 
clandestinità. “Yet, behind [the dog] there was no patrol, there seemed to be absolutely no one.” 
Going back and forth of the crest, where the invisible line of the border is supposed to separate the 
two countries, we don’t know if the dog is disoriented by Varì’s olfactory trick or rather is walking 
the border it is used to patrol, thus being the first non-natural sign of its existence. In a light, ironic 
yet evocative denouement, the dog is recognized and suddenly changes sides, changing from a 
threat to an ally. Moreover, the heavy symbolism of Malò walking up and down along the border 
weeks after his master’s death confirms, to a certain extent, the control that semi-ancestral practices 
of border-crossing have on the borderland despite increased mechanisms of marking and 
surveillance.  
Almost thirty years after, Biamonti’s idyllic and morally uplifting representation of 
clandestine crossings across the Maritime Alps should perhaps be considered the faint memory of 
an era submerged by the last two decades of increased militarization, repression, and death. 
Biamonti’s clandestini may perhaps be considered the romanticization of an “essentially 




crossing it. Yet, a crossing of the same border was undertaken in strikingly similar conditions not 
long ago, and portrayed in the film On the Bride’s Side142. There, too, the phantom of illegalization 
is everywhere and the spectator is confronted with a relieving sense of incompleteness when the 
‘illegal’ crossers celebrate at night in Marseille without having encountered a single agent or sign 
of the border. Only rusty and tangled barbed wire (from when borders were made of barbed wire). 
 
  
Io sto con la sposa (2014), “still frame” 
 
 
Rehumanzition or the “restitution of a human dimension” to the clandestin does not 
necessarily happen through representations that cast aside the violence of illegalization.143 On the 
contrary, realist or hyper-realist representations of the clandestin aim at bringing him/her into 
existence through a detailing of their suffering and the most painful aspects of their legal and social 
status. One of the most singular examples is Hamid Skif’s La géorgraphie du danger, which 
represents a unique representation of clandestinité in French that treats in depth at least two central 
aspects of the illegalization of migration, that is, ‘clandestine’ entry into a foreign country and 
 
142 Gabriele Del Grande, Antonio Augugliaro, Khaled Soliman Al-Nassiry, Io sto con la sposa (On the Bride’s Side), 
Gina Films, 2014, Film, 89 mins. 
143 Youssouf Amine Elalamy, author of Les clandestins, quoted in Najib Redouane, “Clandestins: Voyages au bout 
du désespoir et de la mort,” in Clandestins dans les textes maghrébins de langue française, ed. Najib Redouane 




‘clandestine’ status and daily life within that country. I focus here on the former as La géographie 
du danger provides a starkly different account of clandestine border-crossing that, along with and 
against Vento largo, significantly complicates our understanding of the aesthetics of clandestine 
crossings in relation to the evolution of the conception and role of the border in the first 10 years 
of the Schengen era.   
On niquera tous les murs.144 
 
Hamid Skif was born Mohamed Benmebkhout in Oran, Algeria, in 1951. Early in his life 
he was closely associated first with the theatre company of Algerian writer Kateb Yacine and, 
later, with the poet Jean Sénac who, in his 1971 Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie algérienne, 
included three of Skif’s early poems.145 After being arrested in 1973 for his work as a journalist 
for the newspapers Révolution Africaine and La République, Skif worked for the Algerian press 
agency Algérie Press Service and wrote the screenplay Une si tendre enfance. In the early 1990s 
he founded the Association des Journalistes Algériens. After seeing prominent Algerian 
intellectuals such as Youcef Sebti and Tahar Djaout being fatally targeted in terrorist attacks and 
himself escaping multiple threats, in 1993/4 he fled Algeria with his family and ended up in 
Germany, where he spent the remainder of his life. La géographie du danger, published in 2006 
first in Paris, then in Algiers and shortly afterwards in a German translation is perhaps his best 
known work. 
 
144 Hamid Skif (1951–2011), La Geographie du danger (Paris, France: Éditions Naïve, 2006), 152. 
 
145 His “réalisme protestataire” was already visible in this collection: “Qui donc parlera pour les muets, pour les 
opprimés et les faibles, si ceux-là se taisent qui furent investis de la parole? L’écrivain qui n’a pas en vue la Justice 
est un détrousseur de pauvres aussi cruel que le mauvais riche.” In Jean Sénac, ed., Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie 
algérienne, (Paris, France: Librairie Saint-Germain-des-Prés, 1971), 105. Skif’s poems included in the collection are 
“Contre-poème”, “Poème pour mon sexe” and “Chanson pédagogique couscous”. Sénac was assassinated in Algiers 
in 1973. For all biographical information I am quoting Regina Keil-Sagawe, “Obituary: Hamid Skif. A Life 






Framed as the narrative of an unnamed clandestin hidden in a borrowed apartment without 
electricity or running water, surrounded by an only slightly exaggerated reality of ubiquitous 
policing and a full-scale clandestins hunt, La Géographie du danger takes place, for the most part, 
in the protagonist’s mind as a protracted albeit discontinuous dialogue with himself. The novel’s 
opening scenes, framed as a flashback yet in medias res, recount the crossing by foot of a 
mountainous internal border of Europe during wintertime. In a powerful political move, which I 
will discuss below, the narrator gives no temporal or geographical mark that could allow the reader 
to identify one specific European border and, later on, to situate the protagonist’s clandestinity in 
a specific country. Instead, the reader is guided by an unnamed landscape that sets the tone for the 
tragic clandestinité that the protagonist narrates throughout the novel. “Mon voyage a débuté sous 
une lune à peine naissante, dans le froid d’une nuit d’hiver. Nous marchions dans la neige, les 
pieds enveloppés de chiffons censés tromper d’éventuels poursuivants. Il fallait, disait le guide, ne 
laisser aucune trace de notre passage.” 
Narrated in the first person and at an almost breathless pace, border-crossing in Skif’s novel 
bears no resemblance with the peaceful yet difficult climb of Vento Largo. Nature exists, here, 
only insofar as it makes the crossing more treacherous and potentially deadly, and the clandestin 
crosser a ruined body.  
 
Nous avions remis nos dernières économies au passeur, perche taciturne employant 
quatre acolytes peu loquaces, chargés de convoyer notre troupe à travers passes enneigées 
et massifs forestiers avant de nous livrer aux chemins de traverse, pas plus de trois à la 
fois. Aucune parole n’était permise. Il fallait taire la douleur, ne pas geindre lorsqu’une 
aiguille de silex nous arrachait un cri cadenassé derrière les dents murés ; à peine respirer, 
exhaler ces nuages de vapeur faisant de nous des cheminées mobiles accrochées les unes 
aux autres pour éviter de tomber. Nous étions avertis: ceux qui glisseraient seraient 
laissés au bord du chemin. […] Le passeur n’avait pas menti. Les squelettes bordant la 
piste, à peine un sillon, confirmaient ses propos. Les gardes-frontières tiraient à vue. […] 
Avant l’aube, nous avions franchi le sommet. Nous devions redescendre l’autre versant, 




malencontreux, nous écraser au fond d’un ravin, être entraînés dans une chute dont peu 
sortiraient vivants.146  
 
The landscape, vocabulary, and composition of the very first scene of La géographie 
forcefully pull the reader in the hyper-realism of a crossing represented in terms of a physically 
painful and highly dangerous punitive march. There is none of the openings and hope that 
illuminated the crossing of the French-Italian border in Vento Largo. The drastic tone is 
foregrounded by the description of the passeur, a ‘taciturn beanpole’ who is about profit much 
more than he is about the preservation of human life during the crossing. On the heels of the crude 
portrait of the passeur, the clandestin character’s humanity is made to emerge not from a portrait 
of his human and social existence – and right to existence – despite his status but, in a more 
personal and bodily way, from his wrestling with physical pain. “Taire la douleur”, “ne pas 
geindre,” “ [se faire arracher] un cri cadenassé derrière les dents murées” are all phrases which 
characterise the clandestine crossing as an experience of endurance and repression of pain. The 
ability to express himself only within and with himself that is a salient trait of Skif’s clandestin 
throughout the novel is sketched firstly in his relationship with pain, and similarly later on, with 
the need to retain bodily functions during his break-neck run across the border: “[…] Je fis sur moi 
en courant. De puer si fort me donna le tournis.”147 Furthermore, the body of the crossers is not 
only the sign of their ‘illegality’ – “les squelettes bordant la piste, à peine un sillon, [...]” – but it 
also bears its visible signs in the form of scratches, wounds and bloody tumefactions: “ Nous ne 
sentions plus nos pieds, seulement les piqûres d’aiguilles sur nos visages. Les gouttes de sang 
perlaient sur les fronts et les joues” and, shortly before, “la pente du vertige transform[ait] nos 
 
146 Skif, Géographie, 11–12. 





pieds en pâtés de chair sanguinolents.”148 The crossing narrated as a breathless race through 
mountains and forests, along highways and in windowless vans in which danger and pain are 
constant features articulates, in a rather unique way, a violent portrait of the crossing as continuous 
movement. Continuous movement also points to the volatile nature of survival, never fully within 
the clandestin’s grasp, while being of the conditions for survival, inscribed in this exaggerated yet 
poignant description of the clandestin’s relationship to their shoes: “Nous ne pouvions remettre 
nos chaussures, suspendues autour du cou, que sur la grand-route. Un clandestin se repère à l’état 
de ses godasses. Les nôtres étaient neuves, fournies par le passeur et comprises dans le forfait de 
la traversée.”149 
Worn shoes would betray the crosser as a clandestin, that is, as one who has run ‘illegally’ 
for his life. In this seemingly facile ‘insider’s’ truth is in fact hidden a crucial trait of clandestinité, 
which we already encountered in the Introduction: the illegalization of escape as an act of survival. 
In the case of the clandestin, these contradictions of escape are encapsulated by the paradox of his 
shoes. Unworn and new, they are the clandestin’s sign of legality – that which ‘signifies’ him out 
of the image of clandestin – and yet that legality is nothing, or won’t exist, without his survival 
through escape, which must happen on bare feet – and thus decrease its chances of success.  
By portraying border crossing as an endless escape, La géographie extends, at the same 
time, the geography of the border and the geography of illegalization. Illegalization is, indeed, the 
mechanisms whereby the border, which the protagonists crossed illegally, follows and haunts him 
beyond its physical territorial limits. “La géographie du danger: gares, ghettos d’immigrés, stations 
 
148 Skif, Géographie, 12.  
 





de métro, quartiers chauds, bars, sorties de grands magasins, stades et dancings louches.”150 Most 
of these places are only faintly associable to movement and foreignness, and even less, to illegal 
status. By drawing this peculiar map of danger, that is, a map of the tentacles of state repression 
of illegal status, the clandestin of La géographie is, in fact, pointing to two elements: State racism 
and sociality. Every step the clandestin takes toward participation in a social word is potentially 
risky. Thus, as a mechanism, illegalization isolates – to the point of hiding – the clandestin from 
society. This dynamic is traceable in the trajectory of Skif’s clandestin, whose ‘illegality’ extends 
from the crossing, surrounded by a different landscape and protracts without end other than 
discovery and arrest, inside the four dark walls of his room. 
When asked whether a particular sequence in Géographie was a possible reference to the 
2005 riots in France, Skif categorically excluded the parallel, stressing not only his deliberate 
choice of not anchoring the plot to a European country in particular but also, more intriguingly, 
proposing a colonial reading of the riots that simultaneously ties clandestin to France’s colonial 
past and to its banlieues:  
 
  À l’origine, j’avais pensé situer l’action en Suisse. Mais aucun pays n’est 
cité, ni aucune ville. Pourtant beaucoup de lecteurs sont convaincus que je parle 
des banlieues françaises. J’ai une explication à cela [...] Cela viendrait-il du fait 
que l’on associe banlieues et clandestins ? Pense-t-on que ces jeunes Français qui 
se révoltent contre la « mal vie » dans ces cités bâties sur les modèles coloniaux 
définis par Paul Delouvrier ont partie liée avec ces foules de sans-papiers qui 
troublent le sommeil des gouvernants ? Il serait trop long d’épiloguer là-dessus 
mais c’est intéressant à noter.151  
 
150 Skif, Géographie, 15.  
 
151 Hamid Skif and Siegfried Storz, “Comment décrire ces situations extrêmes de dénuement?,” Africultures 3, no. 
68 (2006): 111. After having been sent as “Government Delegate” to Algeria by de Gaulle from 1958 to 1960, Paul 
Delouvrier was a high-level official for the Paris region. In that capacity he oversaw, in 1965, the “Schéma directeur 
d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région de Paris (SDAURP)” which “encompassed the city and an area of some 
fifty square miles around it [...] and aimed to manage an urban population projected to grow from 8.5 million in 
1965 to 14 million by the end of the century. Key to the plan was the construction of eight new satellite towns in a 
circle around Paris (five of which would ultimately be built).” Nicknamed “le Haussman des faubourgs,” he is 





In his answer, Skif explicitly links the Francophone imaginary of the clandestin to 
colonization. As the previous pages of this chapter have tried to show, he is right, as the clandestin 
became a noun – le clandestin – during colonial times and through the ‘native’ subject. Moreover, 
we can see how Skif’s choice to make “geography” no longer national but emotional and social 
has the power to “resignify” the political in two main ways: On the one hand, he points to the break 
in the colonial and post-colonial trajectory of migration and, most importantly, by not naming 
anything that could be tied to a nation-state he forcefully shifts the burden of the violence of 
illegalization onto Europe as a whole. Thus his is a new clandestinité, one that will emerge 
forcefully in the following decades: a constant illegalization that goes beyond the initial act of 
crossing and that articulates a border that does, embodied by the illegalized, effectively does not 
end.  
 
 From clandestins to sans-papiers: dismissing a word as a political act 
 
In 1997 René Marquès, a senator defending the Debré law, spoke on the undocumentedness 
of immigrants – in the most literal sense, that of ‘not being known to the State’ – in a way 
reminiscent of pre-immigration clandestinité. He spoke of ‘anonymity:’ “l'anonymat est devenu 
une véritable filière d'immigration irrégulière, (car) près de 90% des clandestins maghrébins 
interpellés sont dépourvus de documents. Il suffit de paraître sourd et muet pour être remis en 
liberté.”152 We find again the word ‘filière,’ used to describe a chain of steps or stops along which 
something or someone moves, whether legally or not: a ‘network,’ one may be tempted to translate 
it, although the French word – from ‘fil,’ thread – retains a thinness and linearity that is more apt 
 
Dispute: Planning, Discourse, and State Power in Post-War France,” French Politics, Culture and Society 36, no. 2 
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to describe and especially visualize trajectories of movement. The senator’s intended meaning is 
not immediately clear. Normally, a ‘filière d’immigration’ is a way or an opportunity to enter a 
country with a specific status.153 The term is also often used to in the context of a ‘filière 
d’immigration clandestine.’ What he seems to point out is, perhaps, that ‘anonymity’ itself has 
become a way to immigrate into France.154 In other words, withholding knowledge of oneself is 
seen, paradoxically, as a practicable way to cross borders. Although instances of anonymity as a 
political tool will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3, I evoke the idea because it points to a 
confused yet ever-present line that clandestin necessarily draws with one of its earlier meaning, 
the line between what is known and knowable and what is not. In the French context of the late 
1990s, the concepts of anonymity and its close relative invisibility underwent political 
reappropriation by the sans-papiers movement, which represents a key moment in the history of 
European migration and took shape, discursively, in stark and precise antagonism with the figure 
of the clandestin.  
Between March and June 1996, a collective of illegalized immigrants – about 300 each 
time, most of whom had lost status after having resided in France for varying periods of time — 
occupied first the church of St. Ambroise, in the 11th arrondissement of Paris, and then the church 
of St. Bernard in the La Chapelle neighborhood just north of it. Under increasing media exposure 
 
153 See, for instance, the title of the article: Geoffroy Clavel, “Macron a-t-il vraiment qualifié les visas étudiants de 




154 This forcefully suggest a metropolitan assessment of the practice of anonymous crossing that will be later known 
as harraga. From the Arabic root of ‘burning’, harraga denotes, among other aspects, a particular form of 
‘clandestinité’’, of emigration, and a way of positionitioning oneself vis-à-vis the North African state left behind. 
One of the possible developments of this research should be the connection of clandestins and harragas especially 
as they have been and are still sometimes used to translate one another, even though they occupy large, fluid, and 





and polarization of public opinion, the occupation of St. Bernard lasted almost two months until 
“riot police violently broke down the church doors with axes, using tear gas on mothers and babies, 
and dragged everyone out.”155 The film 1997 La Ballade des sans-papiers, shot with a hand-
camera inside the occupations, presents a brilliant and chilling montage of the St. Bernard 
evacuation. The images of the CRS clearing the premises by force, shattering impromptu 
installations, and dragging people out against their will are narrated by the ‘soothing’ words of 
Prime Minister Édouard Balladur: “Le moment était venu d’appliquer la loi avec fermeté mais 
avec le souci d’humanité et de coeur que souhaite le gouvernement.”156 
The context of the formation of the sans-papiers protest was the harshening of the general 
conditions of the immigrant in France following — as the last of many measures — the Pasqua 
laws voted in 1993. Beside their important modifications to what was, until then, an absolute ius 
soli, the laws restricted several aspects of immigrant life: family reunion was made more difficult, 
along with asylum appeals and the conditions for obtaining a residency permit, while the procedure 
for expulsions was simplified. Thus stripped of legal status and of the bureaucratic means to gain 
or regain it — ‘thrown into clandestinité,’ as a popular phrase at the time framed their condition 
— large numbers of formerly legal immigrants were effectively illegalized.  
The demands of the sans-papiers were simple and without concession: Legalization 
through regularization of status and, further and more abstractly, freedom of movement. In the 
forceful mediatization and politicization of their struggle they were led by two spokespersons, 
 
155 Thomas Nail, “Alain Badiou and the sans-papiers,” Angelaki: A Journal of Theoretical Humanities 20, no. 4 
(2015): 113. See also Anne McNevin, Contesting Citizenship: Irregular Migrants and the New Frontiers of the 
Political (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011). See, in particular, chapter 4, “Acts of Contestation,” 
quoted extensively below. 
 






Ababacar Diop and Madjiguène Cissé, both of whom published memoirs and diaries of those days. 
Rather uniquely, however, Cissé’s Parole de sans-papiers engages directly with the political 
valences of naming themselves sans-papiers. 
 
Nos revendications étaient éminemment politiques. Notre visibilité à travers les 
manifestations, les rassemblements, les occupations, les débats que nous organisions, 
dérangeait à coup sûr. Que des “illégaux” ou des “clandestins” occupent une partie 
importante de la scène publique était, pour le gouvernement, plus que gênant, une 
perturbation trop longue de la vie politique, donnant une image trop peu “civilisée” de la 
vie sociale. […] Tout a été fait pour empêcher cette visibilité dès le début. […] L’idée du 
groupe et de la revendication globale était insupportable pour le gouvernement et même 
au-delà. Le porte-parole du collège des médiateurs, qui avait été accepté et mandaté par 
les sans-papiers, nous rappelait souvent la gêne que pouvaient occasionner. Selon lui, 
nous devions rester à Pajol,157 mais ne pas nous faire trop entendre. ‘Cela pourrait gêner 
la médiation.’ Dans les lettres de menaces ou d’insultes que nous recevions étaient 
souvent évoquées notre arrogance et notre visibilité dans les médias. Nous avons au 
contraire multiplié les manifestations, les forums-débats, ne ratant aucune occasion de 
nous expliquer et de répliquer aux politiciens du gouvernement. […] Nous avions réussi a 
forger une sorte de respect, le respect que l’on accorde à quelqu’un qui se bat, qui résiste. 
La terminologie de sans-papiers, en lieu et place de clandestins, bat en brèche 
l’argumentation officielle faisant de nous des boucs émissaires. Le mythe du clandestin, 
qui passe la frontière au péril de sa vie, est en passe d’être détruit. Nous ne sommes pas 
des clandestins, nous sommes des sans-papiers, c’est à dire, ‘dépourvus de papiers’.”158 
 
We can isolate, in the paragraph above, multiple interventions in which Cissé is engaged: 
First, she brings forth the notion that the sans-papiers’ claim generated discomfort in the political 
class because of the media exposure that they were seeking and receiving. She also points to that 
search for visibility as both a political strategy to garner support and the necessary way out of 
rightless invisibility of their lack of status. Most importantly, however, she tackles the question of 
 
157 The name given to the hangars owned by the SNCF in rue Pajol (Paris 18) and run by a railway trade union 
where the sans-papiers slept before the occupation of St. Bernard. See Madjiguène Cissé, Parole des sans-papiers 
(Paris, France: La Dispute, 1997), 64–67 and following.  
 





collective naming of the movement159 to reflect its politics, and the valences of this rhetorical 
intervention vis-à-vis its direct lexical and political predecessor, le clandestin.  
“Contestations of citizenship,” Anne McNevin wrote, “can be understood on at least two 
levels. The first relates to the formal legal status that citizenship implies and attempts to extend 
that status to those who lack an automatic entitlement to it. Calls to regularize irregular migrants 
work at this level of contestation. They deploy an understanding of citizenship as a static 
possession that is controlled by state authorities with the power to transfer it to approved 
noncitizens.”160 If we take the sans-papiers’ ‘act of citizenship’161 to fall, at least partially, in this 
first category – a claim to ‘regularization’ rests, after all, on the understanding of State as maker 
and distributor of the ‘rules’ of citizenship – the first element that emerges from Cissé’s words is 
that there is at least a double articulation of presence in the sans-papiers’s claim to regularization. 
Not only do they make a claim to a ‘transfer’ of legality to fight the specific illegalization resulting 
from loss of status, but their particular illegalization is itself static, in that it took place within — 
and not across — officially recognized territorial borders. Yet, not all of the sans-papiers’ claims 
seem to fit this description. “A second level of contestation,” McNevin adds, “engages the 
representational dimension of citizenship. This dimension generates an unquestioned “common 
sense” about who belongs to what kind of political community. This common sense tells us who 
 
159 “Quand était-ce exactement? Personne n’arrive bien à s’en souvenir. Au Groupe d’information et de Soutien aux 
immigrés (Gisti), Jean-Pierre Alaux croit que Madjiguène Cissé, la leader de Saint-Bernard a lancé l’idée : Ne plus 
dire ‘clandestin’ mais ‘sans-papiers’. L’intéressée ne s’en souvient pas: “Je crois que le mot existait déjà et que notre 
mouvement l’a popularisé.” Patrick Moni, du Gisti, se creuse la tête: “Je me souviens qu’on se demandait si c’était 
vraiment bien ce terme, parce qu’ils sont peut-être sans papiers ici, mais ils ont tous des passeports et une identité.” 
D’autres pensent que le mot est apparu lors du mouvement des “sans,” en 1995. Dans les journaux, c’est lors de 
l’occupation de Saint-Ambroise, en 1996 que l’on voit écrit “sans-papiers” puis sans-papiers, sans guillemets.” 
Dominique Simonnot, “De clandestins à sans-papiers”, Libération, 23 August 2006. 
 
160 McNevin, Contesting Citizenship, 99. 
 





a citizen is and what being a citizen implies. [...] Contestations that operate at the representational 
level challenge these meanings of citizenship and, in their most radical forms, undermine the 
legitimacy of legal status as a self-evident determinant of political belonging. In these cases, 
citizenship is engaged as a dynamic and contestable identity. Far being from static, it is always ‘in 
the process of becoming.’”162 
Naming themselves sans-papiers, a noun made of a privative preposition and an object in 
a historically deep gesture towards lack of attributes as a federating element,163 the illegalized by 
the Pasqua laws resorted to what Judith Butler has termed an ‘alternative vocabulary’164 to the 
inadequate discourses of citizenship and rights. More specifically, Cissé’s neologism is used to 
operate a few distinctions between different types of belonging and of being illegal. The first one 
is historical: the sentence “le mythe du clandestin … est en passe d’être détruit” points to the 
differences between the illegalization of séjour165 and the illegalization of passage, and seems to 
suggest the latter as being something ‘mythical’ or fabricated versus the former’s hard reality. 
Ultimately, however, associating clandestin with ‘myth,’ if only to underscore the unethical uses 
made of it by the press and the political class pushing for harder immigration measures, results in 
the dismissal of a category but also of a deep legal and historical memory that leads back to the 
passengers of the ‘Sidi-Ferruch.’ The second, more important point that the sentence makes is, 
instead, eminently political. By operating a distinction in ‘perceptions’ of migration – the ‘myth’ 
of border crossing against the ‘reality’ of loss of status – Cissé claims justice for the sans-papiers 
 
162 McNevin, Contesting Citizenship, 99. 
 
163 Sans-culottes, sans-abri, sans-domicile-fixe, sans-dents, sans-papiers. 
 
164 Butler cited in McNevin, Contesting Citizenship, 101. 
 
165 Which we can provisionally translate as “stay.” “Stay” at least partially carries over the distinction that Cissé is 





on the basis of their distance from and relationship with the border. More specifically, having 
crossed the border ‘legally’ and having been ‘legal’ once – even if this simply means a pending 
claim with the OFPRA166– seems to institute a ‘hierarchy of illegalizations’ whereby having lived 
and practiced a participative and active ‘citizenship’167 before falling under the ever more 
restrictive mechanisms of the illegalization of séjour is not the same as breaking the rules of entry. 
By simultaneously ‘owning’ and fighting against the sans-papiers status of illegalized presence, 
Cissé’s words effect a semantic separation between clandestins and sans-papiers that disentangles 
the invisibility and illegality that coexisted in clandestin up until then. In this operation, the sans-
papiers claim invisibility as the harm of injustice, leaving clandestin to mean solely ‘illegal border 
crosser.’ Pushing the border out of the heart of the question of regularization – the sans-papiers’ 
question – by making it an issue of illegalized “stay”, Cissé (and the movement) engage the State 
on higher juridical ground, pointing to the fact that they are not tainted by the ‘original sin’ of 
illegally crossing into France.168 Clandestin, as a result, is the (inadvertent) casualty of Cissé’s 
reasoning in that the illegalization is not contested, namely that the unintended consequence of her 
dismissal of clandestin is the simultaneous legitimization of the premises on which clandestin 
became ‘illegal.’ That is to say, in Cissé’s language much like in that of parliamentary debates, the 
breaking and breaching external borders seemed to warrant the ‘inherent illegality’ which 
clandestin, by then, had come to substantiate and substantivize.  
 
 
166 Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et des Apatrides, the french authority presiding over the judgement of 
claims to international protection. 
 
167 Cissé, Parole des sans-papiers, 82. 
 
168 There is a lot to study and research about this particular type of clandestinité, which we could call clandestinité 
statique. Its particular traits that bring ‘invisibility’ and hiding closer to ‘immobility’ – as in both the immobility of 
the body for fear of arrest and the freezing of the mind – paranoia, the growing and looping thought of illegality, etc 











The separation from and dismissal of clandestin argued by Madjiguène Cissé and the sans-
papiers contributed, in part, to a divergence between the French and Italian trajectories of the word. 
Italian does not have a morphological and syntactical equivalent that managed, to a large extent, 
to replace clandestino in mainstream public and political discourse. Essentializing and illegalized, 
however, clandestino/clandestin have remained a preferred word of the political right, and have 
thus been thrust back into the center of the debate whenever particular racist stances on 
immigration regain traction. In general, however, we could say that the former, clandestino, has 
enjoyed a slightly less peripheral life in political and legal use earlier than its French counterpart.169 
Indeed, the glory days of the clandestino in Italian came after the sans-papiers struggle, 
particularly with the debate surrounding the “Bossi-Fini” law in the early 2000s and when 
‘clandestinità’ was inscribed in the Italian penal code as an ‘aggravating factor’ [un’aggravante] 
for a committed crime: the infamous ‘clause 11 bis’ of Article 61, as amended in 2009, thus read: 
[È da considerarsi circostanza aggravante comune] l'avere il colpevole commesso 
il fatto mentre si trova illegalmente sul territorio nazionale.170 
 
This clause, along with the Bossi-Fini law that spoke officially of ‘immigrazione 
clandestina’ and its later revisions, signaled the complete criminalization of clandestino and 
 
169 This until very recently. Confronted with the standoff surrounding the disembarkment of rescued asylum seekers 
from the NGO ship Open Arms in August 2019 – a standoff that was weakening both his position as Interior 
Minister of Italy and the (precarious) government coalition of which he was part – Salvini answered questions about 
his ‘obsession’ with dinghies crossing the Mediterranean with a sarcastic yet revelatory confession: “Confesso [...] 
la mia “ossessione” nel contrastare ogni tipo di reato compresa l’immigrazione clandestina.” (“I confess my 
‘obsession’ with fighting all crime, including immigrazione clandestina”). Facebook post on “Matteo Salvini” 
(official page), August 15, 2019, 5.51am Eastern. 
 
170 “[It is to be considered common aggravating factor] if the perpetrator committed the crime while being illegally 




provided the final touches to the conflation, semantic as well as in the public imagination, of 
clandestino with ‘illegal.’ It also provided the logical scaffolding and the vocabulary, legal and 
not, for the illegalization of later forms of human movement that came under different names in 
the following decade: the migrant and, to a more subtle extent, the refugee despite the protections 
granted under international law. 
Nevertheless, the clandestin/clandestino cluster remains important even in the present 
Schengen era, which is characterized by increased pressure on EU regarding both its policies of 
bordering and redistribution. The politics of naming and translating status and cross-border 
movement are central to illegalization practices and to the resistance movements that strive to 
expose them and counter them. Indeed, it is precisely in this context that the historical experience 
of clandestin/clandestino offers us an example of how – syntactically and semantically – a cluster 
of related words can be used to create a category of crime and illegality. Most importantly, 
however, the study of this very mechanism offers the blueprint for its own demystification, and a 
roadmap for resignifying every illegalizing category. The next chapters, which are set almost 
exclusively in the post-Arab revolutions Central Mediterranean, will show how, in order to begin, 
this process of counter-semanticization must tackle the mechanisms of illegalization across 






   
 
CHAPTER 2 – REMAINS OF A TRANSIENT لباب  : BABYLON, CHOUCHA, AND THE MAKING OF 





 Contemporary migration across the Mediterranean is often portrayed as a continuous crisis, 
a chain of never-ending catastrophes. Our imagination is filled with bright red life preservers 
dotting the blue sea, or thermal blankets reflecting their shining gold and silver in the night. When 
we see these images, the shipwreck and rescue have already happened. Similarly, when media 
access refugee or detainment camps after reports of inhumane treatment, the event has passed, and 
cameras search for reasons, traces, testimonies, and information.  
In this chapter, my focus turns to representations of the emergency humanitarian camp, the 
purpose of which is to temporarily contain, process, and relocate safely suddenly displaced people. 
As a mechanism of illegalization, the emergency refugee camp functions in two main ways. On 
the one hand the camp, under the direct or indirect control of the State, aims, above all with a 
humanitarian intent, at restricting human movement at various degrees of coercion.171 On the other 
hand, when established for people displaced through national borders, the temporary emergency 
camp produces illegalization as it leaves behind or outside the international humanitarian network 
of which it is a node those who were not granted any form of international protection. In order to 
explore this double function of the camp, which entails positing a specific temporality that takes 
 
171 Across Africa and Europe devices to regulate, enclose and restrict human movement across borders have various 
names and perform specific functions that at times overlap: emergency refugee camps, “hotspots,” centers of 
detention or “retention,” centers of identification and expulsion (CIEs), “zones d’attente” etc. They all, however, 
share the objective of restricting free movement and possibly identifying, enclosing and separating their population 




into consideration the life of the camp as well as the physical and figurative traces it leaves behind 
after being dismantled, my analysis is anchored by an experimental film and, secondarily, an 
internet blog. Both the film and the blog are products of experiences in the Choucha refugee camp, 
built in 2011 under the mandate of UNHCR and the Red Crescent at the border between Tunisia 
and Libya. Babylon, a French-Tunisian collective film, was filmed on-site when the Libyan war 
and Choucha camp were the focus of international media and political attention.172 The internet 
blog Voice of Choucha, on the other hand, was created when all that attention had dissipated. Its 
aim was to reclaim the rights of those who were denied asylum and relocation and who were left 
on the camp’s premises even after Choucha had been officially shut down.173  
I focus on film and online refugee writings for their role as alternative forms of 
representation of a moment and a space – the camp – the ‘narration’ of which is usually firmly in 
the grasp of institutional actors. I also focus on the film and blog because they are attempts at 
recording and collecting illegalized, transitory ‘forms of living’ that populate the temporary 
emergency camp, and that rework and contest institutional choices of preserving and discarding.174 
As forms of representation, collection and preservation existing in a regime of illegalization they 
carry the potential (and a more or less explicit demand) for justice. Released in 2012 to 
underground acclaim, Babylon is a collective film about the experience of Choucha refugee camp, 
from its construction to its official closure. It breaks with the sensationalism of mainstream visual 
treatment of migration by choosing instead to frame the containment of human passage in terms 
 
172 The film’s original title is لباب  / Babylon, by Youssef Chebbi, Ala Eddine Slim, and ismaïl (Tunis, Tunisia: Exit 
Productions, 2012), 1h 59 mins. 
 
173 Voice of Choucha: An International Limbo, Crying out for Help, accessible at 
https://voiceofchoucha.wordpress.com/ 
 
174 For a distinction between forms of living and forms of life – attempting to not reduce human life to bare life – see 
Angela Naimou, Salvage Work: U.S. and Caribbean Literatures amid the Debris of Legal Personhood (New York, 




of a temporal arc, from nothing to something and again to nothing. It draws on the ethnographic 
register of visual anthropology and incorporates some central elements of documentary form, but 
it separates itself from other examples of visual documentation of migration in that it moves away 
from the ethnographic approach to the refugee as a source of information and as a result gives a 
thicker account of human experience. It focuses, instead, on what precedes the arrival of displaced 
persons to the camp, their attempts at creating a common life in the camp and, most importantly, 
on what remains after they have left. In an unusual posture, Babylon’s camera is filming before 
the camp is built, when the earth on which the camp will grow is still bare. And it lingers until 
after its occupants have left, when the camera pauses on what was left behind: layers of plastic and 
debris that will be pushed back into the earth, forever altering it. In another departure from 
documentary-based approaches to filming migration, Babylon does not resort to subtitles or 
translation of any kind except in its title and credits, thus keeping mostly intact the arresting 
multilingualism of Choucha while also displacing the creation of meaning from language onto the 
image. Through its double commitment to the residue of restricted life in the camp and to non-
translation, Babylon represents an alternative form of representation of illegalization through the 
camp as a device of humanitarian assistance. On the one hand, this form seeks to show and preserve 
those signs of refugee life and passage that are otherwise systematically disposed of and, on the 
other hand, it attempts to recenter refugee voice and expression beyond the transmission of 
meaning, and on its own terms. Along with the semi-defunct blog, Voice of Choucha, which, as 
discussed in the last section of this chapter, functioned for a few years as the digital voice of those 
left behind by relocation procedures, Babylon sketches the formal possibilities and contributes to 





Babylon and Choucha 
 Built in a hurry on a patch of desert 6 miles from the border checkpoint of Ras Jedir, 
Choucha camp was a celebrity for a short time. Not quite like other camps such as Zaatari in Jordan 
or Dadaab in Kenya but, as the largest camp along the Tunisian-Libyan border, it came to embody 
the urgency of the displacement crisis caused by the Libyan conflict as well as the extreme 
heterogeneity of those fleeing violence. Even current UN Secretary António Guterres visited the 
camp in his former capacity as High Commissioner for Refugees. As procedures of redistribution 
and resettlement became a point of contention among European countries, Choucha also attracted 
a fair share of Western media attention, the traces of which can still be found online.175  
The demographic composition of Choucha at its beginnings and during the filming of 
Babylon reflected a crucial feature of the transborder movement between Tunisia and Libya, as it 
concerned not only Libyan nationals but also Sub-Saharan, East African, and East Asian persons 
either living and working or simply transiting through Libya at the start of hostilities. In this sense, 
Choucha offered a glimpse of the wide variety of peoples and trajectories of movement that make 
up the Central Mediterranean route.176 As a result, Choucha played temporary host to a variety of 
legal statuses and intentions with respect to movement, some tied to international protection and 
 
175 See, for instance, the segment “Voices of Choucha,” produced by the German non-profit Pro Asyl. Running a little 
over 6 minutes, the short film follows the standard documentary interview plot which almost infallibly takes the 
interviewee through the following questions: ‘where are you from? / how did you get here? / how would you describe 
your current living conditions? / What do you think should be done to improve said living conditions?” Questions are 
usually omitted from the final version, leaving us with only ‘native’ voices, duly subtitled. Its recognizable and perhaps 
canonical format does not, in any way, diminish the importance of the content and of the fact that, although they are 
carefully framed, Choucha dwellers are actually speaking. Pro Asyl, “Voices of Choucha,” YouTube video, 6:09, July 
11, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xLjZhwvP-Zw  
 
176 As articulated in the Introduction, I propose here an expansive understanding of the Central Mediterranean that 
encompasses not only the sea routes from Libya, Tunisia and Algeria to Italy and Malta but also those bringing 
people from East Africa to Libya through the Sahara and, on the opposite shore, the routes that branch out from 





relocation, other only seeking to “go home,” as in the case of a group of Bangladeshi workers 
whose boiling frustration makes for one of Babylon’s strongest sequences.177 
 Although Babylon almost never shows people directly for their status in the camp and never 
makes information about them readily available to the viewer, by combining the film with media 
coverage of Choucha and of the Libyan crisis it is possible to identify some of those transiting 
through the camp. There are Ethiopians fleeing dictatorship and Nigerian girls fleeing the 
“nothingness” of their lives, and youth from Côte d’Ivoire seeking to escape the country’s 
instability. There are those – hailing from all over Sub-Saharan Africa and as far as Bangladesh – 
who once belonged to the large contingent of foreign labor on which the Libyan oil industry relied 
so heavily under Muammar Qaddafi’s rule. At various moments during his 40-plus years in power, 
Qaddafi allowed foreign workers into Libya in large numbers while never proceeding to their full 
regularization.178 Some of them had established residence in Libya long before the war broke out, 
and were subsequently captured by newly-formed militias and spent time in jail, just like migrants 
who were transiting through the country in the hope of reaching Europe. Finally, the Tunisian State 
in the form of its military, the transnational apparatus of humanitarian care – International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) foreign and Tunisian workers, Red Crescent employees and 
UNHCR representatives – as well as foreign members of the press were also present. 
 
177 We can only sketch here how difficult it is to definitively name and categorize people who cross borders because 
citizenship, status, occupation or social position all coexist in the person even when, for legal and political purposes, 
definitions are mutually exclusive. For instance, the same Bangladeshi citizen transiting through Choucha in 2011 is, 
potentially and simultaneously, a foreign worker fleeing Libya – what is termed an “economic migrant” – who also 
filed an asylum request following violence endured there – thus an “asylum-seeker” – and at the same time, is 
asking for what the law calls “voluntary repatriation” because he sees that the system is broken and would rather go 
back home.  
 
178 Ronald Bruce Saint John, “Employment” in Historical Dictionary of Libya, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: The 





 Throughout Babylon’s circular journey from dust to ashes the figure of the poor, angry, but 
nonetheless intelligible migrant depicted in mainstream media is decentered in favor of an opaque 
and multilingual portrait of life in an emergency refugee camp. The camera rarely points to and 
never follows anyone in particular. Rather, people float in and out of its frame, thus destabilizing 
the viewer while expanding the migrant’s humanity by lingering outside and beyond what ‘we’ 
usually need to know. Most documentaries and films about camps179 privilege an information-
based ethnographic approach,180 which uses testimonies and visual evidence as sources of 
information and which almost invariably overlooks or at best flattens the lives involved, often by 
asking standard questions about trajectories, reasons for leaving, and violence suffered along the 
way. While this type of work is important, particularly at a time when injustices and violence along 
the Central Mediterranean route need to be systematically exposed, Babylon deliberately refuses 
this approach and manages to create a break in the aesthetics of migration cinema while 
complicating our understanding of what it may mean to transit through a refugee camp. 
The camp is one of the sites in which non-conformity of status is dealt with both as an 
administrative issue and as an ontological state. The camp anonymizes, conceals, makes disappear. 
While waiting listless days in the backlog of asylum requests and processes of resettlement or 
 
179 I use the word ‘camp’ here broadly, to underscore the genealogies that have been established in recent work, 
particularly in the Francophone social sciences: for an initial bibliography on the humanitarian / detention camp, see 
Michel Agier, Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity, 2011), and “Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects (A Note on Camps and Humanitarian 
Government),” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 1, no. 1 
 (2010): 29–45, as well as his more recent De Lesbos à Calais: Comment l’Europe fabrique des camps (Paris, 
France: Le Passager Clandestin, 2017); Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); and Miriam Ticktin’s work, in particular “Thinking Beyond 
Humanitarian Borders,” Social Research 83, no. 2 (2016): 255–271, and “Invasive Others: Toward a Contaminated 
World,” Social Research 84, no. 1 (2017): xxi–xxxiv.  
 
180 See, among others, Cinzia Castanìa’s Mineo housing (Rome: Axolotl Film, 2012), 60 mins; Hélène Crouzillat 
and Laetitia Tura’s Les Messagers (France: Territoires en marge, 2017) 1hr 10 mins; Isabella Alexander’s The 
Burning (Atlanta, GA: Small World Films, 2018). Specifically on Choucha, see Pro Asyl, Voices of Choucha; Zarzis 





redistribution, people cease to exist in the world. The mechanism of their illegalization is two-fold. 
They are effectively illegalized through the camp’s apparatus of physical and administrative 
restrictions while they wait to be assigned a status. Illegalization is then reinforced when they 
finally exit this administrative limbo. The few whose demands for protection are accepted enter 
the institutional process of refugee and asylum care – resettlement, distribution of allowances , etc. 
Meanwhile, the large majority of those present at Choucha for various reasons that, at a specific 
point in time, all amounted to the need to survive, disappear from the official record of those 
‘rescued’ by the international system of protection. At this point, they become victims of the 
camp’s temporariness both as an infrastructure and as a political solution.181 Moreover, their status 
as persons lawfully present on the camp’s premises, and on the country’s territory, is no longer 
guaranteed. In the way it frames Choucha as a site of illegalization by showing its existence as 
both independent and inseparable from the people who live in it, Babylon utterly disorganizes (and 
points to a possible re-organization) of our perception of migrants.  
 
Babylon as Tentative Archiving and As Archiving Tool 
One of the characteristics of an “archive” as traditionally conceived is that it is under direct 
or indirect control of the State, and is present permanently in one or multiple physical locations. 
As historian Arlette Farge famously wrote, an archive is always the result of the choices of an 
‘archivist’, “a hand that collects and classifies.”182 As a result of actions of documentary inclusion 
 
181 Agier, Managing the Undesirables, 9. 
 
182 Arlette Farge, The Allure of the Archive, trans. Thomas Scott-Railton (New Haven, CI: Yale University Press, 
2015). In both its large and narrow sense, the ‘archivist’ should here be intended to stress the existence of various 
levels of implementation of ideologies and politics of collecting, with the aim to problematize any approach to the 





and exclusion – or of what Arjun Appadurai has called “interventions”183 – the archive shows, or 
speaks, as much as it is blind or falls silent. Publicly accessible institutional archives, whether state 
collection or museums, generally contain few documents or traces of contemporary migration in 
general and of the emergency camp in particular.184 Objects and items related to life on the move 
rarely seem relevant to either domestic or international status. This is true a fortiori of untranslated 
or self-produced narratives or accounts of migration.185 However, the diffusion and increased 
availability of audio and video technology as well possibilities of circulation of de-materialized 
documents have turned the camera into a tool for documenting and re-membering.186 Paula Amad 
speaks of film’s “excessive evidentiary capacities” in her study of film as a counter-archival 
medium, specifically linking film’s “counter-archival origins” to “ its attraction to the everyday 
 
183 “The archive as a deliberate project is based on the recognition that all documentation is a form of intervention 
and, thus, that documentation does not simply precede intervention, but is its first step. Since all archives are 
collections of documents (whether graphic, artifactual or recorded in other forms), this means that the archive is 
always a meta-intervention.” Arjun Appadurai, “Archive and Aspiration,” in Information is Alive, edited by Joke 
Brouwer, Arjen Moulder, and Susan Charlton (Rotterdam, The Netherlands: V2 Publishing/NAI Publishers, 2003), 
24. 
 
184 An archive of migration is as difficult to circumscribe as it is to define. A non-exhaustive list of practices of 
documenting and sites of documentation would, for instance, include: embassies, consulates, and visa registries and 
databases. Asylum and international protection records like applications, judgements, supporting documents (The 
‘mediatedness’ of asylum applications particularly with respect to translation will be the focus of the next chapter). 
Official records of deaths, whether at sea or on land. It is clear that, partially as a result of the legislation restricting 
movement, a large chunk of migratory movement across African and the Mediterranean either strives to go or 
simply ends up uncounted or undetected. The “silence” of the institutional archive, thus, can become deafening.  
 
185 One of the accusations made by those who were refused protection by UNHCR personnel in Choucha was the 
‘mishandling’ and misinterpretation of their file. ‘Mishandling’ in particular suggests a ‘disorderly and unkept’ 
archive, were pieces and files are misleading. Moreover, given the general precariousness of the conditions in which 
identification and asylum procedures happen, it is not uncommon that the files and documents are misplaced or 
altogether lost.  
 
186 See Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance (New York, NY: Civitas, 2012). 
David Scott, in his essay “On the Archaeology of Black Memory,” also uses the hyphenated ‘re-membering’ and 
defines it as the action of “putting back together aspects of our common life so as to make visible what has been 
obscured, what has been excluded, what has been forgotten”. In my use of it, I intend to stress what I see as productive 
similarities with Babylon’s attempt at representing migration by piecing back together the traces of its existence. David 





fragment as the history of the present, in direct contrast to nineteenth-century archives’ dedication 
to the political document as the history of the past.”187  
I intend to mobilize the notion of counter-archive on two distinct though interconnected 
levels. At the aesthetic level, I posit Babylon’s treatment of refugee speech and attention to the 
remainders of refugee-passage as a counter-archival and counter-narrative attempt at expanding, 
through video-salvaging and the circulation of the film, an aesthetic of migration that generally 
does not contemplate the material components of movement and transiency. In this, Babylon joins 
other artistic endeavors around the Mediterranean that are concerned with the construction of 
“alternative” narratives through the memorialization of refuse and residue. On another level, 
Babylon’s salvaging of residue, its looking beyond the usual confines of migrant representation, 
makes it participate in a counter-archive of Mediterranean migration that includes endeavors 
sharing the same aesthetic and a similarly ‘unorthodox’ approach to representation across a variety 
of media. It is by this simultaneous aestheticization and conservation through film of the refuse of 
passage that Babylon both constitutes and participates in a counter-archive of contemporary 
crossings and Mediterranean passages.  
Shoes or clothes lost at sea, pages of passports, cellphone videos and chats, graffiti on the 
walls of prisons or safe houses in Libya or in the Alps, etc., all show how tracking down, collecting, 
and documenting traces outside of the institutional archive of migration can be politically and 
aesthetically meaningful for those illegalized or made invisible by that same archive. All around 
Southern Europe there are museums of migration concerned with its ‘settled dust’, spaces of 
collection that attempt to memorialize the processes and the struggles of integration and 
assimilation that typically follow movement and border-crossing but which also engage in 
 
187 Paula Amad, Counter-Archive: Film, The Everyday, and Albert Kahn’s Les Archives de la Planète (New York: 




processes of aestheticization. They are not museums of the present. But there are also efforts to 
collect traces and signs of movement and passage in more activist and less codified forms. For 
instance, the PortoM project in Lampedusa is a space driven by such urgency, where migrant 
objects either kept or washed ashore are collected and routinely exhibited. The work of Tunisian 
artist Mohsen Lihideb and his Sea Memory Museum located in the coastal town of Zarzis is also 
an example of a similar a preoccupation. In a more extreme and ambivalent way, the spaces known 
as “boat cemeteries” that dot the Southern European coast from Spain to Turkey – where boats 
used by migrants that capsized, were seized, or made it to the shore are kept and await destruction 
– are at the same time state-sanctioned repositories of ‘junk’ and sites of memory and 
documentation for those who strive to piece together the traces of contemporary migration.188 The 
 
188 On PortoM, see https://askavusa.wordpress.com/con-gli-oggetti/porto-m/. On Mohsen Lihideb, among others, see 
Anna Chiara Cimoli and Dario Cieol, “‘The Memory of the Sea’: Exhibiting a Museum”, in Museum Multiplicities: 
Field Actions and Research by Design, ed. Luca Basso Paressut, Cristina F. Colombo, and Gennaro Postiglioni 
(Milan, Italy: Politecnico di Milano, 2014), 37–66. Attention to boat cemeteries – especially in photography and 
video – is growing exponentially. For a critical discussion of their memorialization and aestheticization, see Beatrice 
Ferrara, ed., Cultural Memory, Migrating Modernity and Museum Practices (Milan, Italy: Politecnico di Milano, 
2012), in particular Ian Chambers, “The Museum of Migrating Modernities” (13–31), and Alessandra de Angelis, 
“A Museum on the Margins of the Mediterranean: Between Caring for Memory and the Future” (35–43), and 
“Recovering, Archiving, Contaminating: The Negotiations of Museums with Memory” (93–112). In an equally 
politically meaningful way, extensive and important work is also being done on border deaths. The absolute 
necessity of counting and documenting and ‘making exist’ – even if post-mortem – are at the core of projects such 
as the Human Cost of Border Control, run by researchers at the VU Amsterdam. They use official figures to map 
and count death and possibly name bodies, therefore their concern is less to count or estimate a total number of 
deaths in the Mediterranean (which count be tenfold the official numbers) then to provide some sort of dignity and 
humanity to the human beings lost. The politics of numbering are therefore geared towards the recognition of each 
corpse, of each number, rather the towards an appalling, disconcerting total number of victims. In this respect, the 
tomb itself becomes a trace which, paired with other traces (location of the shipwreck, name of the boat, etc), could 
lead to an afterlife of the person in which they would regain their name and possibly be reclaimed, or at least 
mourned, by their kin. Anonymous tombs are scattered throughout the cemeteries of southern Italy, Christian and 
Muslim alike. They form simultaneously a map and a system of traces. See, in this respect, the work of Giorgia 
Mirto, a snippet of which can be found at https://video.repubblica.it/edizione/palermo/palermo-la-ragazza-che-
conta-le-tombe-per-dare-un-nome-ai-migranti-morti/309761?video&ref=RHPPLF-BH-I0-C8-P6-S2.5-T1  
An important archive of ‘words’ and narratives is the Archivio Memorie Migranti (Archive of Migrant Memories) in 
Rome, itself born from the necessity to preserve the ‘public memory’ of a disaffected railway hangar in which 
migrants and refugees lived after it had been cleared by the police: “Come già fu con i detriti dei Magazzini occupati 
di Tiburtina che servirono a formulare la prima idea di Archivio di ‘memorie migranti’, gli oggetti d’uso e di 
affezione dei migranti sbarcati a Lampedusa, insieme ai loro documenti, scritti e testi sacri, sono un formidabile 
richiamo alla necessità di non disperdere un tale patrimonio pubblico.” See Alessandro Triulzi, “Voci, racconti e 
testimonianze dall’Italia delle migrazioni. L’Archivio delle memorie migranti (AMM),” Storia e Futuro: Rivista di 





question that these documentations of migrant passage ‘from below’ present to us is the following: 
Can these practices be considered archival practices? In the case of Babylon, can a visual aesthetic 
of transiency and trace amount to documenting, and can an online blog post be considered a 
“source” of an otherwise invisible experience? Finally, can we see all these heterogeneous and 
formally distinct examples – film, blogs, itinerant museums, and photographic exhibitions of 
shipwrecked boats – as sharing the same impulse to document and preserve the materiality of 
migration while creating its memory? While the term ‘archival’ does not perhaps fully encompass 
this wide range of practices and their relations, every act of documenting emotional or material 
existence is disruptive and re-creative particularly in the context of illegalized mobility, deliberate 
institutional choices and webs of systemic oppression and discrimination that operate to discard 
those existences or at least render them invisible. Documentation becomes a counter-act in a loose 
but ever-growing counter-archive of migration.  
 The question of documenting in film is particularly complex, and Babylon develops a 
unique take on it. The tension at the heart of such a question exists between the forced or deliberate 
tracelessness of the experience of illegalized migration, and the attempt to document and preserve 
it. How to maintain the secrecy and will to invisibility of those involved, and what to salvage? 
Babylon negotiates this tension by veering away from the impulse of doing justice to the human 
being putting them in an interview setting and making them talk. It focuses instead on what goes 
generally unfilmed and unseen: the residue, detritus and refuse, but also the linguistic confusion 
and the dead-slow pace of the crossings of Africa and the sea. Below, I will focus on these two 
issues – multilingualism and non-translation, and Babylon’s aesthetic of refuse. But before 






of the Arab Revolutions. Because Babylon’s ethos is one of opposition to mainstream aesthetics 
of ‘crisis,’ it is important to both understand this context and to place the film vis-à-vis the 
upheavals that marked the year 2011.  
 
 Babylon in Context: Arab Revolutions between Tunisia and Libya  
The symbolic start to the Arab Revolutions, a transregional series of popular attempts at 
reclaiming political power from the firm grip of decades-old regimes, was the self-immolation of 
Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid who set himself ablaze in 
front of a municipal building to protest against the daily harassment of city officials who had 
confiscated his cart of fruits and vegetables and repeatedly dismissed his complaints.189 Through 
social media and activist networks, the news of Bouazizi’s act initially spread to the town and 
quickly to other Tunisian cities, where his extreme act became a catalyst for wider protests against 
president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, in power since 1987. While protests gained the capital, Ben Ali 
proposed a mixture of military crackdown and mild labor reforms as a solution to quell the 
uprising. On January 13, 2011, four days after army snipers fired on protesters in the towns of 
Thala and Kasserine, the army Chief of Staff refused to move his troops on protesters gathered in 
the capital. The next day, Ben Ali fled the country to Saudi Arabia, where he remained in exile, 
and where he died in September 2019.190 Ben Ali was, however, not the only person to flee Tunisia 
as a result of the revolution. After his ouster, many people took advantage of the disruption caused 
 
189 Asaad al-Saleh, Voices of the Arab Spring: Personal Stories from the Arab Revolutions (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2015), 19. 
 





by the power change to leave the country, mainly by boat. As noted by scholars, migration and 
political change became interwoven in Tunisia since the very early stages of the revolution.191  
 The events unfolding in Tunisia had a contagious impact all over the Arab world. Often 
led by the youth, these movements were shaped and spread through Internet and social media. 
Broadcasting from Qatar, the news network Al-Jazeera was the first to systematically incorporate 
audio and video material from inside the protests in its coverage of Tunisian, and later Egyptian 
and Syrian revolutions. The existence and access to an “information infrastructure largely 
independent from the state” meant that the amount of organizing, reporting, and analysis taking 
place on social platforms such as Facebook and Twitter triggered a parallel revolution in political 
journalism and media at large.192  
 In Libya, the revolt quickly turned into a full-fledged civil war pitting a royalist faction 
siding with Qaddafi against a host of rebel militias. Official numbers offer a dire picture 
displacement and forced migration of both nationals and non-nationals residing in Libya at the 
time. Out of a population of slightly over 6 million, 550,000 were internally displaced or uprooted, 
while approximately 660,000 were forced to migrate to neighboring countries. Alongside the 
staggering numbers concerning Libyan citizens, forced displacement – internal or external – also 
 
191 See Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli, Tunisia as a Revolutionized Space of Migration (London, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017); Riadh Ben Khalifa, “L’émigration irrégulière en Tunisie après le 14 janvier 2011,” Hommes et 
Migrations 1303 (2013): 182–188; Sandro Mezzadra, “Avventure mediterranee della libertà”, in Libeccio 
d’oltremare: Come il vento della rivoluzione del Nord Africa può cambiare l’Occidente, ed. A. Pirri (Rome, Italy: 
Ediesse, 2012). 
 
192 Philip Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3. 
Howard takes the Iranian 2009 protest as the blueprint for “new media revolutions”. Facing “digital media sustained 
protests,” he writes, “the regime’s response was decidedly old media: Expelling foreign correspondents, blocking 
phone lines, preventing the publication of daily newspapers, and accusing enemy governments of spreading 
misinformation. they did not count the large number of Iranians eager to submit their own content to international 
news agencies, and, perhaps more importantly, they did not realize that large numbers of Iranians would use social 
media to share their own stories of beatings, tear-gas inhalation, and protest euphoria with each other.” On this, see 
also Saba Bebawi and Diani Bossio, eds., Social Media and the Politics of Reportage: The ‘Arab Spring’ (London, 





concerned roughly 670,000 migrants who were working in Libya at the time violence erupted.193 
110,000 people, Libyans and not, fled to Egypt or Tunisia in the period going from 17 to 28 of 
February 2011 alone, while an unquantified number of Sub-Saharan immigrants rushed south and 
crossed into Niger. 194 
 This massive displacement, as we have seen, is what triggered the construction of Choucha, 
and the heterogeneity of camp’s population is due in part to the central role played by Libya both 
as a transit country for migration to Europe and as a large-scale employer of foreign, often irregular 
labor. At various points in the last 20 years Muammar Qaddafi used the specter of a “black and 
brown invasion of Europe” to secure his country’s rehabilitation in international fora as well as to 
periodically renegotiate the terms of Libya’s oil and gas industry’s concessions to foreign 
companies. His skillful machinations that used illegal migration for political leverage cemented 
Libya’s role as the “gatekeeper of Europe,” which allowed the country to enter into partnerships 
and bilateral agreements with its EU counterparts on issues of international security and migration 
control, and to remain the beneficiary of generous foreign aid.195  
 The sudden influx of displaced people crossing into Tunisia from Libya while the fight 
against the Ben Ali regime was expanding to the whole country, along with the proliferation and 
dissemination of images of the two concatenated events, make Babylon’s aesthetic and formal 
 
193 For the numbers of displacement in Libya I refer to Meghan Bradley, Ibrahim Fraihat, and Houda Mzioudet, 
Libya’s Displacement Crisis (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016). 
  
194 Emanuela Paoletti, “Migration and Foreign Policy: The Case of Libya,” The Journal of North African Studies 16, 
no. 2 (June 2011): 215. 
 
195 Some of these bilateral agreements provided the blueprint for the current EU policy of outsourcing the 
management of migration to non-Member countries. The most comprehensive of these bilateral agreements on 
“combating illegal migration” was signed between Italy and Libya in 2008 and was deemed to be violating human 
rights by the European Court of Human Rights, but its “spirit” has continued to live through subsequent versions. Its 
terms, including the complete disregard for the human rights of migrants, were taken up by the latest major 
migration deal signed by the EU with a non-Member state, that is, the EU-Turkey deal of 2016. For a lengthier 





choices eminently political. Indeed, due to its mediatization by mainstream media as well as 
private actors on social media, the ‘image’ of the revolution and of the migratory movements it 
triggered became itself contested. Babylon’s trio of filmmakers explains how their approach to and 
intention of making a film were responding to the visual landscape of the revolution, with all its at 
times conflicting forms, aesthetics, and agendas, but most importantly, with all the layers of 
documentation provided by different actors: In their words,  
 
“La première partie insurrectionnelle de la Révolution Tunisienne qui a commencé le 17 
décembre 2010 a été filmée par ceux qui la faisaient. A partir du 14 janvier 2011 sont 
venues se greffer à ces images celles des cinéastes, vidéastes et journalistes. Nous avons 
alors eu droit à un trop plein d’images. Les cinéastes qui n’ont pas filmé la première partie 
de la révolution ont rattrapé leur retard de façon frénétique, comme pour combler un vide 
originel d’images.”196 
 
 The question of representation of the revolution, and of the image-as-document or piece of 
evidence, is clearly a concern for Babylon’s authors. In this interview, they seem to point to three 
different stages of representation: In the first one the revolution is “filming itself,” seemingly 
maintaining control over actions and their images. Only after this first cycle of images, did 
information-based as well as artistic representations of the revolutions start to appear. It is 
interesting to note that the filmmakers are aware of their own “belatedness,” and that they seem to 
ascribe the excessive quantity of images – le trop plein d’images – precisely to this sentiment of 
belatedness that got hold of those whose job is to cover, represent, and disseminate. Something 
akin to a trop plein d’images has similarly preoccupied migration scholars, who have called it the 
 





‘border spectacle’197 and, in more recent years, the ‘migrant rescue spectacle.’198 Most importantly, 
however, this awareness of their belatedness seems to have prompted Babylon’s ethos of 
opposition to the mainstream aesthetics of crisis and its representation within the context of 
migration. 
 
From لباب  to Babel to Babylon 
 In an interview conducted for an exhibition featuring Babylon at New York City’s Museum 
of Modern Art, Youssef Chebbi recounts his first encounter with Choucha and the early difficulty 
of turning it into a filmic work: “Au début, c’était une sorte de chaos, le camp. On ne savait pas 
comment y entrer ni ce qu’on voulait y voir, mais petit à petit on a compris que ça s’organisait 
comme une sorte de ville, comme une sorte de société qui commençait à trouver ses repères et à 
s’organiser, et c’est là qu’on a eu envie de filmer ça, cette ville qui nait et qui finit très vite par 
disparaître.”199 Seeing the camp as a city, with its structures, assignments, and order, offered the 
authors an entry point into its otherwise unintelligible and impenetrable chaos. It is also, most 
likely, the initial reason behind the film’s title. As indicated at the start of this chapter, Babylon is 
largely untranslated. Only the title and credits use translation in the form of subtitles, and the white-
on-black text evokes more an aesthetic of visual bilingualism than a mere act of translation.  
 
197 Among others: Nicholas de Genova, “Spectacles of Migrant Illegality: The Scene of Exclusion, the Obscene of 
Inclusion,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 7 (2013): 1180–1198; Paolo Cuttitta, Lo spettacolo del confine: 
Lampedusa tra produzione e messa in scena della frontiera (Milan, Italy: Mimesis Edizioni, 2012). The notion of 
‘spectacle’ of others and othering mechanism was originally elaborated, in tight connection with the representation 
of stereotypes, by Stuart Hall, particularly in “The Spectacle of the Other”, in Stuart Hall, ed., Representation: 
Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices (London, UK: Sage Publications, 1997).  
 
198 Inspiration for this terminology came from the project Blaming the Rescuers, accessible at 
https://blamingtherescuers.org/, particularly the “Report” by Lorenzo Pezzani and Charles Heller. Reference to it 
will also be made later in Chapter 4. 
 
199 Youssef Chebbi, “Mapping Subjectivities: An Interview with Filmmaker Youssef Chebbi,” Inside Out: A 







 Right after the credits and the title screen, in what appears to be a bilingual announcement, 
the authors prepare the viewership for the absence of subtitles in what is to come, in other words, 
to the lack of translation for the whole film. The syntax, verbs, and tense chosen – the verb ‘to 
choose’ in the present perfect – give to the English phrasing a feeling of unapologetic aesthetic 
choice rather than a gesture to prepare the viewer. ‘Whether you like it or not,’ the viewer is told, 
“you will have no translation.” This straightforwardness is therefore more than a mere warning. It 
functions, in fact, in its layout and content, as a guide on how to read the untranslated 
multilingualism to come. This statement tells us that whatever will be the effect of experiencing 
an untranslated, 2-hour film shot in a refugee camp hosting multiple nationalities, it was the result 
of a deliberate authorial choice. From these very first images we can see how, both at the visual 
and linguistic level, Babylon treats the practice of translation (and non-translation) as more than 
the mere conveying of meaning across languages. Visually, bilingualism is used to “give credit 
where it’s due,” and to root the film in two different linguistic spheres and discern two possible 




‘subtitled’ announcement on the ensuing lack of translation suggests that the viewer reorganize 
their perception around different principles, and look for different signposts going forward in order 
to create meaning from what they see. It also speaks to the impossibility to fully and faithfully 
translate simultaneous multilingualism happening on camera.200 
 Yet, it is also difficult to ignore the emerging connections between the title of the film 
appearing on-screen as “ لباب  / Babylon” in both Arabic and English, the camp-as-city, the lack of 
subtitles, and the implications for translation of the biblical story of the tower of Babel.  
 
لباب  / Babylon: The Tower, the City, and their translations  
 The myth of the tower of Babel as told in Genesis 11: 1–9 is an etiological myth on the 
multiplicity of languages in the world. In a place known as the land of Shinar, humanity, united 
by and in the same language, decides to build a city and a tower to reach heaven. God, alarmed 
that the project could succeed, comes down and ‘confounds’ their language to prevent 
communication and scatters them over the surface of the earth.  
 In Arabic, the term لباب  (ba-bil) is used for both the city of Babel, where the tower was 
built, and the state of Babylon, where the city was. Nowadays, in Arabic, the more frequently used 
term for Babel is Hillah, the city located near the ruins of Babel (the city).201 The tower of Babel in 
 
200 Indeed, subtitling often resorts to a sort of meta-translation in the form of square brackets that usually palliate the 
impossibility of one-on-one translation of what is happening on-screen with descriptive phrases. If Babylon had 
opted for subtitles, a standard and frequently recurring example of this would have been something like the phrase 
“[indistinct chatter in multiple languages]”. 
 
201 For the following etymological investigation I relied heavily on the help of Matthew C. Baker, Head of Burke 
Library at Union Theological Seminary, Columbia University; Peter Magierski, Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 
Librarian, Columbia University Libraries; and Dr. Michelle Chesner, whose help deserved its own footnote, infra 
34. I also relied on the following sources: G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren, eds., Theological 
Dictionary of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977); Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan, 
The Oxford Companion to the Bible (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993); Andrew Dick, “Babel or 
Babylon?: A Lexical Grammatical Analysis of Genesis 10:10 and 11:9”, Jewish Bible Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2017): 





Arabic is actually referred to as "Burj Babil" لباب جرب  , both as a toponym and in reference to its 
biblical identification with the "confusion of tongues". The identification of the root ل ب ب  – which 
constitutes the word لباب  - with elements of concrete geographical reality, such as the state, city and 
tower, as well as the more abstract notion of confusion as in ‘confusion of languages’ begs the 
question of how, when and most importantly why the root came to include both meanings.  
 In fact  the question is, at first sight, rather obscure: the Oxford English Dictionary, in its 
entry on the tower of Babel, tells us that the Hebrew Bāḇel “shows a borrowing of the Akkadian 
name of the city, bāb-ilim,” which means the ‘the gate of the god’. As the definition comments, 
the evolution of the word “probably reflects a folk-etymological reapprehension [as in 
Akkadian bāb gate (cognate with Hebrew bāb and Arabic bāb, in the same sense) + ili god, 
cognate with the words for ‘god’ in other Semitic languages] of a place name of unknown origin, 
probably a borrowing from a substrate language.” 202  
 On the other hand, starting in the Middle Ages and across several European languages, the 
word “Babylon”203 came to signify the ancient city of Babylon in Mesopotamia ( لباب  in Arabic, לֶ֔בָּב  
in Hebrew). “[Babylon] was the capital of the Babylonian or Chaldean Empire, and was renowned 
in antiquity for its magnificence. It was the site of the famous Hanging Gardens, one of the seven 
wonders of the ancient world,” as well as the ‘sinful city’. As the entry continues, Babylon “is also 
thought to have been the original site of the biblical Tower of Babel. The captivity and exile of the 
Jews in Babylon in the 6th cent. B.C. at the height of the power of the Babylonian Empire under 
Nebuchadnezzar is an event of supreme significance in Jewish history, and underpins the symbolic 
 
202 See Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “babel”. In addition to the excerpts reported above, the writer further delves 
into the origin of the word by sketching a comparison with ” the Sumerian name of the city of Babel, ká.dingir.ra, 
lit. ‘the gate of the god,’ which probably shows a calque on the Akkadian name. In Genesis 11, Hebrew Bāḇel is 
folk-etymologically associated with Hebrew bālal ‘to confuse, confound.’” We will return on this “folk-etymology” 
later in this analysis.  
 




description in the New Testament (Revelation 14–18) of ‘Babylon the Great’, a city of unparalleled 
worldliness.” The origin of the word Babylon is to be found in the way in which classical Latin 
and ancient Greek translated the Hebrew “Babel / לֶ֔בָּב ” as Babylōn and Βαβυλών , respectively.  
 
Babel: The proper noun, the common noun, and the verb 
 
 The entry “Babylon” in the Oxford Companion to the Bible states that “Babylon is the 
rendering of the Akkadian Babilum (Babilim), the city that for centuries served as the capital of 
the “land of Babylon” (Jer. 50.28). Cuneiform sources interpret its name in Bāb-ilim, “gate of the 
deity.” The Bible rejected this popular etymology in favor of a more scurrilous one that linked the 
name to the confusion of tongues (Gen. 11.9, Hebr. bālal, “[God] confused]),” and so the city is 
called Babel.” Seemingly, the same link between the proper noun “Babel” and the common name 
“confusion” is made in the “Babel” entry of the same work: “‘Babel’ is the Hebrew word for 
Babylon, which the Babylonians themselves explained as meaning ‘gate of God’. This etymology 
is probably not original, but the meaning is significant for a famous city whose central temple 
tower was said to reach the heavens. In Genesis 11.9 the meaning of Babel is explained by the 
Hebrew verb bālal, “to confuse, mix,” and the confusion of speech.” 
 Now, if we look at the original text, the morphological similarities of the two words in 
Ancient Hebrew seem to offer us proof: In Genesis 11:7, for instance, the word לבלב  (‘bilbel’) 
means "confuse" or "to confuse,": The verse is indeed translated in all major Western languages 
by a verb synonym or close in meaning to ‘confuse’ or ‘confound’: Thus the King James translation 
reads “Go to, let us go down, and there confound (my emphasis) their language, that they may not 
understand one another’s speech.”204 Verse 9 is possibly more explicit in conflating or bringing 
 
204 All quotations from the Bible, unless otherwise noted, are from the King James 2000 version (1999), available at 
https://www.kingjames2000.com/. Dr. Michelle Chesner, Librarian of Jewish Studies at Columbia University 




together the proper and the common noun, the toponym and its defining attribute. The entire verse 
– which keeps a similar syntax in most other canonical Western translations – reads as follows: 
“Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the LORD did there confound the language of 
all the earth: and from thence did the LORD scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth” 
(Gen 11:9). The morphological relationship between the roots is not apparent in Western 
translations. Indeed, in the English translation, there is a causal relationship between “Babel” and 
‘to confound’, but the basis for it is not clear: the semantic link between “Babel” and “did 
confound” is not immediately visible. This link is, however, clearly apparent even to non-readers 
in both the original text and its Arabic translation: The original ancient Hebrew verse reads as 
follows 
ץֶרָֽאָה־לָּכ יֵ֖נְּפ־לַע הָ֔והְי  םָ֣ציִפֱה ֙םָּׁשִמּו ץֶרָ֑אָה־לָּכ תַ֣פְׂש הָ֖והְי  לַ֥לָּב  םָׁ֛ש־יִּכ  לֶ֔בָּב  ּ֙הָמְׁש אָ֤רָק ןֵּ֞כ־לַע   
 
While the Arabic – at least in the first part of the verse, which is what concerns us – reads: 
اھمسا يعد كلذل لباب  كانھ برلا نال . لبلب  ضرالا لك ناسل   
I have highlighted the proper/common noun and the verb – Babel/confusion and ‘to 
confound’ – both in the Hebrew and Arabic to show the similarity of their roots. It is noteworthy 
that the morphological relationship between the two nouns and the verb is the same in each 
language: “babel” the noun is the same in both Arabic and Hebrew, just like the verb “blbl” is. 
Technically, then, Western translations of the biblical story as the myth of “the tower of Babel” 
completely miss a layer of meaning, and have erased what remains an interesting etymological and 
genealogical doubt. If the word “babel” in Semitic languages is both the city where the tower was 
built and the common noun ‘confusion’, then that convergence is lost in most translations, even 
 
ה ָ֔דְרֵֽנ הָ֥לְבָנְו  םָ֑תָפְׂש םָׁ֖ש  ,. Highlighted is the use of a root very similar to לבלב  (‘bilbel’), thus warranting the ubiquitous ‘to 
confound’ translations to be found in Semitic and Western languages alike. For a fairly complete list of translations 




though it appears clearly in the causality announced in the verse quoted above: Babel is the name 
of the city because God confounded the languages, thus its English translation should be something 
like the ‘tower of confusion.’ This foray into the history and meanings of “Babel” and “Babylon” 
is not a simple detour. In fact, it allows us to understand not only the logic of translation at work 
in the bilingual title of the film, but also the larger implications of the author’s choice to keep 
Choucha’s multilingualism untranslated. 
 When they titled their film “ لباب  / Babylon ”, what were the filmmakers attempting to 
translate? Supposing that the title existed in Arabic before it did in English, we can argue that the 
word لباب  in the title refers to the city. But the lack of subtitles automatically evokes the word’s 
other meanings and therefore the unity, in Arabic – the authors’ language and tradition – of ‘tower’ 
and ‘city’, referencing the punitive birth of multilingualism and the strategic confusion of tongues.  
 In fact, for the filmmakers, the ‘urban’ aspect of the camp – the camp-as-city – and its 
sometimes irreconcilable linguistic varieties are closely connected, perhaps because of the 
relationship between the proper and the common noun لباب  in Arabic. In an interview, one of 
Babylon’s authors indeed affirms: 
“C’est ce rapport tout à fait inédit à l’espace de la ville qui était intéressant à interroger 
cinématographiquement. Le camp étant un espace hybride, c’est une ville imparfaite, 
condamnée à être rapidement occupée et quittée, donc à être rapidement construite et 
détruite. L’idée de mouvement est une idée centrale : mouvement de la ville elle-même 
ainsi que des réfugiés à l’intérieur du camp. Les plans sont conçus et sont articulés entre 
eux comme dans une danse, c’est un ballet de personnages auquel on assiste. Rien de ce 
qui est dit n'est traduit. Du fait du métissage des nationalités (une bonne vingtaine) et des 
langues (une dizaine), le peu de compréhension entre les gens, réfugiés et Tunisiens, passait 
par la gestuelle et non la parole. D'où l'enjeu dramatique du film : comment toutes ces 
langues arriveront-elles à construire une cité ? Le langage peut-il continuer à être à la 
source des rapports sociaux s’il est autant éclaté ? […] Les multiples voix entremêlées 
faisaient écho à l’hybridité du lieu. Le travail sur les corps nous a semblé plus intéressant 
que la traduction des bribes de phrases et des discussions. Nous-mêmes ne comprenons pas 
mot pour mot tout ce qui a été dit devant la caméra. Le montage était entre autres construit 




ne pas sous-titrer les dialogues, mettre les spectateurs dans la même situation de 
compréhension disparate.”205  
 
 In this long passage there are three nodes through which the thinking of the camp-as 
(untranslated)-city, or the triad of camp-as-city-as-confusion, is articulated. First, there is the camp 
as “imperfect” city as a result of its transient character. Subtly, the authors identify the camp as 
the site of a particular sort of movement, different from that of any other city. They point to the 
function of the camp in the economy of migration but also to its ontological duplicity, that of a 
place that, in order to attend to people on the move and ensure their survival and in some cases to 
provide them with a more secure future, restricts their mobility. The camp-as-city is built to care 
for human movement through the ‘portability’ and disposability of its infrastructure but it must 
interrupt and constrain movement in order to provide that care. And, in this respect, the camp is a 
city only at the level of communal living within a shared, identifiable space. The authors also posit 
language as the building block of communal life (Comment toutes ces langues arriveront-elles à 
construire une cité?), but they recognize, even in the absence of a shared language, the uniqueness 
of the camp as a form of communal life. Their choice not to subtitle or translate seems thus to be 
informed by the equation of the camp with the ‘confusion of tongues’ as much as it is predicated 
on highlighting the aesthetic and political power of linguistic confusion and the experience of 
untranslated multilingualism, which the authors themselves encountered while filming. 
 In the film, one instance above all others exemplifies the collision of deliberate non-
translation, multilingualism, and semantic displacement. It is a moment in the life of Choucha, 
when general administrative uncertainty over status, a constant influx of people into the camp, and 
delays in food delivery boil over into demonstrations and protests. The scene revolves specifically 
 





around the difficulty of delivering food to the Bangladeshi population and their growing 
discontent. In a series of wide-angle shots, lines of people are seen criss-crossing the desert which 
is now the camp. There is a hum of overlapping languages. An army truck arrives and leaves, and 
a loose line of people, suddenly broken up reforms tightly and impatiently. Shortly after, a soldier 
with a megaphone confronts the crowd, while other armed soldiers calmly walk through it and 
occasionally address someone in Arabic, mostly with imperatives or orders. The officer, between 
Arabic and English206, tells the crowd that food is on its way from Tunis: “There is food, pasta, 
cake, milk, everything. […] Please Bangla, please, food at three o’clock.”207 
 Meanwhile, an initially small crowd gathers in the middle of the only road that leads to the 
camp. Soldiers scream orders. Bangladeshi citizens march to the rhythm of a word that I — 
completely unfamiliar with Bengali — understand as “biman.” When someone in the crowd holds 
up a makeshift Bangladeshi flag — green with a red sun in the middle — and a man comes from 
outside the frame to prevent the person from waving it, a scuffle breaks out. The man who went 
for the flag, standing much taller than everyone around him, stands alone in the middle, throwing 
awkward and furious punches while trying to avoid those being thrown at him. He is hit by a 
handful of sand in his eyes. When the camera closes up on him, he is speaking Arabic to the 
Bangaldeshis surrounding him, pushing tiredly away those who are still trying to approach him.  
 Then the camera dives back into the demonstration: barely taller than the heads and faces 
around it, it shakes with the movements of the crowd. It loses focus and balance when the crowd 
 
206 One being the language of Islam and one that of global communication. 
 
207 The full speech goes as follows: 
 لب نتسن انحا ،ةنوراقم لب نتسن انحا سینوت تیقوت يف ةتلاثلا ةعاش يف لكآلا زیلب الغناب زیلب يشلك يف ،بیلح يف ،كاك يف ،ةنوراقام يف ،لكآ يف
يبرع يكحی نوكش ةنوراقم  ؟
It is interrupted midway by the English quoted above, “Please, Bangla, please …”. “There is cake, there is pasta, 
there is milk, there is everything. The food will be here at three Tunis time. We are waiting for pasta too, we’re 





runs or wavers, regains them when the crowd stops. In the loud, incessant shouting and chanting 
that accompanies this sequence, a man holds a makeshift sign, black marker on cardboard with a 
hole in the middle. The sign, one of the film’s only English texts, reads “we are need air / we are 









This sequence stands out in the sense that here the viewer is thrown into the multilingualism 
of the camp at a tense and potentially explosive moment. Meaning is rare because communication 




forms of rage and conflict. As we have seen above, the biblical story of Babel is about materiality, 
linguistic incommensurability, and migration. By materiality, I mean here the construction of a 
tower threatening to reach the heavens. In this story, linguistic incommensurability is the result of 
the single idiom for all of humanity being broken into several ones by God’s punishment; 
migration is also central to the story since the people too are scattered as part of the punishment. 
Diaspora and multilingualism are thus the result of God’s wrath over human hubris and perhaps 
His fear that the tower of a united humanity could reach His heavens. If we go back to the passage 
in the book of Genesis (11:1–9) and the verses that precede the one discussed above about “Babel,” 
we see that the construction of the tower was possible because humanity shared “one language and 
one speech,” but that this unity of language and intent is also what unleashed the punishment.208 
 In his essay “Des tours de Babel”, Derrida identifies this connection as central to the story. 
He writes: “Does he [God] punish them for having wanted to build as high as the heavens? For 
having wanted to accede to the highest, up to the Most High? Perhaps for that too, no doubt, but 
incontestably for having wanted to make a name for themselves [v. 4], to give themselves the name, 
to construct for and by themselves their own name, to gather themselves there (“that we no longer 
be scattered’), as in the unity of a place which is at once a tongue and a tower, the one as well as 
 
208 The story of construction and destruction, much like the one of Choucha camp, is recounted as follows: “1 And the 
whole earth was of one language, and of one speech. / 2 And it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east, that 
they found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they dwelt there./ 3 And they said one to another, Go to, let us make 
brick, and burn them thoroughly. And they had brick for stone, and slime had they for morter./ 4 And they said, Go 
to, let us build us a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered 
abroad upon the face of the whole earth./ 5 And the LORD came down to see the city and the tower, which the children 
of men builded./ 6 And the LORD said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin 
to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do./ 7 Go to, let us go down, and 
there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech. / 8 So the LORD scattered them 
abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth: and they left off to build the city. / 9 Therefore is the name of it 
called Babel; because the LORD did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the LORD 





the other, the one as the other.”209 The people’s desire to see themselves as one, as betokened by a 
name, is connected to the ambition to build towards and even to reach God. It suggests a connection 
between unity, hubris, and language where a common language, as the element enabling unity and 
collective identity, is the object of God’s punishment. Encapsulated in this sequence portraying 
the Bangladeshi workers’ protest is the film’s articulation of the camp-as-Babel, namely, the camp 
as the paradigm of linguistic confusion and incommensurability. But the film also takes on the 
biblical story’s link between human unity and divine punishment to make a larger, more daring 
point about migration, multilingualism, and the ‘will to translate’. Bangladeshi workers, pushed 
out of Libya by rising violence, are “making a name for themselves”: they manifest as one, demand 
food first and then, holding an inanimate body above their heads, they repeatedly shout and chant 
the word “biman”. Anyone not familiar with Bengali, inside or outside the film, would not 
understand the object of their demands by solely listening to them. What is ‘biman’? we think as 
spectators. Then, the connection with the hollow sign at the demonstration comes to mind: it might 
mean ‘air’.210 
 Translation can be a reflex, perhaps an endless attempt at reconstructing the original unity 
of language at that mythical time when it was not necessary to make up meaning, to redraw and 
rewrite it, and account for losses and accretions when transferring from one language to another. 
By not providing subtitles, Babylon disrupts this reflex and forces us to look outside of language. 
We have to turn to the reactions of the soldiers, in the loudness of the shouting, and the symbolism 
 
209 Jacques Derrida, “Des tours de Babel” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume 1, edited by Peggy Kamuf and 
Elizabeth G. Rottenberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 195. 
 
210 Gnawed by the non-speaking viewer’s dilemma of whether or not to translate something that the film expressly 
chose not to, I finally typed “biman” on Google Translate, feeling like a transgressor. The Bengali word িবমান 





of the sign in order to construct meaning. By leaving the demonstration on screen untranslated, 
Babylon frees language in a gesture aligned with the will to free the Other from the constraints of 
intelligibility and the treacheries of inevitable mistranslation. It allows the Bangladeshi workers to 
‘make a name for themselves’ in their own tongue. Through non-translation, the people transiting 
through Choucha and this crowd in particular are at the center of the screen and, most importantly, 
at the center of their own experience. It is perhaps not excessive to say that, to some extent, the 
filmmakers have ceded them a degree of control over their representation. While the camera frames 
and the filmmakers decide when and how to film and what to show, the camp’s inhabitants are not 
prompted to speak or act and no-one is interpreting the migrants’ speech. This forces us to see 
them as more autonomous subjects who to speak their own demands and needs instead of objects 
of a routinized representation through instrumental translation and information-based media.  
Trace and Trash  
 Babylon gives us a sense of the mechanisms of the illegalization of migration at work in 
the camp first by choosing a singular posture in the filming of the camp and constructing a narrative 
around the dust-to-dust circularity of Choucha’s trajectory as an inhabited space. It also makes the 
question of the incommensurability of languages within the camp a political one, proposing a sort 
of ‘resistance multilingualism’ that complicates the transmission of information between the camp 
and the outside world while re-humanizing the figure of the migrant. But it is, in my view, through 
its treatment of and attention to the physical remainders of human life in the camp – mostly 
unrecycled plastic waste but also clothes and objects – that Babylon most powerfully sketches an 
alternative way of documenting transiency and disappearance. Babylon’s focus on the materiality 
of refuse is a narrative choice within the economy of the film but it is important for what it can tell 




salvaged from oblivion into another realm, where it becomes simultaneously an aestheticized 
object, proof of passage, and evidence of life. This is especially important in the context of 
illegalized migration, where the trace can be at the same time compromising or life-saving and 
where, in general, very little is institutionally or officially collected. Thus, I argue, Babylon’s 
attention to these peripheral, usually meaningless traces amounts to an underground effort of 
preservation.211 
 What does it mean to film state-mandated transiency – the passage of people, the creation 
and destruction of a city – with the purpose of showing and documenting when confronted with 
the classical definition of an archive, an institutional repository of the material traces of discourse? 
There is something of an ellipsis in the journeys to Europe. On statistical maps of migratory flows, 
and in the general public imagination, migration is one long trip. The continuum of movement, the 
distances covered, the thousands of kilometers from home are, in fact, a chain of stops, a string of 
bursts, accelerations, and extended pauses. An infrastructural look at Choucha shows how 
movement, its aura, and its power over the individual are ever-present in the regulated freedom of 
humanitarian detention. Humanitarian camps offer “life”, and the protection of life, at a cost: that 
of the restriction of liberty.  
 
211 As we will see, the ‘documents’ that Babylon would contribute to this counter-archive end up being literally 
underground when the camp its dismantled and its non-reusable remainders are buried in the desert. Ironically, they 






 With life flowing into the camp, the bare, essential lines and features of the architecture of 
care are slowly altered by the growing number of occupants: the infrastructure of temporariness 
clashes with the daily sedimentation of human life. The architectural skeleton of the camp acquires 
clothes, rags and colors. On the ground and in the corners of the tents, trash piles up. All these are 
signs of the lives transiting through Choucha and populating it. These signs symbolize 
sedentariness within the frame and structure of absolute temporariness: temporary help, temporary 





 The eye of the camera, throughout the movie, strives to capture this layering – the deposit 
that thickens the landscape around migrant lives in the camp and that alters the bare skeleton of 
the orderly series of white tents. In framing these layers of life as signs of visibility, as proofs of 
existence despite the tracelessness which generally envelops migration, Babylon inscribes itself in 
a long-standing artistic practice of transforming daily life into art. This brings us to the crux of our 
question: how does one record urgency and crisis, namelessness, invisibility, and the necessity for 
near-tracelessness? In trying to excavate the poetics of detritus and remainings as cultural and 
anthropological signs of passage and claims to existence, we might turn to one of the precursors 
of Junk dada, the L.A. artist Noah Purifoy, whose production was deeply tied to the turbulent 
context of 1960s Los Angeles. As art historian Kelly Jones tells us, “in 1965 came the Watts 
rebellion — the largest urban uprising in US history up to that moment. For Purifoy, who claimed 
that the Watts rebellion is actually what made him an artist, that event proved to be an inspiration. 
[He] reinterpreted Watts as a discursive force, emblematic of both uncompromising energy and 




highly charged mixed media constructions from the detritus of the rebellion, which had shocked 
the world by erupting in the utopian paradise of California. With assemblage, [he could] refer to 
the complexities of African American culture and life without having to rely on simplistic painted 
representation of the black figure.”212 A year after the insurrection, Purifoy organized the seminal 
exhibition 66 Signs of Neon, which featured assemblages made over the vestiges of the urban 
rebellion, including his own Watts Uprising Remains (c. 1965-66). 
 
  
Noah Purifoy, Watts Uprising Remains, (c. 1965 - 1966)  
 Layers of seemingly unyielding materials – such as iron and steel – remodeled or 
compressed are a feature of post-industrialist pop art from César to Rauschenberg and Kaprow. 
All of these artists used an industrial tool, the steel press, for purposes ranging from an ironic 
reduction of technical advancement (César) to a more historical, experiential use of materials, with 
added focus on the materiality of existence. The residue of 103rd Street in Los Angeles, which 
 
212 Kellie Jones, South of Pico: African American Artists in Los Angeles in the 1960s and 1970s (Durham, NC: Duke 




was completely destroyed in the riots, is simultaneously reduced (in space and form) and elevated, 
both in historical time and as an object with social and artistic value. It is made into a vehicle of 
the memory of that event.  
When compared with the industrial disposal of the camp’s waste in Babylon, we see 
striking visual similarities: layers of brown-red materials, compacted by human force into 


















 The film accounts for the process of transformation of life into waste and then into oblivion, 
but it also transforms what are usually considered to be the lowest signs of life into a celebration 
of that life, of a transient presence, and of the journey over the course of which the camp was just 
a stop. Assemblage, compression and layering become techniques of waste-management. Under 
the shifty close-ups of the camera, however, we witness what amounts almost to a process of 
anthropomorphization of the camp’s remainders. The film is punctuated by images of endless 
queues of the camp’s inhabitants, in line for food, water, or simply in line and waiting through the 
day. We also see these lines of men suddenly break out of the ranks, and give way to protests and 
revolts, invariably and painfully quelled by the soldiers on site. What we see here, under the 
bulldozer’s arm, is an allegory of the treatment and management of human life, to use the words 
of Michel Agier, reenacted by two different actors: machinery in lieu of soldiers and plastic bags, 
shreds of bottles, units of residue instead of migrants and refugees. The result is a progression from 
scatteredness and confusion to neat layers, to uniformization and reproduction. The camera 
documents the effort and the various steps that form the process of effacement of human life in 
transit and of human experience.  
The transformation of trash is the last of these steps. In a piece on “Detritus”, Sharad Chari 
defines it as that which “names a process of wasting that is not willing. […] A political theory of 
detritus would posit the ruins of racial capitalism and decolonization as protracted, if frustrated, 
sites of struggle.”213 In our case, the displaced people crossing over into Choucha, many of which 
 
213 Sharad Chari, “Detritus,” in Fueling Culture: 101 Words for Energy and Environment, edited by Imre Szeman, 





were formerly Libya’s foreign workers, are the detritus of capitalism’s global distribution of labor 
and of the exploitation of its own precondition, fossil fuel. They also are the “detritus” of 
colonization. If the border, and the camp as one of its many instantiations, is a contemporary site 
of struggle, Babylon is trying to subvert the logic of detritus by salvaging from this process not 
only the people but also their waste and the environment in which they live as it becomes waste.214 
Similarly stemming from and concerned with the lives of those “systematically excluded 
from state power,”215 Babylon’s archive of migration shares with the other non-institutional forms 
of counter-collecting the necessity to locate, represent, and free – through filming and 
dissemination – the migrant experience from the enclosure of the camp, which functions as the 
repository of institutional power. Moreover, the film excavates the “scattered” documents that "[...] 
possess a coherence that remains inert, muted, or “disqualified” until they are literally and 
figuratively “excavated” into a counter-formation [...].”216 As anthropologist David Scott has 
noted, archaeologies of memory have special salience in contexts of oppression and 
disenfranchisement.217 Binding together the classical, disciplinary meaning of the word 
‘archaeology’ as well as its Foucauldian connotation, Scott’s concept signals the collection of 
positive objects, the generative system of which they are part, and the narrative they point to. 
Babylon underscores the idea of an aesthetic and political counter-practice developed in the face 
 
214 “Salvage is neither a full nor a failed recuperation; it is not a miracle of reanimation or resurrection.; it is not part 
of the economy of recycling. [...] The aesthetics of salvage [...] reflect a critical and creative practice that animates 
every encounter with the ruined, junked, and trashed. [It] calls into question and refashions the objects and subjects 
of history, creating literary and visual assemblages of historical fragments figuratively pulled from the wreck of the 
present.” Angela Naimou, Salvage Work, 9-10. 
 
215 And also altogether excluded from the state. 
 
216 Brent Hayes Edwards, “The Politics of Scraps (Black Radicalism and the Archive, part 1)” (unpublished lecture, 
W.E.B. DuBois lecture series, Harvard University, March 24, 2015). 
 





of the state-enforced invisibility of migrant lives and voices, by using the camera as an archiving 
tool, one that does not leave the camp when everyone else has, but stays to follow the disposal of 




 This how the film ends: The last truck departs, leaving behind a sea of tires, and below, an 
archeological site. Beyond the facile and tragic metaphor of there being one tire for each unnamed 
person who transited through the camp, or worse, who died crossing the desert or the sea, I want 
to focus on the process of documenting what is by now not only a palimpsest of the event of 
“detention”, but also a geological layering of the land on which these tires now stand. Documenting 
is, throughout the history of the dispossessed, an act of resistance. In the case of migration the act 
of undocumenting and illegalizing oneself – clandestinity, non-status, harrag – is also an act of 




infrastructure surrounding the body and its refuse, while freeing the body itself from the constraints 
of representation, identity, and status. This aesthetic, which Babylon exemplifies, is the seed for a 
generative practice of theorization and archivization of the traces of human passage. Similar to the 
manufactured good that was once turned into an artwork, Babylon shows that what we could call 
the ontological illegality of migration changes the value of its residue into a system of narrative 
elements and historico-anthropological documents. An archive is in the making: a precarious, 
volatile, still unbound counter-archive of illegalized forms of migration, which one day could 
become a transnational archive of mobility. 
The Afterlives of Choucha, On-site and Online 
After the relocation of many of its residents to Western countries, Choucha camp was 
“officially closed” June 30th 2013 by the UNHCR.218 The official act of closure did not mean, 
however, the end of the settlement. Despite the end of medical, housing, and food assistance as 
well as the interruption of water supply, a varying number of people either stayed, arrived, or left 
and later returned to the former site of the camp for years to come. Those who did not leave when 
it was closed were, in large part, original occupants whose asylum demands were rejected and who 
refused the three options which were subsequently presented to them: remaining in Tunisia, a state 
that does not have an asylum system, going back to Libya, or going back to their country of 
citizenship.219 The remaining persons have received the attention of journalists and visual artists, 
 
218 Dalia Al Aichi, “UNHCR Closes Camp in South Tunisia, Moves Services to Urban Areas,” UNHCR – News, 
July 3, 2013, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2013/7/51d2a40e9/unhcr-closes-camp-south-tunisia-moves-
services-urban-areas.html. The piece quotes a UNHCR spokesperson reporting that “The closure of the camp [at the 
weekend] has the support of the Tunisian authorities, who have expressed readiness to offer temporary residence to 
some 250 refugees who will not be resettled to other countries.” 
 
219 Bright, a young Nigerian man whose asylum demand was not granted by any Western country, is reported to 
have summarized this status in clear and succinct terms: «Je ne peux pas rentrer au Nigeria car je risque ma vie, je 
ne veux pas retourner en Libye et je n’ai jamais demandé à être en Tunisie.» Sophie Janel, “Tunisie: Les réfugiés 




albeit in waning fashion with the passing of time.220 For the persons involved, the closure of the 
camp and retreat of the international protection infrastructure effectively meant a further degree of 
invisibility beyond that of the camp as an emergency and transient entity. The struggle for the 
UNHCR to “finish [its] job,” namely to attend to those remaining in Choucha and to satisfy their 
desire to relocate elsewhere than in Tunisia, however, started as soon as the news of the camp’s 
closure spread in late 2012 and continued at least until 2018.221 In a process of clandestinization-
by-humanitarianism, what has been called a “Choucha beyond the camp” was effectively born. It 
has since taken various shapes: political demonstrations, open letters, a blog, and of course, life on 
the former camp site itself.222 Much of the political organization – as well as the writing – were 
 
libye-choucha. Since Tunisia does not have an asylum system, interviews were conducted directly by UNHCR, as it 
is the case in states formally unequipped to process demands. 
 
220 See, for instance two Al-Jazeera articles from 2014 and 2016: Mat Nashed, “Refugees Left Behind in Tunisia’s 
Desert,” Al Jazeera, November 14, 2014, and Thessa Lageman, “Life in Tunisia’s Closed Refugee Camp: ‘I lost my 
mind,’” Al Jazeera, December 20, 2016, as well as the short film The Horizon is Far Away, produced by British 
visual artist Kimbal Quint Bumstead in 2015, and accessible at https://vimeo.com/121456138  
 
221 Ursula Schulze Aboubacar, UNHCR Representative in Tunis at the time was quoted, in an article previously 
cited, on the subject of those left behind by UNHCR as follows: “«Ces personnes ne sont pas de notre ressort. Elles 
sont suffisamment débrouillardes pour trouver une solution. L’Organisation Internationale aux Migrations va offrir 
des billets à ceux qui veulent rentrer dans leur pays, se défend Ursula Schulze Aboubacar. En restant ici, elles 
prennent le risque d’être en situation illégale tant qu’elles ne mettent pas à jour leur titre de séjour. Seules les 
autorités tunisiennes peuvent faire quelque chose. Pour le moment, elles ne le font pas et je les respecte pour ça. Ces 
personnes sont tolérées à Choucha mais de façon in-officielle.” 
 
222 For the phrase “Choucha beyond the camp” see Martina Tazzioli, Spaces of Governmentality: Autonomous 
Migrations and the Arab Uprisings (London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 109–111. “Governmental 
migration maps and images tend to focus on border crossings, ‘exceptional’ spatial sites of detention and hosting, or 
emergency contexts, but between those moments of visibility it is important to shed light on how borders impact on 
people’s lives at a temporal distance. By that I mean two different but complementary things: on the one hand, it is 
important to know what happened to those migrants after Choucha, how their juridical status has influenced their 
movement; on the other, [...] migrants have collectively assumed their flight from Libya and the period in Choucha 
as two criteria for claiming international protection for those who escaped the Libyan conflict. This ambivalent 
‘Choucha effect’ brings out the nuances of the production of migrant subjectivities in the camp. [...] The juridical 
labeling that takes place is in fact only one of the subjectivizing conditions (along with racial and gender issues, as 
well as labour conditions) that shape and impact on migrants in the camp and on their concrete field of possibilities 





organized under the collective Voice of Choucha,223 which organized political activities, and its 
online presence.  
The latter set of documents – proclamations, blog posts, interviews and accounts posted 
online and which we could call the ‘digital afterlife’ of Choucha224 – interest me for three main 
reasons. First, they not only supplement and reveal the flaws of the institutional narrative offered 
by competent authorities whereby Choucha camp closed in the summer of 2013 after relocation or 
‘integration’ of its population in Tunisia, but also supplement the narrative of Babylon, extending 
and complexifying the dust-to-dust arc of the film. Second, the Voice of Choucha documents not 
only speak to a later ‘age’ of Choucha – the age of the invisible camp – they also do so with an 
explicitly documentary and political intent by carrying the voice of the stranded refugees beyond 
the confines of film, after all outside cameras have left. In this sense, they differ from Babylon 
aesthetically.225 Third, their nature as documents has slightly altered with the passing of time, 
moving from punctual pieces speaking to the present of the struggle to testimonies of that struggle 
and digital traces of invisible (refugee) life, eventually contributing, along with Babylon, to 
Choucha’s counter-archive. In the last few lines, I will briefly survey the digital residue of Choucha 
and situate its participation, along with and in opposition to Babylon’s representation of 
illegalization, in a running counter-archive of migration. 
 
223 In the singular use of the word ‘voice’ – as opposed for instance to previously quoted title ‘Voices of Choucha’ – 
clearly appears the intent to speak for one and as such to address a common plight: that of being pushed off the cliff 
delimiting the system of international protection, and of still being unheard.  
 
224 Specifically, I refer to the Wordpress blog Voice of Choucha, accessible at 
https://voiceofchoucha.wordpress.com/, and to the Youtube channel of the same name, accessible at 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCtAUVS4v5mRjzeYQFIQCHiQ  
 




The Voice of Choucha blog is striking in its uniqueness as a collection of fairly 
heterogeneous forms of seemingly untranslated and perhaps unmediated writings – from the 
polemic and the proclamation to the call for demonstration and the SOS – as well as for its 
increasingly clear significance as a repository for the words and livelihoods of a struggle for 
various forms of survival: legal, physical and mental, and against oblivion. Indeed the blog, once 
lively, recorded only three entries since 2015, the last one in December of 2018. When reviewing 
the blog in chronological order one is struck by the fluctuations between indignation and dignified 
complaint, desperation, and waning hope. In the last section of this chapter I will consider details 
from three different posts that roughly span the entire period of production of the blog. I have 
reported them in fairly extensive form even though I will be focusing only on a few salient aspects 
in each of them.  
We are a group of asylum seekers whose claims were ms-understood, ms-interpreted and 
not accorded a proper consideration by the UNHCR protection emergency protection 
team in Tunisia.We are writing regarding an official plan to close the Choucha refugee 
camp in JUNE 2013,leaving us without any sought of suitable or durable 
solutions.(Disenfranchised). 
For more than two years,we have been leaving in LIMBO(languishing)in the 
desert makeshft remote region. Our present living condition in Choucha camp exceeds 
our capacity to bear,our feeding rations(alimentations) has been cut off since the past five 
months. Mindful of the fact that there are many families with children,single men and 
women as well as pregnant women in this plight,we are appealing for your consideration 
to support our objection to such cruel decisions that is already starving and frustrating 
many human beings in the camp.OUR MAIN ARGUMENT IS THE UNJUSTIFIED 
AND UNPROFESSIONAL MANNERS WITH WHICH OUR CASES WERE 
TREATED In view of the aforementioned,we have embarked on a struggle since the past 
one year and also made a manifestation to the UNCHR HEAD-QUARTERS and the EU 
delegation in Tunis from JAN 27-FEB 03 2013. OUR DEMANDS REMAINS; 1) To be 
accorded asylum protection. 2) To be granted international protection in a safe third 
country(a country with effective system of protection. CONTACT; 2758389226 
 
226 Voice of Choucha, “TUNISIAN WORLD SOCIAL FORUM 2013/CHOUCHA REJECTED 
ASYLUM SEEKERS,” Voice of Choucha: An International Limbo, Crying Out for Help (blog), 
March 31, 2013, https://voiceofchoucha.wordpress.com/2013/03/31/tunisian-world-social-forum-2013choucha-




The passage above is quoted from an entry published on Voice of Choucha around the time 
that news of the camp’s closure began to circulate. From the post it can be evinced that the 
collective for whom it speaks is made of people whose asylum demands were rejected by UNHCR 
and who demand relocation to a third country, thus neither Tunisia nor their country of nationality. 
In the very first lines, the document attributes the reasons for their rejection to misunderstanding 
and misinterpretation of their claims while decrying, later on, the “unjustified and unprofessional 
manners with which” their demands were treated. Reproducing a recurrent structure in other Voice 
of Choucha blog posts, the document accompanies political demands with a description of the 
deteriorating conditions of life of those left behind, making an explicit connection between the 
increasingly deafening silence of competent authorities and the refugees' worsening plight. In a 
mix of highly formal and loose vocabulary and syntax, the post describes life in Choucha as 
“exceeding [the refugees’] capacity to bear,” as well as “starving and frustrating.” But it is one 
particular sentence that opens a rare window of emotional and semantic complexity onto the 
refugees’ life: “For more than two years,we have been living in LIMBO(languishing)in the desert 
makeshft remote region.” The syntax, vocabulary, and visual appearance of the sentence create a 
few instances of unexpected rapprochements that have to them the force of poetry. Visually, the 
lack of spaces between words reinforces assonances and alliterations – as in 
“LIMBO(languishing)in” – while also establishing both visually and semantically a channel of 
communication between the words, blurring, in a certain way, the boundaries between them. 
“LIMBO(languishing)in”, in which ‘(languishing)’ denotes a way of living the ‘limbo’ of asylum 
procedures but also substitutes itself to it, as languishing seems to be a characteristic of camp 
existence. Furthermore, the last word ‘in’ could belong to either ‘limbo’ or to the following 




claims have been ‘processing’ for two years and to the physical location in which their juridical 
limbo takes place, that is, a desert with no other bearings than a border road and the temporary 
installations of the camp.227 The last part of the sentence is at once the most confusing and the 
most evocative, particularly around the adjective ‘makeshft,’ which seems here to be extraneous 
to the geographical coherence of the other words in the phrase (desert, remote, and region). 
“Makeshft” in fact contributes to extend a structural characteristic of an emergency camp onto its 
surroundings, thereby extending its meaning beyond a physical description of the tents and onto 
the life in the limbo that the camp, its surroundings, and the legal regimes regulating it constitute. 
We can see how powerful the writings of Voice of Choucha are in simultaneously representing and 
resisting an illegalization-by-oblivion and in articulating the various layers and semantic textures 
of that same process in terms of political will, enforced geographical marginality, and emotional 
and mental health. The “we can see” is odd here. The post certainly registers protest and resistance 
to oblivion but to the extent that it is probably not read by many people that fight is clearly labored.  
The second extract from the blog that I would like to highlight is a post from October 2014. 
Although it was published more than a year after the camp’s official closure, it relays an official 
eviction notice received from Tunisian authorities and the IOM by the refugees still on-site. 
“Eviction of Choucha camp officially announced” (October 6th, 2014) 
Tunisianan red crescent and I.O.M alongside gave this official notice on Friday 
3/10/2014,when they paid a visit to the camp,That Wednesday 15/10/2014 Choucha will 
be Evicted(final closure) giving option to those recognized(statutory refugees)as one of 
the red crescent partnership re-installation program.For those finally rejected under the 
UNHCR,the I.O.M reiterated the voluntary return program (ii) move into Tunisian 
cities(iii)go wherever your deteriorated state of mind asked you.After all the tragic 
experiences. 
 
227 Although they are present in most posts, I am not arguing that the erasure of spaces between words is the 
writer(s) deliberate aesthetic choice. However, I do think that it has an impact on the text that can be measured 





What is most important to them Is bringing down all the tents to erase the memories & 
hearings of Choucha(one of the Libyan 2011 crisis product). 
On a long term struggle which stood for the transitional justice for those of us who fled 
the Libyan violence with legal registered claims under the UNHCR, Our Demand is still 
;Resettlement to a safe third country counting with effective system of asylum 
protection.228 
 
The post is important because it brings up, among the political revendications, the issue of 
memory and survival. Or more precisely, it makes the issue of memory one of survival. It explicitly 
points to the eviction as an attempt to “erase the memories & hearings of Choucha,” and signals 
this destruction as being the authorities’ primary objective. In the preceding pages I discussed the 
framing and conservation, through film, of the transiency of the camp as a place and form of life. 
What the document above points to – and what makes it so important – is that it connects that life 
with its memory, advancing that by destroying the ‘memories and hearings’ of Choucha, all the 
life that populated it, present and past, will go. In illegalized movement there is a moment in which 
the illegalized person exists through the material proofs – official or otherwise – of her existence. 
For instance, in the epigraph to the last section of the previous chapter, ‘an old Moroccan man’ 
brought to the Moroccan consulate in France all of his papers “to prove them that [he] existed.”229 
A similar moment occurs in the passage above, in which the authorities are suspected of wanting 
to evacuate Choucha because they know that if the immaterialities – the memories and the memory 
of the hearings – tied to the physical place are erased, the persons whose only belonging are those 
immaterialities will also, somehow, no longer exist. It is in this vein – as a last-resort fight against 
the erasure of place, memory, and the person’s existence – that Voice of Choucha should be read, 
 
228 Voice of Choucha, “EVICTION OF CHOUCHA REFUGEE CAMP OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED,” 
Voice of Choucha: An International Limbo, Crying Out for Help (blog), October 6, 2014, 
https://voiceofchoucha.wordpress.com/2014/10/06/eviction-of-choucha-refugee-camp-officially-announced/ 
 
229 “Zineb, an old Moroccan man” whose testimony was collected by Bénédicte Goussault in Paroles de sans-





and for the same reasons, treasured and preserved. It is also important to note how ‘memories and 
hearings’ are brought together in the same sentence. The word ‘memories’ seems, on the one hand, 
to refer generally to life in the camp. ‘Hearings’ is, on the other hand, trickier to interpret, as it 
seems to point to the asylum procedure – commonly known as ‘asylum hearing’ or ‘asylum 
interview’ –whereby authorities decide whether or not an asylum seeker is awarded international 
protection. ‘Erasing the memories & hearings’ could point to ‘traces’ or ‘records’ of the asylum 
hearings conducted in Choucha as somehow existing or being ‘kept’ by or within the shaky walls 
of UNHCR tents. Consequently, this signals their destruction as amounting to a destruction of the 
refugees’ proof of their rightful claims, of the possibility of further examination of those claims 
and thus, eventually, of their possibility of existing in the law and being protected by it.  
The last excerpt from Voice of Choucha that I am considering is the blog’s second-to-last 
(or second most recent) publication, dating from the Fall of 2017, almost two years after the one 








In the beginning was a war signed by the international communities for reasons 
best known to them.This very war affected and transformed lives of 
millions,choucha refugee camp Tunisia was one of it,people who were unable to 
return back to their country of origin,due to fear of persecution actively struggled 
and lived there since 2011.Come June 19th 2017 the camp was invaded using 
military coup that very early hour of 6am,that the entire camp was leveled down 
under 20m in a haste and stopped everyone from taking any photo or video 
evidence,except for some hidden cams and again placed the remnants of the camp 
in another chaotic state of disbelieve and torment(mental,physical)torture.230 
  
A stolen photograph precedes a brief political commentary that links the international 
politics of the Libyan war to the existence of Choucha, its seemingly final erasure by “military 
invasion” that must remain undocumented, and the recurring account of the ever deteriorating 
physical and mental state of those still there. The photograph bears acutely similar traits to the 
dominant image of Babylon, in both content and texture. Grainy, lilac, uncentered, and portraying 
what looks like an unmarked army Jeep and the same bulldozer mobilized that leveled the camp 
in Babylon’s final sequence. The accompanying short paragraph, bearing all the signs of a last 
 
230 Voice of Choucha, “SOS PUBLIC NOTICE TO THE CONCERNED,”  





message, provides a chilling account of the post-camp settlement’s very final days. In these days 
and years since the camp’s official closure, the dehumanization of those left behind is actually 
complete. One the one hand, it is sanctioned by an undocumentable act of military force. On the 
other hand, these years of invisibility have made the refugees speak of themselves as ‘remnants,’ 
thus adding them to the neatly layered remnants of the camp filmed in Babylon’s final sequence.231 
 
 Conclusion  
 
Babylon, Voice of Choucha, and Choucha both as a humanitarian camp and, later, as an 
semi-invisible human crisis, triangulate to create a fraught bundle of issues of movement 
restriction, illegalization, voice, and representation.  
Babylon, as its authors have stated repeatedly, is a film, and as such a work of art. It 
answered to a ‘desire for film’ (une envie de cinéma) which itself responded and countered an 
existing trop plein d’images (excess of images) that followed the beginning of the Tunisian 
revolution, the Libyan crisis and the cross border movement of thousands of people into Tunisia.  
As a work of art, Babylon has its own rules. And it is in this sense that its narrative arc ‘from dust 
to dust’ should be read. By reframing the existence of Choucha as an arc, temporal and 
experiential, after which the camp ceases to exist and its remainders are destroyed and buried under 
tires, Babylon is telling us that a film is not reality, that however close it comes to filming reality, 
it necessarily rearranges it, and that perhaps there is no such thing as unmediated reality to begin 
with. Thus, Babylon’s ‘departure’ after the first major relocation of refugees to Western countries, 
its choice to end on the disposal of inanimate refuse as if everyone had left, is the choice, and the 
 
231 For a brief discussion of Babylon and the human and non-human ‘remnants’ of Choucha camp, see Federica 
Sossi, “Choucha camp: The Production of Space of Remnants,” Darkmatter: In the Ruins of Imperial Culture, 
October 5, 2015, http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2015/10/05/choucha-camp-the-production-of-a-space-of-
remnants/ . Somehow conflating temporalities and spatial change, she calls ‘garbage-space’ the phase of existence in 




necessity, of a finite work of art. In this choice, as well as in its treatment of other major themes 
such as multilingualism an the filming of migrant voices and bodies, we can read its politics. As a 
result, Babylon embodies a commitment to art as well as an awareness of and desire to depart from 
an overly mediated representation of migrant life. Deliberate non-translation of refugee speech and 
striving to frame and preserve the ‘signs of living’ in the camp exemplify this commitment and 
constitute, in large part, Babylon’s uniqueness. 
When read alongside Babylon, Voice of Choucha seems to be working on different planes. 
Not only does it ‘translate’ into English the demands of those left behind by the apparatus of 
international protection, it also exists to extend Choucha’s life and therefore to complicate its 
narratives. Not only does the blog challenge institutional narratives whereby those left on-site ‘are 
not UNHCR’s responsibility’ and the camp as ‘officially closed,’ it also challenges Babylon’s arc 
of narration and transiency. It provides a vivid proof of the workings of illegalization from the 
restriction of movement to the clandestinization of the moving person, whose transiency remained 
stubbornly and defiantly rooted, after everyone else left, waiting for an official authorization to 
‘resume movement’ (i.e. relocation) to come. It never came.232  
Yet Voice of Choucha survives, in a corner of the internet and in an even more remote 
drawer of public memory, and its digital survival contributes, along with Babylon and each in their 
specific way, to a counter-archive of a moment of migration, the words of its protagonists 
unmediated as much as possible, and stills of their progressive disappearance stored somewhere 
in a server.
 
232 I study the specific implication of the ‘Asylum Interview’ as a mechanism of illegalization in the Italian context 




CHAPTER 3 – THE RSD: A LITERARY ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE REFUGEE STATUS 





The previous chapter touched only indirectly on an aspect of paramount importance in the 
politics of the camp and, indeed, of every migration ‘crisis’: the question of international protection 
and asylum. Many of those detained or housed in Choucha received no international protection 
and did not succeed in their request to be relocated to a country with an operational asylum system. 
This chapter moves north to Italy and focuses on the asylum procedure, honing in a single but 
particularly important moment in the process. It considers the translation politics of asylum, trying 
to wrestle this question away from an institutional narrative that tends to portray translation 
practices in asylum procedures as uneventfully neutral. These largely unacknowledged yet crucial 
moments of translation take place in the larger context of state-mandated policies to obliterate – 
from education and public discourse alike – Italy’s dialectical and linguistic diversity in favor of a 
standard, supposedly ‘purer’ Italian.  
In a context of receding legal protections and growing demand for asylum, the asylum 
procedure represents a dangerous path dotted by obstacles and traps. It is also a powerful 
mechanism of illegalization since a person whose appeal is rejected is given only a limited amount 
of time to leave the country. Although unacknowledged by the state, translation thus becomes an 
eminently political practice. To reinforce this claim, the system operates on the principle that the 
‘burden of proof’ rests squarely on the applicant, regardless of how distant their experience of 
flight and danger may be from the Commission’s cultural and linguistic frame of reference and 





The crucial moment of the asylum request that I examine below is the Refugee Status 
Determination Interview – generally known as “the RSD Interview” or, simply, “the interview” – 
in which an asylum-seeker is asked to ‘tell their story’ and prove that the reasons given for having 
left their country and seeking protection elsewhere are ‘well-founded’ and that they deserve 
protection. In Italy, the Interview takes place in front of a “Commissione Territoriale,” a Territorial 
Commission or TC. This is a State-appointed panel of judges that comprises at least 6 members, 
not all of whom, however, are present on the day of the interview.233 Often, the interview is 
conducted by a single member, who will then submit the transcript (verbale) and all relevant pieces 
of the request to the other members for a final vote. The composition of the TC was reformed in 
2017; it now consists of at least four officials specifically trained by the Ministry of Interior, one 
UNHCR representative, and one additional Government official from a separate Department. Each 
Commission maintains a list of translators in case the interviewee requires one. At the Interview, 
before proceeding with questions about the applicant’s story the interviewer always asks whether 
the applicant and translator understand each other well. The applicant can ask for the translator to 
be replaced, in which case the interview is rescheduled without prejudice. 
The excerpt below is from the verbale (official transcript)234 of an interview conducted by 
an Asylum Commission in Northern Italy in 2015235: Where unspecified, the events narrated took 
place in Edo State, Nigeria. 
  
 
233 At the Interview, asylum-seekers have the right to ask to speak to the entire Commission. This right is seldom 
exercised because it is rarely known.  
234 There is no exact equivalent to translate verbale into English, as it can be both a ‘(police) report’ or a ‘transcript’. 
However, it always denotes an official document. 
235 I have strived to keep the syntax, verb tenses, punctuation and grammar as close to the original as possible. I have 
also tried to reproduce the layout and visuality of the original document by keeping, as much as possible, the same 
distance between words, the same sometimes unorthodox use of punctuation, and the same inconsistencies in the use 




[applicant A]: “Upon my father’s death my brother was supposed to succeed him 
as king, but my uncle did not accept this and wanted to be chosen himself, thus 
since we were afraid that our uncle would take the place by force [prendere il posto 
con la forza], me and my brother took it236 to a friend’s house in a nearby village, 
where we got word that, in the meantime, our house had been burned down by my 
uncle and his group who went there to take the throne and, after looking for it and 
not finding it, set the house on fire , we were made aware of this by a phone call 
while we were at our friend’s house looking to leave the throne there , , we saw the 
house burned down, and we were on our way to get advice from an elderly man 
from the village whom our father trusted when we were attacked by our uncle and 
his group, they hit us with sticks and pinned my brother to the ground, I was slashed 
in the neck with a knife but I managed to escape and reach my friend’s house where 
we had left the throne, I was bleeding a lot so he called a nurse to treat me, then 
told me to reach the town of [blank] where I would be safer. I reach [blank] by bus, 
and when I arrive to the house of my friend’s acquaintance he (my friend) tells me 
on the phone that they are looking for me, and that my life is in danger because the 
throne couldn’t be brought outside the village , , I haven’t heard anything from my 
brother since the attack, my friend’s acquaintance who was hosting me knew a 
Libyan man who came periodically to [blank] for business, so I was told to go with 
him and this is how I reach Libya, I don’t pay for the trip. If I were to go back I 
would be killed because I left the throne close to Tripoli, and the throne couldn’t 
leave the village, I got the throne back as soon as my wound healed, I put it in a bag 
and it was the only thing I carried.  
  
[Commission] Question: Cosa se ne fa? 237 
[applicant A]: It represents my life, my family, now it’s in the house of the Libyan 
man I was working for, or rather that I helped selling african food, sometimes I 
helped an electrician I didn’t bring it with me to Italy because when I left I had to 
save my life 
 
  
Several months after the interview excerpted above, the Asylum Commission decided on 
Applicant A’s ‘request for international protection’.238 The response was sent to Applicant A’s 
 
236 As confusing as it is, this is how the original verbale reads: the relative pronoun ‘it’ precedes the object it refers 
to, that is, ‘the throne’ [il trono]. 
237 A note on the difficulty to translate the question: “Cosa se ne fa?” Acceptable or correct translations of this 
question/ expression, widely used in Italian, may range from “what do you do with it?” to “what’s the purpose of 
it?” to the more dismissive “why would you care?” Knowing the tone in which this question was asked would be 
crucial in assessing the way it was meant, and what type of answer it was really looking for. As it is, written out and 
‘muted’ on the verbale, the question “Cosa se ne fa?” may be coming from genuine surprise at the strangeness of the 
account or, inversely, it may be a skeptical question informed by the examiner’s growing confusion and by his 
distrust of the applicant’s narration. The object implied in the question is, of course, the throne. 
238 “Richiesta di Protezione Internazionale” is the official name of what is commonly referred to as ‘asylum 




address, as well as to the legal counsel who followed his application. Although much longer than 





OBSERVED […] That [the applicant] declares being from [blank], Edo State 
where he lived until February 2014. He also declared that his father passed away in 
2013, maybe because of a medicine given to him by his brother, and that his father, 
although he studied mechanical engineering, was payed by the Government to be 
the king of the village. At his father’s death, [the applicant’s] brother was supposed 
to succeed him as king, but this was against their uncle’s wishes, who wanted to be 
chosen as the next king. Because they were afraid that their uncle would seize that 
role by force [prendere quel ruolo con la forza], the applicant and his brother took 
the throne and surreptitiously moved it to a friend’s house, in a village nearby. 
While away, they learned that their uncle and his supporters [sostenitori], furious 
for not finding the throne, burned down their house and later, after they found them, 
beat them up with sticks, and pinned his brother down to the ground while the 
applicant was slashed with a knife but managed to escape to his friend’s house, who 
provided him with medical assistance and later told him to reach his friends in the 
town of [blank]. The applicant learned from a telephone call that he was being 
sought because the throne couldn’t be carried out of the village, and for that reason 
he was fearing for his life and thought about reaching Libya, he has had no news of 
his brother since. The applicant also narrated of how he brought the throne to his 
employer’s house in Libya; 
CONSIDERED that the applicant’s narrative appears implausible [inverosimile], 
in some respects contradictory, generic, and lacking detail [non circostanziato] in 
particular with regards to his fleeing with the throne behind [appresso]; 
DECIDES not to grant international protection. 
  
  
     To write this chapter from an ideal point of view, one encompassing all the issues 
raised by human movement across physical and linguistic borders, I would have to play all of the 
following roles: An African policy expert, an observer of the mission Dakar-Djibouti,239 a 20-year 
 
protection granted by the Italian State, the other being “Subsidiary Protection” and ‘Humanitarian / Special’ 
protection. For a more extensive discussion of their differences and implication see below, p. 10 
239 The Mission Dakar-Djibouti, officially known as Mission ethnographique et linguistique Dakar-Djibouti, left 
Bordeaux in March 1931. After traveling across present-day Mali, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Cameroon, 
Niger, and Ethiopia, the expedition finally reached Djibouti in 1933. Part of it were, among others, renowned 
ethnologist Marcel Griaule and, as the official ‘writer’, a young Michel Leiris. It represents an early traveling across 




old Gambian boy, his mom, an anthropologist in Bordj Mokhtar, a doctor in Libya, a lawyer in 
Italy, and a policeman there too. Again, in Bordj Mokhtar or in Sabha, a trafficker and a volunteer, 
then further up North, a fisherman, a coast-guard, a lawmaker or a mayor. To the East, a rubber 
boat manufacturer in China and the person who, somewhere in Libya, unloads the shipment. A 
Thuraya phone, and a person on each side.240 A legal counsel, an Austrian Railways employee 
checking train tickets and calling the police, a refugee relief clinic staffer in Berlin. A sister waiting 
to hear from her brother, and whether he crossed, in an apartment outside of Stockholm. Then, 
finally, someone able to translate all these different experiences into each other and to weave those 
translations into a narrative that flows and, at the same time, someone who is able to make sense 
of all these countless encounters and their own processes alike. It is not by chance that, above and 
beyond everything else pertaining to the matter of this chapter, the very fact of trying to write it 
requires me to at least define what the word ‘scholarly writing’ can and should be, particularly in 
a case of manifest inadequacy. In light of this, then, this chapter is an attempt to discuss official 
practices of translation operating in a set of documents that conceal those practices, in a landscape 
that often exceeds my own linguistic competencies. It considers how we might speak about the 
formation of a narrative when the steps and moments that led to its formation are opaque, 
 
an early cartography of the ‘Mediterranean’ that contemporary migrations have come to define. It is in this list 
because it embodies a search for the historical depths of the routes that, almost a century later, appear so often in 
asylum interviews. 
240 Thuraya, a UAE-based company owned by the Mubadala sovereign fund, specializes in satellite phones that are 
widely used, both at the private and ‘industrial’ scale (i.e., by smugglers) during the crossing of the sea. They work 
as regular phone as well as guides when coordinates are entered. In relation to another ‘obsession’ of this 
dissertation, that is, all the possible traces of migration, they are endowed with strong poetic force as well as 
paramount practical importance. As one of the preferred tools of communications among people involved, from 
anywhere at sea to anywhere on shore, Thuraya phones are most often used for locating and rescuing purposes. A 
communication happening between sea and shore through the Thuraya phone is, in a way, the trace of one of the 
many events of seafaring migration that happen regularly but that are lost to memory or almost impossible to 
preserve materially, and a source of information on the condition of the trip that would contribute to a better 




inaccessible, or irremediably lost, and only a few traces are made available in random ways and at 
unpredictable times. 
The chapter considers in particular how the gaps just mentioned are bridged by the actors 
involved, how are the blanks of the story are filled in, and how their intervention can be appraised 
critically. In asylum narratives in general, and in particular when they are produced in multilingual 
contexts, these gaps – whether temporal, logical, spatial, or semantic – are inevitable and naturally 
wide. For procedural reasons, asylum narratives are transformed from oral to written in a very 
short time, and the ways in which this transformation occurs tend to collapse cultural and linguistic 
distances between different versions of the same narrative in a way that, instead of bringing them 
closer, effectively multiplies the thousands of miles that already separate the beginning of a story 
from its end. In these translations and transformations, the story loses consistency, unity, meaning 
and as result, the application is rejected and the asylum-seeker is one step closer to losing status 
and falling into illegality. 
  
 The Asylum Procedure: International Frameworks, the EU and Italy 
 
According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, there are currently 68.5 
million forcibly displaced people worldwide, 25.4 million refugees (over half of whom are under 
18), 3.1 million asylum-seekers, and 10 million stateless people. In 2018, more than half of the 
world’s refugees came from three countries: South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria. The top hosting 
countries are Turkey, Uganda, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Ethiopia, and Jordan. 85% of the world’s 
displaced people are hosted in developing countries.241 Europe is nowhere in these numbers. 
Indeed, European asylum laws and procedure are some of the world’s most restrictive. At the 
 




supra-national level, EU asylum policies are a mix of international instruments of refugee and 
human rights law and region-wide regulations and jurisprudence. Member State can also 
implement their own legislation, although it is not supposed to limit the scope of the regional and 
international instruments of which they are signatories.242 Asylum policy within the EU space and 
among Member States is governed by the Dublin Regulation,243 which instituted the principle that 
anyone seeking international protection in Europe must do so in the first country of entry. The 
nature and topography of migratory flows to Europe in the past ten to fifteen years have 
increasingly shown this framework to be ill-adapted and outdated, resulting in criticism both from 
proponents of stricter policies of relocation (generally identifiable with the anti-migrant 
governments of Southern and Eastern Europe) and from those who decry the framework for its 
segmentation of the European space and violent disruption of trajectories of human 
displacement.244 It is in the very nature of the Regulation to establish what effectively has become, 
 
242 Subsidiary Protection is “The protection given to a non-EU national or a stateless person who does not qualify as 
a refugee, but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown to believe that the person concerned, if 
returned to his or her country of origin or, in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual 
residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and who is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.” It was defined by Council Directive 2004/83/EC, and is 
accessible on the European Commission website at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/subsidiary-
protection_en.  
243The original framework dates back to 2003. Throughout the years it has been altered but its core ‘first-country’ 
principle remained largely unaltered. Its latest iteration is Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, accessible at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/;jsessionid=jHNlTp3HLjqw8mqGbQSpZh1VWpjCyVQq14Hgcztw4pbfSQZffnrn!557467765?uri
=CELEX:32013R0604 (accessed February 1, 2019) 
244 In part due to the competing and opposed views on how the Framework should be reformed, talks on a 
harmonized and EU-wide asylum policy have stalled. A comprehensive reform of the EU asylum system is on the 
agenda of both right-wing and more progressive parties and national governments. One of the most important issues 
is that countries seem to agree that the system must be reformed, but depending on their geographical position vis-à-
vis the current migratory routes, they are pushing in opposite directions. Telling is the case of right-wing 
governments such as Italy and Hungary, who now share an anti-immigration agenda that they would like to see 
implemented in Brussels through, among other things, a reform of the asylum system, but on seemingly conflictual 
terms: Italy’s government is pushing for an asylum reform that would do away with the Dublin Regulation and thus 
allow them to force migrants and asylum-seekers entering Europe through Italy to seek asylum elsewhere. This 
represents, in a twisted xenophobic way, a call for a more balanced politics of redistribution of asylum demands. On 




for asylum purposes, a continent of borders and unbreachable walls.245 Under this framework, 
states establish procedures to evaluate asylum claims within their territory that may vary slightly 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but one constant is the Refugee Status Determination Interview. 
As its name suggests, the RSD Interview is the circumstance in which the Commission summons 
the asylum-seeker, whose claim has already been filed, for an in-person evaluation of that claim. 
The structure of this encounter is rather strict. The interview moves through a set of predetermined 
questions that can be complemented according to the specificities of each story. Their wording 
changes not only from state to state but also from one administering authority to another. Among 
the questions that are always included is one about the reasons for leaving one’s own country and 
another one asking the claimant to provide a narrative of the events that led to their departure, and 
to explain the risks they would be facing in the eventuality of return. The procedure’s guidelines 
are fairly standardized and are mandated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
who defines Refugee Status Determination as “the legal or administrative process by which 
governments or UNHCR determine whether a person seeking international protection is 
considered a refugee under international, regional, or national law. States have the primary 
responsibility for determining the status of asylum seekers, but UNHCR may do so if states are 
 
current laws in the hope to diminish the refugee redistribution quotas currently in place for their countries. This is a 
textbook case of a “not my problem” politics of asylum that treats asylum-seekers as something that could magically 
evaporate but that will, if and when it will become policy, simply lead to the illegalization of a large number of 
them. Against this seemingly united but bound to disunite front there is a more progressive agenda that would seek 
to do away with the Dublin Regulation in order to reshape the EU asylum system around the main features of 
current migratory patterns with the aim of making more attuned, humane, and ease pressure on ports of entry such as 
Southern European countries. Both agendas have been put on hold until the EU Commission and Parliament will be 
reshaped by the momentous EU elections of May 2019.  
245 As we will see below, this very regulation establishes a mechanism of illegalization and, in various direct and 
indirect ways (not least the anti-migrant racism sentiment it contributes to foster in those countries where mass 
migratory routes end, thus turning those countries into inhospitable places in which people would rather not be stuck 
in), ensures its reproduction. For instance, those who have a claim to international protection and an acquaintance or 
a network elsewhere in Europe are forced to cross the country of entrance undetected, therefore “illegally”, and 
expose themselves to the consequences of that status, the least of which being having to seek asylum there to avoid 




unable or unwilling.”246 These Guidelines, which in and of themselves represent a potential site 
for fruitful critical reflection on the asylum procedure,247 break down the ‘Refugee Status 
Determination’ moment in all its aspects by providing rules on the structure of the process as well 
as recommendations on several ‘anthropological’ and behavioral aspects of the process, not least 
the ways to conduct a fruitful interview in a respectful manner.  
The procedure for seeking asylum or another form of international protection is regulated 
by international, regional, and national legal frameworks, which differ in sometimes important and 
life-changing ways (such as the types of protection that can be granted besides asylum) but which 
all refer, in their definition of who can be a refugee, to two foundational texts: the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.248 Each of these texts is central for 
specific reasons. The Convention provides, to this day, the language with which to assess a claim 
to asylum. Terms249 such as ‘refugee’, ‘well-founded fear’, ‘harm’ and ‘persecution’ provide, 
alone and in relation to each other, the space within which a personal story must fit to be considered 
worthy of protection. Together with the specific historical and geographical context in which the 
claim takes place, they create a discursive space within which the story must fit. This space is at 
the same time one of opportunity and one of closure and strictly-enforced limits. Each of these 
 
246 UNHCR, “Refugee Status Determination,” accessed October 7, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-status-
determination.html (accessed October 7, 2019). See Violeta Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe : 
Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
247 For instance, of the kind attempted on the concept of “absconding - fuite - fuga” in the Introduction.  
248 The 1967 Protocol was instrumental in creating contemporary international refugee law because it expanded the 
scope of the Convention beyond its originally-intended historical and physical limits. Indeed, before the Protocol’s 
adoption and ratification by Contracting States, the 1951 Convention was restricted to “persons fleeing events 
occurring before 1 January 1951 and within Europe.” See UNHCR, “Introductory Note by the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,” in Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 60-year 
Commemoration Edition (Geneva, UNHCR: 2011), 2. Article 33 of the Convention is discussed in depth in Chapter 
4.  
249 As I have tried to show in other chapters, in the context of illegalized migration ‘terms’ are much more than just 
definitions: they are categories, status, they are perceptions, and what is more important, a change in terms can 




terms is a criterion that, if fulfilled, makes the claim eligible. But at the same time, each term 
provides a limit, a ‘fence’ around a space within which a personal narrative should stay in order to 
be received favorably. This space is almost physical, as the personal narrative must develop 
logically in a specific way and it is also made to look a certain way on the page. 
In the context of the Central Mediterranean, the Italian asylum system is a particularly 
interesting case study for reasons that are at once political and linguistic. Since the early 2010s, 
Italy’s Southern shores have been, along with those of Greece and, intermittently, Spain, the main 
entry point of maritime migration to Europe. In part due to the Dublin Regulation discussed above, 
to the soaring influx of people corresponded a growing number of demands for international 
protection that tested an underequipped and understaffed system. Another compelling reason for 
looking at the procedure and treatment of recent asylum demands deposited in Italy relates to the 
linguistic relationship between the State and the people asking for its protection. Italy’s 
expansionist projects in the nineteenth and twentieth century were, from the point of view of the 
state, relatively unsuccessful, with the result that Italian never became a significant language of 
empire nor was it, in postcolonial times, ever powerful enough to frame the relationship between 
Italy and its former colonies in a relevant way. Moreover, since World War II, there has never 
been a sustained effort to train the population in foreign languages, including English, and certainly 
not in any way comparable to the ideology of multilingualism in education embodied by Northern 
European and Scandinavian countries. With regard to asylum, this is an important trait, because it 
presents a system – and a group of administrators – the ideology of which did not grow out of a 
particular postcolonial linguistic relationship between the metropole and its former empire.250 It is 
 
250 The French asylum system is the opposite example. Although things are changing now, people who historically 
sought asylum in French had a degree of knowledge of French that made the linguistic relationship between 




possible to affirm, indeed, that the Italian asylum system is ideologically monolingual, in the sense 
that it does not make the linguistic distance between the applicant and the State a central or relevant 
aspect of asylum procedure. It is thus important to reconstruct the ways in which multilingualism 
is constantly negotiated in order to understand how, between and across languages, the asylum 
procedure in general and the interview in particular become moments and sites of the illegalization 
of mobility.  
In Italy, the asylum system has been at the center of political, scholarly, and humanitarian 
attention for roughly the past decade. Its inception, evolution and recent life in the spotlight reflect, 
with some necessary delay, the shifts that have occurred in the migratory flows to Southern Europe 
over the same period of time. Italy did not have a comprehensive immigration policy until the 
Martelli law (1991). In the period 1990-2013, the country’s asylum system processed a number of 
asylum requests that never reached 40,000 a year, which was in line with other E.U. countries.251 
2013, however, signaled a watershed moment, after which asylum requests doubled in the space 
of four years. There were 63,000 in 2014, 83,000 in 2015, 123,000 in 2016, and more than 130,000 
in 2017. They fell back to 53,000 in 2018.252 Up until late 2017, successive governments left an 
increasingly inadequate system to deal with the ballooning number of requests, prompting a “state 
of emergency” for practitioners and users alike.253  
In the frenzy of what was being portrayed as a biblical invasion of asylum-seekers who 
would bring the system to a breaking point, and under pressure from all political sides, the center-
 
251 Ulrich Stege, “La normativa europea sul diritto d’asilo” (2017), quoted in Maurizio Veglio, “Uomini tradotti: 
prove di dialogo con richiedenti asilo,” Diritto, Immigrazione, Cittadinanza, 2 (2017): 4. 
252 For the official and precise numbers see the Interior Ministry website, Department of Civil Liberties and 
Immigration, at http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/it/documentazione/statistica/i-numeri-
dellasilo (accessed February 1, 2019). 
253 For this breakdown of the state of the Italian asylum system pre-Minniti I have drawn substantially from 




left government of the time passed a sweeping reform that strengthened border control and 
restricted access to international protection. This was known as the Minniti law (2017)254 after the 
name of its rapporteur, then-Minister of Interior Marco Minniti. In a purported effort to 
‘streamline’255 asylum procedures, the law introduced several controversial measures. It decreased 
the period to appeal the decision of the Commission to 30 days. It took away one degree of appeal, 
leaving only the Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) to hear a rejected appeal from an ordinary 
tribunal.256 It also introduced a highly controversial requirement to video-tape the Commission 
Interview, so that the judge reviewing the appeal could base their verdict on the film alone instead 
of having to hear the applicant in person. This measure, widely criticized as a blatant infringement 
of the person’s right to representation in court, has not yet been enforced because of technological 
delays.257  
The Minniti reform, although passed with the votes of a self-professed center-left 
government, provided the blueprint for the following reform of “immigration, citizenship and 
 
254 Its full title is Legge 13 aprile 2017 n. 46 recante disposizioni urgenti per l’accelerazione dei procedimenti in 
materia di protezione internazionale, nonché per il contrasto dell’immigrazione illegale. Note, as a sign of the 
times, the seemingly natural coexistence of the phrases ‘international protection’ and ‘illegal immigration’ in the 
same sentence.  
255 “Snellire e semplificare”, to trim (as in body-fat percentage) and to simplify. 
256 I will provide a more detailed structure of the Italian judicial order later. Following the Minniti law and, more 
recently, Salvini’s amendments to it, this is what happens to an asylum request filed in Italy: A rejection by the 
Commission can be appealed by the asylum-seeker within 30 days from being notified. This is when the request for 
asylum enters the judiciary system, as it is heard by a judge at a ‘specialized section’ of one of 14 courthouses 
(tribunali ordinari) all around the country (usually in the same region where the Commission first interviewed the 
person). If the appeal is denied, the asylum-seeker can petition the Corte di Cassazione to hear his or her case, 
something that is notoriously difficult. (Only certain attorneys are allowed to argue before the Court, the procedure 
can be prohibitively expensive, etc.). Minniti’s law took away one degree of appeal, that of the ‘Appeals Court”, 
which had existed until then. 
257 Besides the question of infringement of the rights of asylum-seekers, the reform’s part related to videotaping 
introduces a measure that has not been widely discussed, yet is crucial to understand the ideological assessment of 
the role of translation in the asylum process. Not only will the interview with the Commission be video-taped, but its 
“transcription into Italian will be done using an automatic software of voice-recognition.” (Legge Minniti, supra 15, 
my translation). When it will be used consistently and depending on whether and to whom it will be available for 
study, the video-recorded interview will constitute and important archive on which to develop critical work on the 




security”, this time at the hands of a proudly racist and xenophobic Interior Minister, Matteo 
Salvini. His reform (approved by the Parliament and signed into law in December 2018)258 
provides a set of stringent measures regarding migrant detention as well as health and citizenship 
rights. It also introduces an important modification to Italian asylum law by modifying the types 
of protection that can be granted. Prior to this latest reform and in addition to the two statutory 
forms of protection sanctioned by the 1951 Convention – International Protection (Refugee Status) 
and Subsidiary Protection, both lasting 5 years – Italy259 had a third form of protection in the form 
of a residence permit “for humanitarian reasons” that lasted up to two years and could be renewed. 
What became simply known as “humanitarian protection” was frequently used by judges and 
Commissions, particularly after the truth of reports of systematic violence and torture in Libya 
became unavoidable.260 As a legal instrument, ‘humanitarian protection’ was heavily relied upon 
for its suppleness. As opposed to the rigidly and narrowly-defined criteria of both Refugee status 
and Subsidiary protection – where the burden of proving “well-founded fear of 
persecution,”261often by a State or group, “a real risk of suffering serious harm,” or the danger of 
exposure to “torture or other inhuman or degrading or treatment”262 may be insurmountable – 
‘humanitarian protection’ provided a much larger umbrella of acceptable reasons for protection. 
They had to be “serious and well-founded,” but could range from age and health to political 
 
258 “Legge 1 Dicembre 2018, n. 132 recante Disposizioni urgenti in materia di protezione internazionale, 
immigrazione e sicurezza pubblica [...]”, available at http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2018/10/04/18G00140/sg 
259 “Humanitarian protection” status exists in several other EU countries, but the Commissions’ and courts’ reliance 
on it vary largely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
260 The Territorial Commission of Bologna practiced, for some time in the period 2016–2017, an unofficial policy of 
blanket humanitarian protection for anyone who could be reasonably believed to have been detained in Libya prior 
to the crossing. {This is to some extent unverified information, as it comes from an informal conversation I had with 
a legal counsel who accompanied asylum-seekers to their interview with the Commission for many years}. 
261 As in the language defining criteria for protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 




instability in the home country, failure to sufficiently uphold human rights or prevent violence, 
and being a victim of a natural or environmental catastrophe.  
The late-2018 law effectively replaced humanitarian protection with what it called 
protezione speciale, or ‘special’ protection. And as its name suggests, this embodies an effort to 
narrow the scope of protection while simultaneously making it less accessible. Indeed, the 
residence permit granted with protezione speciale only lasts one year, cannot be converted into a 
work permit, and can be renewed by the Commission upon revision (renewal is not automatic). 
Furthermore, its scope mirrors considerably that of asylum and of subsidiary protection, as it cites 
“the risk of persecution” and “the risk of torture” as deciding factors, while also adding “grave 
violations of human rights.” A key provision of this type of protection is that it can be granted only 
if a “bordering State” cannot offer analogous protection.263  
 
 
Part I: The RSD. Structure, Documents, Elements 
 
As we have seen, the procedure to assess the admissibility of a claim to international 
protection – the determination of the applicant’s status, or RSD – revolves around one key moment: 
the Interview, that is, the encounter between the person seeking protection and a Commission that 
evaluates the claim. The interview, is, however, the most important moment in a series of 
procedural steps through which a claim must pass and during which the applicant’s narrative is 
 
263 Restrictions in access and length of asylum mirror the general spirit of the law, geared towards the creation of an 
illegalized and thus invisible class of people who formerly benefitted from some sort of protection or integration 
program. Among its ‘highlights’, the law stretches the detention time for people awaiting repatriation from 3 to 6 
months. It expands the number and nature of crimes that can lead to loss of status and/or protection (this is a crucial 
point of law that must be discussed further. Usually most ‘instruments’ of illegalization are administrative: length or 
type of residence permit, access to public services, etc. Here, an intervention in criminal law is use to expressly 
criminalize refugees and protected status.) In addition to these and the modification of ‘humanitarian’ protection, the 
law also excludes refugees from the ‘public registry” (anagrafe) and restricts access to ‘hospitality and insertion’ 
programs — work, medical and legal assistance, etc — to asylum and subsidiary protection, excluding ‘specials’ and 




thoroughly modified. After crossing into foreign territory (usually when caught after crossing into 
foreign territory, and in the Italian case in recent times, when caught or rescued at sea) a person 
can declare her or his desire to seek protection in that state. In theory, an asylum request is started 
at the utterance of the desire to seek asylum when a foreign national comes into contact with a 
representative of the state or of UNHCR, wherever this may be. In the case of Italy and the current 
migratory routes that traverse its jurisdiction this includes, for instance, state-operated ships in the 
Central Mediterranean, which, due to their ambiguous function as repression and rescue units, 
became a critical site for access to asylum.264 In Italy, however, it is common practice to consider 
the asylum request open once the applicant has reached a police station and filled out a form called 
C-3, in which they are identified and then asked to provide information on their country of origin, 
reasons for leaving, countries through which they went in order to reach Italy, and the dates for 
each of the salient moments of their journey. The C-3’s role as a legal document but also as a 
foundational moment for organizing the logic, structure, and temporality of the applicant’s 
narrative will be discussed below. The interview with the Commission represents the next step of 
the claim. Its verbale, or official transcript, is the focus of this chapter. The Commission’s 
deliberation on the applicant’s claim comes months later, in written form: the Commission can 
either grant one of the three forms of protection discussed above, or reject the claim. If the claim 
is rejected, the official document that communicates the rejection to the claimant is called diniego 
(rejection, denial). The Commission’s decision can then be appealed in the judicial system. For 
 
264 See, on the right to seek asylum onboard foreign military vessels, the landmark judgement Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 
Grand Chamber Judgement (European Court of Human Rights), 23 February 2012, Application no. 27765/09. The 
case is not exclusively about the issue of access to asylum, but the Court did find Italy guilty of not allowing the 
persons it had intercepted at sea to seek protection, and of returning them to the Libyan coast. The case is discussed 




each of the two stages of appeal, the official document will be a judge’s sentenza (judgement or 
verdict).  
It has hopefully become clearer now why this chapter started with a badly written, barely 
linear account of Applicant A’s flight from his home country of Nigeria, followed by a technical 
description of asylum procedure in the EU and Italy. This potentially disorienting presentation 
paves the way for the fundamental claim I am trying to develop in the following pages: that 
narratives of asylum are produced, narrated, written and owned by the applicant who lived them 
as much as they are by the system that requires them in order to grant some sort of protection. And 
that every step through which the narrative has to go in order to reach its intended goal – to protect 
the person who tells it – is not a neutral stage in a chain of legal acts, but instead a moment that 
decides how the story must be told, written, and reported.  
The second part of the argument is that the fiction of the system’s neutrality in assessing a 
claim that belongs solely to the claimant is possible only as long as the various practices of 
translation at work at different stages of the asylum procedure are treated as transparent, neutral, 
and marginal moments of duly transmitted, unaltered information. Only by deliberately ignoring 
the transformative force of translation and the many instances in which translation shapes asylum 
narratives, can the State maintain its role of ‘objective and impartial judge’ of biographical and 
historical facts, and therefore assess the way in which they comply with the criteria set forth by 
international, regional, and domestic refugee law.  
As a consequence of this deliberate ‘blindness’ to the centrality of translation, I am also 
arguing that the RSD Interview as it is practiced in Italy amounts to an instance of illegalization.265 
 
265 This is how the RSD fits into the larger argument of my dissertation, that is, the necessity to read discursive 
practices of migration control – and the way they are engaged with in aesthetics – as a system in which rules, 
morphologies, and semantics are in constant circulation across languages and between national and transnational 




This is true not only structurally but also discursively (narratively): On the one hand, and as we 
have seen, paths toward obtaining asylum or any other protected status have become narrower and 
narrower, and of more arduous access. On the other hand, the narrative is de facto treated as the 
applicant themselves, in the sense that based on the narrative decisions are taken that will 
dramatically shape the applicant’s future and life. Yet, the narrative cannot be considered to be 
solely the applicant’s, let alone the applicant themselves, because of the various narrative, 
translational and stylistic interventions that happen at the hand of the State, from the time the story 
is uttered to the time it is signed by the applicant on the verbale. After an additional exploration of 
the documents of the RSD procedure, I will sketch the formal and stylistic elements that define the 
genre of the interview and then, in the remainder of the chapter, discuss them in relation to 
translation. 
In Italy, in recent years, the composition and work of some Territorial Commissions has 
been soundly criticized for its inadequateness and sometimes underwhelming preparation and level 
of knowledge. Following a sweeping inquiry by a Senate Committee set up to look into any 
wrongdoing in the system governing asylum and migration, a reform of the Commission, and of 
the necessary requirements to be part of it, was initiated. Yet despite changes in the overall 
composition and level of training of the Commission, the interview itself, however, remains a two- 
or three-person affair: One examiner or interviewer, the applicant, and the interpreter when needed. 
The examiner takes notes and redacts, during the interview, the verbale, namely the minutes of the 
conversation. On the basis of the verbale, the Commission will decide collegially on every single 
claim. At least 3 favorable opinions are needed for a claim to be admitted. One of the verbale’s 
most salient features is that it follows a set of predetermined questions, and that it is monolingual. 




does not, however, and indeed in cases requiring interpreting and translation, the verbale bears no 
trace of the continuous back-on-forth between languages, let alone the corrections, pauses, 
silences, particularities in diction, etc.. The verbale is a reduction of the interview as event, yet it 
is generally treated and used as the event itself. In the verbale, the applicant’s narrative is utterly 
domesticated. The document, in its format and tongue, bears no trace of foreignness, multilingual 
contexts, negotiations of meaning, untranslatability, or ignorance of context. My questions thus 
are: how do we look for these? And are they visible somewhere, particularly in a context in which 
translation is utterly instrumental, marginalized and portrayed as a neutral step in a chain of 
seamless transmission of information?  
I approach the verbale and other official documents constituting the traces left by an 
asylum request as themselves a form of translation, or more precisely, I investigate the various 
forms of translation at work in its production. The verbale is a form of translation because, due to 
its predetermined form and fixed stylistic conventions, it effectively rewrites the applicant’s story. 
The structure of the interview and therefore of the verbale act on the applicant’s story like a narrow 
creek would on a large body of water. By leaving out of the verbale most signs of the 
multilingualism in which the interview took place, and by barely acknowledging the role of the 
translator, the verbale as an official document alters what it purports to transcribe. For a long time, 
translation has been considered to be founded on the principle of equivalence between two texts266. 
Here the verbale rests on a principle of sameness, which is aimed at voiding it of any value that is 
not that of mere and faithful transcription of the Interview. But we know that a lot is left out in the 
name of this sameness, and that sameness is a fiction. I am arguing for us to consider it a form of 
 
266 Eugene Nida, “Principles of Correspondence” (1964), in The Translation Studies Reader, 3rd. ed. edited by 
Lawrence Venuti (New York: Routledge, 2012), 141–155. For one of the strongest critiques of that assumption – 
and the instrumentalist model of translation that it expresses – see the work of Lawrence Venuti, in particular the 




translation in order to “slash the canvas”267 that this fiction of sameness constitutes, and as a result 
to unveil some of the mechanisms that contribute to its production and, finally, to complicate our 
understanding of asylum procedure by restoring one of its central yet muted components. 
The definition of a ‘refugee’ is provided by Article 1, A (2) of the 1951 Convention: “For 
the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who […], as 
a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” 
Aside from phrases such as ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and, ‘owing to such fear, [ 
the inability or unwillingness] to return [to one’s own country]’, there is in this definition an 
element instrumental for defining a way in which an asylum claim must be formulated. It is the 
principle, and the necessity, of belonging to a group as it is expressed by the phrase “reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group.” This automatically establishes 
two planes for judgement. On the one hand, we have the individual, the one who fears, and on the 
other have we have the collective, namely the group that, for the reasons named above, is the target 
of violence and persecution. Thus, the burden of proof is squarely with the applicant, and it is not 
just about proving of being in danger, but proving that one is in danger as member of a group. This 
requirement places considerable weight on the applicant’s narrative, which must be at the same 
time personal enough and general enough to be credible and relevant to the terms of the law. This 
 




is one of the foundational paradoxes resulting from the requirement to comply with a semantic 
field (the word-choice of Article 1) that was designed to represent a specific persecution (against 
Jews), in a specific place (Europe), at a specific time (WWII). This distance between the 
geography, temporality and general reality of the stories that seek protection in Italy – in a word 
the ‘present’ of asylum – and the discursive landscape in which they are supposed to enter that 
belongs, as both lexicon and logic, to the past becomes an important factor in the construction of 
an asylum narrative. It forces a story to bend and comply to it. It forces the asylum-seeker, often 
at the cost of great pain, to organize past events into a narrative and then it reorganizes it, 
effectively rewriting it. This is our first glimpse of a process in which the violence experienced by 
the applicant in the past is mirrored by the ‘violence’ that the interview format does to the story, 
by strictly governing syntax, grammar, and lexical choices but also order and choice of events.  
 
I. 1 - The Subjectivity of Judgement 
 
When an asylum claim is filed, the person’s story and past become evidence in what will 
be first an administrative (Commission) and then a judicial decision (appeal to the Commission). 
When a person’s past, and their narrativization of it enter the legal sphere, the centrality of notions 
of trust and faith is reaffirmed. Maurizio Veglio states, for instance, that “the transformation of the 
right of asylum from being a noble institution based on trust to a less noble virus attacking the 
national order of things is common to several European countries.”268 The case of France, for 
instance is exemplary: “in the mid-1970s, 19 out of 20 asylum seekers obtained refugee status; two 
decades later, this ratio had plummeted to three out of 20. Since the mid-1990s, it has remained 
more or less stable, at that same level. In 2001, 18 percent of all Ofpra and CRR decisions 
 




combined were favorable. A quarter of a century ago, asylum was a matter of trust, in which the 
applicant was presumed to be telling the truth. Today, asylum is set in a climate of suspicion, in 
which the asylum-seeker is seen as someone trying to take advantage of the country’s 
hospitality.”269 The authors point to two concurring factors, or trends: a “crisis in political asylum, 
marked by the increase of application and the sharp decrease in authorizations, and what they call 
“the loss of credit of the concept of ‘asylum’ itself”, particularly visible in the evolution of the role 
of faith in it, from something given by the very fact of being there to something that has to be 
earned under an increasingly heavy burden of proof.  
What is striking is that despite guidelines and, in general, the framework provided by 
international and national refugee law, deciding on an international protection application is often 
portrayed as a personal decision based on matters that the law does not and cannot regulate: the 
plausibility of the story, its credibility, and whether the applicant elicited a sufficient amount of 
trust during the interview. In the opening pages of his recent Croire à l’incroyable: un sociologue 
à la Cour nationale du droit d’asile, Smaïn Laacher recalls the circumstances under which he 
became an asylum judge at the CNDA (Cour nationale du droit d’asile, Paris). His account puts 
particular emphasis on “the first person”, or la première personne as he calls it, in an effort to 
underscore the subjectivity in which the several steps that form the legal act of judging an asylum 
claim are steeped. In the opening pages, he reports a conversation with the person who recruited 
him. This person, already sitting on the Court, dismisses the author’s doubts about not being a 
judge, or even someone trained in law: “Regarde, moi je suis politiste, pas juriste; et le droit des 
réfugiés, ça s’apprend. Moi je connais surtout le droit des étrangers et j’ai lu la Convention de 
 
269 Estelle D’Halluin and Didier Fassin, “The Truth from the Body: Medical Certificates as Ultimate Evidence for 




Genève sur les réfugiés, mais pas plus. [...] Tu verras, ce qui est compliqué, ce n’est pas le droit 
mais c’est de comprendre des situations de persécution. Le droit, c’est nécessaire, mais ce n’est 
pas le plus décisif. Le plus dur, c’est de décider à partir du récit du demandeur d’asile s’il a besoin 
d’une protection.”270 This quotes sketches a landscape in which the letter of the law does not 
provide enough ground for a decision to be made solely on conformity. Instead, the decision seems 
to be based for a large part on the applicant’s story and its performance, judged less by conformity 
to the law than by conformity to a narrative genre, the tenets of which are generally understood 
but not framed normatively, and by the respect of a number of abstract and in some respects literary 
concepts, such as credibility and plausibility.  
In the way the asylum process takes shape in its written traces – the documents that form 
an asylum request, from the original filing to the interview and decision – the narrative is presented 
as a series of facts, and the Commission’s response is framed as a judgment of the truthfulness of 
those facts in light of refugee law271 and the geography conjured by the applicant’s story. In the 
strict, pre-printed format of these documents, there is almost no room for the subjectivity of 
narration and interpretation. There is also no acknowledgement of the role of translation as a form 
of knowledge production of additional content, and as itself a form of interpretation of foreignness 
and semantic distance. I argue that the official layout and presentation of the decision is 
 
270 Smaïn Laacher, Croire à l’incroyable: Un sociologue à la Cour nationale du droit d’asile (Paris: NRF 
/Gallimard, 2018), 13–14. My emphasis. This sentiment is the focus of Carolina Kobelinsky’s article “The ‘Inner 
Belief’ of French Asylum Judges,” in Asylum Determination in Europe: Ethnographic Perspectives, edited by Nick 
Gil and Anthony Good (London: Palgrave, 2019), 53–68. In the piece, she tackles specifically intime conviction 
both as legal notion and a psycho-social position vis-à-vis asylum claims, and the ways in which it is often perceived 
as uncertain, self-defined principle of judgement that replaces questions of the law. A judge on the CNDA (Cour 
Nationale du droit d’asile) is quoted as follows: “There are few technical aspects involved in decision-making. In 
fact, there are some thorny questions but we do not raise them, for instance, concerning the notion of nationality or 
of residence; but most of our decisions completely rely on the intime conviction” (53). 
271 International and domestic refugee law to be precise. These include the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol as 




deliberately blind to the centrality of translation which, if restored, would complicate the process 
and turn a seemingly neutral appraisal of facts into a real, sometimes incommensurable and mind-
boggling cultural encounter that starts when a request for international protection is filed.  
 
I.2 - The Refugee Status Determination Interview as a Genre 
 
A literary genre is generally understood as a body of works that are more or less loosely 
connected by formal, material, and stylistic similarities. The codification of these common 
elements is necessary for the recognition of the genre. A crucial distinction among genres, 
provided by Mikhail Bakhtin in his foundational essay “Epic and Novel,”272 concerns the degree 
to which codification has happened or is still ongoing. Genres, in Bakhtin’s view, must first be 
apprehended in terms of their state of development and capacity to change and expand. 
Specifically, Bakhtin identifies the novel’s distinctive quality, one that separates it from all other 
literary genres, as its being “the sole genre that continues to develop, that is yet uncompleted. The 
forces that define it as a genre are at work before our very eyes. [...] The generic skeleton of the 
novel is still far from having hardened. And we cannot foresee all its plastic possibilities.”273 
Bakhtin’s insight on the specificity of the novel is important to our work because it points to a 
decisive feature of our corpus: the open-endedness, and in-the-makingness of asylum narratives 
taking shape as a genre before our eyes. Yet, this open-endedness is complemented by the fixity 
and strict definition of some of its core elements. As we have seen, definitions of who constitutes 
a refugee, or of what constitutes a valid reason to receive protection are set and seemingly 
unmovable. On the other hand, however, aleatory and volatile elements such as the composition 
 
272 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Epic and Novel”, in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin (University of 
Texas Press, 1981), 3. 




of the interviewing Commission, its interpretative framework, and the constantly changing local 
and global political circumstances in which the interview takes place and by which the narrative 
is shaped, all contribute to destabilizing the normative power of definitions. These elements of 
specificity contribute to outlining a body of narratives that are bound together, formally and 
stylistically, forming a genre whose limits are hazy and not entirely set.  
Jacques Derrida suggests that our thinking of genre as such should focus precisely on such 
limits. Yet he does not understand limits as much in terms of what is and what is not, but rather in 
terms of what can and cannot be, or be done, thus posing genre as a normative concept. In “The 
Law of Genre,” Derrida focuses on the margins of genre, evoking a “law of a ‘do’ and ‘do not’ 
which […] occupies the concept and constitutes the value of genre. As soon as the word genre is 
sounded, as soon as it is heard, as soon as one attempts to conceive it, a limit is drawn. And when 
a limit is established, norms and interdictions are not far behind: ‘do’, ‘do not’ says ‘genre,’ the 
word ‘genre,’ the figure, the voice, and the law of genre.”274 In addition to analyzing the asylum 
interview in terms of its fixed as well as movable components, thinking of genre in terms of its 
limits, constraints, and coded possibilities can help us navigate the Refugee Status Determination 
Interview as both a literary and a legal document, by asking ourselves what are the limits, the ‘dos’ 
and ‘don’ts’ of the interview which we can posit as, simultaneously, a type of narrative and a piece 
of evidence resulting as much from the story at its core as it does from their performance, 
transcription, and translation. Scholars have not yet read or analyzed the documents produced in 
the RSD interview as being part of a corpus, but the “narrative tactics” used by asylum-seekers 
have been linked, in specific circumstances, to recognizable literary genres. Ethnopsychiatrist 
 
274 Jacques Derrida, “The Law of Genre”, Critical Inquiry 7, no. 1 (1980): 56. It must be noted that the original 
French title, “La loi du genre”, presents a semantic overlapping that the English translation does not convey: the 




Roberto Beneduce, one of the foremost specialists of trauma and narrative formation in the asylum 
process and one of the first to make this link, observes that “when we analyze tales told by asylum-
seekers, we can often recognize a sort of common ‘script’, mostly of an epic genre. Such a script, 
and the narratives that we gather, are the expression of a wider autobiographical bricolage with its 
specific chronotopes, but also of the need to adhere to the criteria set down in asylum laws, criteria 
that define ‘an ideal’ victim.” Their use reveals a fundamental feature of the contemporary 
postcolonial order of experience, what he calls the “moral economy of untruth.”275 
 
I. 2.2 - Formal and structural constraints  
In the preparatory material used by NGOs and other actors assisting asylum-seekers, the 
way in which narratives should be presented is described in astonishingly precise terms. Details 
about violence should never be withheld yet too many of them, especially if not corroborated by a 
medical examination report, may weaken the overall credibility of the story. The linearity of the 
narrative should coincide with the linearity of time from departure to arrival, that is, the narrative 
should attempt to ‘straighten,’ both literally and symbolically, a history of flight and life on the 
move that is often tortuous and convoluted. “We” – a legal counsel said, speaking to an asylum-
seeker both as simulated interviewer and as a member of the state listening to his narrative – “we 
put a lot of emphasis on locations and dates. Your story has to mention all the places and have at 
least a month, a year, and a duration of stay for each of them. And it has to be consistent. If you 
give different dates for the same event, the Commission will find it difficult to believe you.”276 
 
275 Roberto Beneduce, “The Moral Economy of Lying: Subjectcraft, Narrative Capital, and Uncertainty in the 
Politics of Asylum,” Medical Anthropology 34, no. 6 (2015): 554. 




There are formal impositions on the applicant’s story that are the result of knowing how a 
particular Commission has reacted to other accounts of violence and flight in the past, and how 
certain narrative elements, the presence or absence of details, fit in the Commission’s interpretation 
of the Refugee Convention guidelines. There are also elements of structure and logic that act, 
within the economy of the genre, as both distinctive and restrictive elements of an asylum 
narrative. As we have seen, during the interview the examiner must go through a list of questions, 
which provide at the same time the direction in which the narrative will go and the limits within 
which it will develop. This set of predetermined questions constitutes a necessary set of steps – 
temporal, spatial, and logical – around which the interview is constructed. But they also work 
narratively and visually once they are put on the page, like a skeleton that the narrative must flesh 
out. This double force, at once directive and restrictive, that the Interview and its verbale exert on 







Above is a sample “Modulo C-3” or C-3 form, which formalizes the opening of an asylum request. 
It is filled out by a police officer in a questura, or police station, where the applicant must go to 
answer the questions and thus kick off the procedure. The content of the form varies slightly from 
region to region, but its overall structure as well as the type and order of the questions remain the 
same. C-3’s are, indeed, not only the first thing that the legal counsel verifies but also the first 
thing that the Commission verifies, particularly with regards to biographical data.277 I have elected 
to paste 2 out of the 5 pages of the form in lieu of simply describing it because the boundaries of 
the narrative and the direction in which it must develop appear more clearly if seen on paper. In 
the space of 5 pages, the C-3 transitions from the collection of biographical, ethnic and 
administrative data (Questions 1-4) to becoming the template – the ‘skeleton’ – of the future 
narrative. On page 4, right-hand side, the request for simple information, such as a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ 
becomes a request for a full answer, and indeed one that already presupposes a specific ordering 
of events on the part of the applicant (Question 12 (g)). 
The questions that appear on the C-3, the memoria and, finally, during the Interview tend 
to be the same or very similar.278 The space within which they operate is the language set forth by 
the 1951 Convention and all concurring instruments of protection. Together, these define the limits 
 
277 On the C-3. Something that I won’t be exploring in this chapter but that is worth taking a look is the evolution of 
the making and notion of identity in the early stages of the RSD. The confusion of names, dates, family info, etc. I 
argue, later on, that the applicant does “become” the translated version of his own narrative but this only happens 
later, in the verbale and the decision.  
278 On the one hand, the C-3 serves as a preliminary inquiry into the applicant and provides initial information to the 
interviewer. On the other hand, the memoria serves the double purpose of verifying and correcting any mistakes or 
inconsistencies in the C-3 and, simultaneously, of preparing the applicant to the official interview by following, in 




within which a personal narrative should operate, as well as other more or less explicit 
requirements such as precision with regard to dates and places, linearity of time and events, the 
clarity of the succession of events and their narration, and an implicit expectation of the plausibility 
of the violence and danger narrated. These expectations defy formal constraints but contribute to 
shaping the personal narrative.279 For multiple reasons that have to do with local politics of asylum 
as much as with global and regional migration policies, narratives of personal experiences of flight 
and eventual arrival in Italy that took place in the period 2014-present present a number of 
identifiable tropes: At the start, there is conflict within a family or community, often framed in 
confessional terms. This is the trigger for flight, which in the cases I was able to see generally 
starts somewhere in West Africa and then crosses Algeria and / or Niger to finally reach Libya. A 
constant element of this part of the journey is racism everywhere, and the danger of being robbed 
and losing everything or most of one’s possessions, a danger that is intensified once Libya is 
reached. There, kidnapping and torture take place in recognizable places (foyers, etc) at the hands 
of “gangs” that are sometimes explicitly named by the applicant (a recurrent one is the militia/gang 
known as Asma Boys).280 After being tortured, the person is often sold for slave labor and asked 
 
279 There are also other principles for obtaining international protection, that operate at a higher level than the 
content of the narrative itself, such as ‘preventive protection’, which concerns people that are entitled to 
international protection solely on their country of departure. In the early 1990s, the principle was articulated 
specifically for persons fleeing Bosnia and Herzegovina by Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees at the time. Bill Frelick, “‘Preventive Protection’ and the Right to Seek Asylum: A Preliminary Look at 
Bosnia and Croatia”, International Journal of Refugee Law 4, no. 4 (1992): 439–454.  
280 Reports on this particular group vary. The name “Asma Boys” has been used at the same time to describe a 
system of gangs operating mostly in and outside Tripoli whose business would be the kidnapping and imprisonment 
of migrants for ransom. This use is documented, for instance, in a 2017 Reuters report accessible at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-gangs/migrant-boys-tell-of-attacks-murder-in-libyan-hell-
idUSKCN0YW187 . On the other hand, “Asma boys” can also be used by applicants to refer to anyone who 
perpetrates violence on them systematically, be they militias, gangs, or the Libyan Army. The confusion and 
frequent accumulation of roles in the Libyan political landscape when it comes to profit from migration further 
suggests that these two uses are not mutually exclusive and could, in some cases, apply to the same groups of 





to find money, mostly through families back home, to buy back their freedom. Then someone 
appears, a non-specified man or more rarely a friend, who acts as a ‘savior’ by freeing them from 
imprisonment. This character either sells the person to traffickers or ‘pushes’ an unaware person 
to the boats. Sometimes he pays for the trip. The sense of unawareness or surprise that is conveyed 
by the applicant when they speak about reaching the shores and seeing departing boats is 
widespread: it is either presented as an unexpected salvation or a moment of sudden fear. Most 
narratives convey the idea of complete ignorance of the existence of the industry of departure or 
at least of it being a last resort. A diverse range of personal situations and experiences is condensed, 
as a result of the constraints of the genre, into a familiar story. Although some of this story’s 
elements might strain the trust of the listener not for their exceptionality but for their all too 




Part II. Can the Migrant be Translated? 
 
Interlude 
It took a long time to organize my stay at the Centro Servizi Integrati per l’Immigrazione, 
or CSII, the office where I spent the few weeks at the end of 2018 that constitute the central 
experience of this chapter. CSII is a publicly-funded office that fulfills several functions for the 
immigrant population of the town where I grew up. The bulk of the staff’s time is devoted to tasks 
pertaining to the daily management of life as an immigrant, such as residency or working permit 
renewal, liaison with administrative or police services, housing questions, etc. The reason I chose 
to observe their work, however, is that a counseling service was established to serve vulnerable 




assists and prepares asylum-seekers in advance of their interview with the Territorial Commission, 
or as they call it, for “il passaggio in commissione.” Depending on time and financial resources, 
each of the asylum-seekers in the program sees a legal counsel at least twice before their official 
Interview. The general goal of these meetings is twofold: on the one hand, to prepare the applicant 
for the interview as a legal, emotional and anthropological moment: the applicant is instructed on 
his or her rights within the interview,281 on the way in which he or she should present himself, and 
on how the interview could be emotionally taxing. On the other hand, they prepare the applicant’s 
story. They prepare, in a way, the applicant’s narration of her own past to fall, as much as possible, 
within the criteria set by the two “Codes” regimenting international refugee law, The Convention 
and the Protocol. This operation often represents a painful and simultaneous stretching of memory 
in trauma, temporality, and vocabulary.  
I’ve been thinking about the RSD procedure in general and the Interview in particular for 
some time now, and I have been in touch with the Head of the CSII since I first saw an official 
transcript of an asylum interview. After a long back and forth she agreed, last summer, to send me 
some anonymized scans of verbali (transcripts) and decisions. It was immediately clear to me that 
the writing process of those documents was much thicker and potentially complex that the 
documents themselves acknowledged. Specifically, occasional traces pointed to a much more 
complex process of transformation of an oral conversation into a written narrative than what the 
final and official documents showed. The case of the “throne,” discussed above, was one such 
revealing instance. After some administrative maneuvering, I was finally able to spend some time 
at the office, perusing its little archive, and following and questioning the people working there, 
 
281 Among these rights, the most important for the purposes of these chapters is the right to ask for postponement at 
a later date if the translator/interpreter appears to be not sufficiently competent, not faithful, or biased in any way, 




lawyers, legal counsels, administrators and interns. When allowed by the applicant, I got to sit in 
the ‘preparatory meetings’ in which asylum-seekers, together with an interpreter and a legal 
consultant, get ready for the Interview with the Commission. This is how the initial layer of my 
observations was constituted. 
“We begin — As James Clifford notes in his famous introduction to Writing Culture — 
not with participant-observation or with cultural texts, suitable for interpretation, but with writing, 
the making of texts.”282 Indeed, in the room of what used to be the city’s hospital where I sat and 
listened as personal histories of violence, flight and crossing attempted to become asylum 
narratives, I was worried about being able to understand the words, gestures, silences that took 
place in front of me as much as I was interested in the process through which they are written 
down, and through which they become the set of documents that constitutes a request for 
international protection. In that windowless room, I was thinking about the writing from both sides. 
When I uttered my insights or conjectures, the legal counsel behind whom I sat during most 
interviews usually nodded with an understanding half-smile, the one given to those who haven’t 
seen much yet.  
During interviews, Letizia – the counsel – mostly listened. She took notes, but the story 
was wrought, built and rebuilt orally in quick back-and-forths between her, the interpreter, and the 
applicant. Although deprived of official value and thus having a somewhat indeterminate function 
in the economy of the asylum request, the document that she authors following these conversations 
remains important. Called a memoria by professionals, it presents a faithful discursive account283 
 
282 James Clifford, “Introduction: Partial Truths,” in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, 
edited by James Clifford and George Marcus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 2. 
283 At the stage of the memoria, the main ‘steps’ that the narrative takes towards becoming what it will be in the 
verbale are mainly matters of style and translation. More specifically, the memoria discursivizes in a third-person 




of the applicant’s narrative as they told it, yet in a form that is supposed to be more understandable 
for the Commission. It thus works as a facilitating or mediating piece that ‘brings’ the applicant’s 
story closer to its official audience in cultural and linguistic terms with the intention of helping the 
Commission to form a judgment of the claim. It also works, in a more personal way, as a 
memorandum or rehearsal document that should help the applicant remember and repeat their own 
story when interrogated orally. Finally, it serves as a written addendum to the applicant who does 
not have a self-written story but wishes to have a written one nonetheless. From a legal standpoint, 
a memoria written by Letizia or any other counsel at CSII does not have the value of a memoria 
written by a lawyer on behalf of a person who, for instance, cannot write Italian or wishes not to: 
at CSII and in countless centers throughout Italy that do similar work, counsels do not have power 
of attorney and thus lack the mandate to write on behalf of anyone. They remain informed listeners, 
and act as fluent redactors. In the counsel’s double (triple) capacity of conveyors and writers (and 
translators) lies the importance of the memoria, which facilitates the work of the Commission by 
bridging the distance with the applicant’s story and its possible inconsistencies while working as 
a (non-legal but literary) guarantee of the narrative’s veracity, sometimes corroborating it with 
external research or medical evidence. The premises of this idea are that ‘written is better’, more 
forceful and convincing, and that writing by a mediator/legal counsel/lawyer who is Italian, and 
therefore brings it to the register and general level of expectation and communication of the 
Commission, makes the document more trustworthy, and the dossier perhaps more complete. 
Embedded in this structure is also the steeply hierarchical system that a story as uttered by the 
applicant must climb in order to successfully reach the desks of a Commission. The disturbing 
 
three languages. I make a case for this being an important reason for considering the memoria despite its unofficial 




ambivalence of the memoria reflects again the perception that a pre-existing ‘story’ is not good 
enough, that it might need help to be properly formulated and that, most important, the 
Commission would require a member of their own (educational) class to write this story in order 
for them to even understand it or access it more thoroughly.  
The closing formula with which legal counsel end their memorie is telling in this respect: 
“Quanto sopra viene riportato per opportuna conoscenza affinché la Commissione territoriale 
competente possa più agevolmente valutare le circostanze e le esigenze del caso, al fine della 
concessione all’interessato dell’eventuale misura di protezione che si riterrà più opportuna.”284 
Here the counsel is talking to the Commission and thus to the State. The formulaic is a necessary 
part of their interaction, but what does this do to (and what does this tell us about) the story of the 
person involved? It’s certainly “brought closer” to the attention and sensibility of the Commission 
through a whole array of structural, formal, and stylistic elements (conditional, exit formula, etc). 
But these changes also move it away from its initial form, with all the consequences that this 
entails. The vocabulary, structures of thinking and feeling, and all other elements of meaning in 
which the story happened and through which it was remembered and told by the asylum seeker in 
the first place.  
 
 II.1 Translation and The Guidelines 
   
The translation of matters pertaining to law demands a hierarchization of languages, or 
rather, a hierarchization of versions. There must be an original, and there must be a translation and 
the two are not equal in value. A telling example can be found in the ‘outer galaxy’ of the Refugee 
 
284 “The above is hereafter transcribed in order for the competent Commission to evaluate more comfortably all 
circumstances inherent to the case, in order to grant to the person the form of international protection deemed most 
appropriate.” My (tentative) translation, in which I tried to account for the almost caricatural tone, deference, and 




Status Determination procedure, namely, the myriad of documents, briefs, Pro-memoria, and 
opinions that constitute the legal and interpretative framework of the interview as a legal moment. 
The “Aide-mémoire & Glossary of case processing modalities, terms and concepts applicable to 
RSD under UNHCR’s mandate” is a document accessible in four languages: English, French, 
Arabic, and Russian. By statute, all of the UN’s official languages are equal. Here, however, each 
of the three versions of the “Aide-mémoire” defers to the English version, and does so in its own 
language. The French, for instance, bears this disclaimer, alone on a white page after the title-page: 
“En cas d’incohérence ou de discordance entre la version anglaise et la version française de la 
présente publication, la version anglaise fera foi.”285 
In Arabic, the concept expressed by the expression « faire foi » is conveyed by the word 
عجرملا  (elmarj3), which means “reference.” Literally, the expression “faire foi” means to “make or 
create faith,” where ‘faith’ must be interpreted as trust. Only one of these versions, the English, 
‘makes faith’ or ‘makes trust,’ i.e. only one of these versions is trustworthy in a context that 
implicitly demands the existence of a language as reference. What begins to emerge here is the 
relationship between translation and faith, and between translation and trust that is constitutive of 
a complex, tangled and murky system comprised of multiple languages, versions, and their need 
for representation in contrast with the need to order them by importance, by level of 
trustworthiness. The system rests on a strict hierarchy and, at the same time, on the somewhat 
paradoxical idea that all versions of the same document – i.e., the “Guidelines” – have to be 
considered the same and are equal until ‘discrepancies or discordances” (incohérence ou 
 
285 UNHCR, Aide-Memoire & Glossary of Case Processing Modalities, Terms and Concepts Applicable to RSD 
under UNHCR’s Mandate (The Glossary) (Geneva: UNHCR, 2017), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a2657e44.html. For the French translation: « Aide-mémoire et glossaire 
concernant les modalités de traitement des dossiers, termes et concepts applicables à la détermination du statut de 




discordance) arise. Power-relations within global language politics justify the place of the English-
language version of the “Guidelines” as that which “makes faith” or that generates faith in itself 
when the need arises for judgment or interpretation across languages.286 The need for an original, 
one that amongst all the successive and naturally diverging versions of itself has kept the “faith” 
it was originally endowed with, is central for a global system of judgment such as asylum 
adjudication under UNHCR mandate. As it is framed and practiced in Italy, the RSD moment, 
from the C-3 to the interview, only represents a small articulation of the global asylum order. If, 
on the one hand, it seems to be resting on the same assumptions, namely equality of all languages 
before the law, right to translation without the claim being penalised, etc. – it does however operate 
in a very specific way: It does not hierarchize languages, there is no original language “qui fasse 
foi”. What does ‘make trust’ is, in fact, a document, a document in Italian that is itself a translation 
of a conversation between three people happening in at least one other language.  
The asylum-seeker’s signature, at the end of the interview, added after a purported 
‘rereading and proofreading’ (the document stated to be ‘reread and proofread’ by the applicant is 
in Italian), is what originalizes the document, it is what ‘makes trust’ and makes it trustworthy. 
This is now his or her original version of their story and, for the purposes of the Commission, the 
official version of themselves.  
 
II.2 The writing of the document as a form of translation 
  
In order to explore the role of translation in the writing of official asylum documents, let 
us go back to the throne: 
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CONSIDERED that the applicant’s narrative appears implausible [inverosimile], 
in some respects contradictory, generic, and lacking detail [non circonstanziato] in 
particular with regards to his fleeing with the throne behind [appresso] 
DECIDES   not to grant international protection 
  
The final document, the one that we see and on which the appeal judge will rule presents 
itself as the translation of a conversation that has happened in the language chosen by the 
applicant287. In an overwhelming majority of cases, this language is not Italian. Sometimes it is 
English, more frequently in my experience it was another West or Central African language. As a 
result, the conversation that the verbale purports to report is in fact a mediated, multilingual one, 
as questions and answers are translated back and forth between Italian and the language chosen by 
the applicant. This conversation is then transcribed, almost simultaneously from his or her notes, 
by the Commissioner simultaneously into the Italian verbale. This document, in order to be 
finalized and bear legal value, is then retranslated for the applicant, who then signs it. However, 
the verbale bears almost no trace of this thick process of translation and retranslation. Beside the 
two questions about language and translator intelligibility mentioned above (mention), most 
documents examined bore no trace of this acknowledgement. When they do, it is through sentences 
such as the following: (extradiegetic) “Al termine, il richiedente viene reso edotto del contenuto 
 
287 Although the phrasing and word-choice may vary slightly from one Commission to another, the Verbale of the 
Interview always starts as follows: “Verbale of the statements made during the personal audition: During the 
meeting of (Date), at (Time), is examined the request for Refugee Status filed by (Full Name of Applicant), born on 
(Date), in (City, Country), of (Country) citizenship. The audition of the applicant is conducted in (language), in 
accordance with his wishes as well as the collaboration of the interpreter Mr. (Full Name of Interpreter), with 
whom the applicant confirms to be in full understanding.” To complete thus preamble is an enunciation of the 
relevant instruments of International Protection and their articles, after which the interview proper starts, and is 
reported in the verbale as a Q&A that is, however, strikingly linear and non-digressive. The original Italian of the 
translated document reads: “Verbale delle dichiarazioni rese nell’audizione personale. Nella riunione del giorno 
(Data), alle ore (Ora), viene esaminata la richiesta di riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato presentata da (Nome), 
nato il giorno (Data), a (Località, Paese), di cittadinanza (Paese). L’audizione dell’interessato viene resa in lingua 
(Lingua), d’intesa con lo stesso e con la collaborazione dell’interprete Sig. (Nome), con il quale il medesimo fa 




del presente verbale mediante lettura e traduzione dello stesso da parte dell’interprete, nella lingua 
in cui l’audizione è stata resa.”288 The applicant is effectively signing something that he or she is 
not able to understand: they are not signing what is being translated for them (the translation), but 
rather the source text, without understanding it.  
  In the official transcript and re-transcription of the interview quoted above, the applicant is 
asked to tell his story, which he starts in medias res by recounting a power struggle for succession 
involving him and his immediate family in a kingdom of which his father, now deceased, was 
king. In his narrative, applicant A. refers to having fled “with [his] brother … and the throne …, 
which should not have left the village.” As applicant A. subsequently tells the Commission, he 
eventually lost possession of the throne while on his way to Europe, because of harassment and 
violence in Libya. For the purposes of the genre of the RSD interview, the narrative told by 
Applicant A. is unsuccessful. In its reasons for denying his claim to protection, the Commission 
states that his narrative appeared “implausible [inverosimile], in some respects contradictory, 
generic, and lacking detail [non circostanziato] in particular with regards to his fleeing with the 
throne behind [la sua fuga con il trono appresso].”289 
The fact that this interview took place in English highlights how, in the RSD interview in 
general, translation acquires a meaning that exceeds the mere distance between languages. In the 
eyes of the Commission, the truthfulness of the narrative is undermined by a detail that has no 
place in their imaginary. A throne is usually solid gold, it can be sometimes decorated with 
 
288 This is a widespread if not constant closing formula, found in most verbali with little lexical and syntactic 
variation. Here is the translation: “Following the interview, the applicant is instructed as per the content of this 
transcript through its reading and translation by the interpreter, in the language in which the interview took place”.  
289 Just a small aside on the difficulty – and the potential for compromising the logic of the decision – of translating 
the Italian adverb “appresso” into English. Appresso means with or alongside someone but in Italian it bears a strong 
connotation of being with someone but behind them, as if dragged or pulled, in any case not at the top of the 
caravan. But translating it with “behind” in English would compromise the overall meaning of A. A’s story, as he 




diamonds and other precious pearls and, as the ultimate sign of power, it is decidedly unmovable. 
Not only did the applicant move the throne (with the help only of his brother), the throne was the 
only thing he brought with him, and he left it in Libya. The narrative is, indeed, implausible, 
“particularly regarding his fleeing with the throne behind (appresso).” The story is implausible, 
however, only insofar as a reader refrains from asking a simple question about language, custom, 
and translation. The question, both simple and huge, is: Is a throne a throne? In other words, is 
anything that this person is saying what I – lawmaker, Commission member, representative of the 
State, delegate of its power – can effortlessly understand it to be? 
Applicant A is denied, and the official refusal reads as follows: “having considered [the 
above], and that the events narrated by the claimant and his fear of repercussion in case of 
repatriation do not allow to gain recognition (pervenire al riconoscimento) of subsidiary 
protection…[the Commission] decides not to grant international protection.” 
Two main problems are represented in the flattened, smoothed-over multilingualism of 
Applicant A’s interview. One is a problem of logic, which impacts what we could call the cultural 
translation of his narrative. It pertains to the throne, and what an asylum Commission in Europe 
might think is a throne, and how it would imagine a throne that moves across borders, deserts and 
seas. The second, intertwined with the first one, is a problem of language. Superficially, it looks 
like a lexical discrepancy. The word used for throne in the applicant’s mother-tongue does not 
have an equivalent in Italian because signs and symbols of power in Applicant A.’s home country 
are different or organized according to a different system. 
It would be interesting to know what the word is in the original and the path it took to 
become “trono,” and as such, simultaneously legible and illegible to the Commission. We would 




what was missed. In other words, knowing the original signifier is less relevant than knowing its 
signified. Thus the question would be: what is this object that in Applicant A’s society is the 
highest symbol of power, bestowed to the king, which cannot leave that society, and which makes 
Applicant A unable to return home for many reasons including the fact that he lost this very object 
while escaping? This seemingly ethnographic concern is also a literary and political one. What if 
what was translated as “the throne” is in fact a metaphor, or a metonymy, as in the phrase “heir to 
the throne,” or “watch the throne”? What is most likely at stake here is Applicant A’s power of 
abstraction, and his right to exercise it without losing credibility. The right is stripped both as a 
result of the strictness of the form and the flattening of the role of translation. The allophone 
asylum-seeker, the linguistic Other, is foreignized by the limits of translation that do not account 
for the possibility of figurative speech or for a different system of political signs. The diniego or 
refusal is written as if the narrative that it disqualifies took place in Italian or English and, most 
certainly, somewhere in the West, thus legitimizing the narrow-sighted, geographically-inflected 
logic according to which a “throne” cannot be moved so easily, cannot simply be left in Libya, and 
cannot be the reason why Applicant A.’s life would be in danger if his request for protection were 
denied. 
  In the same official transcript, only three questions concern the linguistic environment in 
which the interviewee's status is assessed. The applicant is asked the language in which he wants 
to be interviewed, whether he and the interpreter “understand one another well” and whether he 
speaks “other languages or dialects.” The linguistic aspect of the status determination procedure is 
then set aside, as the rest of the interview is an examination of the applicant’s claim. However, it 
is a matter of appalling incongruence that the veracity of a claim can be assessed without a critical 




the applicant and the reviewing commission, the act of relegating translation to a mere procedural 
step, stripping it of its effective impact, is one of the ways in which “power enters into the process 
of cultural [and legal] translation.” As anthropologist Cristiana Giordano affirms, translation 
“becomes a form of listening and poses a fundamental epistemological question about what is 
knowable of the other language and what remains untranslatable (and unknown).”290  
Although by law and consensus the obligation to offer proof when relating one’s story 
during the RSD interview is “attenuated”, and the word of the applicant suffices, the result is a 
silent injunction to comply with an idea of what is true that is shaped, for the most past, by reasons 
that are utterly political: some reflect what is known to be working as an ‘acceptable’ narrative at 
a given time in a given country or city, the Commission’s political ties or the larger stakes of 
tweaking the acceptance rate of asylum requests. There are two separate factors that influence the 
outcome of a narrative, which are separate but operate, sometimes conflictingly, at the same during 
the interview: On the one hand, narrative expectations influence the perception and judgment of 
truth. On the other, political contingencies such as mandate quotas and overarching policies also 
play a central (if not predominant) role. In light of all these variables, what remains largely 
unaddressed and uncontested is the power of the state and its representatives to directly influence 
the form, length, pathos and detail of the claimant’s narrative. In this way, the state not only 
evaluates, but is itself responsible for the “narrative capital” that a claimant’s past may or may not 
have. The example of A. in front of an Italian asylum Commission bears witness to how the 
Commission’s power to shape and subsequently judge the narrative they are hearing results from 
the narrowness of the system of thought in which this word is received. This system of thought 
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has little room for alternative polysemic signifiers, non-linear plots, and confused memories, and 
above all abstraction. It also has its very own, rigid expectation of how one should confront the 
law of admission and refusal under protection status, and its strict narrative codes. General cultural 
and geopolitical unawareness on the part of the Commission dramatically shrinks the realm of the 
true, the plausible, and therefore the acceptable. 
Simultaneously, the strict impositions of a ‘successful’ narrative rewrite the claimant’s 
relationship with its own story and past, while assigning a different function to truth and lie. With 
particular reference to common European interviewing practices, it has been affirmed that “there 
can be no doubt that the politico-moral order of Schengen helps maintain arbitrary inequalities, 
and that the practice of deceiving or using “tricks” to circumvent them, is by now part of 
postcolonial subjectivity and experience.”291 The production of an asylum demand is, as we have 
seen, a process of layering. It starts in the tongue and mind of the applicant. The first layer is the 
C-3, which takes place in the presence of an interpreter when the applicant and the police agent 
cannot communicate.292 The verbale and the Commission decision, in particular, as moments in 
which the narrative is translated, transcribed and reported, constitute further layers that participate 
in the making of the narrative. Ideally, from a critical point of view, we would have them all. In 
my case, this is simply impossible. Only fluency in every step of the narrative – uttering, 
interpretation translation, writing – could provide access and intelligibility of all the moments 
through which the narrative is constructed. Having had access to some of these layers, my aim is 
to discover, through translation, the traces of one layer that remains visible in the next, thus 
informing us un tant soit peu of the mechanisms of production both of the document from a 
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material standpoint and of the story from a narrative one. One certain thing is how muted the 
written document, whether it be the memo or the verbale, appears with respect to the multiplicity 
of languages, gestures, and feelings that went into its creation. The dryness of the memoria and 
more so of the verbale contrasts sharply with the thickness, sometimes unfathomable density of 
the preparatory meetings. In the transformation from the preparatory meeting to the memoria and 
then to the interview, years of a past life have to fit in a few pages, and the confusion of that life – 
the very cause and result of leaving – have to be neatly organized. In what follows, I attempt to 
follow this transformation from meeting to verbale to the decision through the case of Applicant 
K. 
The last preparatory meeting I attended while at CSII was brought by an applicant from 
Pakistan, and the legal counsel was sent from the office’s headquarters in Bologna. He used to 
work with unaccompanied minors, a situation he himself described to me as “completely 
different.” Applicant K was notified that his interview with the Commission was going to take 
place the following day. In the next few hours he had to familiarize himself with the next step in 
his asylum requests, the questions that punctuate it and the challenges they may present, and most 
importantly understand the importance not only of his own story, but also of the way he told it. 
After introducing me and asking for any objections to my staying in the room, the legal counsel 
briefly explained what international protection is (“You filed a request for international protection: 
do you know what it is?”), in which forms it can be granted, and made sure that everything was 
clear, to Applicant K and the interpreter, before jumping into the story.293  
 
293 Note how paradoxical it is that, in order to make sure that meaning properly flows – namely that the translator is 
doing their job properly – there is no other way for the counsel to go through the translator himself, namely, to ask 
through the translator, whether the translator is making everything clear. What this shows is that, ultimately, legal 
counsel and asylum-seeker cannot reach a common space of mutual intelligibility without the translator’s work, and 
that therefore a considerable amount of trust and power must be bestowed upon him / her for the conversation to go 




As we saw earlier, the counsel’s opening or introductory speech, and the lead-up to the 
story are governed by structural rules. This is the case for two main yet potentially contrasting 
reasons: on the one hand, the counsel tries, as much as possible, to prepare by mimesis and 
reproduction of the conditions in which the Interview with the Commission will take place. On the 
other, questions such as “Do you know what the Commission is?” or the recurrent advice to “tell 
everything”294 are efforts to build a safe space surrounding the applicant, one in which he or she 
can, with the help of the counsel, re-order their past in a way that best follows the rule of the 
interview as a genre and what are generally understood of the particular expectations of the 
Commission in question. 
Applicant K looked comfortable and at ease. He was the first person I listened to who did 
not come from somewhere in Africa. I sense the counsel’s surprise, as I am struck by mine, when 
Applicant K flatly states that he prefers to tell his story to the Commission. Silence. The counsel 
tried sensitively but insistently to underscore how this could simply be helpful, not harmful at all, 
and that he, A. K, should instead try to tell his story in advance, given that he could ultimately 
decide whether the counsel’s “memoria” will be sent to the Commission as part of his dossier. “It 
 
Commission interview is organized. There, the translator not only makes the conversation happen, but he or she is 
the one tasked with re-reading the “verbale” to the applicant for official validation. My point, as I have tried to show 
throughout this chapter, is that these are not transparent operations even when we assume the utmost good faith and 
competence of all parties involved, yet they are treat as such, or rather, they are treated as un-altering passages in the 
construction of meaning and, by extension, in the construction of the asylum case. The study of this layering of the 
narrative shows that, invariably, translation means alteration and the production of something else, perhaps not other 
in nature but different in a number of aspects which should be taken into account when the decision is made on the 
applicant’s story. Translation makes the story that is eventually evaluated for protection, yet the implications of this 
‘participation’ are not deemed important anywhere along the chain of official documents. It is more likely to find a 
legal counsel that, at least in his or her own notes (that are never divulged), makes room for translation and its 
challenges. Interpreters are, of course, much more attuned and attentive but in the RSD procedure as it officially 
appear on legal documents they are muted despite their being indispensable to the production of these same 
documents. 




is your right …, but I just want to remind you – the counsel said – that we can make it better, 
together, identify its strengths ….” 
Later, in New York, I received the verbale of A. K’s interview with the Commission in my 
email. I have a strange sense of surprise, of being about to break into someone’s intimacy without 
their consent, or at least, of being on the verge of trespassing a limit was implicitly set by A. K’s 
decision to keep his story for the Commission. While trying to find an acceptable justification to 
proceed, I asked myself why A. K remained so steady in his refusal yet seemed eager to talk about 
his country, his village, and to look with us for proof of their existence on the Internet. I caught 
myself thinking – in a way that tells a lot more about me, Western ‘straight’ male, that we were all 
male in that room when he refused to narrate, and that given his background and religion, his 
decision to keep his story for the Commission may have had to do with the fact that it ventured 
into the intimacy of sexuality. Suddenly, in front of his verbale, I felt ashamed both for having 
assumed that a man is or should be able to talk about everything, every form of violence and pain 
endured and ashamed for being about to break into someone’s past that might reveal some elements 
of his sexuality. It’s not voyeurism, on my part, it is a slight, creeping disrespect. One, specifically, 
that comes with a sort of acclimatization to violence, even after such a short exposure to it, and 
which results in the progressive degrading and downgrading of that violence. This is not a 
conscious operation, but I feel that it is almost impossible to avoid on the spot, and difficult to 
consciously reverse. It is the extreme force of delivering and receiving the narrative under its 
constraining format. Because any story, regardless of its “distance” from the audience, its 
complicated and non-linear plot and shifting characters, has to be necessarily channeled. This, at 




interview as ‘light’, extremely movable yet coercive State infrastructure – on individual stories 
and the infinite ways of telling them.  
 During that meeting, I learned that silence isn’t silent, even if in the counsel’s notes there 
will only be a single sentence: “decides to keep his story for the Commission.” Yet our meeting 
lasted almost two hours, for most of which we tried to locate A. K’s village on a map, each on our 
own version of Google Maps. His C-3 was all wrong, so when the counsel read him the wrong 
place of birth and dwelling, A. K tried to correct it. We all tried, but it became clear after a bit that 
us finding an online presence of his birthplace was far more important to him than rectifying the 
C-3 form. It became clear that, on and through our screens, we had to find his home, and that there 
was no reviewing of the C-3, let alone any discussion of his story, if we couldn’t find it. We had 
to make his home exist in this foreign room, in this foreign situation, in this foreign country far 
away. And his eyes lit up, every time we mentioned to him a place or locale that was not very far, 
in the surroundings, or on the way to his village.  
It turns out that A. K comes from a place that civilian satellites have a difficult time 
covering. He comes from a border, one of the most militarized ones in the world: AJK, Azad 
Jammu Kashmir. His village, he explained, is right in the heart of the region but also right on the 
superimposed border between India and Pakistan. Neither I nor the counsel spoke Urdu or were 
able to type it. The interpreter, sitting next to A. K and across the desk from us, did not seem to be 
able to find it either. Maybe connection on his cellphone was bad, plus we were in an old hospital, 
with walls built to keep everything in. We tried various spellings: Ketli, Kori, Keri, Kary, Qari, 
Curry, Qeli, nothing. We zoomed in and out of the map, we asked him about rivers or signposts 
nearby. “Close to …?” “No.” The reality that the internet in front of us was able to reconstruct and 




did not let us search it, explore it, know it. If one zoomed in on the probable surroundings, roads 
would be cut off and end nowhere, the map was blank. And, above all, one could not zoom in too 
deep, could not land. “K,” I wanted to tell him, “your village does not exist on the Internet.”  
Suddenly, in Italian, he exclaimed: “Mia città badarlan!”295 
 
badarlan, badarlan  
  
  
Borderland. My city borderland. I was suddenly reminded the opening scene in Gianfranco 
Rosi’s documentary Fuocoammare,296 where a Coast Guard searchlight, from a helicopter, scans 
a pitch-dark patch of Mediterranean Sea at night, searching for signs of a capsized dinghy and for 
possible survivors. I tell myself that the border is, at 10,000 feet above as well as below sea-level, 
in the mountains of Kashmir and deep in the High Seas, just as deadly and, to us on this side of 
the desk, just as mute. And whatever and whoever is on it is just as invisible, just as absent. From 
spelling to geography, from writing to existing in the world, the distance is short. In this former 
hospital room we could not agree on a way to search for A. K’s village on Google Maps, on a way 
to spell its name that would yield results. We could not locate the village and write it into existence. 
The impossibility of locating his home, in this case, does not exactly equal complete absence – A 
K. exists after all, he was right here in front of us – as much as it equals absence of presence, 
absence of proof. His story had a vague point of origin, one that did not correspond to the precise 
coordinates of a defined place but to the more loose and tentative ones of a perimeter, and as a 
consequence it was already a step removed from being entirely verifiable, and therefore entirely 
 
295 Literal translation of the sentence is “My city badarlan”. Every letter “a” in the word should be pronounced like 
the a in the Spanish “agua”. Since Applicant K started his sentence in Italian, I am using an “Italian” transliteration, 
where “a” always sounds like “a”.  




credible. Later on, as I read the verbale of his interview in New York, some details emerged. But 
these details only reinforced this absence, only thicken the fog surrounding this uncertainty of 
place, provenance, and belonging: The examiner, institing on locating A. K’s village as precisely 
as possible, asked him to name the road they used in order to reach the closest town – which 
appears on Google Maps. “There’s no main road,” he said. “Only trails. There are no well-built 
roads.” 297 
A. K’s answer is important for two reasons: One the one hand, it encapsulates the operation 
of vertiginous synthesis and reduction that the interview and its act of simultaneous translation 
constitute. Hidden behind this sentence from A. K, invisible behind the line it occupies on the 
printed verbale in front of me, there is a lot of information and a lot of life. There are the several 
minutes of discussion about the mountains, lakes, and trails that surrounded his village. The 
number and distribution of the houses on the land. There is our almost senseless search for it on 
the internet, and the strange impression that pervaded the room that finding the village online was 
actually very important. There is, invisible behind this single verbale sentence, A. K’s deep need 
to see, hear of and tell us about home, even if it was only its name on a map. And, as a consequence 
of this, also invisible behind the sentence is the resulting impression that his leaving home wasn’t 
simply leaving, it wasn’t “economic” or about a better paycheck. In A. K’s attachment to proving 
the existence of his home through the Net there was the restlessness and urgency that constitute 
the residue of flight. Flight that is, often, the result of fear. And fear, if it is visible, must factor into 
the decision to grant international protection. And if fear were visible in the verbale of the 
interview it would at least give it a chance to be credible, and thus provides grounds for protection. 
 
297 I had to betray my commitment to literal translation here. The Italian version states: “Non c’è una strada 
principale, sono strade pedonali, non ci sono strade ben costruite”. I discuss the implication of my choice for 




I am not arguing here that the Commission’s decision of A. K’s case hinged on the invisibility of 
this fear in and through the written verbale. I am, however, arguing that by making his fear more 
visible through a more articulated, plain, and thorough process of translation, the “facts” on which 
the decision was made would have been different.  
The second reason for which this sentence is important is its subtle power of estranging the 
potential reader, of sending them away from the context of the story. If A. K’s were to appeal the 
Commission’s decision, a judge would read the verbale before granting him a hearing. And, even 
if followed by an in-person conversation, the judge’s first encounter with A. K’s story and case 
would be through the verbale of his interview with the Commission. We cannot, therefore, 
underestimate the importance that the verbale has in the process of an asylum request, both as a 
decisive document and as the transcription-translation of a decisive moment. The verbale, 
however, is generally badly written, as I’ve tried to show above. It is also often roughly or strangely 
translated, in ways that undermine the coherence of the applicant’s narrative. The sentence here is 
exemplary of this pattern. Keeping in mind that the examiner’s question is asked in the context of 
his attempt to reconstruct the topography of a mountainous, impervious, sparsely-populated and 
highly-militarized border-zone between Pakistan and India in relation to A. K’s story, the 
problematic part of the way in which K’s reply is translated is the phrase “strade pedonali”. In 
Italian, strade pedonali literally means “pedestrian streets,” and the phrase is generally used in the 
context of old city centers that, after being plagued by excessive car traffic throughout the 80’s 
and 90’s, progressively started to interdict motorized vehicles. In pollution-prone and tourist-
oriented Italy, where city centers are a constant battle-ground for motorists, business owners, and 
tired residents, the phrase cannot but send the reader’s imagination somewhere else, somewhere 




strong potential to make the reader’s mind at least fleetingly jump out of Kashmir and land in 
Lugano, Salzburg, or any other Cleanest City in Europe where a steep carbon tax pays for bike 
lanes and a fully pedestrian city center. Consequently, it has the power to potentially lead them to 
think, even fleetingly or inadvertently, that it cannot be that bad where A. K grew up if there are 
pedestrian streets, a universally recognized sign of first-world civility and peace.  
In translation theory, the power to estrange and unsettle the reader is generally granted to 
translations that maintain an element of foreignness, and that ask the reader, and not the text, to 
bridge the distance between themselves and the story that they are reading. Here, and in similar 
instances throughout the body of transcripts that I was able to see, this power of confusion and 
partial disorientation rests instead on domestication. The reader is not unsettled by the foreign, by 
an inaccessible element of culture that would require mediation. They are, instead, unsettled in 
their reading practice by the utterly domestic and familiar [the “strade pedonali”], causing a ‘bump’ 
in their understanding of the story and simultaneously weakening its coherence. For this reason, I 
chose to translate “strade pedonali,” a quintessentially urban phrase, with the English “trails,” in 
an attempt to maintain the foreignness of the landscape throughout, and to keep the reader “abroad” 
and therefore not disrupt the coherence of A. K’s answer.  
Following the layers shows a general path to dryness, concision, and firmness, all in the 
aim of enhancing intelligibility and truth (through domesticating translation practices). One crucial 
node in this path towards “intelligibility” is the memoria from the counsel. But it would be wrong 
to consider this a linear process of steps happening in a chronological way. Although there is a 
chronological order, we see the biggest décalage between what is oral and written, between notes 
and official or fully redacted documents. From the looseness, lack of direction of the meetings we 




and the use of information as empirical evidence. They result in the ultimate depersonalization of 
the narrative, which through indirect and reported speech and heavy-handed summaries has by 
now lost its centrality.  
 
II.3 - The Visualization of Translation / Translation in the Gaps  
 
 
Translating the RSD interview is first a matter of translation across media: an interview is 
an oral event that must make its way into a text. Only to complicate things, the text is not open. It 
is not a blank page; rather, just like the conversation, the written document’s rhythm is provided 
by questions that are predetermined and which may or may not be repeated in the exact same way 
during the interview. On a second plane, translation in the RSD interview is a matter of languages, 
and in the case of an applicant who does not speak the language of the Commission, it happens in 
at least two moments. First, it happens during the interview itself, and it is the result of the 
participative effort of the examiner, the interpreter/translator/cultural mediator, and the person 
seeking asylum. At a later moment, this multilingual interview becomes a monolingual written 
document, the verbale, that carries the legal weight of official transcript of the interview.  
Third, and not least important, it is the translation of everything, besides language, that 
constitutes the interview and that contributes to making it what it is. In short, everything that would 
need to be reported and thus translated into the verbale, but that rarely if ever is. Sounds, facial 
and general body expressions of the applicant, variations in the tone of their voices, the length of 
their pauses and the accompanying expressions, etc. None of these make their way into the verbale 





Despite all these efforts at naturalizing and neutralizing the act of translation, there are 
instances, scattered unpredictably and disorderly around the verbali I saw, in which the 
interviewer/examiner shows him or herself, most likely inadvertently, as translator and witness. In 
what follows, I consider the translator’s appearances in the text and what they reveal about the 
process of translation going on in the verbale. 
Translator’s or ‘external’ notes and comments appear in the text, but they are bracketed by 
parenthesis as to signal their difference from it. This distance or foreignness is peculiar: these 
interventions don’t technically belong to the conversation between applicant, examiner and 
interpreter, but they are part of the text that constitutes the faithful transcription of that 
conversation. Sometimes, they are also made visible by a change in font: when not bracketed, they 
are italicized when the rest of the text is in roman characters, or vice-versa. Moreover, the nature 
of the verbale as transcript means that a typographic switch – a visual distinction – signals the 
different voices and positions vis-à-vis the narration, creating a split between intradiegetic action 
and extradiegetic commentary. Finally and most importantly, the use of these interventions is 
somewhat ambiguous: on the one hand, these interventions represent a technique of explanation 
of a particular choice made in the writing, such as the use of the word “[phonetic]” next to a foreign 
word in order to justify its particular spelling. On the other, they seem to be used to add non-
linguistic information, namely, information not inferable from the transcript, thus not pertaining 
to what was said, but rather to what happened in the room where the interview took place. When 
utilized this way, they act directly on the transcription, supplementing the content of the interview 
and therefore expand its meaning.  
  
Domanda: Mi parli della sua famiglia 
Risposta : Sono figlio unico e i miei genitori sono morti … Mia madre è morta di 




Si dà atto che il richiedente si commuove. 
Domanda : mi dispiace molto. Vuole sospendere ? 
Risposta: No, possiamo andare avanti. 
Domanda: Quando è morto suo padre? 
Risposta : Nel 2015 . Non ricordo invece quando è morta mia madre ... 
  
 
This is an excerpt from a verbale.298 These few lines encapsulate two of the most frequent 
ways in which translator’s interventions manifest themselves: ellipses, on the one hand, and the 
sentence “si dà atto che il richiedente si commuove.” Regarding the former, it is important to strike 
and unpack their ambivalence. A visual signs, they are not bracketed, they are dropped 
nonchalantly, as if by reflex, by the person who typed (usually the interviewer him-herself). They 
mark, at the same time, a pause in the speech, a time interval between sentences, but also something 
in the voice, a particular inflection. A change in pitch, tone, a syllable dragged into a breath. This 
is presumably why, at the end of the last sentence and the word “guerra,” there is no full stop but 
three marks. Is this suspension, suspense, or omission? 
Three dots usually mark omissions of unnecessary elements in quoted or reported speech. 
If we posit the verbale as a document that fulfills its legal duties of reporting the encounter of the 
interview in every detail, we must contrast this with the fact that the exchange is reported in its 
entirety only after translation. Yet, as we have seen, the back and forth, or at least the constant 
rerouting of questions and answers through a third party – the interpreter – is almost entirely 
omitted from the verbale. Therefore, this should be considered the first omission, one that is 
systematic, in a document purportedly reporting everything that is taking place during the 
interview.  
 
298 (Allegato 2, Sezione Forlì-Cesena, Nazionalità Mali). For the translation: [Question: tell me about your family 
[sic] / Answer: I am an only child and my parents are dead … My mom died of disease… My father died during the 
war … / the applicant is moved (emotional) / Question: I am really sorry, would you like to pause? / Answer: No, 





But we cannot rule out the other two possible function of this visual expedient, as suspense 
and suspension can be signaled by the three dots at the same time as they are the faint trace of the 
applicant’s grief, confusion, and pain at having to remember. Three dots hide three of the most 
important elements of the testimony, but upon scrutiny they are easily reduced to the dry and 
unfitting patch of a painter who’s taught to only use big brushes and bold strokes. The institutional 
constraints of the form only allow for the three dots and not for anything behind them to be on the 
page. They stand here for anything that is deemed unimportant, that is not determinable fact. They 
gloss over the interview, and choose not to report, and thus not to translate. They make the 
interview look more and more like a police questioning.299  
 
Conclusion 
There is a trial happening at the borders of Europe. A trial that, for the most part, is not 
administered within the judicial system, and seldom reaches it, nonetheless one that has legally-
enforced consequences on the lives of the people involved. It is represented as a smooth and 
straightforward process, the simple construction of a narrative of violence, fear, flight, and arrival 
around a list of criteria for the granting of international protection. Is that fear enough, was what 
they did to him enough? Is what they’ll do to him enough?  
We can by now see how this process is in fact fraught with arbitrariness, the linearity of 
the narrative constantly broken and remade by linguistic and cultural incommensurability. It often 
leads to otherworldly conclusions such as the one that sealed Applicant A.’s demand. The format 
of the RSD interview pushes the practice of translation (and the role of the translator) to the margin 
of its economy. It confines the translator to a seemingly peripheral and impactless role over the 
 
299 “Interrogatorio” in Italian, as already brilliantly suggested by Barbara Sorgoni in “Chiedere asilo: Racconti, 




process of status determination while its asymmetrical multilingualism is loudly silenced in official 
scripts. These efforts aim at making a contentious and opaque process look as transparent as 
possible. Translation as practiced in the RSD, thus, comes to resemble what Gayatri Spivak called 
the “wholesale translation of the Third World,” and against which she calls for the re-centering of 
translation around agency of the subject, rhetoricity, and intimacy of the translator with the source 
language. The C-3, memorie, the Interview, and the decision are treated more as slight variations 
of the same act and moment. Consequently, their peculiarities and discrepancies are treated as 
marginal differences, unimportant for the overall story, or straight-up overlooked.  
Yet, there is much understanding to gain in simultaneously acknowledge this deliberately-
instituted resemblance and all that is concealed and excluded from the documents in order for this 
resemblance to hold. And what is immediately visible in the layout of the official documents form 
the asylum procedure is the stark contradiction between their content seemingly pointing towards 
freedom of speech and of history (Now, please elaborate freely on the reasons that led you to 
leave; What would happen, in your opinion, if you had to return to your country?..) and the fact 
that the form and structure of the document already arrange this supposed freedom along a specific 
linearity of logic and temporality. But what’s more important is that if the structure of the 
document (and therefore of the encounter) arrange the structure of the narrative along a certain 
line, if they force the applicant to think about it in a specific way, then content is also affected by 
the structural possibilities of narration. In this chapter, I have tried to read together the form and 
the style of the official documents of the RSD and sketch the contours of this required path that 
the individual story must take in order to become asylum narrative. I have also argued that the 
narrowness of this path, which is enforced both materially and discursively, profoundly shapes the 




choices, I have tried to rewrite into the official traces of escape some of that other life that they 





CHAPTER 4 – THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT: TRANSLATIONS AND 







Different interpretations of the high seas have shaped the space and the conditions of the 
‘encounter’ between the State and the unauthorized vessel, between the legal and the illegalized. 
This chapter is a discussion of these interpretations and the histories that inform them, focusing on 
two discursive sites in which the figure of the ‘illegal migrant’ is created: on the one hand the 
translation of the word refoulement by courts in the United States and Europe, and on the other, 
poetic responses to illegalization that involve a creative reappropriation of the high seas. The 
chapter considers how together and in opposition to each other law and poetry write, and respond 
to, illegalization of maritime migration and mobility. In Part I, I focus on the different practices of 
translating the French verb refouler into English, as well as the refugee law principle attached to 
its substantive form, non-refoulement. I posit that these practices of translation, each informed by 
a particular politics of translation as well as of human rights, participate in the spatial construction 
of the border, which in turn has concrete consequences on what, where, and when rights may be 
claimed by persons escaping by sea. In Part II, I investigate how the Caribbean Sea of the 1990s 
and the contemporary Central Mediterranean are invested, imaginatively as well as physically, by 











  Non-refoulement and interdiction at sea 
 
Established by Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, non-refoulement is arguably the 
most important principle of refugee law. Indeed, a number of scholars argue that it has risen to the 
status of a jus cogens norm,300 and that today it forms the backbone of human rights law. It prevents 
a refugee or asylum-seeker from being returned to a place where she could be in danger, thus acting 
as a guarantee to the foundational right to seek asylum. Yet because of a number of jurisprudential 
developments, non-refoulement has also come to play a role in illegalization and the discursive 
formulation of ‘illegal’ migration. In this chapter I follow the interpretation of the principle in two 
influential judicial cases: Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,301 a 1993 case adjudicated by the United 
States Supreme Court, and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy,302 a case brought before the European 
Court of Human Rights in 2012. Connected by way of the dissent in Sale later cited in Hirsi, the 
two cases articulated different interpretations of the principle that were grounded in opposite 
approaches to its possible translations, effectively conjuring two distinct formulations of the limits 
of state sovereignty on the high seas with regards to interception of ‘migrant’ vessels. 
The Sale case concerned a form of migration control, known as the Interdiction Program, 
which was established by presidential order to ensure that boats fleeing violence and unrest in 
Haiti would not reach the United States, and that their occupants would not seek asylum there. The 
Program, which entailed returning large numbers of people intercepted on the high seas to Haiti 
without granting them the possibility of seeking protection, was seen as possibly contradicting the 
 
300 Jus cogens generally designates norms from which no derogation is permitted because of the fundamental values 
they uphold. For a discussion of the principle of non-refoulement as jus cogens, see among others Guy Goodwin-
Gill, The Refugee in International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
301 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). Hereafter Sale. 
302 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Grand Chamber Judgement (European Court of Human Rights), 23 February 




principle of non-refoulement. In Sale, much of the Court’s logic guiding its judgement was 
predicated on a heavily disputed interpretation of the original French meaning of refoulement and 
its original scope in the 1951 Convention. This interpretation, I argue, betrays a logic of the border 
on the high seas that, in turn, enables interception and the subsequent return of boats fleeing Haiti. 
The Interdiction Program, unsuccessfully challenged in Sale, inaugurated similar mechanisms of 
state control over the high seas a bit everywhere around the borders of the West.303 When, in 2009, 
an Italian military vessel intercepted a boat in international waters and returned to it Libya without 
allowing the passengers to claim protection, the framework regulating that encounter was fairly 
similar to the one regulating the Interdiction Program. A bilateral agreement between Italy and 
Libya allowed Italians to intercept and summarily return, or “push back”, boats to the Libyan 
shore. Yet, in a landmark 2012 verdict, Italy was found guilty for these actions by the European 
Court of Human Rights in the case Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy. The Court, and in particular a separate 
opinion filed by J. Pinto de Albuquerque, grounded the reasoning in a translation of refoulement 
that is at odds with that of the US Supreme Court from 20 years earlier. This originates at least in 
part, I argue, from the sustained practices of translating the French word refoulement in various 
European languages which, despite not being always successful, not only refined the meaning of 
the original principle but accrued its scope and applicability.  
The legal contours around maritime migration are hazy and ever-evolving.304 A vessel 
carrying migrants could also – or only – be carrying refugees, but general provisions of 
 
303 For a definitive, uniquely expansive and detailed study of the Interdiction Program and U.S. migration control in 
the Caribbean see Jeffrey Kahn, Islands of Sovereignty: Haitian Migration and the Borders of Empire (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2019). 
304 The distinction between State and non-State actor in no longer clear-cut with the latest policies in effect in the 
Central Mediterranean where, through the criminalisation of rescue, the line of illegality in no longer drawn around 
the migrant vessel but expanded to include all non-State actors deemed to encourage or favor, through assistance at 




international law concerning freedom of movement do not apply to undocumented or unauthorized 
persons, unless they manifest their intention to seek asylum.305 Three major legal regimes apply 
on the seas. Within a 12-nautical mile limit from the shore, the sea is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the coastal state. Beyond these “territorial waters,” the high seas are generally considered a space 
of free movement, but only for vessels flying the flag of a state. Boats carrying migrants pose a 
double problem. First, they are generally considered to be flagless vessels; secondly, the status of 
the people they carry may be difficult or impossible to determine justly with existing legal 
definitions. A flagless vessel is a vessel without the protection of a state and for historical reasons 
that date from the history of the war on piracy, one with very few rights. International law 
regulating the high seas offers a number of provisions regulating the encounter between states and 
(possibly) migrant vessels on the high seas. Article 110 para 1 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) permits the boarding of flagless vessels, such as most of those 
carrying persons in flight across the Mediterranean, while para 1 (b) of the same Article allows 
ships to board vessels on the high seas if there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is 
engaged in the slave trade or, by analogy and extension, human trafficking.306 The Palermo 
Protocol307 also authorizes states to intercept and ‘take appropriate measures’ against vessels 
reasonably suspected of migrant smuggling. The fourth, and last provision and probably the 
 
305 Jus cogens provisions of international human rights law, such as those against torture, apply. Crimes such as 
slavery and piracy are also prosecutable everywhere by everyone. Otherwise, as noted above, jurisdiction over ships 
– and therefore acts committed on them on the high seas – follows the flag state principle. Yet, because of the 
specificities of crimes committed at sea regarding in particular distance from law enforcement, witnesses, multiple 
nationalities onboard, etc., the issue is thorny. See, as an example, Asia Wright, “High Seas Ship Crimes,” Loyola 
Maritime Law Journal 7, no. 1 (2009): 1-46. 
306 UNCLOS, Montego Bay, 1982. 




largest, because it applies everywhere at sea and to every type of ‘encounter’ is the duty, cited 
above, to render assistance to persons in danger or distress. (UNCLOS, Art. 98).  
These provisions limit a regime of absolute freedom on the high seas. In an already highly 
asymmetrical relationship, the position of the ‘migrant boat’ is weak; only the provisions of 
international human rights and refugee law safeguard its passengers in relation to the intercepting 
state. The principle into which these safeguards merge is known as non-refoulement: the duty to 
not return a migrant to an unsafe place.  
The reasons for focusing on encounters on the high seas and their interpretations – both 
legal and literary – pertain to the specificity of the high seas as a conflictual space of free and 
illegalized movement. The principle of non-refoulement – touching on the contested line 
separating refugees or asylum-seeker from any other type of person on the move, as well as on 
several potentially conflicting legal regimes – is an optimal vector for such a study. Moreover and 
perhaps most importantly, the principle is inherently multilingual, from its earlier definitions to its 
contemporary interpretation. In the following pages, I retrace its history and some of the most 
salient cases in which it has been taken up, contentiously translated, and evoked in the Atlantic 
and the Mediterranean, to show how the history of its translations has participated deeply and at 




 I.1 refoulement: Contaminations Between French and English  
 
Article 33, para. 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
(Prohibition of Expulsion or Return (‘Refoulement’) / Défense d’Expulsion et de 
Refoulement 
 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return 
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner 
1. Aucun des États Contractants n’expulsera 




whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. 
soit, un réfugié sur les frontières des 
territoires où sa vie ou sa liberté serait 
menacée en raison de sa race, de sa religion, 
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un 
certain groupe social ou de ses opinions 
politiques.  
 
Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is widely 
regarded as a cardinal principle and cornerstone of the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers. 
It prevents states from returning refugees or asylum-seekers to territories where their lives or 
freedom would be in danger. It is also the closest thing to a “right to be granted asylum” (see 
Introduction), in that in the absence of such a right, “the principle guarantees that refugees remain 
beyond the reach of a persecuting state as long as their fear of persecution remains well-
founded.”308 Until World War I, entry into and residence within the borders of a state was only 
sporadically and non-systematically regulated. In the early interwar period, however, national 
borders along with criteria and evidence of citizenship hardened, particularly in Europe. The 
massive displacements of World War II contributed decisively to the discursive refinement and 
normative definition of the categories of the refugee and the stateless person that occurred in the 
immediate aftermath of the War. In the preface to their collection of the travaux préparatoires of 
the 1951 Geneva Convention, editors Alex Takkenberg and Christopher C. Tahbaz make a case 
for the particularly important role of the records of debates and deliberations out of which came 
the document that we all read now. “Nearly forty years after the final version of the text was 
drafted, there are questions about the Convention which cannot be answered within the four 
corners of the document. Compared to other international instruments, the Geneva Convention 
 
308 Walter Kälin, Martina Caroni, and Lukas Heim, “Article 33, para. 1,” in [ed.“The 1951 Convention Relating to 





contains a considerable number of ‘vague terms’. What exactly does ‘membership of a social 
group’ contribute to the definition of the term ‘refugee’? What is meant by the words ‘well-
founded fear of being persecuted’? What types of situations does the restrictive term ‘national 
security’ encompass?”309 The list of possibly ‘vague terms’ could be extended to the term 
refoulement.  
In paragraph 1, Article 33 of the 1951 Convention cited above, several details claim our 
attention. The one that I will focus most on in the following pages is that although the French term 
‘refoulera’ is translated in English with ‘[shall] return’, this translation seems to be supplemented 
by the repetition of the verb refouler in parenthesis, leading to two possible, not necessarily 
mutually exclusive interpretations: on the hand that the English ‘return’ may be understood as not 
covering the entire range of meanings carried by the French ‘refouler’. In this case, ‘to return’ 
would need to be attached to the original French in order to provide equal protection in both 
versions of the Article. On the other, the loanword refouler included in parentheses in the English 
version has the indirect and perhaps unintended consequence of adding to the French word all the 
meanings of the verb ‘to return’ that the verb refouler does not cover. This seemingly small, 
marginal and parenthetical presence of the French in the English and its reverberation for the 
meaning of the original French term is, I argue, one of the main reasons that the principle of non-
refoulement has been interpreted in radically different ways in contemporary legal cases.  
In French dictionaries published during and around the time the 1951 Convention was 
being drafted, ‘refouler’ meant various things, all more or less having to do with the use or exertion 
 
309 Christopher K. Tahbaz and Lex Takkenberg, “Preface,” in The Collected Travaux Préparatoires of the 1951 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, vol. 1, edited by Christopher K. Tahbaz and Lex Takkenberg, 




of force.310 This general meaning remains central to more recent definitions. The Petit Robert 
(2004)311 lists three main meanings to the verb ‘refouler’ ([v. tr. (1) – XIIe; de re- et fouler]) that 
are relevant here312: Meaning 1), “pousser en arrière, faire reculer.” ‘Refouler le courant ou la 
marée’ means, accordingly, to go against the current (‘s’avancer contre le courant’); Meaning 2) 
(1824), “faire reculer, refluer (des personnes).” As examples of this second use, the dictionary 
gives “Refouler des envahisseurs, l’armée ennemie => chasser, repousser”, but also “Les 
clandestins ont été refoulés à la frontière. => expulser”; And 3) (dated “fin XVIIIe” and listed as 
figurative), “Faire rentrer en soi (ce qui veut s’extérioriser, s’exprimer), ‘refouler ses larmes. 
Refouler sa colère, son désir.” This last meaning is connected to the psychoanalytic313 use of 
refouler to mean “rejeter, éliminer inconsciemment une idée pénible.” One of the salient aspects 
of this definition is the inclusion, in meaning n. 2, of the use of ‘refouler’ in the context of 
migration, in particular of ‘clandestine’ immigrants or migrants. This would, according to the 
 
310 To begin, here is a non-legal, morpho-etymological definition of the word, from Oscar Bloch and Walther von 
Wartburg, Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Française (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950): 
“REFOULEMENT: Foulon, latin fullonem. Fouler, c'est proprt procéder comme le foulon, presser à coups répétés, 
d'où endommager par pression, même d’un seul coup. Foule, substantif verbal défouler, signifie proprt action de 
fouler, mais, dans cette acception, il a été remplacé par le dérivé foulage, tandis qu’il prenait lui-même le sens de 
réunion de gens qui, en raison de leur nombre, se foulent, se pressent, cf. l’un des sens du substantif « presse ». 
Fouler, qui vient du nom d'agent foulon, a produit un autre nom d'agent, fouleur, qui s'emploie pour une espèce 
différente de foulage. Substantif participial foulée; nom d'instrument fouloir; une foulure est le résultat de l'action de 
« se fouler » un membre. Composé refouler, repousser en foulant, d'où refoulement.” [My emphasis] 
311 Josette Rey-Debove and Alain Rey, eds., Le Nouveau Petit Robert: dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la 
langue française (Paris: Le Robert, 2004). Specifically regarding meaning n. 2, ‘s’avancer contre le courant’. This 
corresponds to the English ‘stemming’, that is the action of a boat or ship ‘making headway against the tide or 
current. ‘Stem,’ in OED online (https://oed.com). The definition continues : “Hence [the action] of a swimmer, a 
flying bird, and the like: To make headway against (water or wind), to breast (the waves, the air). Often in figurative 
context.” This is probably, as obscure, old (Shakespeare, Henry IV (1623), among the first recorded examples), and 
technical as this use of the verb ‘to stem’ is, the English word that best translates the French ‘refouler’ / 
‘refoulement’, both literally in the context of the sea and metaphorically by keeping the original force and sense of 
forceful action or struggle pervading the original French. A case of literal poetics that probably even the Ad Hoc 
Committee drafters had missed, in light of the fact that what they had in mind was a land border between contiguous 
States. 
312 Meaning “1. TECHN: Comprimer avec un outil percutant”, is paradoxically too metaphorical to be taken into 
consideration as a possible reason for the use of the verb in Article 33. 
313 This use is dated 1905, alluding perhaps to the translation (or to the original edition) of Freud’s Trois essais sur 




Robert, make ‘refouler’ a synonym of ‘expulser,’ thus conflating the distinction made by Article 
33, where ‘expulser ou refouler’ define two different ways of denying the right of entry or stay. 
This conflation is, in turn, taken up by a contemporary French dictionary of public international 
law, where ‘refoulement’ is defined, first, as “the act whereby a state prevents the entry of an alien 
person on its territory and sends her back (le renvoie) to the country where she came from.”314 But 
also, “in a larger sense, [as] the act whereby a state removes (éloigne) from its territory an alien 
who entered it or resides in it without complying with the laws regulating entry and residence.”315 
Although the focus of this study is Article 33, unearthing earlier uses of the word 
‘refoulement’ in an international legal context will allow us to assess the width and purpose of its 
use in 1951. The Geneva Convention of 28 October 1933,316 article 3, para 1, for instance, defines 
refoulement as ‘non-admittance at the frontier’.317 In its early meetings to compile what will be 
the first draft of the 1951 Convention, the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related 
Problems defined refouler as both ‘the turning back of a refugee to the frontiers of a country where 
his life would be threatened’ as well as the act of ‘refus[ing] entry to refugees at the frontiers of 
their country of origin’.318 The Ad Hoc Committee is particularly important because it is one of 
 
314 My translation of “Acte par lequel un État s’oppose à l’entrée d’un étranger sur le territoire et le renvoie vers le 
pays d’où il vient”.“Refoulement”, in Jean Salmon, ed., Dictionnaire de droit international public (Brussels: 
Bruylant, 2001). 
315 This one is more subtly difficult to translate: here is the original : “Au sens large, acte par lequel un État éloigne 
du territoire un étranger qui y est entré ou qui y demeure, sans avoir rempli les conditions d’accès ou de séjour 
requises”. “Refoulement”, in Salmon, Dictionnaire de droit international public. 
316 One of the three Conventions related to displaced persons in general that anticipated the 1951 Geneva 
Convention.  
317 1933 Geneva Convention, Article 3, para 1:“Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or keep 
from its territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the frontier 
(refoulement), refugees who have been authorized to reside there regularly, unless the said measures are dictated by 
reasons of national security or public order.” 
318 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(New York: ECOSOC, 1950), Article 28: “Prohibition of expulsion to territories where the life or freedom of a 
refugee is threatened”, commented as follows: “The turning back of a refugee to the frontiers of a country where his 




the two fora in which the philosophy, goal and scope of the 1951 Convention were decided, the 
other being the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, where state representatives turned the original 
draft of the Ad Hoc Committee into the final text of the Convention. The reason why this seemingly 
marginal, backstage history is important is that a specifically territorial idea of border, or “frontier’ 
as it used to be called then, resulted in the bilingual definition we have today in Article 33 as well 
as in the multiple interpretations of the word refoulement. And by a cursory look at these 
definitions it is possible to grasp how the conception of what ‘refoulement’ meant changed over 
the less than two decades separating the 1933 and 1951 Convention, in a way that dramatically 
altered its scope and use. ‘Non-admittance’, ‘turning back’ , and ‘refusing entry’ all bear different 
connotations, which in light of what refoulement becomes in Article 33 ( [to expel or] ‘to return’) 
expand or contract the action envisioned and here proscribed. What, however, makes the three 
 
tantamount to delivering him into the hands of his persecutors. The Convention of 1933 contains a provision of this 
kind (art 3, para 2): It undertakes in any case not to refuse entry to refugees at the frontiers of their countries of 
origin’. In the present text reference is made not only to the country of origin but also to other countries where the 
life or freedom of the refugee would be threatened for the reasons mentioned. This article does not imply that a 
refugee must in all cases be admitted to the country where he seeks entry.” (In TP, vol III, 134). Also see Ad Hoc 
Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Chapter XI Expulsion and Non-Admittance, Art. 24, para 1 
(New York: ECOSOC, 1950). Available at https://www.unhcr.org/protection/statelessness/3ae68c280/ad-hoc-
committee-statelessness-related-problems-status-refugees-stateless.html. The concept and status of ‘statelessness’ 
has a very intricate and multifarious history. Early form of statelessness, due to mass displacement, represented – as 
papers-less migrants do now – a menace for the state. ‘Resolving the problem of statelessness’ was part of the 
original mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and one of the original goals of the Convention. The ‘stateless’ 
embodies the paradox of a person being considered simultaneously dangerous and in danger. The absence of 
protection from a State makes the person at the same time vulnerable and a potential threat for any other state. This 
is because individuals exists in the relationship of States among each other – even at the level of private international 
law – through the State of which they are nationals. A stateless person is a small stone in the system’s kidney. The 
stark ambivalence of the stateless is visible in the way former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice defended 
extraordinary rendition as a practice necessary for dealing with ‘stateless terrorists’ during the War on Terror: “ The 
United States, and those countries that share the commitment to defend their citizens, will use every lawful weapon 
to defeat these terrorists. Protecting citizens is the first and oldest duty of any government. Sometimes these efforts 
are misunderstood. I want to help all of you understand the hard choices involved, and some of the responsibilities 
that go with them. One of the difficult issues in this new kind of conflict is what to do with captured individuals who 
we know or believe to be terrorists. The individuals come from many countries and are often captured far from their 
original homes. Among them are those who are effectively stateless, owing allegiance only to the extremist cause of 
transnational terrorism. Many are extremely dangerous. And some have information that may save lives, perhaps 
even thousands of lives.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Remark Upon Her Departure for Europe”, 




definitions part of one same logic is the constant element represented by the existence – right there 
and then, right in front of the state – of the ‘frontiers’ of another country, whether of origin or of 
transit. This is best exemplified by the phrase “refusing entry to refugees at the frontiers of their 
country”, which shows again a conception of borders dividing contiguous States. Clearly, although 
one of the ‘triggering guilts’ for the Convention on refugees was exactly the repeated refoulement 
of a ship,319 a borderless space or even a different type of border have no place in the imagination 
of the drafters, because it would not be possible to refuse entry to someone, on the high seas, ‘at 
the frontiers of their country’. Unless, of course, the State refusing entry is able to do so at the 
‘country of origin’s’ limit of territorial waters, which is exactly what the US and Southern 
European countries have done and are systematically doing through a doctrine of bilateralism with 
the common goal of ‘combating illegal immigration.’  
But what constitutes refoulement ? Tellingly, commentators divide behavior that could 
“raise questions in relation to Art. 33, para 1” into two broad categories based on geographical 
limits: on the one hand behavior happening at the border, and on the other events happening inside 
or within the borders of a state. To the former group belong acts such as the decision to shut down 
a border completely, the ‘rejection of asylum-seekers’ at land borders, and the interception of 
people ‘in small or overcrowded boats in territorial waters’. Conversely, acts happening inside a 
nation’s borders possibly falling under the category of refoulement include expulsion, deportation, 
extradition, and forced return, and include ‘mass deportations without screenings.’320 Neither 
definition encompasses ‘behaviour’ in spaces where borders are not easily locatable or in spaces 
 
319 MS St. Louis was a German ocean liner that left Hamburg in May 1939 carrying roughly 900 Jewish refugees 
with the intent to disembark them to safety in Cuba. The ship was, however, repeatedly denied port, not only by 
Cuba but also by the US and Canada. It had to sail back to Europe and docked in Antwerp in June 1939. Only after 
strenuous negotiations the 907 passengers were redistributed among England, Belgium, and France. 




existing beyond the territorial borders of a state, such as the high seas. The only border at sea that 
is mentioned is the one coinciding with the limit drawn by territorial waters, because that is where 
an idea of the territorial state ends, regardless of whether the territory of another sovereign entity 
is contiguous.  
 
 I.2 The Genesis of the Principle: Problems of Translation 
 
In the back and forth between the Ad Hoc Committee and the ECOSOC, which acted as a 
conveyor of various Governments’ demands, the need arose for an exception to the principle of 
non-refoulement as it had been drafted by the AHC. Put simply, the concerns centered on the 
tension between the ‘duty to not refouler’321 and a possibly corresponding ‘duty to grant asylum’ 
or, from the point of view of the person fleeing, at least an uncontested right to admission. The 
United Kingdom, with Switzerland and France agreeing, asserted the impossibility of an absolute 
prohibition of refoulement ‘not allowing for exceptions for known criminals and people considered 
to be a danger to public order.'322 When the duty to produce a consensual document shifted to the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries,323 doubts and wariness regarding the scope of the protection 
persisted. Specifically, concerns were raised by delegates with regards to the ‘absolute prohibition’ 
of refoulement as it had been intended by the Ad Hoc Committee, and this time they had much 
wider support. One area of concern resulted in what is now paragraph 2 of Article 33, which 
provided states the right to grant asylum ‘with the corresponding right to withdraw such 
 
321 The provision against refoulement was enshrined in article 24 of the 1933 Convention, article 28 of the first draft 
by the Ad Hoc Committee, and finally became Article 33 in the 1951 Convention.  
322 Kälin et al., “Article 33,” 1339. 
323 Differently to the Ad Hoc Committee, which was comprised of experts, jurists, and scholars, the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries was attended by delegations of high-level diplomats from each country that participated in the Ad 
Hoc Committee, in addition to a few more members and observers. To my knowledge, state representatives who 




protection.’324 A second issue revolved around the philological and interpretative debate 
surrounding the French verb ‘refouler,’325 not only in terms of what the French verb meant in the 
context of refugees crossing borders, but also with respect to what constituted permissible behavior 
on the part of states.  
The first delegate to articulate states’ unease vis-à-vis the principle was the Swiss 
Representative:              
“Mr. ZUTTER (Switzerland) said that the Swiss Federal Government saw no reason why 
article 28 should not be adopted as it stood; for the article was a necessary one. He thought, 
however, that its wording left room for various interpretations, particularly as to the 
meaning to be attached to the words "expel" and "return". In the Swiss Government's view, 
the term "expulsion" applied to a refugee who had already been admitted to the territory of 
a country. The term "refoulement", on the other hand, had a vaguer meaning; it could not, 
however, be applied to a refugee who had not yet entered the territory of a country. The 
word "return", used in the English text, gave that idea exactly. Yet, Article 28 implied the 
existence of two categories of refugees: refugees who were liable to be expelled, and those 
who were liable to be returned. In any case, the States represented at the Conference should 
take a definite position with regard to the meaning to be attached to the word "return". ”326   
 
The unexpected syntax of the italicized portion of the quote makes the logic of the Swiss 
Representative’s thought quite difficult to follow. Why, in light of what the Ad Hoc Committee 
had expressed, could the term ‘refoulement’ not apply to someone who had not yet entered? And 
most importantly, how would the English word ‘return’ be able to convey that idea exactly, 
namely, to apply to people outside the country? 
 
324 Kälin et al., “Article 33,” 1340. See, e.g., Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law 
(Leiden, The Netherlands: A.W. Sjithof, 1966), 94: “Article 33 only prohibits the expulsion or return (refoulement) 
of refugees to territories where they are likely to suffer persecution.”. 
325 It should be immediately noted that the official debates at Conference of Plenipotentiaries, and therefore this 
discussion around the semantic boundaries of the verb ‘refouler’ and, subsequently, of its preferred English 
translation, seem to have taken place in French. Thus all the Travaux Préparatoires and commentaries (Weis) 
quoted heretofore and hereafter are possibly on translations from the French (Kälin et al., “Article 33”). I have 
contacted the Office for Original Documents at the UN Library to clarify this but I have not been able to see the 
original debates in French yet, provided they actually took place as I suspect. 





 I believe that these seemingly unconnected sentences express a fairly straightforward idea 
of the encounter between state and refugee as it was imagined by the Ad Hoc Committee as well 
as by the CoP at the time of drafting. Zutter articulates the idea that a state cannot return a refugee 
that is not already inside its borders and as such, a provision against refoulement cannot apply to 
someone who is outside. In order to be ‘returned’ somewhere, the refugee must be somewhere 
else, that is, in another state. There is no room for an in-between territory, for a physical or 
juridical gap between one state and another. In the Swiss Representative’s logic, states are 
necessarily contiguous, which means that for a state to have control over a refugee, he or she must 
necessarily be in their territory. The border can only be the line separating sovereignties on land. 
There is no room, in this logic, for geographical separation that does not fall under the control of 
a state. The seed for the interpretation of the high seas made by the U.S. Government in Sale were 
planted in this assumption. 
     
 I.3 Sale v. HCC and Hirsi: Translations and Interpretations 
 
Executive Order 12324, signed September 29, 1981 by Ronald Reagan, and Executive 
Order 12807, signed in 1992 by George Bush are often credited for establishing a protocol for the 
interception of migrant boats on the high seas that was subsequently adapted throughout the world. 
Guy Goodwin-Gill, a leading scholar of international refugee law, has called Reagan’s Order “the 
model, perhaps, for all that followed.”327 With E.O. 12324, Reagan ordered the Secretary of State 
to enter into “ cooperative arrangements with appropriate foreign governments for the purpose of 
preventing illegal migrations through the sea.”328 At the same time, he ordered the U.S. Coast 
 
327 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, “The Right to Seek Asylum: Interception at Sea and the Principle of Non-Refoulement,” 
International Journal of Refugee Law 23, no. 3 (2011): 443. 
328 Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, U.S.-Haiti, Sept. 23, 1981, 33 U.S.T., implemented by Executive 




Guard to “enforce the suspension of the entry of undocumented aliens and the interdiction of any 
defined vessel carrying such aliens.” The order also instructed the Coast Guard to board any such 
vessel and to “return [it] and its passengers to the country from which it came.”329 With this order, 
Reagan established what came to be known as the Interdiction Program which practiced the 
stopping and ‘screening’ of Haitians fleeing the island by boat. The ‘screening’ meant a 
preliminary interview — what later became known as the Credible Fear Interview — to establish 
whether the interviewee faced a ‘credible fear’ of political persecution. Those who met the criteria 
were ‘screened in’ and allowed to file an asylum claim from within the United States. This policy 
remained in effect throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, despite a series of legal challenges that 
ended when the US Court of Appeals, DC Circuit, found against the appellants in Haitian Refugee 
Centers v. Gracey (1987). In the meantime, a military coup in Haiti toppled the government of 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide and unleashed military and paramilitary violence on his supporters.330 As 
a result of the increase in maritime departures, President Bush issued a new Executive Order, 
noting the ensuing “serious problem of persons attempting to come to the United States by sea 
without necessary documentation and otherwise illegally,” thus replacing the older Executive 
Order but maintaining its form and content almost unaltered. Among the alterations was the 
 
Story of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council: Guantánamo and Refoulement,” in Human Rights Advocacy Stories, edited 
by Deena R. Hurwitz, Margaret L. Satterthwaite, and Doug Ford (New York: Foundation Press, 2009), 385–432. In 
1981, Haitians were fleeing en masse the violence of the régime of Jean-Claude Duvalier, alias Baby Doc. In late 
1991, early 1992 they were fleeing the unrest and widespread violence following the coup d’état that deposed Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, who in 1990 had won the first free (i.e. without major violent interference) elections to be held in 
Haiti. 
329 Executive Order 12324, Fed. Reg. 48109, 1981. 
330 Created in 1959 by François Duvalier alias Papa Doc, the Tonton Macoute had been rebranded the “Volontaires 
pour la Sécurité Nationale” in 1971 but their original name never left. Along with other militias, paramilitary or 
splinter groups from the army, they terrorized Haiti well after the fall of Duvalier’s son Jean-Claude’s régime in 
1986. See “Tonton Macoutes”, in Paul Lagasse, ed., The Columbia Encyclopedia, 8th ed. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2018). There does not seem to be a consensus on the spelling in either English or French. 




statement that “the international legal obligations of the United States under the United Nations 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees [...] to apply Article 33 of the [1951 Convention] do 
not extend to persons located outside the territory of the United States.”  
After several attempts at challenging the order at various levels, the United States Supreme 
Court decided to hear a case – Sale v. Haitian Centers Council – challenging both the Interdiction 
Program on the high seas and the indefinite detention of Haitians in Guantánamo, which 
inaugurated the recent history of the military base as an American detention center outside of the 
reach of U.S. law.331 
 
 I.3 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council. Border and Translation between Court’s Opinion 
and Dissent 
In Sale, the Court found for the Government with an overwhelming majority of 8 to 1, the 
only dissent being that of Justice Henry Blackmun. “Although the human crisis is compelling,” 
the court writes, “there is no solution to be found in a judicial remedy” because “acts of Congress 
normally do not have extraterritorial application unless such an intent is clearly manifested.”332 
 
331 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council was indeed divided in two different cases. See Koh and Wishnie, “The Story of 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council.” Regarding the two different human rights claims within the same case, they write: 
“HCC-I, or ‘the Guantánamo Case’ was the first federal lawsuit by non-citizens raising a constitutional challenge to 
their indefinite detention on Guantánamo. [...] HCC-II, or ‘the Direct Return Case’, was a challenge brought within 
the same lawsuit by Haitians who should have been screened in but were instead summarily and forcibly returned to 
Haiti. In HCC- II, these Haitians argued all the way to the Supreme Court that the two U.S. Administrations had 
violated the international human rights prescription against refoulement, the direct return of refugees to their 
persecutors” (386–387). In the following pages I focus on the Court’s judgement on the refoulement claim. As the 
lead counsel in HCC-II, Harold Hongju Koh, poignantly said, “it was the first time most of us ever heard of 
Guantánamo.” Koh, “The Enduring Legacies of the Haitian Refugee Litigation,” New York Law School Review 61, 
no. 31 (2016–2017), 34–35. On the role of Guantánamo in the Interdiction Program and in the War on Terror see 
Jeffrey Kahn, Islands of Sovereignty, particularly Chapter 3 at pages 121-129. 
332 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) at V. The Act of Congress is the incorporation of the 
language of Article 33 into domestic law in the form of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1980, particularly 
§243(h)(1). In 1980, the INA was amended in ways relevant to our discussion: In order to reflect the language of the 
Convention (and therefore to ratify the accession to the 1967 Protocol) the word “to return” was included to and the 
phrase “within the United States” was erased. This is how the Court talks about it: “The 1980 amendment erased the 




The objective of my analysis is not to validate or criticize this judgement but rather to show that 
the Court’s opinion, delivered by J. Stevens, is based on a certain interpretation of the sentence 
quoted in the opening pages of this chapter, namely, Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, “ … to 
expel or return (refouler).” Below, I present the most salient moments of the Court’s reasoning 
regarding the ‘correct’ translation of this phrase. I will suggest that the Court’s decision contributed 
to the construction of the high seas as a space at once inside and outside the United States’ 
territorial borders. Under this regime, the high seas is understood at once as far from the United 
States and outside the protective scope of the 1951 Convention, thus preventing vessels passengers 
from making human rights claims, and fully under the United States’ sovereign power, thus 
allowing for border enforcement activities and police operations aimed against unauthorized 
vessels. Before we investigate further the Court’s opinion, it is important to note that all along the 
case’s tortuous journey through the lower courts, the focus on translation had been central. In 
particular, as Harold Koh – the lead counsel who also argued the previous case in front of the 
Appeals Court – recounts, the Government had at one stage tried to ground the legitimacy of the 
Interdiction Program in a peculiar translation of the verb refouler that is only found in Cassell’s 
dictionary.  
 
“The district court issued several injunctions against the Government’s conduct. 
[…] In its appeal to the Eleventh Circuit,333 the Government argued that the term 
“refouler” meant “to expel,” not “to return,” and hence, barred only the forced 
expulsion of Haitian refugees who had already landed in the United States, not the 
forced return of those refugees intercepted en route. The Government’s reading of 
“refouler” […] effectively rewrote Article 33, creating a pointless redundancy: “no 
 
“return” and removing the words “within the United States” from § 243(h), Congress extended the statute’s 
protection to both types of aliens, but it did nothing to change the presumption that both types of aliens would 
continue to be found only within United States territory.” Sale v. HCC, III (B). Interesting how the interpretation of 
Congress removing the physical limitations to the protection against refoulement would somehow still mean that it 
only applies within “United States territory”. 
333 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., [498 U.S. 479 (1991)] was the name of the case argued in front of the 




Contracting State shall expel or expel a refugee” to conditions of persecution. The 
Government’s effort to equate “expel” and “return” relied on a subsidiary definition 
of “refouler” listed in Cassell’s, a nonauthoritative French dictionary, not the 
definitions “to repulse … drive back … repel” provided in the authoritative French 
dictionary, Dictionnaire Larousse.”334  
 
As Koh recounts, the U.S. government tried to make a case around a translation drawing 
on a single source – Cassell’s dictionary – that it portrayed as authoritative while Koh, in opposing 
this move, similarly implied that an authoritative source –the Larousse –existed, although in an 
attempt to underscore the semantic multiplicity of the word in French. It is worth reminding that 
the entry in question fully reads “to expel (aliens); to refuse entry”335 and that, together, the two 
translations somehow cover the distinction made in Article 33 between expelling and returning, in 
this case ‘return’ being equated to a ‘refusal of entry’. Perhaps not coincidentally, the same 
dictionary is used by the Court in Sale v. HCC, this time, however, to make a much more nuanced 
point about ‘refouler’.  
Without delving into the original French meaning of the verb refouler or its substantive 
form, in Sale the Court’s opinion written by J. Stevens builds its discussion of possible 
interpretations of the word around the argument that refouler does not, in fact, mean ‘to return.’336 
He explains that “Article 33.1 uses the words “expel or return (‘refouler’)” as an obvious parallel 
to the words “deport or return” in § 243(h)(1). There is no dispute that “expel” has the same 
meaning as “deport”; it refers to the deportation or expulsion of an alien who is already present in 
the host country. The dual reference identified and explained in our opinion in Leng May Ma v. 
Barber suggests that the term “return (‘refouler’)” refers to the exclusion of aliens who are merely 
 
334 Harold Hongju Koh, “Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council,” Harvard International Law 
Journal 35, no. 1 (1994), 4. 
335 The Court’s Opinion ignores what comes after the semicolon. 
336 Despite Article 33 bearing the seemingly symmetrical relationship between “n’expulsera ou ne refoulera” and the 




“‘on the threshold of initial entry.’”337 J. Stevens further asserts that, “refouler is not an exact 
synonym for the word ‘return’”, and grounds his point on the fact that neither Cassell’s nor 
Larousse dictionaries translate one with the other.338 But what is the purpose of divorcing ‘to 
return’ from its graft, refouler? Of course, the larger philological and political question would be 
to ask why ‘return’ is effectively used as a translation of refouler in Article 33, but for now I will 
focus on the first, more technical question. From the way Stevens develops his reasoning after this 
analysis it seems that the goal is to prove that return not only does not mean ‘refouler’ – whatever 
that may mean – but that it also does not mean ‘to return’, at least not in the general sense of the 
word. As opposed to French, where refouler only has transitive forms, ‘to return’ in English has 
both transitive and intransitive forms that are widely used. In the intransitive form, one may or 
may not have arrived somewhere in order to be able to return. In the transitive form, however, in 
order to return someone to where they came from, that person must have necessarily come into 
contact with the entity that is returning them and, one can assume, must have been brought 
elsewhere than where contact was made. J. Stevens is, of course, focusing on the transitive form, 
yet without acknowledging the full trajectory of the action embodied in the meaning. This is clear 
in the following passage: “ [the dictionaries in question] do, however, include words like ‘repulse’, 
‘repel’, ‘drive back’, and even ‘expel’. To the extent that they are relevant, these translations imply 
that ‘return’ means a defensive act of resistance or exclusion at a border rather than an act of 
transporting someone to a particular destination. In the context of the Convention, to ‘return’ 
means to ‘repulse’ rather than to ‘reinstate.’”339 The leaps of the Justice’s pen are fascinating: if 
 
337 Sale v. HCC, Opinion, IV(A) 
338 “Indeed, neither of the two respected English-French dictionaries mentions ‘refouler’ as one of the many possible 
French translations of ‘return’. Conversely, the English translations of ‘refouler’ do not include the word ‘return’.” 
Sale v. HCC, Opinion at IV(A). 




‘return’ does not mean to (fully) return, only to push back or repel, then the extension of the 
provisions of Article 33 only coincides with a State’s borders. Immediately, as a result, the 
encounter on the high seas between Coast Guard vessels and boats fleeing Haiti no longer falls 
under Article 33 because it is happening beyond the border, or extraterritorially.340 These leaps are 
not unwarranted: the Conference of Plenipotentiaries had a full session of arguments – beside the 
one made by the Swiss Representative above –  about the need for ‘refouler’ and ‘to return’ to 
mean something akin to ‘repelling at the border.’341 States at the Conference did not want the 
provision against refoulement to mean a right to indiscriminate entry in cases of mass migrations 
presenting themselves at the border. What is most interesting here is the use of translation to define 
an action of returning that starts and ends at the border. A sort of half- or incomplete return. If it 
is true that Article 33 allows for a legal interpretation of ‘return’ as somehow less complete or 
narrower than its everyday meaning, then there can be no refoulement outside the borders. J. 
Stevens defended this narrower sense by using dictionaries. I would argue, however, that what he 
showed was a specific ‘logic of the border,’ similar to the idea of the border as “a line dividing 
contiguous sovereign entities” that informed both the AHC and the Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
at the time of drafting Article 33. Moreover, if there is nothing wrong with J. Stevens showing this 
 
340 “The text of Article 33 thus fits with Judge Edwards’ understanding that “‘expulsion’ would refer to a ‘refugee 
already admitted into a country’ and that ‘return’ would refer to a ‘refugee already within the territory but not yet 
resident there.’ Thus, the Protocol was not intended to govern parties’ conduct outside of their national borders.” 
Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 257 U. S. App. D. C., at 413, 809 F. 2d, at 840 (footnotes omitted)””. Sale v. 
HCC, Opinion at IV(A). 
341 The Court’s Opinion quotes the Dutch Representative, also quoted in HRC v. Gracey (1987), on this point: 
“Baron van BOETZELAER (Netherlands) recalled that at the first reading the Swiss representative had expressed 
the opinion that the word ‘expulsion’ related to a refugee already admitted into a country, whereas the word ‘return’ 
(‘refoulement’) related to a refugee already within the territory but not yet resident there. According to that 
interpretation, article 28 would not have involved any obligations in the possible case of mass migrations across 
frontiers or of attempted mass migrations. “He wished to revert to that point, because the Netherlands Government 
attached very great importance to the scope of the provision now contained in article 33. The Netherlands could not 
accept any legal obligations in respect of large groups of refugees seeking access to its territory.” Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Thirty-fifth Meeting, U. 




logic at work in the interventions of the Conference delegates, what is problematic is his use of 
translation as an a-historical guarantee342 for continuing to uphold the understanding of the border 
as it was imagined in 1950-51.343 In the context of the Interdiction Program on the high seas, this 
produces a border where there should be none, while exonerating potential violations stemming 
from that act – such as those listed in Article 33 – because that border is not the territorial limit of 
the United States. The high seas as a space of flight and control, are thus produced by the 
justification in translation of the extension of a land-based logic of border that was the result of 
refugees traversing Europe during and after WWII to the very different late 20th and 21st century 
context of maritime flight on the high seas.  
The lone dissent in Sale contests the Court’s uses of translations of refoulement to construct 
– and thus legitimize – the high seas as a space for interception beyond the provisions of Article 
33. “The majority,” J. Blackmun writes, “has difficulty with the treaty’s use of the term ‘return 
(refouler)’. ‘Return,’ it claims, does not mean return, but instead has a distinctive legal meaning.” 
In the same paragraph, he underlines that the majority asserted, “without explanation, [...] that the 
word ‘return’ as used in the treaty somehow must refer only to ‘the exclusion of aliens who are … 
on the threshold of initial entry.’”344 In particular, Blackmun takes issue with the Court’s line of 
reasoning that “the term refouler [is] pertinent only as an aid to understanding the meaning of the 
English word ‘return’, and that this assumption [neglects] to treat the term refouler as significant 
 
342 Whether it was deliberate or not, the use of dictionaries published much after the Convention but also before the 
establishment of the Interdiction Program partly enables the translation to perennialize the conception border theory 
that justifies the claim whereby extraterritorial actions do not fall under Article 33.  
343 Thus overlooking the provisions of UNCLOS (1982) about the High Seas as a space surrounded by but free of 
border. The Conference was signed by the United States in 1994. 




in and of itself.”345 The issue, framed as a non-acknowledgement of the bilingual nature of the 
Convention and the equal validity of its French and English texts, originates in fact in the uncertain 
attributes of the ‘cushioning’ of Article 33, that is, the parenthetical insertion of refouler after 
‘return.’ We know, from the Convention’s travaux préparatoires, that the Style Committee346 had 
recommended ‘return’ as the ‘nearest equivalent’ of refouler, and that the inclusion of the French 
verb in the English version was proposed by the President of the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries.347 Perhaps contrary to its intent, the President’s choice, although in line with 
previous uses in international treaties, opens up and destabilizes the English text as much as it is 
supposed to ground it in its French equivalent. In translation practice, ‘cushioning’ or ‘grafting’ 
the original word onto its translation can serve different purposes, but in no circumstance it can be 
said to be irrelevant to the translated word. For instance, it can be directed to those readers familiar 
with the original language to show the translator’s reasoning and justify her choices, in particular 
when there is no clear equivalent in the target language.348 In more extreme cases, it can signal a 
shortcoming in the target language whereby the ‘closest equivalence’ does not capture the original 
 
345 And thus that it “overlooks the fact that under Article 46 the French and English version of the Convention’s text 
are equally authoritative.” Dissent, note 5 at 193. 
346 At the current stage of this research, next to nothing is known about the Style Committee, its composition, and in 
particular its rationale for certain choices. What can be evinced by the travaux préparatoires is that this committee 
was called upon by delegates to incorporate amendments or suggestions made by delegates, as well as to smooth 
problems of translation, in written form. Their suggestions or changes would then be brought again to the attention 
of the Conference Delegates, who had to approve the text in its final form. 
347 “Mr. HOARE (United Kingdom) remarked that the Style Committee had considered that the word ‘return’ was 
the nearest equivalent in English to the French term ‘refoulement’. He assumed that the word ‘return’ as used in the 
English text had no wider meaning. “The PRESIDENT suggested that in accordance with the practice followed in 
previous Conventions, the French word ‘refoulement’ (‘refouler’ in verbal uses) should be included in brackets and 
between inverted commas after the English word ‘return’ wherever the latter occurred in the text.” Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Thirty-fifth Meeting, U. 
N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.35, pp. 21–22 (July 25, 1951). 
348 Translations of Derrida into English are a good example, due to the multiple hermeneutic possibilities that the 
original either calls for or signals, and for which English may not have the same range every time. In particular, see 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 




word with sufficient precision, and therefore the original is needed to fully convey the intended 
meaning, or at least to signal the gap between the two. Whenever they are employed, grafting and 
cushioning do, in any case, establish not only a punctual relationship between the translator and 
her reader, but also, and most importantly, one between the word that is grafted and the one it 
follows. Given this, Blackmun was clearly right to find fault with the Court’s opinion for 
disregarding the possible meanings of refouler in French and grounding its analysis only on (some 
of) its possible translations. One could go further and point to the Supreme Court’s reluctance to 
look at other jurisdictions for guidance on the interpretations of the term as a symptom of a cultural 
monolingualism that is fully entrenched in the U.S. legal sphere. Moreover, Blackmun finds fault 
with the Court’s use of translation as it warrants the conclusion that the Interdiction Program, since 
it is taking place beyond the border, is beyond the reach of Article 33.  
Since it can be difficult to follow the reasoning of both the Court and the Dissent, let me 
sum up at this point. If – the Court held – refouler is translated in various ways into English but 
never as ‘to return,’349 then it must mean something less broad: a more ‘defensive act’ such as 
‘exclusion at the border.’ Article 33, as a result, must have been meant to only cover acts happening 
at or inside ( “A country [...] shall not expel ..”) a border. The dissent, on the other hand, finds fault 
with this narrow reading grounded on a very specific translation of refouler, one that completely 
disregards the grafting. “I am at a loss to find the narrow notion of ‘exclusion at a border’ in broad 
terms like ‘repulse’, ‘repel’, and ‘drive back’”, J. Blackmun writes. He is lost: he can’t find the 
border being enforced by the Interdiction Program, the one extending over the high seas 
legitimized by the Court’s argument that Article 33 extends only as far as the territory of the United 
States. He also can’t quite reconcile the use of a very narrow translation of refouler to describe an 
 




action that could also, and perhaps more easily, correspond to other meanings provided by the 
same dictionaries. Yet he is also lost, in my opinion, because he is not looking to contest the notion 
of the territoriality of refoulement as much as he is trying to expose the Court’s unjustified 
interpretation of English translations of refouler. Rather than challenging the Court’s idea of where 
the border ends, he is challenging the translation that justifies this idea. This becomes clear in a 
sentence in the latter part of the dissent: “This is a case in which a Nation has gone forth to seize 
aliens who are not at its borders and return them to persecution.”350 The verbs ‘gone forth’ and 
‘seize’ suggest a ‘reach’ beyond the border for aliens who are not (yet) there. This reasoning, 
however, can only confirm the extraterritoriality of the High Seas argued by the court. 
Unknowingly, Blackmun is dismantling the linguistic and hermeneutic basis of the Court’s 
judgment while subscribing to its logic of the high seas being beyond the U.S. border, thus 
exonerating agents of the Coast Guard practicing interdiction from falling under the jurisdiction 
of the U.S.  
What I believe is important to reaffirm is that the Court’s understanding of what a border 
meant at the time of the drafting of Article 33 is correct, even if it is used, 40 years later, to theorize 
the High Seas as a space of migration control where ‘the encounter’ between fleeing boats and the 
State would not be protected by international refugee law. The fact that the original grafting in 
Article 33 – most likely intended to provide semantic reinforcement to the English version, 
provides instead the basis for rethinking the high seas as a space in which that very provision 
would not apply is clear in the words of Louis Henkin, who wrote a sworn affidavit included in 
Sale.  
 




Louis Henkin, a University Professor Emeritus at Columbia and one of last century’s 
foremost scholars of international law, was the American Representative at the Ad Hoc Committee 
sessions that led to the first draft of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. “When the 
Committee drafted Article 33 we had in mind primarily persons seeking refuge across land 
boundaries: there had been stories, and some evidence, that police of some countries had pushed 
refugees back into the hands of the pursuing Nazis. Article 33 was designed to prohibit such 
heartless behavior. The Committee did not consider the case of refugees coming by boat in 
particular, but the sentiments moving the draftsmen and their governments applied to them as 
well.”351 This position, he said, remained the U.S.’s even after, when George Warren took over 
the drafting as U.S. Delegate to the Conference: “ [This] continued as the official position of the 
United States government with regard to the meaning of Article 33. Mr. Warren took no action to 
rescind that interpretation or to support any other interpretation.”352 
Before we look at how the language of Sale traveled to the Mediterranean and to the ECtHR 
judgment in Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, it is important to underscore the relation between the literal and 
the literary of the language of law that is a central concern for this thesis. This tension starts with 
the original use of refouler to describe, in official texts, the refusal, by a state, of persons escaping 
violence and persecution. The term refouler did not, however, have that meaning at the time it was 
used. For the first time, the idea of forceful action pervading the various senses of the French verb 
are attributed to that act of refusal. At the same time, refouler is used in this context as a metaphor 
to name the human rights crime of returning someone to persecution. Its English translation as ‘to 
return’, however, does not bear the same metaphorical character; it names literally rather than 
 
351 Henkin, Affidavit, para. 6, in Sale v. HCC. 




projecting an idea of forceful exclusion. Was it perhaps to compound literal and literary, metaphor 
and reality, that the President of the Conference proposed the grafting?  
As a result, it is not striking to see the Court aiming at the potential breadth of the grafting 
‘to return (refouler)’ by treating it as a one-to-one relationship between a word and its translation 
and not as an accretion of meaning. This enabled, in return, a certain idea of border to emerge from 
the reading, thus effectively keeping the high seas out of the reach of Article 33. J. Blackmun’s 
dissent tries to reestablish the metaphorical qualities of refoulement but he still does it by looking 
at translation, rather by considering that Article 33 in the English version retains the metaphorical 
qualities of refouler. Why is it important that the compound form brings into English the metaphor 
of the original refouler? I would argue that it is because the legitimacy of the Interdiction Program 
was grounded on a most literal interpretation of ‘return’, disregarding the fact that the original 
provision included metaphor. And this participated in the construction of the high seas as a space 
of illegalization where persons in flight are not covered by applicable protections.  
The link between Sale v. HCC and Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy that I am making has been made 
before by many scholars. Itamar Mann, in particular, devotes a considerable part of his study of 
the ‘human rights encounter’ at sea to the relationship between the two cases, and in particular 
between J. Blackmun’s dissent in Sale and the concurring opinion of J. Pinto de Albuquerque in 
Hirsi.353 With regard to the encounter at sea, Mann’s main concern, as a legal scholar and 
 
353 Itamar Mann, Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), in particular Chapter 5, “The Place Where We Stand”. Mann relies in part on 
and relays the work made on this particular question by Simon Cox, who was a lawyer assigned to Hirsi and who 
wrote about the Court’s decision in relation to J. Blackmun. “The clear and far-reaching opinion of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque shows the stark contrast between this result in Strasbourg and the much criticized ruling of the US 
Supreme Court in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, which upheld the action of US coast-guard vessels in intercepting 
and repatriating Haitian migrant boats. ... By requiring states to guarantee human rights beyond their state’s 
territorial boundaries, Europe’s human rights court has upheld the primacy of fundamental rights and the rule of 
law.” See Simon Cox, “Case Watch: European Ruling Affirms the Right of Migrants at Sea,” Open Society Justice 




international and human rights lawyer, is with the limits of sovereignty and the attribution of 
responsibility.354 My approach to the encounter at sea, which has benefited greatly from his and 
others’ work, lies to a greater extent with its linguistic fabric, and in particular with the negotiations 
of the multilingualism inherent to the principle regulating this encounter. As I have shown, the 
Court’s opinion in Sale delivered a judgement restricting access to human rights protections at sea 
via a restrictive understanding of jurisdiction and sovereignty on the high seas. That understanding 
was based and argued through a rather monolingual understanding of the phrase ‘to return 
(refouler)’.  
On the other hand, The ECtHR decision in Hirsi applies a much broader, and indeed almost 
opposite understanding of those limits. ‘To return’ interpreted narrowly and divorced from refouler 
allowed the Supreme Court to remove the high seas from the protection of Art. 33. Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent signaled the need to call the Interdiction Program by its name, i.e. an 
infringement of international refugee law. The hermeneutical monolingualism of the Court’s 
opinion, whereby only the English ‘to return’ in fact matters to understand refouler was questioned 
by J. Blackmun’ dissent. But it was only twenty years later that the compound form ‘to return 
(refouler)’ was given a full, bilingual and translingual interpretation by the ECtHR, and by J. Pinto 
de Albuquerque’s Separate Opinion. 
 
 I.4 Non-refoulement in the Mediterranean: Hirsi Jamaa vs. Italy (2012) 
 
On May 9, 2009, the Italian Coast Guard and Revenue Police intercepted two hundred 
individuals aboard three ships, thirty-five nautical miles south of the island of Lampedusa. The 
 
354 “But [sic] stepping out of sovereignty and into the high-seas commons, the balancing of relations between 
individuals shifts. Law defines differently the ways in which we are implicated by each other’s claim upon life. The 
absence of sovereign control leaves open the possibility of mutual responsibility among individuals. It is this 




intercepted individuals were transferred to military vessels and brought to Tripoli, Libya. During 
the voyage, Italian police allegedly took no steps to identify the passengers, nor did they inform 
them of their destination. Citing violations of Article 3 of the European Convention of Human 
rights (‘prohibition of torture’) and Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the same convention (‘prohibition of 
collective expulsion of aliens’), twenty-four of these individuals later brought a case to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), filed as Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, and 
adjudicated in 2012.355 
As in the case of the U.S. Interdiction Program, Italy’s actions on the high seas were taking 
place within the framework of a bilateral agreement, drafted in Tripoli in 2007 and ratified by the 
Italian Parliament in 2009, with the aim of “combating the phenomenon of illegal immigration.”356 
Article 2 of this bilateral agreement set up an area of interception of migrant vessels that included 
non-territorial waters.357 Yet, unlike the US Supreme Court in Sale v. HCC, the European Court 
 
355 ECtHR, Hirsi, para. 11. Given its importance and its ‘landmark’ status concerning State practices of pushback 
and return on the high seas, there is a large body of literature on the case. Among the most relevant to my discussion 
of the case are: Seline Trevisanut, “The Principle of Non-Refoulement and the De-Territorialization of Border 
Control at Sea”, Leiden Journal of International Law 27 (2014): 661–675; Seunghwan Kim, “Non-Refoulement and 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: State Sovereignty and Migration Controls at Sea in the European Context,” Leiden 
Journal of International Law 30 (2017): 49–70; Goodwin-Gill, “The Right to Seek Asylum”; Violeta Moreno-Lax, 
“Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy or the Strasbourg Court versus Extraterritorial Migration Control?,” Human Rights 
Law Review 12, no. 3 (2012), 574–598; Maarten den Heijer, “Reflections on Refoulement and Collective Expulsion 
in the Hirsi Case,” International Journal of Refugee Law 25, no. 2 (2013): 265–290; Mann, Humanity at Sea, 
Chapter 5; Efthymios Papastavridis, “The EU and the obligation of non-refoulement at sea,” in Migration in the 
Mediterranean: Mechanisms of International Cooperation, edited by Francesca Ippolito and Seline Trevisanut 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 236–262; Mariagiulia Giuffré, “Watered-Down Rights on the 
High Seas: Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (2012),” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 61, no. 3 
(July 2012): 728–750. 
356 “Fronteggiare il fenomeno dell’immigrazione clandestina”, Protocollo di Tripoli, 2007, Introductory notes. 
357 “Italy and the ‘Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ undertake to organise maritime patrols using six 
ships made available on a temporary basis by Italy. Mixed crews shall be present on ships, made up of Libyan 
personnel and Italian police officers, who shall provide training, guidance and technical assistance on the use and 
handling of the ships. Surveillance, search and rescue operations shall be conducted in the departure and transit areas 
of vessels used to transport clandestine immigrants, both in Libyan territorial waters and in international waters, in 
compliance with the international conventions in force and in accordance with the operational arrangements to be 




of Human Rights established Italy’s violation of the principle of non-refoulement by expanding 
the scope of the application of its obligation beyond state territorial borders. The ECtHR had in 
fact begun to establish a doctrine regarding non-refoulement, and particularly about non-
refoulement at sea, well before Hirsi. “As the Fifth Chamber noted in Medvedyev v. France in 
2008” writes Goodwin-Gill, “however legitimate it may be, the end does not justify the use of no 
matter what means.”358 
Interestingly, although Hirsi is generally spoken about as an important non-refoulement 
case,359 the principle does not figure among those allegedly infringed by Italy. In fact, in European 
human rights law there is no expressed prohibition of refoulement – whether direct or indirect. 
Nonetheless, the principle has been established by the ECtHR on the basis of the link between 
refoulement and the prohibition of torture. More specifically, the European Convention of Human 
Rights contains in Article 3 a prohibition against subjecting anyone “to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”360 This ties the text of the regional Convention to a global 
international covenant, the 1984 Convention Against Torture (CAT), in which we find the almost 
exact phrasing of Article 33 used in the context of torture.361 The absence of the principle of non-
refoulement from the European Convention, however, has not prevented the originally French 
 
358 “The special nature of the maritime environment relied upon by the Government in the instant case cannot justify 
an area outside the law where ships’ crews are covered by no legal system capable of affording them enjoyment of 
the rights and guarantees protected by the Convention which the States have undertaken to secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction, any more than it can provide offenders with a ‘safe haven’.” Medvedev v. France, ECtHR 2008, 
quoted in Goodwin-Gill, “The Right to Seek Asylum,” 446. 
359 See most recently Violeta Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe: Extraterritorial Border Controls and 
Refugee Rights under EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), in particular Chapters 6 and 8. 
360 Article 3, European Convention of Human Rights, last amended 2010. 
361 Article 3, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, New 
York, 10 December 1984. Article 3, para 1, reads: “No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a 
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.” Correspondingly, the French too bears the addition of the verb ‘extrader’ : “Aucun Etat partie 
n'expulsera, ne refoulera, ni n'extradera une personne vers un autre Etat où il y a des motifs sérieux de croire qu'elle 




‘non-refoulement’ from being adopted in several official documents, which in turn has led to 
translations of the principle in other EU languages, with different results.362 Even if we limit 
ourselves to three languages – French, English, and Italian – and one document – The 2011 
Qualifications Directive363 – we see how through various translations of the word its meaning is 
invariably refined and clarified, and thereby expanded. 
The Preamble to the Directive affirms the commitment of member States to work towards a 
Common European Asylum System “based on the full and inclusive application” of the 1951 
Convention, “thus affirming the principle of non-refoulement and ensuring that nobody is sent 
back to persecution.”364 The English version is striking because, while not translating ‘non-
refoulement’ , it nonetheless offers an indirect translation in the form of ‘to send back’. In the 
French and Italian versions the meaning is further refined but in ways that widen the semantic field 
of the original phrase ‘non-refoulement’. The Italian version reads: “[in tal modo da] garantire che 
nessuno sia nuovamente esposto alla persecuzione, in ottemperanza al principio di ‘non-
respingimento’ (divieto di rimpatrio a rischio di persecuzione).”365 The French version presents a 
 
362 See, for instance, a list of translations/imports of the phrase non-refoulement in all 28 EU languages, made by the 
Department of Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission: BG: non-refoulement / забрана за 
експулсиране или връщане; CS: princip nenavracení / non-refoulement; DE: Nichtzurückweisung / Non-
refoulement / Schutz vor Zurückweisung / Verbot der Ausweisung und Zurückweisung; EL: μη- επαναπροώθηση; 
EN: non-refoulement; ES: non-refoulement; ET: tagasisaatmise lubamatus/non-refoulement; FI: palauttamiskielto; 
FR: non-refoulement / interdiction de retour forcé (LU); GA: neamh-refoulement; HU: visszaküldés tilalma; IT: 
non-refoulement; LT: negrąžinimas; LV: neizraidīšana; MT: Prinċipju (il-) ta’ non-refoulement - li ma jsirx ritorn 
imġiegħel jew sfurzat; NL: non-refoulement / beginsel van niet-uitwijzing; PL: zasada non-refoulement/ zasada 
niewydalania; PT: non-refoulement RO: non-refoulment/nereturnare; SK: zásada zákazu vyhostenia alebo vrátenia 
/ zásada non-refoulement / princíp nenavrátenia; SL: načelo nevračanja; SV: non-refoulement (förbud mot 
avvisning / utvisning); NO: vern mot utsendelse (b); vern mot utsending (n). https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/content/non-refoulement_en, accessed May 28, 2019. 
363 “Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted,” 
which is the latest and more formal attempt at uniformize asylum criteria across the EU.  
364Directive 2011/95/EU, para (3) 
365 “Direttiva 2011/95/UE del Parlamento Europeo e del Consiglio del 13 dicembre 2011 recante norme 




similar strategy of over-translation: “[ afin ] d’assurer ainsi que nul ne sera renvoyé là où il risque 
à nouveau d’être persécuté, c’est-à-dire d’affirmer le principe de non-refoulement.”366 
Later in the same text, we are confronted with a similar example: in Article 21, titled in 
French ‘Protection contre le refoulement’, the form ‘non-refoulement’ is the same in French and 
English, whereas in Italian it becomes ‘respingimento’ (push-back). The verb ‘refouler’, however, 
which is used in para 2 of the same article, is consistently translated in Italian as ‘respingere’ (to 
push back), but in English it becomes something else, an altogether new form: to refoule.367 This 
strange formulation, which, although morphologically similar to French, reconfigures it 
syntactically, is a product of long-standing practice of a translingual use of non-refoulement,. 368  
It is apparent that although multiple translations that seemingly seek to maintain the 
original French ‘refouler-refoulement’ as long as possible in the target language, the meaning of 
the French concept has gained in scope and precision since the Court’s Opinion in Sale. Not only 
has the phrase non-refoulement become a jus cogens principle of international law in its original 
French form, thus traveling untranslated – at least morphologically – to multiple jurisdictions. But 
it is perhaps its original opacity – the non-commensurate nature of the multilingual compound ‘to 
return (refouler)’, itself rooted in the metaphorical use of the verb refouler – that provides the 
 
uno status uniforme per i rifugiati o per le persone aventi titolo a beneficiare della protezione sussidiaria, nonché sul 
contenuto della protezione riconosciuta.” 
366 “Directive 2011/95/UE Du Parlement Européen et du Conseil du 13 décembre 2011 concernant les normes 
relatives aux conditions que doivent remplir les ressortissants des pays tiers ou les apatrides pour pouvoir bénéficier 
d’une protection internationale, à un statut uniforme pour les réfugiés ou les personnes pouvant bénéficier de la 
protection subsidiaire, et au contenu de cette protection.” https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/FR/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32011L0095&from=EN, accessed May 28, 2019 
367 “Where not prohibited by the international obligations mentioned in paragraph 1, Member States may refoule a 
refugee, whether formally recognised or not, when:[ …]”. Directive 2011/95/EU (EN), Article 21, para 2 
368 I believe that this non-translation but trans-syntaxisation of the French verb actually works in English. Ironically 
the French ‘refoule’, which corresponds to the 3rd singular and singular imperative, in this context would go quite 




reason for its widespread presence in international law. The example of article 21 of the 
Qualification Directive, cited above, is telling: Forms such as ‘to refoule’ in English and 
‘respingere’ in Italian translate the original refouler but do not erase it by translation. On the 
contrary, the French survives and resounds behind any attempt at translating, perhaps because of 
the original ‘poetic license’ represented by its use in Article 33.  
 
 I.5 Pinto de Albuquerque’s ‘Abstract’ Refoulement  
 
The need to make the principle of non-refoulement recognizable in its original form while 
adapting it to the context of the EU’s unavoidable multilingualism in my view laid the basis for 
the wide interpretation that the Court offered in Hirsi.  
 J. Pinto’s Separate Opinion is in this respect telling, because it offers and understanding 
of it that goes well beyond the boundaries of earlier understandings article 33, thus capturing in an 
unprecedented way the abstractive quality of the original use of refouler in the context of refugees 
moving across borders.  
 “The act of refoulement,” J. Pinto writes, “may consist in expulsion, extradition, 
deportation, removal, informal transfer, ‘rendition’, rejection, refusal of admission or any other 
measure which would result in compelling the person to remain in the country of origin.”369 In this 
unprecedentedly wide definition of refoulement, J. Pinto decisively divorces the border from the 
act, and extends the verb refouler past its immediate meaning to encompass its effect, that is, to 
force someone ‘to remain’ in the place they attempted to flee. But since a wider definition of what 
constitutes an act of refoulement would be somehow incomplete without a matching definition of 
 




what the cases in which a lawful act of expulsion should be indeed considered refoulement, J. Pinto 
also redefines the notion of “serious harm”, on which the principle rests and which is the notion 
that connects the principle of non-refoulement to what legally constitutes a refugee370: “The risk 
of serious harm”, he adds, “may result from foreign aggression, internal armed conflict, 
extrajudicial death, enforced disappearance, death penalty, torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, forced labour, trafficking in human beings, persecution, trial based on a retroactive 
penal law or on evidence obtained by torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, or a ‘flagrant 
violation’ of the essence of any Convention right in the receiving State (direct refoulement) or 
from further delivery of that person by the receiving State to a third State where there is such 
risk.”371    
The result of these acts of rewriting is the consequential redefinition of what is permitted 
on the high seas. Following J. Pinto’s opinion, the refugee at sea is far more non-refoulable than 
she was in the Caribbean twenty years prior. The perimeter of what constitutes danger around her 
has also been significantly enlarged. As a result, the encounter is reshaped through what constitutes 
a hermeneutical attempt at stripping it of its violence and rebalancing the original asymmetry in 
which it happens, and the high seas emerge as a space of conflicting trajectories and competing 
definitions of persons and their rights.  
 
Part II: Onboard Poetry 
 
Of the literary endeavors concerned with escape or migration on the high seas, few try to 
imagine and inhabit a position on board a migrant boat on the high seas and on board the naval or 
 
370 On the link between the notions of ‘serious harm’ and ‘credible fear’ being at the basis of what constitutes a 
refugee, and on the principle of non-refoulement being tightly linked to them, see Kälin et al., “Article 33.” 




coast guard vessel dispatched to intercept it. After considering the multilingualism of illegalization 
at sea in a transnational juridical space, this section will look at how two poets responded and 
contributed to that grammar and responded to the factual claims and stated truths of the legal 
frameworks by emphasizing the figurative and the fluid. “Dream Haiti”, published in 1994 by 
Kamau Brathwaite, and Se i delfini venissero in aiuto, published in 2017 by Erri De Luca, look at 
the Caribbean and the Central Mediterranean in unusual ways. I consider, below, their differences 
and similarities in engaging with, dreaming, and writing the high seas as a space of criminalized 
mobility.  
Specifically, I consider the differences between Brathwaite ‘dreaming himself’ on a raft 
and on a “Coast Guard Gutter” [sic] that intercepted the raft in 1994, and De Luca writing from 
the deck of a MSF ship in the Central Mediterranean about vessels it tracks and rescues. I ask what 
these differences tell us about the reach and the limits of imagination when it comes to writing the 
encounter from a ship, and not the fixed perspective of the coast. The reason for choosing these 
two poems is that, among the works that represent the crossing, they explore, in quite different 
ways, the fine ethical, legal, and practical lines between interception and rescue. Interdiction, 
interception, return, expulsion, refoulement are just some of the definitions given to the State action 
of stopping unauthorized vessels on the high seas and, as we have seen in the earlier sections of 
this chapter, they must or at least should overlap with the ‘law of solidarity’ governing all cases of 
distress at sea. As another example crystallizing the paradoxes of ‘humanitarian reason’ uneasily 
straddling the use of force with the duty to rescue, the encounter-as-rescue, both failed and 
successful, is articulated by Brathwaite and De Luca in powerful ways that shed light on the links 
between legal imagination, humanitarian and security regimes and poetic representation of 




When engaging with heavily-regulated spaces of migration, generally shielded from public 
view, and with the questions of justice that they pose, poetry acts on the boundaries of the 
imaginable and the livable and visible. It engages, beyond the strictly observational, with the 
reality of a highly asymmetrical encounter between a military apparatus of control and 
unseaworthy vessels, between thick steel and deflating plastic and rotting wood. The power of 
poetry resides in its ability to tell us something else about the encounter. Both Brathwaite’s ‘dream’ 
and De Luca’s first-hand testimony pause on its dangers and cruelty but also on its potential power 
of salvation and relief. Through their witnessing and imagining, these two poems bring the 
encounter to life, not excluding its most inhumane aspects, such as the reality of drowning. As a 
result Brathwaite’s and De Luca’s poetry – revising the logic of what is important and worth telling 
of the encounter at sea – escapes the boundaries of the legal, the verifiable, the true and confronts, 
through metaphor, free verse, and visions, the injustice of the real with another way to imagine it 
and practice it. 
At the time of the US Interdiction Program, the US Coast was responsible for conducting 
Search and Rescue as well as interception operations on the high seas. This has also been the case 
in the Mediterranean until operation Mare Nostrum, after which large-scale systematic Search and 
Rescue operations conducted by States have become political questions and have been 
subsequently abandoned.372 The focus, both at the EU and the national level, shifted forcefully 
 
372 A quick history of recent operations in the Central Mediterranean here [to develop]: The first institutionalized, 
systematic rescue was the Mare Nostrum operation (2015), later abandoned by Italy citing lack of collaboration from 
EU countries and institutions and its increasing political costs for the center-left government at the time. It was 
replaced by the operation Sophia, run by Frontex. Sophia dramatically redirected the focus from rescue to 
interception, by decreasing the number of vessels and explicitly privileging border control over rescue. Now, the 
space between Libya and Italy in particular has been rewritten under operation Nauras, which consisted in inventing 
a ‘Libyan Coast Guard” by arming militias more or less affiliated with Fayez Al-Serraj and providing them with old 
Italian military vessels. Under the terms of the operation, the newly-constituted Libyan Coast Guard was in charge 




towards interceptions and various forms of return. In the face of continuing departures from the 
Libyan coast and the effective retreat of states from their rescue duties, privately-funded NGOs 
comprised mostly of E.U. citizens started chartering or repurposing vessels to conduct rescue 
operations on the high seas between Tunisia, Libya, Malta, and Italy. The presence of private 
rescue ships in an area usually under the control of states was depicted as a ‘pull factor’ that had 
the perverse effect of encouraging departures and, consequently, of putting lives at risk. This 
political campaign against private rescue was accompanied by judicial and legislative efforts to 
criminalize it373 and leave the high seas to an outsourced military force of interception and pull-
back in the form of the newly-formed ‘Libyan Coast Guard’.374 As a result, rescue at sea of vessels 
leaving Libya is increasingly treated on the scale of criminal behavior, with the intent to clear the 
high seas of every non-state entity.375 Increasingly, crossers and rescuers are equally illegalized, 
sometimes in similar ways but with openly different outcomes: the latter cannot be deported, 








373 Lorenzo Pezzani and Charles Heller, Death by Rescue: The Lethal Effects of the EU’s Policies of Non-Assistance. 
London: Forensic Oceanography, 2016. Film, 14 mins. https://deathbyrescue.org/  
374 While prosecutors in Southern Italy investigated (and impounded) NGO ships for a variety of possible violations, 
including smuggling, the Italian Interior Minister issued a strict “Code of Conduct’ to which NGO ships had to abide 
in order to act in the SAR zone off the Libyan waters. See Violeta Moreno-Lax, “’Nonsensical,’ ‘Dishonest,’ 
‘Illegal’: The ‘Code of Conduct’”, interview with Sea-watch.org, July 24, 2017, available at https://sea-
watch.org/en/nonsensical-dishonest-illegal-the-code-of-conduct/. Particularly in the South of Italy judicial 
investigation resources have long been used to combat organized crime. Now those same resources, human as well 
as material, are increasingly being shifted towards investigating private rescue at sea as an organized criminal 
enterprise. Following its bloody ‘guerra all Mafia’ that had is apex throughout the 1990s, Italy’s has built of the 
most refined legislative apparatuses against organized crime in the EU. 
375 This is of course the case when we consider Libyan militias armed and dressed up as ‘coast guards’ as “State 
entities”. As noted above, NGO ships as well as ‘smugglers’ are now being investigated using anti-mafia judicial 




 II.1 ‘Dream Haiti’  
 
Brathwaite has described the poems that make up DreamStories “like a kind of RIFT 
VALLEY in my sensscape” after three major events: the passing of his wife; the destruction of his 
Barbados home, library and personal archives in 1988, and a violent sequestration at his apartment 
in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1990. It is after this time of trauma – to which Brathwaite also refers as 
his ‘Time of Salt’ – that he developed the graphic poetics that he called “Sycorax Video Style.” 
Made of “shifting typefaces, indeterminate syntax, ambiguous images and ‘calibanisms’”376, 
Brathwaite’s breakup of typescript and visual conventions aims to “unsettle the reader’s 
expectations by an unfixing or unhinging of word and image.”377 Moreover, his reconfiguration of 
the relationship between voice and visuality “moves between registers, creating frequently dense 
syntactic and referential networks that suspend his poetry between testimony and artifact.”378 
“Through Sycorax, Brathwaite articulates what he calls a genuine ‘alterNative,’ a notion of culture 
‘in its otherness’ predicated on difference and differentiation, and a poetic procedure linked to 
what he calls ‘trans-liminalness, trans-limitness erasure of xpectant boundaries’, emphasizing the 
‘trans-’ of transmission or transit.”379 Discussing the formal and textual innovations that are 
constitutive of Brathwaite’s poetics would require reading for and writing a parallel project. Thus, 
in what can perhaps be seen as an excessive narrowing of the focus, I will not be engaging with 
otherwise central aspects of his work such as the development of Sycorax as a form of visual art 
 
376 Sycorax is used in reference to the mother of Caliban, the unseen character of Shakespeare’s The Tempest, 
credited by Brathwaite as his muse. Anthony Reed, Freedom Time: The Poetics and Politics of Black Experimental 
Writing (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 60.  
377 Gordon Roehler, a Brathwaite specialist who entertained with the author a lengthy epistolary relationship, 
described DreamStories this way. Roehler, “Introduction”, in Kamau Braithwaite, Dreamstories (Harlow, UK: 
Longman, 1994), viii.  
378 Reed, Freedom Time, 60.  




and nation-language.380 The DreamStories are all poems presented in the form of dreams that are 
concerned, at varying degrees, with violence and death. In light of their genesis and their origin in 
traumatic events in Brathwaite’s life that had all to do with loss, it may not be inaccurate to suggest 
that these are poems of grief.  
Despite their oneiric character, each of the ‘stories’ in DreamStories is rooted heavily in 
the first person and Brathwaite’s personal experience. The dreams are his, and he is himself – to a 
large extent – in them. Given this autobiographical referencing, I speak below of ‘the poet’ when 
evoking the narrating voice. However, it is immediately clear that the oneiric character is not 
simply a fiction of trauma displacement. In powerful ways, it enables the creation of the 
fluctuating, transforming and ubiquitous identity of the narrating voice, which is able to cut across 
characters, objects, temporalities and space in the same dream. As I will show below, this is a 
central element in the construction of the encounter at sea. 
There are at least three versions of ‘Dream Haiti’, each substantially different from the 
others. Not only do they differ in length, but the content they have in common presents significant 
variations in spelling and visual-typographic emphasis. I have chosen to read the poem’s first 
edition, written in February 1992 and published two years later in Dreamstories,381 because of a 
certain temporal symmetry with De Luca’s text. Having been written when the lawsuits against 
 
380 Brathwaite describes the technicalities that enabled Sycorax as follows: “the voice of a simple MAC SE30 and an 
almost xhausted Stylewriter printer … to make possible the revolutionary return of speak-voice-bo- | dy cinema-
performance riddim in what we can now truly say is MODERN poetry”. Quoted in Reed, Freedom Time, 63. 
“Nation language emerges in [Brathwaite’s] History of the Voice as a catachresis for the “submerged” African 
aspect of the English language that traditional English prosody suppresses or distorts into the mask of dialect. 
Crucially, nation language emerges as part of a larger project of cultural interpretation that unseats European 
literature, metonymically invoked through iambic pentameter, as the standard against which the literature of the 
former colonies should be measured. Brathwaite’s insistence on literary and aesthetic standards tooted in the 
Caribbean and the lives of the people who live there is perennially important, especially for the processes of 
decolonization that follow the end of formal colonization.” Reed, Freedom Time, 61. 




the Interdiction Program had yet to reach the Supreme Court, ‘Dream Haiti’ shares with Se i delfini 
.. an engagement with a space under legal and discursive transformation. That space was no longer 
the same at the time of publication in 1994 after the Supreme Court ruling on Sale, just as the high 
seas from which De Luca wrote in 2016 have also changed since.382  
‘Dream Haiti’, the fifth of the seven-poem collection that is DreamStories, is dedicated to 
Trinidadian calypso legend David Rudder, who in 1987 recorded an album titled Haiti. The title-
track is itself subtitled “An apology to the most overlooked country in the Caribbean.”383 Slightly 
lower down on the title page, the poem bears a second inscription that resembles a dedication to 
the memory of “Alex Haley / 20 Yrs in the US Coast Guard who dies today May 92 / Age 70”. 
This dedication is both posthumous and a posteriori, in the sense that the date “May 92” does not 
match the date and place – “New York, February 1992” – indicated at the end of the poem, right 
above the stylized silhouette of a (military) ship standing where a signature is usually positioned. 
Alex Haley, most famous for his work with Malcolm X on the latter’s Autobiography and for his 
popular novel Roots, is here remembered in his lesser-known capacity as a member of the US 
Coast Guard, in which he enlisted in 1939. Haley was deployed in the Pacific during WWII, and 
quit 20 years later, at 48 years of age.384  
 
382 Published in 2007, The “Dream Haiti” version in DS(2): Dreamstories (New York: New Directions, 2007) is 
much longer and the poem’s political engagement with one side is made more clear throughout. The existence of 
these two versions would deserve a comparative reading of the encounter across the two. The third version, much 
shorter, appeared in Stefanie Hessler, ed., Tidalectics: Imagining an Oceanic Worldview through Art and Science 
(Boston: MIT Press, 2018). 
383 From David Rudder’s personal website, http://www.davidmichaelrudder.com/, accessed May 10, 2019. The song 
is interesting in that it historicizes the suffering of Haitians under the violence of consecutive bloody dictatorships 
by tying it to the price that Haitians have had to pay for their ‘original’ rebelliousness and struggle of independence 
from France. In particular, the song makes an explicit link between ancient slave ships and contemporary boats. In 
the third verse, Rudder sings the following words: “They say the middle passage is gone / So how come / 
Overcrowded boat still haunt our lives / I refuse to believe that we good people / Would forever turn our hearts / 
And our eyes … away.” 
384 Ironically or not, Alex Haley has a Coast Guard Cutter named after him, whose homeport is currently Kodiak, 
Alaska, where its primary tasks are “homeland security, search and rescue, and international and domestic fisheries 





 II.2 The Encounter at Sea in ‘Dream Haiti’ 
 
In Dream Haiti, the encounter is enveloped in a dream. It is less a punctual event than a 
sensible reconstruction that spans – with frequent interjections – the entire length of the poem. As 
a result, the contours of the scene are not drawn clearly, and the haze and narrow focus of the 
dream blurs any initial attempt at reconstructing the characters and, among them, the position of 
the first persons, singular and plural. This blurriness, like mist from waves on a shield, is created 
from the very first stanza: 
 
The sea was like a slate of what was left of 
my body 
& the white waves 
I remember 
they was like very white on what was left of my skin  
& they kept comin in at this soft swishing diagonal  
against the 
bow & wet metal slides of my nerves 
 
where the US Coast Guard cutter was patrolling all  
along the borders of the Mexicans & my brothers - 
the what was called ‘the Haitian Refugees’ 385 
 
 
Although the general elements of the scene appear clearly – a sea, a ship, and the poet – 
distinctions between them are not easy to make: their edges disaggregate and merge into one 
another. The body and skin of the narrating voice are already no longer whole, as if by erosion of 
the methodical, rhythmic impact of waves. More strikingly in an almost systematic way, the body 
 
SAR vessel, recommissioned for the Coast Guard under its current name in 1999. For a full bio see 
https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Cutters/cgcAlexHaley/ , accessed April 23, 2019. It may appear 
striking that a poem like “Dream Haiti,” which seems to be — at least in general terms — in solidarity with the 
plight of Haitians fleeing their homeland while the United States enforced a program of High Seas interceptions and 
summary returns, is dedicated to a member of the Government Agency tasked to carry out such interdictions, albeit 
an agent long retired by the time it was put in place. The lines of solidarity criss-crossing the poem sometimes 
intersect in ways that would merit systematic investigation. 




of the poet seems to mix with and transform into the colors and textures surrounding him: the grey, 
the waves, and the ‘diagonal swishing’ “against the / bow & wet metal slides of my nerves.” In 
what E. Deloughrey, in one of the few critical works engaging directly and consistently with the 
poem, has called a “blurring of past and present, self and other, human being and steel ship,”386 
not only do waves wash the skin as well as the ship’s bow, they also wash the “metal slides” of 
the narrator’s nerves. This identification leaves room for a multimorphic figure made of water, 
metal, and human body parts. Any attempt at locating the body as alive or not, and at positioning 
it vis-à-vis the ship, is complicated by its physical transformations and identification with non-
organic (metal) and non-human elements. Yet, from this confusion of materials and shapes – ropes 
like nerves, body parts like ship parts – emerges a transcendent figure that, in the rest of the poem, 
will morph into different shapes, characters, continent, and jump from the cutter into the sea.  
The last three verses of the incipit somehow clarify the landscape and the ‘theatre of 
operations’ while signaling, briefly, a solidarity between the poet and his “brothers / the what was 
called ‘the Haitian Refugees’’, and the Mexicans. On the other hand, or side, the Coast Guard 
cutter patrolling all along the borders. Yet the position of the narrating voice, little by little, shifts: 
 
“And it was not that we was goin anywhere if you  
 
386 Elizabeth DeLoughrey, “Heavy Waters: Waste and Atlantic Modernity,” PMLA 125, no. 3 (2010): 709. As 
mentioned, DeLoughrey’s is one of the few sustained critical engagements with “Dream Haiti”. She reads it for its 
material component, retracing what she sees as Brathwaite’s treatment of Haitian refugees as “human waste” in the 
frame of a larger argument, thematic as well as historical, about the transportation, policing and effective discarding 
of black bodies across the Atlantic from the Middle Passage to the Interdiction Program. Although she is in my 
opinion off on a few elements (such as the ship Salvages as being the name of the Coast Guard cutter, whereas I 
believe the poem being very clear in naming Salvages the ‘canot’ given by the smuggler to the protagonist to leave 
the island clandestinely: “in all that mist of Kenscoff & bamboo & filao & did not even / have time to scrape the 
ashes from the fireplace / before I was down the hill bound for those / tuilleries behind the Iron Market / whe we was 
to meet the man w/ the canot / Salvages “ [Brathwaite, DS(2), 172.]), she correctly frames the poet as the “protean” 
protagonist of this dream. I would like to argue that this ‘protean’ quality is paramount for a representation of the 
encounter that exceeds the boundaries of the Coast Guard cutter’s deck and allows the poet to become a 
shipwrecked haitian looking at the cutter from the waves, waiting for a rope. More below. Other readings of “Dream 
Haiti” include April Shemak’s in Asylum Speakers: Caribbean Refugees and Testimonial Discourse (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2011) and, to a lesser extent, Angela Naimou’s mention of the poem in Salvage Works: 




see what I mean 
i mean we was not goin anywhere although the ship  
was movin 
i suppose & the sea was also movin impeccable & so 
were the waves 
& yet in my dream it was juss like on board anyship 
Anytime & tide  
[...] 
& there was like nothing we cd do about anything 
now that we was there in the dream of the ship 
waiting as I say for these Haitian refugees in a  
strange land 
 
& I do not know why i was there - 
how i came to be on board that ship - that navel of 
my past w/ my nerves as I say comin & goin & my 
head soffly spinning387 
 
The narrating voice comes in and out of the dream to lay out, over the course of these three 
stanzas, a transformation of the state of the poet and of its purpose. From simply existing – or 
rather being – simultaneously in organic and inorganic matter, the body of the narrator has become 
one not only with the steel elements of the ship but also with its movement, ‘impeccably’ in 
coordination with the waves. The syntax and the overall sense of absence contribute to creating 
the rocking of waves as an endlessly repeating action, frozen in time. We understand, however, in 
our first perception of recognizable historical reality, that the ship on which the poet is located and 
with which he shares elements is in fact waiting, on the ‘strange land’ that are the high seas. This 
is, in my opinion, a feature of the encounter that ‘Dream Haiti’ uniquely brings out: the State 
waiting for fleeing vessels. It reverses a dominant trope in representations of sea crossings where 
vessels – especially those tasked with interceptions – are generally moving and shaping the 
landscape with their movement and noise. Immobility – and the silencing of the engine – are 
 




mostly used at night as a way to remain undetected by a moving patrolling vessel.388 Otherwise, 
stillness and silence mean that, in cases of an engine failure or other emergency, the boat can no 
longer continue and starts drifting. Drifting is, in the reality of boat crossing and thus in our 
imaginary, the prerogative of unseaworthy boats, not of Coast Guard cutters.389 Drifting is thus, 
usually, a synonym of distress. Here, on the contrary, Brathwaite presents it, in a manner that may 
seem ingenuous, as a hunting technique. The mobility of the voice across objects and identities 
continues, and with it, the in and out of the dream: 
 
 since i was suppose to be a poet not a coast guard 
cutter or fireman or one or two others on that  
 deck & standing by the railing where there was  
 these hard white life-savers or boys that you  
 pulley over yr head like tyres as you swim in the  
 dark or the water or  
throw them screaming to someone trying to dream or drownin390  
 
 
This stanza has obscure passages – such as the phrase ‘someone trying to dream or 
drownin’ – but its overall implications are very clear. It is the poem’s first description of an 
approaching encounter in what, even inside the dream, is still the work of the narrating voice’s 
imagination. The poet here is imagining himself under an identity other than his own while 
imagining, in a sort of oneiric mise en abîme, the trajectory of the life-saver once it is thrown 
overboard, and how the drowning would have to bring her head underwater in order to bring it 
over her head and finally be pulled back onboard. As a result, the poet onboard is no longer a poet 
 
388 See, for instance Merzak Allouache, Harragas (Algeria: Librisfilms, 2009), 95 mins. 
389 In Liquid Traces (London: Forensic Oceanography, 2014), 17 mins., Lorenzo Pezzani and Charles Heller 
reconstitute through various data sources precisely the drifting of what became known as “the left-to-die boat”, 
whose distress call was ignored for days resulting in the death of several passengers. The material assembled in 
Liquid Traces was used as evidence in a case against several EU navies present in the area for failure to rescue. 




but a ‘man of rescue’, whether it be on sea or land (‘ a cutter or fireman’). This specific instance 
reinforces the pattern of mutation and transformation that the narrating voice undergoes throughout 
the text while it makes visible an inherent paradox of the high seas as a space of migration: as ‘a 
cutter or fireman’ the poet is – or cannot help but being – an interceptor and a rescuer. Thus ‘cutter’ 
– a name given to light and powerful vessels dedicated to maritime enforcement, among other 
things to cut other vessel’s trajectories – may be seen, in this personified version, as a realization 
and admission of unavoidable responsibility.  
This inseparable duplicity is, as we have seen throughout this chapter, embodied by the 
conflictual practices of the high seas as a space of freedom and solidarity, but also of the repression 
and restriction of migration and of the universal duty to rescue. In “Dream Haiti’, this foreshadows 
the displacement of the narrating voice form the deck to the water, from being a rescuer/captor to 
finding himself, along with others, in the water. 
 
& we were trying to reach the lifelines that were 
made of the same material as our lungs & our 
fingers & our skin although we cd hardly see that 
nobody had started throwing any of them overboard 
to help us 
 
The dream, and the protean qualities of the character, are used here to investigate death by 
drowning. The scene is set magisterially, reaffirming the continuum between flesh and metal, 
between deck and sea, between poet(s) on the cutter and poet(s) drowning. It’s all one scene made 
of intertwined, albeit different, materials. Ropes could be organic or organs made of metal or 
plastic, there is no escaping the fact that deeply-connected tissues deeply connect fates. With 
sarcastic detachment, the poet tells the dream a posteriori, where bodies in the water, some already 





& there was so much going on all above & around us 
what with the ferrymen shouting and fighting for 
survivors though we were all quite dead and bloated 
by this time 
& some of us had even started floating on our 
blacks up to the surface which is when i suppose we 
cd barely see 
 
that nobody wasnt throwing no lifelines nor booies 
nor anything like that toward us & in anycase i 
didn’t have time to think any of this down even if i cd391 
 
The irony of death by lack of rescue, unexpected and unwarranted, continues and grows in 
bitterness. Corpses float on their bellies, well past death, thus they can’t see the life-lines nor ‘those 
mints’, as they were not thrown at them. After several stanzas in which a poetics of material and 
ethical interpenetration is developed, we witness here a strain: the shipwrecked and drowning are 
removed from everything else surrounding them, human or inanimate, by the absence of life-line 
or ‘booie’. This is an additional feature of Brathwaite’s poetics of the encounter: It culminates and 
seems to reach its climax in absence, that is, in the failure to rescue. A specific type of death is 
evoked here: one indirectly caused by privation of the object that would constitute contact and 
provide salvation.  
 
 II.3 Se i delfini venissero in aiuto 
 
In 2017, when De Luca’s text was published, the high seas had recently been profoundly 
rewritten by a variety of rulings, law decrees and events. Since Hirsi Jamaa, the EU and Italy have 
intensively coordinated their political thinking towards ways to circumvent the principle of non-
refoulement that the ECtHR had just upheld. Since the demise of operation Mare Nostrum and the 
end of large-scale, systematic state rescue programs, the criminalization of migration has extended 
 




beyond the boats attempting the crossing by boats to the private rescue ships that have attempted 
to fill the enormous void left by Italy and the European Union. The hasty construction of a semi-
fictitious Libyan Coast Guard had the goal of reconstituting the Libyan SAR zone over which the 
new Coast Guard would have sole jurisdiction to conduct rescues and, most importantly, to prevent 
boats from sailing further North. In the grammar and syntax of illegalization subjects, tenses, and 
modes have then changed. Europe was no longer going to refouler or push back, it was going to 
keep boats out by arming (in the case of Libya) and financing (in the case of Turkey) coastal states 
to prevent crossing. As a result refouler became retenir, ‘to push back’ became ‘to pull back,’ and 
the verb ‘to return’ – so contentious in its transitive form throughout Sale v. HCC – started being 
used in a no less problematic intransitive form: “The dinghies were forced to return.”392 
It is in this land and seascape progressively and intensively reshaped by the criminalization 
of seafaring migration as well as its rescue apparatus that De Luca’s Se i delfini venissero in aiuto 
roots itself and takes shape. Erri De Luca, a well-known leftist poet and writer now in his late 60’s, 
is not new to political action nor to political, polemical writing. In 2015, his trial for ‘instigation 
to sabotage’ cited as evidence his words against the high-speed railway project that would connect 
Turin to Lyon at a high environmental cost. The highly-publicized trial ultimately ended with De 
Luca’s acquittal on ‘lack of grounds’ but made De Luca one of the most prominent intellectual 
voices of the movement against the project and more in general against environmentally-blind 
transnational economic interests. Se i delfini … is not De Luca’s first attempt at writing about 
migration across the Central Mediterranean. In his 2005 poetry collection, solo andata, he engaged 
directly with contemporary maritime crossings. The title-poem, in particular, is a polyphonic 
 
392 “Costretti al rientro,” in Erri De Luca, Se i delfini venissero in aiuto (Naples, Italy: Libreria Dante & Descartes, 




account of different trajectories of migration that meet on a boat. This work, in all its imaginative 
and narrative power,393 rests squarely on a distance between poet and event that is a fairly constant 
feature of literature about the crossing. The poet is rarely on board, is rarely present, it is always 
speaking through a passenger. Perhaps more in line with a form of mimetic and identificative 
solidarity through which the poet lends his voice to persons fleeing on a boat, this very act shows 
the distance that still separates – legally and emotionally - those at sea from those on land. The act 
of identification with the fleeing passengers of a boat bypasses them as independent voices and 
erases the possibilities of the encounter. This posture was indeed more frequent, and widely 
accepted, in the earlier stages of migration across the Mediterranean, or rather, at the beginning of 
publicly-exposed emergencies, when numbers were significant yet incomparable with those of the 
2013-2015 period and the problem of State interception seemingly not as acute. Practices of 
summary return, however, had existed for decades, both in the Mediterranean and the Caribbean.394 
I have chosen to leave De Luca’s early work on migration aside and to focus instead on Se 
i delfini ... because it belongs to a different era of migration, and also because the different material, 
demographic, and discursive conditions of this particular era are what made De Luca leave the 
shore and set out to sea, as a poet and writer, on an NGOship conducting SARs on the high seas. 
Moreover, these material and discursive conditions result directly from the way in which legal and 
political writings have shaped practices of criminalization and migration control around and 
 
393 The crossing and what precedes it, particularly the flight from an unspecified location in Africa and the time 
spent on the boat are imagined and narrated in the first person and with vivid detail. This only contributes to signal 
the distance between these imagined crossings and those actually crossing, while the poet remains squarely on the 
shore.  
394 The shipwreck of the Kater i Rades (January 1997), carrying Albanian asylum-seekers to Italy, after collision 
with an Italian Coast Guard vessel was the first deadly episode of interceptions at sea that resounded loudly in 
Italian public opinion. See, among others, Maurizio Albahari, Crimes of Peace: Mediterranean Migrations at the 
World’s Deadliest Borders, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), and Alessandro Leogrande, La 




against the principle of non-refoulement as reassessed, in the Mediterranean, by the ECtHR in 
Hirsi Jamaa. 
In Se i delfini, despite the lyricism enveloping the chronicle, there is no room for doubt 
about poet’s position – physical as well as moral and political – vis-à-vis the encounter on the high 
seas. De Luca the poet and citizen, sets himself squarely on the good side – on the right deck – is 
generally adamant in drawing a moral line between those at sea, governed by and abiding by its 
laws – from those crossings to the Coast Guard agents – and those who try to extend to and impose 
on that space policies of control that, in their application, disregard the sea’s basic principle of 
saving human life in distress. Se i delfini also offers a unique perspective on the rescue encounter. 
Besides being a first-hand account of the ‘human rights encounter’ at sea from the point of view 
of a poet participating in that encounter, it also allows us to glimpse, and therefore discuss, a 
question that is rarely raised. Specifically, Se i delfini makes us ask what it means to witness and 
write the rescue encounter from the point of view of a non-State actor involved in it: a particular 
legal and ethical position vis-à-vis the persons rescued.  
The poets stayed onboard for a agreed-upon period of two weeks, during which the ship 
Prudence docked twice in Sicily to allow for the disembarkation of the rescued. The two excerpts 
that I have chosen to read articulate two distinct types of encounter: the one that happens and the 
one that, like in Brathwaite, is expected but does take place. 
“At six in the morning, 18 nautical miles off the Libyan coast Pietro Catania, captain of the 
MSF’s ship Prudence, shows me on the map the location of three inflatable boats that were 
signaled to have departed during the night from the beaches around Sabrata. I grab my 
binoculars and start my observation shift. Radars are not enough to spot a boat that low, 
made of rubber and human bodies. On the other side of the bow Mathias Kennes, on-board 
official for MSF, scans the remainder of the horizon. We see lights on shore, the sunrise is 
clear. Hours pass and nothing happens. We are eventually told that the dinghies have been 
intercepted by Libyan patrol vessels and have been forced to return. [...] On board the 
Prudence everything was ready. We’re left with our fists clenched, unable to open them to 




sink without waves, and blasphemy it is to drown when the sea is calm, when there is no 
force that is adverse in nature, except for ours. We’re left with our fists clenched.”395 
 
As in “Dream Haiti”, we are confronted with a sentiment that emerges as constitutive of 
the rescue encounter but which is rarely – if ever – discussed in such terms. It is the sense of 
expectation and attente, of hurry and constraint, that inhabits both sides – the rescuer as well as 
the passengers in distress – from the moment a mayday is sent out. In Brathwaite, as here, the 
encounter did not materialize. But if in ‘Dream Haiti’ the poet retreated from the scene and from 
the water to tell that emotion, here we learn with De Luca that the dinghies were pulled back. I 
have yet to find a suitable translation for the Italian ‘rimaniamo con i pugni chiusi’ – which I have 
translated with ‘our fists clenched’ in a way that only covers one shade of the term. The original 
text plays strongly on the double meaning of rage and frustration – which is the general meaning 
of the expression – and the impossibility to act, to open one’s hand to the rescued, and to actualize 
the possible physical manifestations of the encounter, the touch, the lifting and rescuing grip. 
 
“The following day at dawn we resume scanning the horizon through our binoculars. We 
know they left from Sabrata. My cabin mate, Firas, is reading Facebook messages in Arabic 
where info of this kind is exchanged. We are able to locate the first rubber boat: it is 
overcrowded, men are riding one leg out over the sides, and it’s deflating at the bow. It is 
approached by our emergency vessel (the “fast unit”) that, first thing, hands out lifejackets. 
Often, seeing rescue approaching generates a dangerous frenzy onboard the rubber boats. 
The sea is as smooth as it was yesterday. Firas, from the bow of the fast unit, is trying to 
keep everyone calm by shouting information on how the rescue will be conducted. When 
everyone has their life-jackets on, the Prudence approaches and hooks the boat to its side. 
They climb up using a small rope ladder, helped on their last step by strong arms. [...] One 
by one, one hundred and forty three freezing people tiredly climb up the ladder, one woman 
is 8-months pregnant. Their eyes have lost every expression of question, prayer, focus. 
They are still staring at the empty horizon. “You can smell on them the amount of time 
they’ve been in the water,” tells me Cristian Paluccio, second-in-command. I smell 
something strong too, it’s tannin, the tanner’s product, a leather sweat.” 396  
 
395 De Luca, Se i delfini, 5–6. 
396 De Luca, Se i delfini, 16–17, 32–33. “Il giorno seguente all’alba torniamo a scrutare l’orizzonte dietro le lenti dei 
binocoli. Sappiamo che sono partiti di notte da Sabrata. Il mio compagno di cabina, Firas, di origini siriane, legge su 
Facebook messaggi in arabo dove si scambiano queste notizie. Localizziamo il primo gommone, stracarico, gli 





The encounter finally and successfully397 materializes. De Luca’s account of it is, however, 
descriptive as if lyricism had to give way to the duty to chronicle. It is, in some ways, no different 
from the account that a member of the crew could give. But as in Brathwaite, the encounter takes 
on a meaning transcending its reality when the poet pauses on a detail mentioned only in passing 
in the passage above: The ‘rope ladder’ with wooden steps, which is dropped down along the side 
of the Prudence to allow the rescued to climb up. 
 
 
From Se i delfini, 32. 
 
giubbotti di salvataggio. Spesso la vista del soccorso produce una pericolosa agitazione a bordo del gommone. Il 
mare è quello piatto di ieri. Firas, a prua col megafono, mantiene la calma spiegando le manovre seguenti. Quando 
tutti hanno indossato il giubbotto, la Prudence si accosta e aggancia il gommone alla sua fiancata. Da una scaletta di 
corda salgono a bordo uno per volta, aiutati da braccia robuste [...]. Salgono centoquarantatre persone intirizzite, una 
donna all’ottavo mese di gravidanza. I loro occhi hanno perduto espressione di domanda, di preghiera, di messa a 
fuoco. Stanno ancora fissando l’orizzonte vuoto. ‘Lo senti dall’odore, da quanto tempo stanno in acqua’ mi dice 
Cristian Paluccio, comandante in seconda. Lo sento forte anch’io, è tannino, materia da conciatore di pelle, un 
sudore di cuoio.” 
397 I will not discuss the wide implications of being rescued at sea. Being picked up by a State vessel has a set of 
implications, ranging from refoulement to disembarkation and, subsequently, another subset of possibility. Detention 
and expulsion, a successful asylum claim, or clandestinity reached in various ways. Rescue by a non-governmental 
actor is slightly different particularly in terms of the port of disembarkation. Political fights between EU states over 
who should accept the rescued and where they should be disembarked have led, in some cases, to a dramatic stretch 
of the encounter over various days and at times beyond the ship’s capabilities and endurance. This is an aspect of the 





De Luca pauses on the ladder in a moment that becomes frozen in the frenzy of action, and thus 
remains fixed when action ends:  
 
The two weeks spent on board tattooed another image on the inside of my skin. A rope 
ladder dangling over the waves. From its last step I saw emerging one by one faces who 
faced the abyss, and climbed up. Packed on a raft, they climbed the steps of their 
survival. Those hundreds of faces: I don’t have the capacity to retain them all. I’ve had 
the absurd privilege of having seen them. Of them remains with me the rope ladder that 
they climbed, barefoot and scantily clothed, one wooden step after the other. I do 
mountaineering and I thought I knew that the verb ‘to climb’ meant. I didn’t. I learned at 
sea, on a ship, that which no summit had ever taught me. Thus the inside of my skin has a 
tattoo of a rope ladder with wooden steps. 398 
 
Through dreaming and witnessing, the poets attempt to keep alive the otherwise unhearable 
voices of the shipwrecked, the sunken, and the sinking. They witness their bodies disappear or 
difficulty climb a rope from the rescue dinghy onto the main deck. They both focus on the 
possibilities and impossibility of the encounter as contact. On the one hand, contact is made 
through life-lines or ‘white sweeties,’ evoked by Brathwaite with bitter irony as the only rescuing 
option that has life written on one side and death on the other.399 Similarly, De Luca’s focus on the 
rope ladder puts the object at the center of that encounter, along with the hands of the ship 
personnel that help with the last step. It is what he keeps with him, ‘tattooed on the inside of [his] 
skin’, after his stay on the Prudence comes to an end. 
There is something to be said about the power of poetry to augment the reality of the rescue 
encounter in ways that few direct testimonies, reports, or aerial pictures do. These texts disseminate 
 
398 “Le due settimane a bordo mi hanno impresso un tatuaggio nuovo: una scala di corda che pesca nel vuoto. Dal 
suo ultimo gradino ho visto spuntare una per una le facce di chi risaliva dal bordo di un abisso. Stipati in una zattera, 
scalavano i gradini della loro salvezza.”  
399 “& there was suppose to be some kind of rope or / chord - of music or an anthology called life-line / that iere had 
send me & gripped in yr hand when / you tossed this little white sweetie with the legend / COAST GUARD 
GUTTER / stencilled upon its both sides on what i / suppose was suppose to be like top & bottom / US COAST 
GUARD GUTTER / & then / RETTUG DRAUG TSAOC SU / w/ i suppose the / US COAST GUARD GUTTER / 




objects beyond their usual uses. If only for a fraction of a second, we will not look at a ‘white 
sweetie’ or the grey steel ropes on a deck, or at the back of our vacation dinghies in the same way. 
In these poems objects and actions — gasping while trying to stay afloat, climbing the ladder step 
by step until a hand sticks out — are recast and reframed beyond their punctual nature: a 
shipwreck, a drowned body, a person lost. Objects are systematized and inscribed within a 
constellation of shipwrecks and rescues that is the product of an ideology of illegalization. Poetry 
– which I take in this case to mean slowing, pausing, and reducing the scales of observation – 
exposes the violence of this systematization through resignifying its objects. Beyond their 
everyday meaning as human defense against the force of the sea, the objects of rescue, in their 
absence and emptiness, become in the imagination of the reader the signs of the systematized 
violence from which they are supposed to rescue. Like Brathwaite’s last verse on drowning, where 
“their arms still vainly trying to reach Miami & Judge Thomas & the US Supreme Court & their 
mouths wise open drinking dream & seawater,”400 the rope ladder reframes the encounter within 
the realm of ethics, justice, and contact.  
 








In June 2019, the German NGO ship Sea-Watch 3, an old tugboat repurposed for Search 
and Rescue operations in the Central Mediterranean, was denied entry to Italian territorial waters. 














on board, rescued from a drifting dinghy in the Sicilian Channel. In a standoff with Italian 
authorities, Sea-Watch 3 was denied port of entry and as a result roamed the waters off the island 
of Lampedusa for 14 days while a “political solution” was sought and the most pressing medical 
cases were evacuated to land.401 The image below shows the trajectory of the boat during those 




401 This alone shows how much of a symbol of the success or, conversely, the failure of ‘closed-ports’ policies the 
ship was being held to be.  
 









If a child was asked to “color within the lines”, her drawings would probably look like Sea-
Watch 3’s trajectory around the 12-mile limit, until she became distracted and found something 
else to do. Or perhaps, by an inadvertent stroke of her pen, Sea-Watch 3 would cross into Italian 
waters without permission to enter, and the game would end. Or would it?  
When Carola Rackete, Sea-Watch 3’s captain, announced that she was entering Italian 
waters, citing the unsustainably deteriorating condition of those on board, she chose to disregard 
the government’s injunction and ‘illegally cross’ with the intention to dock in the port of 
Lampedusa. Immediately, then-Interior Minister Salvini took to Facebook to vent his anger: 
“Immigration cannot be managed by outlaw ships: we are ready to stop all kinds of illegality. 
Those in the wrong will pay. P.S. Europe? Absent, as usual.”403 The verbal standoff of executive 
 
403 Facebook post on “Matteo Salvini” official page, published June 26, 2019. “L’immigrazione non può essere 
gestita da navi fuorilegge: siamo pronti a bloccare qualunque tipo di illegalità. Chi sbaglia, paga. P.S. L’Europa? 




orders, pleas for solidarity, and offers to disembark elsewhere in Europe that kept Sea-Watch 3 
patrolling at the 12-mile limit was eventually resolved when the ship was met by military vessels 
at the entrance of Lampedusa’s port. As a last attempt to prevent the Sea-Watch 3 from docking, 
an Italian cutter positioned itself between the rescue ship and the dock, leading to a minor collision. 
After docking, Sea-Watch 3 was boarded and Carola Rackete immediately arrested on charges of 
‘resistance and violence towards a warship,’ carrying a potential sentence of 3 to 10 years in prison. 
All charges were later dropped. 
The Sea-Watch 3 standoff revolved around the conflicting interpretation and 
implementation of important issues of migration at sea. On the one hand, the duty to rescue – and 
freedom of passage for – persons in danger; on the other, the recognized 12-mile limit of territorial 
waters and the formal injunction not to cross it. On the one hand, the captain's duty under 
international law and the law of the sea to disembark to safety those who were rescued, and on the 
other, the national and international laws against migrant smuggling, seemingly prompting Italy’s 
Interior Minister’s accusations that Sea-Watch 3’s activities were illegal. On the one hand, the 
captain’s affirmation that disembarking migrants in Libya is a violation of the principle of non-
refoulement and, on the other, the accords between Italy and Libya that, despite ongoing violence, 
attempted to make the war-torn country a ‘port of safety.’ And, finally, the Italian cutter protecting 
the dock of Lampedusa’s port, a last attempt to preserve the country’s ‘receding sovereignty’, 
threatened by “masses of clandestine migrants” and the international human rights system that 
curbs national self-determination on migration issues. Against this view stood the exercise of the 







These contradictions and conflicts are at the heart of some of the main themes that this 
dissertation has tried to explore: the role of language in the actualization, enforcement, and 
contestation of borders on land and sea; state imagination and practices of control over cross-
border mobility and, most importantly, the fluidity and fluctuations of concepts and practices of 
‘legality’ and the resulting illegalization of those who are kept out of this constantly shifting frame. 
Indeed, the structure of this dissertation and the choice of documents underscore both the 
multilingualism and the cross-disciplinarity of the grammar of illegalization. Perhaps the greatest 
obstacle I have encountered in constructing this project was finding a way to think them together 
systematically as inherent traits of migrant illegalization. The solution I found was to focus on a 
few of the countless moments, the ‘multilingual encounters’, that regulate the passage of people 
across borders. Reading for the role and practices of translation in these encounters provided a way 
to account for the pervasiveness and magnitude of my object of study and, at the same time, build 
my analysis on existing work and methodologies from other disciplines that participate in the study 
of migration, from literary criticism to anthropology and film studies.  
 
Chapter One examined the adjective clandestino/clandestin in its bilingual life between 
French and Italian. Showing how its meaning shifted over the course of the 20th Century and in 
the context of Mediterranean crossings between French colonies in North Africa and the Metropole 
but also in-between European countries, my analysis read the adjective not only as an early 
example of the work of illegalization on morphologies and semantics, but also it approached 
clandestino/clandestin as encapsulating the potential of translingual analysis on the lexicon of 
migration, past and present. In its future development, this project should examine lexical clusters 




the frame of a collaborative project, Spanish and Greek, and other languages that, as a result of 
processes of migration, cross that space. 
Chapter Two, on Babylon and Choucha camp, articulated the same central issues of 
illegalization – multilingualism and the possibilities and impossibilities of translation – through 
the idea of the residue of migration being collected in a nascent counter-archive taking shape across 
various forms of representation, in this case online writings and visual art. Developing this analysis 
will require a more sustained engagement with the potentialities and complications of thinking 
visual art – and more broadly the image – of migration as both aesthetic representation and source 
of information.  
A concern with information, form, and the way they shape the livelihood of asylum-seekers 
animated Chapter Three, in which I examined the process leading to the Refugee Status 
Determination interview as a moment of illegalization within the Italian asylum system. I argued 
that the encounter between the asylum-seeker and the state is guided by generally unacknowledged 
domesticating practices of translation that deeply influence the production of asylum narratives 
and their ‘effectiveness’ in gaining international protection.  
Chapter Four turned to the criminalization of migration on the High Seas through an 
investigation of the linguistically and semantically contested origins of the legal principle of non-
refoulement – enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
– and of its legal interpretations in the context of migration control in the Caribbean and 
Mediterranean. Methodologically, along with Chapter One this is the most important, as it tries to 
develop a way of reading illegalization for its poetics as much as for its practices of enforcement, 




Throughout the dissertation, I posit illegalization as an institution that works through texts, 
images, structures, and disciplines. I look for ways to read its grammar and content that may be 
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